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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this work is to examine the concept or notion of policing 
by consent and it is important to note, at the outset, that the vast majority of 
the literature produced on the subject, both current and past, has 
concentrated on policing by consent from many different viewpoints with one 
quite startling omission. There does not appear to be any academic study   
based on the views and perceptions of it [consent] that the practitioners, the 
police themselves, have.  
In order to correct this imbalance the study therefore set out, by means 
of a series of semi-structured interviews, to obtain the views and perceptions 
of both serving and retired officers of a principle, certainly of policing in 
England and Wales, which is at the very core of their professional lives. Prior 
to the interviews, which took place between November 2007 and December 
2008, the officers were arranged into four cohorts, each cohort consisting of 
ten officers, and within each cohort, the officers range across the continuum 
of rank, ethnicity, gender and length of service. This provided a series of wide 
ranging views, but with some important common themes, across the 
continuum of policing. 
It is important to note however, that in a study as limited as this, it could 
never be said that the views expressed represent those of the police service 
in general, nevertheless, the study does represent the views of a number of 
officers, and, more importantly adds to the body of knowledge on the subject.  
Following the interviews, which were digitally recorded and later 
transcribed, analysis, which was based on an amalgam of analytical methods, 
took place. The psychological aspects were dealt with by reference to both 
axiomatic knowledge and the actions and motives of subjects who are placed 
in an interview situation   
The findings, which have been arranged into a series of themes based 
upon various models of what has been termed the ‘unofficial’ culture of the 
police which often appears to be at variance with the accepted norms and 
values of policing. These ‘official’ values are driven by legislation, a series of 
national policies and national policing initiatives, all of which, in turn, are 
bound by the financial constraints of a fixed annual budget composed in part 
of a local policing precept set by the police and crime commissioners in 
consultation with Chief Officers. The remainder of the budget is funded by 
central government following the annual inspection of forces by Her Majesties 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).  
The findings also reveal the emergence of a strong sense of duty 
which, in turn, indicates, that as professional police officers, they do indeed 
both recognise and endeavour to practice policing with that most important 
element of consent. To their credit they have also acknowledged  the 
occasions when through either their own actions or because of the constraints 
placed upon them by the legislation they have lost that vital element of 
consent and have reflected upon it and the impact that it has had upon their 
future practices. 
The work, in its entirety, provides a valuable insight into the views of 
both serving and retired officers, particularly with regards to the effects that 
police culture have had, either knowingly, unknowingly or unwittingly upon 
their actions. It has also provided a valuable contribution to the extensive 
body of literature on policing in England and Wales.  
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Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 
 
 
ACPO   Association of Chief Police Officers 
 
ACC   Assistant Chief Constable 
 
ANPR  Automatic Number Plate Recognition – a roadside or 
mobile camera unit which captures vehicle registration 
marks and immediately transmits them to the PNC (see 
entry) which checks for current VEL and Insurance as 
well as any intelligence on the vehicle/owner or keeper. 
 
APA   Association of Police Authorities 
 
BCU Basic Command Unit – A system of dividing a 
constabulary into semi-autonomous, self-budgeting areas 
usually commanded by a Superintendent.  
 
BTP British Transport Police – the force responsible for 
policing the entire rail network and its environs. 
 
CC Chief Constable 
 
C/S Chief Superintendent 
 
C/Insp. Chief Inspector 
 
Core Policing See also under ‘response’ – the shifts of officers who 
provide the day-to-day street cover, dealing with incidents 
and attending calls from the public – often seen as 
reactive policing. 
 
CRS Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité – Republican 
Security Companies (military terminology not plc terms). 
This is the riot control arm of the French National Police. 
 
DCC Deputy Chief Constable 
 
Elected Police 
Commissioners The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 
2011(the Act) establishes PCCs within each force area 
and charges them with responsibility for the totality of 
policing within that area. The Act requires a PCC to hold 
the force area Chief Constable to account on behalf of 
the public which both the PCC and the Chief Constable 
serve. 
 
 
 
Extended Police  The term currently used to describe the myriad of 
Family ancillary bodies who assist in the policing function and  
includes, amongst others, PCSO’s, Special Constables, 
police support staff, Neighbourhood Watch and 
Community Wardens. 
 
HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary – a quasi-
independent body of senior ACPO officers whose brief is 
to inspect forces and report on their efficiency or 
otherwise. 
 
HMCIC Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector Of Constabulary. (At the 
time of writing it was Sir Ronnie Flanagan, one time Chief 
Constable of the RUC (now the PSNI). 
 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. HMRC was formed 
by the merger of the Inland Revenue and Her Majesty's 
Customs and Excise which took effect on the 18th April 
2005. 
 
HPDS High Potential Development Scheme. The HPDS is a five 
year programme delivered by the NPIA with an academic 
partner, Warwick Business School. It uses a range of 
innovative approaches to challenge and equip future 
leaders. Participants will have to demonstrate their 
desire, commitment and the potential to reach senior 
officer levels and progress to ACPO. It is open to serving 
police officers at the ranks of Constable and Sergeant 
only.  Officers from all 43 forces in England and Wales 
and those from PSNI (see later entry), States of Jersey 
and BTP (see earlier entry) can apply for the scheme.  
 
HRA The Human Rights Act 1998. In 1951 the UK ratified the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. In 1998 UK law gave effect 
to the Convention by the enactment of the Human Rights 
Act. 
 
IAG Independent Advisory Group(s) created as a result of the 
McPherson Report which encouraged lay oversight of 
policing.  
 
Insp. Inspector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPCC Independent Police Complaints Commission – set up in 
2005 to investigate complaints against the police. To date 
there have been a number of notable cases including 
Commander Ali Dezai of the Metropolitan Police, who 
was convicted in a criminal court and Graeme Maxwell 
the Chief Constable of North Yorkshire who was found 
guilty of gross industrial misconduct and given a final 
warning.  
 
IPLDP Initial Police Learning and Development Programme, 
introduced in 2005. It replaced the nationally delivered 
Probationer Training Programme and although there 
were core requirements for all forces contained in the 
programme forces were left free to design their own local 
requirements and delivery schedule according to their 
needs. Notably there was a national requirement that 
Student Officers must take part in some community 
based training prior to attending the formal law training 
sessions. This was designed to expose them to the 
problems of various hard-to-reach groups prior to their 
becoming ‘contaminated’ by the police mindset or 
‘canteen culture’. From personal experience I can state, 
with some certainty, that this particular facet of the 
programme was an unqualified success in Durham 
Constabulary, where I was employed. 
 
KPI   Key Performance Indicator – one of a series of 
performance indicators introduced in an attempt to 
measure the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the use of an 
officers patrol time. It was treated quite contemptuously 
by the junior ranks who simply saw it as a ‘tick box’ 
exercise. 
 
LSE London School of Economics 
 
MPS Metropolitan Police Service 
 
NCRS National Crime Recording Standards - Adopted in April 
2002 to provide greater consistency between police 
forces in the recording of crime and the collection of 
statistical data. 
 
NDPB Non-Departmental Public Body - of which the IPCC is 
one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency.  An agency which 
was created to support police forces to improve the way 
they work by providing expertise in such areas as 
information technology, information sharing, and 
recruitment. It is a police owned and led body, which has 
replaced national policing organisations such as the 
Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) and 
Centrex, as well as functions that were carried out by the 
Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO). 
 
PACE Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. A seminal piece 
of legislation designed to curb the excesses of police 
officers conducting investigation/interrogation which had 
previously come under the auspices of the Judges Rules, 
which in turn had been regularly flouted and in some 
cases ignored. As well as regulating procedures the act 
also facilitated proper investigations by allowing the 
police to hold people in custody, but, at the same time 
being subject of strict time schedules and availability of 
evidence.  
 
PEACE The acronym used to define the interview methodology 
now adopted by the police and other law enforcement 
agencies as a result of the Baldwin Report. It sets out 
how all interviews with suspects should be conducted. 
 
   Planning and Preparation, 
   Engage and Explain, 
Account 
Closure 
Evaluation 
 
PC Police Constable 
 
PCA Police Complaints Authority – forerunner of the IPCC 
(see previous entry) which fell in to disrepute because of 
both a lack of sanctioning powers and a perceived lack of 
independence from the police. 
  
PCSO Police Community Support Officer 
 
PNC Police National Computer – which, amongst other 
functions, has direct access to DVLA Vehicle Keeper 
details, DVLA Driver Records, the Motor Insurers Data 
Base, the Vehicle Inspectorate (Formerly Ministry of 
Transport) Test and Vehicle Inspection records. It also 
hosts the National Sex Offenders Register. 
 
PND Police National Database. A development of  the PNC 
whereby, in addition to the historical information currently 
held  there will also be a database of ‘live’ intelligence, 
both fed and accessible by all police forces.  
 
 
PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland (Formerly the RUC) 
 
PSU Police Support Unit. A PSU consists of 1Inspector, 3 
Sergeants and 30 Constables. Both the officers and the 
vehicles have riot equipment. They were introduced in  
the 1980’s during the miners strike whereby each police 
force in England and Wales had to have available a 
number of trained and ready men and vehicles to 
respond to a cross-border request for mutual aid via the 
National Reporting Centre ( an ACPO designed ‘quango’) 
 It also raised the requirement for all officers to have 
regular public order training to Tactical Level 2 in order to 
ensure a prompt and balanced response to all public 
order situations. 
  
Response See ‘Core’ 
 
RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which, 
amongst other things, set out to regulate and control the 
management and handling of police informants. It also 
defined covert and intrusive surveillance by various 
methods including CCTV, phone ‘tapping’ and computer 
‘hacking’, and laid down the occasions when these 
methods could be employed and, perhaps more 
importantly, how they were to be conducted.      
 
RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary (See also PSNI) 
 
Sanctioned  
Detection A sanctioned detection occurs when (1) a notifiable 
offence (crime) has been committed and recorded; (2) a 
suspect has been identified and is aware of the detection; 
(3) the CPS evidential test is satisfied; (4) the victim has 
been informed that the offence has been detected, and; 
(5) the suspect has been charged, reported for summons, 
or cautioned, been issued with a penalty notice for 
disorder (my emphasis) or the offence has been taken 
into consideration when an offender is sentenced. NB 
The practice of issuing fixed penalty notices for relatively 
minor offences was viewed in some quarters as a ‘quick 
fix’ to enhance the crime detection rates. 
 
Sgt. Sergeant 
 
SLSA Socio-Legal Studies Association 
 
SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency 
 
Supt. Superintendent 
 
VEL Vehicles Excise Licence 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This Chapter will briefly examine the historical background of the police 
in England and Wales prior to the introduction of the ‘new police’ in 1829 and 
will develop a time line to the present structure with the subsequent aim of 
examining policing by consent  from a practitioner’s point of view.  
Historically the ‘hue and cry’, was a measure of citizen accountability 
which, from the time of the Norman Conquest, had been the mainstay of law 
and order. This system was improved in the middle ages with the appointment 
of town watchmen and in the late 1500s the office of parish constable came 
into being; these men (for they were always men)  were variously appointed to 
what was an unpaid and usually unwanted office by Courts leet, parish 
vestries and town meetings who ‘….did not provide new constables with 
handbooks….nor were they given any formal instruction regarding their legal 
powers’. (Philips and Storch, 1999: p.24).  The parish constables, together 
with a system of a local Justices of the Peace who, incidentally, had no say in 
the appointment of constables, courts of Quarter Session and District Judges 
who sat at courts of session, formed the foundations of the English legal 
system up until the revolution, that was to be called the ‘new police’, took 
place, starting in the late 1820s and culminating in the 1850s with the 
introduction of the County Police Act. 
It is recognised that prior to the 1820s there were no regular full time 
paid police forces in England and it is only in 1829 that the Metropolitan Police 
Force was established. This subsequently gave rise to a veritable avalanche 
of legislation which saw, by the mid to late 1880s, the establishment of both 
County and Borough police forces.  
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The ‘New Police’: The Metropolitan Police Service 
In 1956, towards the end of what was termed the ‘golden age of 
policing’, Charles Reith, a lifelong historian of the British police in a study of 
policing history, outlined Sir Robert Peel’s nine principles of policing (See app 
‘A’).  The work also examined the early years of the Metropolitan Police 
following the introduction Peel’s Bill for Improving the Police in and near the 
Metropolis' in 1829. The Bill, for the introduction of a civil police service, in 
both the metropolis and later throughout England and Wales was placed 
before Parliament on no less than five occasions and its passage is recorded 
as a long and tortuous process. It is well documented that there was an 
overwhelming opposition to the concept of the ‘new police’; indeed Phillips 
and Storch, whilst acquiescing to the well documented history of the formation 
of the Metropolitan Police, stated ‘...we should note….the opposition 
succeeded for 44 years in defeating all the moves for a professional police for 
London.’ (Phillips and Storch, 1999: p.61) 
The ‘New Police’: The County Police 
This opposition was mirrored throughout the country, especially in the 
shire counties, and a police force for London ‘… appeared to many of the 
gentry as the thin end of the wedge; once granted, a police for the rest of the 
country, involving greater government powers and bureaucratic centralization, 
would surely follow’ (Phillips and Storch, 1999: p.61).  Indeed the opposition 
to county policing was to prove almost as intransigent as that to the formation 
of the Metropolitan Police and the County Police Act of 1839 which, although 
initially rejected by Quarter Sessions, courts that were held 4 times per year 
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and heard crimes that could not be tried summarily by Justices of the Peace, 
was eventually accepted in the face of Chartist unrest. Take up of the act was 
voluntary and by 1856 only 25 out of 55 (45%) of counties had installed a 
police force (Phillips and Storch, 1999: p.63). 
Following a series of rancorous and excoriating exchanges in 
Parliament the County and Borough Police Act of 1856 passed onto statute. 
The act made the establishment of a police force obligatory ‘on all counties in 
England and Wales and on all incorporated boroughs.’ (Elmsley, 1994: p.54) 
The Treasury was to contribute one quarter of the pay and uniform costs to 
forces which had been assessed as efficient by the newly introduced 
Inspectorate of Constabulary and this, broadly speaking, this is the funding 
system that is still in place today whereby central government contributes 
50% with the remainder being raised via the police precept on local Council 
Tax, currently standing at around 5% of the council tax collected. In the 
current [2009] financial climate Police Authorities who exceed that limit are 
‘capped’ by government. 
The ‘New Police’: The Current Structure 
 Following the last Royal Commission on the police in 1962, the Police Act of 
1964 set out the tri-partite structure for the governance of the police, 
consisting of the Home Office, the Chief Constables and the local Police 
Authorities. The 1964 act also forced the vast majority of smaller borough 
forces into to amalgamation with their geographically co-terminous county 
force which effectively reduced the overall number of one hundred and 
sixteen forces to their current level of forty three. This system of police 
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governance remained relatively unchanged until 2012 when a new system 
was introduced. In their election manifesto the Conservative party promised, 
when elected, to remove most of the power from the locally elected Police 
Authorities and invest it in elected Police and Crime Commissioners. This 
promise was kept by the coalition government and in late 2012, following 
nationwide elections Police and Crime Commissioners were appointed for all 
forces in England Wales with the exception of the Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS).    
Prior to this in 2011 the Shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper asked 
Lord Stevens, a one time Commissioner of the MPS to chair an Independent 
Police Commission (IPC). The commission was given broad terms of 
reference, similar to those given to a Royal Commission, but without the 
extensive resources or the powers normally allocated to such a body. It was 
to examine all aspects of policing in the 21st century and in November 2013 
the report, entitled Policing for a Better Britain, was published. This report will, 
in all probability, form part of the Labour Party Manifesto for the General 
Election to be held in 2015. It is a substantial report and its key findings will be 
examined in Chapter three, the Literature Review.  
Returning to the opposition to the ‘formalisation’ of what had hitherto 
been viewed as a somewhat amateurish and, at times, chaotic state of affairs 
that comprised policing in this country prior to the introduction of the ‘new 
police’ features largely in policing literature. It has been comprehensively 
researched and documented and it continues to be of historical interest. As 
recently as 2000, Reiner again re-iterated the opposition to the formation of it 
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(the ‘new police’) which, he noted, was fiercely contested and ‘…a bitter and 
protracted process’. (Reiner, 2000: p.16).  
The police are now established, governed, regulated and empowered 
by statute which, in turn is approved by a democratically elected parliament 
and, in an idealised world, represents the will of the people. Therefore neither 
the law nor elected politicians determine policing policy; neither does the law 
instruct the police in what they should pursue, nor the methods they should 
use, they have become guardians of delegated and independently exercised 
general policy responsibilities.  
Consent 
The concept of a police service which policed by consent was 
established by the first joint commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, Rowan 
and Mayne. It was unique in both an historical context and on a world-wide 
basis ‘….because it derived not from fear, but almost exclusively from public 
co-operation with the police, induced by them designedly by behaviour which 
secures and maintains for them the approval, respect and affection of the 
public.' (Reith, 1956: p.140).  Whether in fact Rowan and Mayne ever used 
the term ‘policing by consent’ is open to a great deal of conjecture; however, I 
would support Reith’s view that it is probable they may well have coined such 
a phrase because the notion of consent is implicit in the phraseology 
employed in the delineation of their principles. 
In 2009, the Sage Dictionary of Policing took an entirely different view 
of policing by consent. The authors distanced it from Reith’s concept of cosy 
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familiarity with its paternalistic overtones formed during that same ‘golden 
age’ of policing. They stated that, ‘despite its iconic status....the phrase 
‘policing by consent’ is oxymoronic. Policing is an inherently conflict ridden, 
potentially coercive mode of governance, concerned with the maintenance of 
dominant conceptions of order and the regulation of deviance, ultimately using 
legitimate force if deemed necessary.’ (Wakefield and Fleming, 2009: p.52).  
It is worthy of note at this stage that because of the pluralisation and 
commodification of certain functions within the police service which have been 
contracted out to private bodies the duties of the sworn officers, both regular 
and special constables, are being increasingly narrowed into dealing with only 
the conflictive and coercive aspects of policing. This, in itself, does not bode 
well either for the legitimation of policing as we know it or for the concept of 
policing by consent.  
In between these radically opposed views we have the great ‘myth’ of 
the British Bobby who has been both lionised and vilified from the formation of 
the ‘new police’ to the present day. Whilst there has been a vast amount of 
literature published on the subject of ‘policing by consent’ it has, almost 
exclusively, been researched and written from either an official i.e. 
governmental standpoint or as part of a public viewpoint; however, the unique 
features of this work are the views of the practitioners themselves, in essence, 
the ‘police’ view of policing by consent.  
It is essential to note however that the consent that is constantly 
referred to is the consent from which the power of the police is actually 
derived; that is from the common consent of the public and not from either 
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legislation or the legislature themselves. It is obvious that it does not mean, 
nor that it ever has meant, that individual citizens ‘consent’ to be policed. No 
one in this country has either the common law right or the legal (contained in 
legislation) right to remove their consent to be policed from those appointed to 
uphold the law or indeed from the legislation. It is this concept of consent that 
will run through this work. 
Chapter two will outline key theories and concepts including police 
discretion, accountability and consent.  It will highlight Sackmann’s 1991 
theory on cultural knowledge within organisations, which was in turn, 
employed by Chan in 1997 to develop her model of police culture. 
Additionally, Reiner’s later (2000) model of police culture, which defines 
numerous aspects of that culture and also debates whether its mainly informal 
aspects, or sub-cultures, are for or against the official purposes of the police. 
Both of these models, as well as some of Holdaways earlier (1984) findings 
on police culture will be utilised later in the data analysis chapters.  
Chapter three will review relevant literature, published nationally and 
internationally, on the subject of policing by consent. This will provide both 
comparison and contrast with that which is practised in England and Wales. 
Whilst it is accepted that most free and democratic countries police in many 
ways that are familiar to us, other more restrictive regimes appear at times to 
simply pay lip service to the concept. This position will also be briefly 
highlighted.  
In Chapter four, a brief explanation of a number of different research 
methodologies that utilise qualitative data, both in the gathering and its 
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subsequent analysis will be outlined. This has a twofold purpose, firstly to 
identify the most suitable methodology for the collection and analysis of the 
research data and, secondly, as a means of justifying the chosen research 
methodology. 
In addition, and, more importantly, Chapter four will highlight the impact 
of my positioning within the research where I have identified myself as a 
‘distanced insider researcher’. This positioning has offered almost unique 
access to the interview subjects and a greater understanding of the internal 
power relationships that exist within the police service. It has also provided 
some unrivalled advantages which have been afforded by a relatively informal 
and constant access. However, at the same time, there is sufficient distance 
insofar as the researcher is far enough removed from the strictures of being a 
serving officer and therefore able to ask the ‘hard questions’.  
The chapter will also include accounts of the research methods 
employed, including sampling methodology interview structure and ultimately, 
the data analysis.  
Additionally, Chapter four will examine various aspects of police 
culture, and the development of a number of models. In 1997, in a study of 
policing in New South Wales, Chan designed a model of police culture based 
on both Bourdieu’s habitus and Sackmann’s 1991 concept, in which she 
proposed four dimensions of cultural knowledge, based on social axioms, 
within organisations. Further research in 2009 by C.-M. Hui and N.H.-H. Hui 
proposed that social axioms are ‘….fundamental psychological constructs 
tapping a person’s beliefs about the social world and how it works….and 
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capable of predicting crucial psychological outcomes.’ (C.-M. Hui and N.H.-H. 
Hui, 2009 : p1). They further identified that ‘….the five-factor model of social 
axioms is universal across multiple cultures.’ (Cheung, Leung, & Au, 2006, 
Leung and Bond, 2004 in C.-M. Hui and N.H.-H. Hui, 2009 : p.14) .   
In 2000 Reiner also examined police culture in some detail and his  
observations on the core characteristics of what he termed ‘cop culture’ will 
also be utilised to determine whether the particular features of that culture are 
often employed by the ‘rank and file’ officers to subvert or even defeat the 
recognised functions and official purposes of day-to-day policing. The model, 
Figure 6 shown on page 142, highlights the main features of Chan’s, Reiner’s 
and, to a lesser degree, Holdaway’s 1984  models.  
Chapters five, six, and seven will analyse the interview data, utilising 
these models and the views of the four interview cohorts will be measured 
against those models, particularly with regard to accountability, discretion and 
consent. Additionally, within these three chapters the validity and veracity of 
the replies will also be analysed and tested in order to identify answers that 
may be regarded as genuine and truthful as opposed to the interview subjects 
producing replies which are in accordance with what they think the interviewer 
wants hear and which are also contextual to the interview situation. These 
particular features are based on C. Wright-Mills’s ‘Situated Actions and 
Vocabularies of Motive' (1940). The particular question on when it was felt 
they, both personally and as the police service in general, thought they had 
lost the consent of the public will also assist in getting somewhat nearer the 
truth.  
  10 10  
 Chapter eight, the findings chapter, will demonstrate the results of the 
findings and, additionally, identify any major themes or discourses that have 
emerged. It will also identify any particular themes of ‘police culture’ that are 
present and whether those themes can be said to be a particular construct of 
the differing age, gender, service length and rank of the four participating 
cohorts. 
Chapter nine will present the conclusions drawn from the study and will 
highlight the three main models of culture drawn upon throughout the work. It 
will also examine the solutions proposed by Holdaway, Chan and Reiner, the 
authors of the models that have been utilised in the work. Finally it will include 
my recommendations which will at least open up the debate upon the 
influences of police culture as well as exploring the possibility of the creation 
of a ‘jurisprudence of consent’.   
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Chapter Two: The Research Question - Key Concepts and Theories 
This research has been undertaken in order to establish the validity 
and applicability of one of the basic, if unwritten, tenets of policing in the 
majority of democratic countries, that of ‘policing by consent’. It is intended to 
examine the perceptions of this paradigm through the eyes of a number of 
carefully selected, purposive and highly structured cohorts across the 
continuum of age, rank, gender and ethnicity that comprises the police service 
in England and Wales. 
This work falls within the boundaries of the University of Sunderland’s  
Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) general mission statement to 
address issues of equality and social justice.  If those goals are to be 
achieved then this work, which examines the perceptions of ‘policing by 
consent’ but from the ‘inside’ as demonstrated in the previous paragraph, will 
make a substantial contribution to the eventual achievement of those goals. It 
will also open up the debate on the meaning of consent as understood from 
the inside and how that will, in turn, contribute to the overall aims of equality 
and social justice. 
Objectives 
To conduct a series of semi-structured interviews, and in the case of the 
additional Chief Constable interviews a further completely open, free 
flowing and unstructured data collection exercise to establish at a later 
stage in the research, whether their views on consent had changed 
substantially since initial interview.  
To gather the perceptions of the four cohorts on how they personally view 
policing by consent, on how they feel that they are, or conversely are not 
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allowed, to exercise discretion in the daily performance of their duty and to 
employ the data as a  barometer to gauge their views on both collective 
and individual accountability. 
To further analyse the data in order to find any evidence of the 
employment of ‘content specific rhetoric’. 
To establish whether we can, methodologically, overcome the problem of 
convenient responses that are the outcome of a particular situation and 
pattern of personal questioning. If Mills is right then there are no valid 
responses as proposed in his hypothesis of ‘Situated Actions’ and 
‘vocabularies of motive’. 
 
Having outlined the research questions,  the key concepts and theories 
that will underpin the work will be examined. The concepts include 
accountability, control, discretion and consent. The key theories are based on 
both the work of Mills (situated actions and vocabularies of motive) and on 
Chans model of police culture which is, in turn, based on Sackmann’s 1991 
concept of cultural knowledge within organisations.  
 
Accountability 
It is well known that the police are now subject to a system of New 
Management Culture, identified by Hough in 2007, which, incidentally, is also 
present in most public services. Within this particular ‘culture’ they (the police) 
are required ‘….to explain, justify and answer for their conduct. Individual 
police officers are obliged to account internally to their superiors….(in rank) to 
an internal investigation unit and to....external, independent accountability 
institutions’. (Wakefield and Fleming 2009: p.1). However, the main concerns 
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were the individual officers’ views of their accountability, not only to 
governmental officers and departments, but also their perceptions of 
individual and rank based accountability that they have towards their own 
organisation. Surely however their accountability to the public in general must 
remain paramount in order to ensure both continuing legitimacy and consent.  
It could however be argued that, at the lowest level, they are 
accountable to themselves, that they make decisions every day which will see 
one offender being arrested and charged, another being given a fixed penalty 
notice, another being given a formal warning and another being ignored as 
being either not worthy of further attention or whose minor breach of the law is 
viewed by the officer concerned as part of the social milieu.  As officers 
progress through the rank structure, accountability becomes a high priority, 
and indeed a higher profile priority, whereby Chief Officers are accountable 
both locally to the Police and Crime Commissioner and nationally to the Home 
Secretary.  
In addition to these methods of control there is also the quasi-
independent HMIC, the national police inspectorate, which follows the model 
for  external inspection set by prisons, education and factories;  this, however, 
is about to change to some degree whereby HMIC will be disbanded and a 
new Criminal Justice Inspectorate, encompassing the whole Criminal Justice 
System, will come into being. Whether this will result in the process becoming, 
as some commentators tend to view it, less incestuous and to some degree, 
less self-serving is open to considerable conjecture. There are striking 
similarities and comparable criticism to be drawn from comparison with the 
British Medical Association which also carries out its own investigation into to 
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their members’ wrong-doings. However there are hopes that the most recent 
re-incarnation of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) may 
go some way to finally creating a truly independent and indeed rigorous 
alternative investigative body into police wrong-doing.  
The failings of Humberside police, which were revealed in the Bichard 
Report1 into the police handling of the Soham Murders in 2002, eventually led 
to the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett ordering Humberside Police 
Authority to suspend David Westwood, the Chief Constable of Humberside 
over his force’s alleged mishandling of ‘intelligence’ concerning Ian Huntley, 
who was subsequently convicted of both murders, with regard to his attraction 
for early and pre-teen schoolgirls. In the ensuing ‘power’ struggle, which was 
accompanied by the almost obligatory media frenzy, the Chief Constable was 
suspended; however, he was later re-instated with the caveat that he 
tendered his resignation, which he did so, leaving the force in March 2005.    
This exercise of power, obviously at a much higher level, can be equated to 
Luke’s three-dimensional view of ‘power’ whereby the focus is on ‘….decision 
making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through 
decisions)’. (Lukes, 2005: p.29) 
Parish constables, throughout their long history attracted a great deal 
of opprobrium and they were stigmatized by reformers, government ministers 
and justices as being ‘lazy, recalcitrant, illiterate , officious, aged, bumbling, 
mercenary and corrupt, often perfect Dogberries.’ (Phillips and Storch, 1990: 
12).  Critchley also commented that the constables, prior to police reform 
                                            
1  Following publication in 2005 the police instigated the ’MoPI’ (Management of Police Intelligence) system 
with rules for recording and retaining information/intelligence in line with the recommendations of the Bichard report. 
As a direct result the PNC (Police National Computer) by 2012  will metamorphose into the PND (Police National 
Database) and will contain ‘live’ intelligence as well as being a repository of historical information.   
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‘….were at best illiterate fools, and, worse, as corrupt as the criminal classes 
from which not a few sprang.’ (Critchley, 1979: p.19).   
In 1986, Kent, in a work about early modern, pre-industrial rural 
England2 traced the history of the office of constable. She devoted a 
substantial proportion of her book to a social profile of the communities and 
their constables. Within the profile she posited that the views (of the office) 
held by a number of historians were indeed wrong and that, in recent years, 
further research has shown that ‘….constables were more substantial and 
better qualified for the position than earlier writers contended’. However she 
also recognised that those constables were constrained by the process of 
consent and felt unable to deal with some strict applications of the law where 
the community would not support them. (Kent, 1986: p.80). 
In 1979 Williams concluded that ‘…. the absence of a bureaucracy in 
the provinces does not seem to have constituted as a great weakness in the 
English polity as some have suggested’ and that ‘government by the informal 
mechanism of consent’. (Williams, 1979 in Kent 1986: p.101). This informal 
mechanism appears to have worked during most of the early years of policing.   
It is at this juncture that those in authority were becoming more and 
more concerned with what they perceived to be an exponential increase in 
crime and general disorder; various debates took place culminating in the 
introduction of a number of statutes which facilitated the formation of police 
forces; the Lighting and Watching Act of 1833 allowed smaller boroughs to set 
up a police, the County Police Act of 1857, which followed the formation of the 
Metropolitan Police, facilitated the formation of county forces, through to the 
                                            
2  See Chapter 3 – Literature Review.  
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1964 Police Act which saw a number of amalgamations take place bringing 
about  the demise of the borough Watch Committees, and the subsequent 
introduction of larger unitary police authorities.  
It is clear from the evidence presented thus far that, certainly since the 
early nineteenth century, the police did, to a certain extent, become more 
accountable to those in political power, from the parish councils of the early 
years, to the current authorities which have a responsibility, by means of the 
council tax precept, for the funding of policing in their particular area, a system 
which ensures the continuance of accountability both locally and nationally. 
Whilst there have been a number of statutes dealing with the 
establishment of a ‘new police’ one of the seminal pieces of police history, 
certainly in the twentieth century, is the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police 
which gave rise to the Police Act of 1964. The report of the commission and 
the subsequent legislation, initiated a series of amalgamations which, by 
1974, had reduced the number of police forces in England and Wales from 
125, to its current level of 43. Thus the political control of the service was 
invested in a smaller number of larger unitary authorities whose very 
remoteness led to a further loss of accountability.  The tri-partite (Chief 
Officer, Police Authority and the Home Office) agreement drawn up under the 
act was, in theory, introduced to ensure that no one person or representative 
body had overall control.   
It is interesting to note that the same report was quite ambivalent about 
a national police force with some members of the commission appearing to be 
in favour of such a move. This could have led to the police coming under the 
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direct control of the government of the day, a measure that was feared by the 
opponents of the both the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 and the later 
County Police Act of 1856, although some would argue that, in certain 
situations in recent years, moves towards this have already occurred.    
In recent years however, accountability, like consent, has become a 
casualty of circumstance. The breakdown of consultation between the police 
and community representatives, was in Lord Scarman’s view, one of the key 
factors in the escalation of the Brixton riots in 1980s,  reinforced by the 
reluctance of many senior officers ‘….to discuss operational questions with 
leaders of the local community’. (Scarman, 1981: para 5.55); he went on to 
say ‘….community involvement in the policy and operations of policing is 
perfectly feasible without undermining the independence of the police….’ and 
that ‘….accountability is….the key to successful consultation and socially 
responsive policing.’ (Scarman, 1981: paragraphs 5.56 & 5.57). 
However in December 1981, following the Scarman report, the Home 
Secretary, William Whitelaw, stated in the commons that he ‘did not rule out’ a 
statutory framework to ensure that consultation between the police and local 
representatives regarding the operational running of the police forces should 
be put into place, if his consultations indicated its feasibility, but that the first 
step was national discussions with representatives of police authorities and 
chief officers. According to Baldwin and Kinsey; 
It seemed likely that ACPO (Association of Chief Police 
Officers) tried to persuade the government to keep the 
voluntary system that Lord Scarman criticised so heavily. 
For his part John Alderson, [Chief Constable of Devon and 
Cornwall and a champion of consultation at local level], 
  18 18  
stated publicly that Scarman ‘had been mugged’ by the 
Government on the issue of statutory consultation. (Baldwin 
and Kinsey, 1982: p.114)  
 The creation of the National Reporting Centre, introduced by Chief 
Officers during the miners strike in the early 1980’s, enabled calls for mutual 
aid to receive immediate response without the need to consult each other. 
Each force informed the centre, on a daily basis, how many Police Support 
Units (PSU’s) they were able to supply without detriment to the normal 
policing requirements of their area. This facilitated the immediate mobilisation 
of those units to which ever force required mutual aid.  
 Many commentators viewed the creation of the National Reporting 
Centre as a ‘bridge to far’ and suggested that it may even help to facilitate 
governmental control of the police, a view unsupported by ACPO, who denied 
there had been any government pressure to set up such a body. 
Further examples demonstrating the erosion of control and 
accountability abound; the lack of fiscal accountability in West Mercia 
Constabulary was highlighted by Young in 1993 when he stated ‘….it 
appeared we bought first and then perhaps told the Police Authority later, who 
then must have rubber-stamped these decisions made in the name of the 
chief constable….the previous chief had told the authority what he had done 
or wanted to do, and they merely agreed….’  (Young, 1993: p.76)  
Additional evidence to negate the concepts of both accountability and 
consent can be found in the policing of the miners strike in the early 1980s 
when the alleged sympathies between the police and the (Conservative) 
government highlighted ‘….the inability of local police authorities to challenge 
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the approaches taken in policing the pickets would generate concerns that 
continue about the centralisation and accountability of the public police in the 
UK.’  (Reiner, 2000: pp.189-91). 
In the early 1990s the basic structure of the majority of the police 
forces in England and Wales was changed and what had previously been 
referred to as Divisions became Basic Command Units (BCUs).  A BCU is the 
largest unit into which territorial British Police forces are divided and, in most 
cases it is commonly referred to as a Command Unit; however it may have 
another designation, such as a Local Policing Unit (LPU) or area. There are 
228 BCUs (including those with different titles such as Divisions) in England 
and Wales. 
The BCU is usually commanded by a Chief Superintendent and most 
forces are divided into at least three BCUs with the larger forces having more; 
in some cases they are further subdivided into smaller units.  
The Metropolitan Police use the term Borough Operational Command 
Unit (BOCU) for regional units (which are based on the 32 London boroughs) 
and the generic heading Operational Command Unit (OCU) for  units outside 
of or in addition to the borough structure, for example the Aviation Security 
OCU. 
More recently, in September 2005, an HMIC thematic report, entitled 
‘Closing the Gap’, which examined key issues such as the capability and 
capacity of forces to provide the protective services required in this day and 
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age, the economics of policing and the risks posed by organised criminality 
concluded that; 
….whilst the BCU arrangements and neighbourhood 
policing provides a solid local platform for the future, the 
current 30 year old, 43 force structure of widely differing 
sizes and capabilities does not. (HMIC 2005: p.1) 
The report argued that the present policing structure was not 
sufficiently robust to provide the necessary level of protective services that the 
21st century increasingly demands. Those services are divided into seven 
major groups as follows; counter terrorism and extremism; serious organised 
and cross-border crime (usually of organised criminals and major incidents, 
affecting more than one BCU); civil contingencies and emergency planning; 
critical incident management; major crime (homicide); public order and 
strategic roads policing.  
The report concluded that some re-organisation of forces was 
necessary in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness of policing. Whilst a 
number of restructuring options were available, it recommended creating 
‘strategic forces’ of a sufficient size to provide both effective neighbourhood 
policing and effective and sustainable protective services.  Charles Clarke 
was the Labour Government’s Home Secretary between December 2004 and 
May 2006 and he wholeheartedly welcomed this report. In consequence of its 
findings he then asked the police service as a whole to ‘….undertake radical 
reform of structures.’ (Clarke, C. 2005). The proposed creation of a number of 
larger regional police forces was, according to the report, welcomed by some 
chief officers, particularly those who commanded smaller forces which had 
neither the capability or the resilience in staffing levels to meet the demand 
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engendered by the joint provision of protective services and BCU level 
policing.  
In addition a number of forces, both large and small, had experienced 
fiscal problems due, in part, to the government ‘capping’ of the police precept 
at around the 5% level over the last few years and a number of Chief Officers 
view its loss as a ‘missed opportunity’, directly attributable to government 
failure in agreeing a proper funding structure. 
At the same time ‘Closing the Gap’ suggested that public resistance to 
combining smaller forces could be abated to some degree by emphasising 
that local arrangements at both BCU and neighbourhood level would not 
change. Other proposed alternatives to the ‘strategic forces’ proposal were 
collaboration between forces; lead force for specialist capabilities; lead 
regional force and finally a federation of forces. However, the statement that 
local policing arrangements would remain the same failed to soften the 
public’s dislike of even larger and more remote police forces. Indeed it was 
lost in the welter of publicity surrounding Charles Clarke’s stated wish to adopt 
the strategic force proposal, which would see the creation of perhaps twelve 
forces. These [forces] would have the resilience and capability to deliver both 
effective and sustainable protective services and BCU level policing at a local 
level throughout England and Wales. 
In April 2006 the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) was set up 
as a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) in order to deal with serious, high 
level crime. It’s inception followed a merger of the National Crime Squad, 
the National Criminal Intelligence Service (elements of which were 
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incorporated into the ACPO Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service (AVCIS), 
the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU), the investigative and intelligence 
sections of HM Revenue & Customs on serious drug trafficking, and 
the Immigration Service's responsibilities for organised immigration crime. 
The Assets Recovery Agency became part of SOCA in 2008, while 
the Serious Fraud Office remains a separate agency.  In early 2013 SOCA 
was disbanded and became the National Crime Agency (NCA) whose 
purpose was similar to that of SOCA. It was, as the government proposed, 
designed to enable the NCA to deal effectively with the complex national and 
international crimes that are committed on a daily basis. As expected, Her 
Majesties Opposition called it a simple re-branding exercise without either an 
increase in existing funding or any new funding and involving very little 
structural change. 
The proposed amalgamations into larger forces, culminating in the 
‘strategic forces’ proposal, brought the formation of a national police force 
closer to reality, the feasibility and political will having already been 
demonstrated; however, Chief Constables themselves have expressed a 
somewhat pessimistic view that this will happen through time and, as one 
commented, ‘….the way things are going, if there’s a political will, a national 
police force will come’ (Reiner, 1991: p.265). Whilst this last comment, made 
in 1992 seems somewhat apocryphal, each and every one of the Chief 
Constables interviewed saw absolutely no merit whatever in the idea of a 
national police service. 
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Chapter three will outline the main recommendations of the 2013 report 
of the Independent Commission on Policing in England and Wales, chaired by 
Lord Stevens one time Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Amongst the 
wealth of proposals concerning greater visibility and numbers of patrolling 
officers, he also criticised the current structure of 43 forces as unwieldy and 
recommended a number (possibly eleven) of larger ‘strategic forces. In 
essence this is a reiteration of the recommendation in the 2005 ACPO report 
entitled ‘Closing the Gap’. Incidentally it is also interesting to note that he 
recommended that Police and Crime Commissioners should be done away 
with and their authority re-invested in the local police authority chairs. In an 
interview with the Telegraph newspaper on the 3rd of November 2012 Lord 
Stevens stated 'I am very worried about the politicisation of the police service, 
it concerns me that you’ve got one person covering a massive area, without 
the breadth of the old police authorities and their multiple members.” 
At a different level there is also an additional internal accountability that 
is the Police Discipline Code. It is governed by legislation, now principally 
contained within the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 and is 
used to regulate the working lives and actions of police officers and to 
facilitate the investigation of complaints about the behaviour of individual 
police officers from members of the public These complaints, if substantiated, 
can be subject to either local resolution whereby it is dealt with by an officer of 
the rank of Inspector, or to a full formal hearing before the Deputy or Chief 
Constable. It must be said, however, that it had the tendency to suffer from 
the same problem, as has been previously stated, that most self-regulatory 
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bodies suffer from insofar as it appears to be somewhat incestuous and, for 
this reason, is seen as an unsatisfactory and fundamentally flawed process.  
Following the major public unrest in locations such as Brixton, Toxteth 
and Broadwater Farm in Tottenham in the early and mid 1980s the Police 
Complaints Authority (PCA) was introduced to investigate complaints against 
the police.  This supposedly ‘independent’ body fell rapidly into disrepute 
because it had no powers of sanction, was as partisan as the previous 
internal enquiry processes had been and was, in fact, little different to what it 
had replaced. In 2003, in an attempt to install rigour into the previously flawed 
processes, the government created the IPCC which became operational on 1 
April 2004.  Although funded by the Home Office, it is, by law, entirely 
independent of the police, interest groups and political parties.  
It has a legal duty to oversee the whole of the police complaints 
system, created by the Police Reform Act 2002; their stated aim being the 
transformation in the way complaints against the police are handled. In a 
relatively short time however, public confidence in the new system was badly 
shaken by the publication of an interim IPCC report into the Stockwell 
shooting in July 2005 where a young Brazilian national, John Charles De 
Menezes who was working in London, was shot by police as a suspected 
terrorist.  The final report of the IPCC, published following the Health and 
Safety prosecution of the Metropolitan Police, made a total of sixteen 
recommendations which were addressed to Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary (HMIC), the Home Office, ACPO and the MPS. The 
recommendations in full can be found in appendix ‘B’. 
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In direct contrast to the Stockwell shooting, a more recent case has 
demonstrated a willingness by the IPCC to grasp the nettle. In July 2007 a 
number of complaints of indecent assault and sexual harassment were made 
against a recently retired police officer which were committed whilst he was 
still serving. These offences were investigated to prosecution solely by the 
IPCC, is this, rhetorically speaking, the ‘new dawn’ of their transformation into 
a truly independent investigative body which has powers that it is not afraid to 
use? Will this, in turn, contribute in some measure to instilling public 
confidence in the way in which complaints against the police are dealt with? 
Doubtless, in the longer term, it will add some weight and gravitas to the 
public perception of policing by consent and may even indicate the nascent 
beginnings of a ‘jurisprudence of consent’.  
 Having examined the concept of ‘accountability’ within the context of 
policing, and, more importantly within the context of this work, it is abundantly 
clear that it (accountability) by its very nature is inextricably linked with the 
concept of consent. As has already been premised, if we do indeed ‘police by 
consent’ then whenever that consent, or implied consent, is withdrawn then it 
immediately raises the question of accountability; rhetorically speaking ‘can 
there be accountability where there is no consent?’  It could be convincingly 
argued, that if there is no consent, or that consent is negated by the actions of 
the police, then there is no requirement for accountability.  If and when this 
happens, and some would say, to a certain degree, that it already has, then 
surely we will have moved further towards the formation of a national police 
force.  This, in turn, will inevitably lead to the escalation of the social control, 
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which has already been evidenced, and place even more power into the 
hands of central government.  
Whilst each of these concepts of accountability, control, autonomy and 
consent, can be seen as separate entities they are inextricably linked; there 
are elements of each present in the other and it would serve no useful 
purpose to examine them in isolation.  Indeed even the literature under review 
does not attempt to examine them individually because they are, by their very 
nature, intrinsically linked.  
Control 
The third concept, which can rightly be labelled as the opposite of 
discretion, particularly in the world of policing, is control. If the structure and 
resources existed, every officer, from the beat constable to the chief officer 
would be subject to regulation and procedures which would, in effect, negate 
any vestige of discretion whatsoever.  It could be legitimately argued that , in 
fact, this is already the position and that the police discipline code coupled 
with the statutory duties of the police that are enshrined in a multitude of law 
already create a situation that has no place for the exercise of discretion.  
The premise that the police are but one means of social control, and 
that they are by no means the only or most important one in the regulation of 
daily life,  was also made earlier by Banton, in his seminal work on policing, 
who recognised, amongst others, that ‘…. the police did not create social 
control by themselves, and were but one component of a diverse regulatory 
framework drawn from a patchwork of informal, formal, state, private and 
community sources’.  (Banton, 1964: pp.1-11).  
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In order to meet the demands of the public, and, some would argue, 
the accretion of power by chief officers, there is always an on-going demand 
for increases in both the funding and the authorised establishment of police 
personnel in order to keep pace with the ever increasing work-load. The 
proposed increases are argued by each force’s chief officer under the 
auspices of an ‘Establishment Review’, a process that employs a vast array of 
statistical and other evidence, which is submitted to both the Home Office and 
the appropriate police authority when they are bidding for increases, an 
annual process that takes place in the autumn.  
Whilst this whole process may be viewed as part of a slow move into 
state control, it is both adroitly and astutely managed by the government 
whereby, according to Young ‘….political demands ensure that police growth 
is seen to be in line with the public acceptance of control, and not part of 
some move towards impending totalitarianism’  (Young, 1992: p.136). 
During this process Chief Officers are not afraid to use the media in 
order to highlight the various factors that support their request for increases, 
for they are always increases, in both budget and resources; witness the 
comments made by Julie Spence, the Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire 
during an interview on the Radio 4 ‘Today’  programme (R4 ‘Today 19th 
September 2007) when she stated that extra funding was required due to the 
increase in policing problems caused by an influx of citizens from the recently 
expanded EU. Whilst acknowledging that they were, in many respects, one of 
the mainstays of the agricultural/rural economy, she stated that they also 
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brought problems in the shape of long running, bitter and divisive family feuds 
and an almost cavalier attitude to drink-driving and its associated problems. 
Discretion/Autonomy 
Discretion and the practice of ‘officer discretion’ at its ‘lowest’ level from 
an operational viewpoint, is the discretion exercised on the streets by 
patrolling officers. These individual officers still practise a day-to-day 
discretion, or some would argue, a preference based on personal prejudice, in 
whom they stop, in whom they decide to warn and in whom they decide to 
prosecute, proceeding by way of summary jurisdiction (summons) or by arrest 
and charge. In 1995 Weinberger highlighted this unusual positioning when 
she stated that ‘uniquely, those at the bottom of the police hierarchy have 
wide discretion….their actions become some of the most critical in the whole 
criminal justice process’ (Weinberger, 1995: p.3). The usual cliché applied to 
this situation is ‘the lower you are the more discretion you have’. 
It must be said however that although legislation defines what a crime 
is, out on the street ‘crimes’ or criminal acts do not always literally ‘define’ 
themselves. Therefore, in this respect it is the very practice of discretion which 
allows an officer to define that (a) a crime has been committed by examining 
the evidence available and (b) the immediate action needed in order to 
support the victim and, where possible, arrest the perpetrator. This filtering 
process is part of the on-going application of the legal and practical decisions 
made in day-to-day policing which, as a necessity, requires the application of 
that much maligned discretionary power.  
At an early stage in the research indications emerged from the 
interview data that discretion appeared to be reducing because of the 
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bureaucratization of more and more aspects of an officers daily routine;   
however, as Lord Scarman pointed out in 1981 ‘It (discretion) is the 
policeman’s daily task’.  
Power 
In 1969, Austin Turk viewed the social order as ‘….powerful social 
groups who successfully control society in their own interests.’  He argued 
that social control is exercised by providing ‘….justification for the law which is 
then enforced by agencies such as the police’ (Turk, 1969 in Burke, 2003: 
p.148). Turk had also argued that there are degrees of discretion in how the 
law is exercised ‘….which allows the powerful to manipulate the legal 
system….while still preserving an image of due process and impartiality.’  
(Turk, 1969 in Burke, 2003: p.149).  Whilst the ‘street’ level of discretion 
involves a great deal of trust in the individual officer’s honesty and integrity, 
and the concomitant legitimation of the doctrine of consent, it is nevertheless 
an area of police operations which always has, and will continue to provide, 
the fuel for both rational and irrational debate about the elements of social 
control that are forever present in the minutiae of policing, which, Waddington 
so succinctly described, stating that ‘….the police use the law rather than 
enforce it, as a means of achieving social order’ . (Waddington, 1999: p.95) 
Within this equation consideration also needs to be given to the 
exercise of ‘power’, in its most empirical sense, that is the exercise of 
autonomy by individual police officers over the people that they deal with 
when seeking their compliance; parallels can be found in the ‘two 
dimensional’ view of power, as identified by Bachrach and Baratz, where it 
involves ‘….coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation’. (Bachrach 
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and Baratz in Lukes, 2005: pp.21-22).  In their view compliance can, and, in 
many cases, no doubt is, secured by the application of one or many of these 
factors; 
….coercion exists where compliance is secured 
by the ‘threat of deprivation’; influence is used 
‘….without resorting  to either a tacit or an overt 
threat….’; authority is legitimated because the subject 
recognises the reasonableness of the command 
‘…..either because it is legitimate and reasonable or 
because it has been arrived at through a legitimate and 
reasonable procedure; manipulation is identified as 
‘….being an aspect or sub-concept of force…. since 
compliance is forthcoming in the absence of 
recognition….of the exact nature of the demand’; and  
finally, force, usually the last resort, is applied by 
removing the subjects ‘….choice between compliance 
and non-compliance….’  (Bachrach and Baratz in Lukes, 
2005: pp.21-22).  
  
Turk (1969) also identified coercion as a means of controlling society 
by using ‘the threat and exercise of physical force….the most obvious form of 
control’  but added the caveat that, the more force is applied, the less likely it 
is to be accepted as legitimate, thereby  making the control of society more 
difficult (Turk, 1969 in Burke, 2001: p.148).  In 2007 McLaughlin highlighted 
coercion, as used by the police to validate and justify their work through the 
agency of the police officer as a ‘ruler’ in a ‘moral enterprise’.  Other authors, 
particularly Holdaway in 1984, have explored the use of force, both as a 
legitimate means in effecting an arrest and as an (illegal) means of re-
enforcing an officer’s personal authority when it is called into question. 
However, even within this ‘illegal’ use of force there are rules which have 
‘….specific connotations which have to be described and analysed within the 
occupational culture….to be understood against a background of 
acquiescence, if not overt support, of colleagues.’ (Holdaway, 1984: p.120).   
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In other words this ‘occupational culture’, according to Holdaway, leads 
to officers remaining silent, even when they know that their colleagues are 
acting, in some instances, outside the law. The parallels with ‘street’ policing 
are both obvious and readily identifiable within these paradigms. 
 In Chapter 3, the Literature Review, it will be demonstrated that there 
is vast and eclectic range of work on the police service in general and on 
‘policing by consent’ in particular.  It must also be recognised that in recent 
years some commentators and researchers, particularly in the western world, 
have reported on a reduction in the legitimacy of the police. In 1992 Reiner 
noted ‘….a decline in policing by consent.’ (Reiner, 1992: p.49)  and in 2009 
Wakefield and Fleming also identified the same decline which they opined 
was allied to the ‘....democratisation of liberty and erosion of deference’ which 
had ‘....produced a culture of egoism and anomie’ (Wakefield and Fleming, 
2009: p.54). That said however, police officers have not, until now, been 
asked to express their views on the legitimacy of either policing by consent or 
the somewhat esoteric doctrine of consent. 
 
Consent 
The overall purpose of this study is an exploration of the idea of 
‘policing by consent’ which is both held and practised by serving police 
officers and held by retired police officers across most democratic societies. It 
is recognised that there is a vast literature on the subject of consent which 
has already been discussed in depth with notable contributions from Brogden 
(1982), Dixon Coleman and Bottomley (1990), Sutton (1999), Adlam (2002), 
Tyler and Huo (2002) and Innes (2004/2005) to name but a few; however, the 
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majority of these authors have concentrated on the juridical aspects of 
policing by consent. 
 In 1979 Brogden, in recognising the ambiguous nature of consent, 
stated that ‘….the general consent to policing is tentative….that consent is 
subject to continuing interpretation, re-interpretation, adaptation and 
negotiation – an endless testing and resolving of the contradictions and 
ambiguities and contemporary experiences…..’ (Brogden, 1979: p.7). This 
constant negotiation and re-interpretation of consent is similar in many 
respects to the contrasting concepts of order that were prevalent in 17th 
century England where, according to Wrightson, the ideal of order was ‘firmly 
embodied in the regulative penal legislation to which parliaments of the time 
devoted so much energy’  (Wrightson, 1980: p.23); whereas, on the other 
hand, in the day to day relationships of neighbours in a community, order was 
seen as ‘….less a positive aspiration towards a national condition of 
disciplined social harmony than a negative absence of disruptive conflict 
locally,’  (Wrightson, 1980, p24), which, in essence, meant ‘….little more than 
conformity to  a fairly malleable local custom which was considerably more 
flexible than statute law.’ (Wrightson, 1980: p.24). 
It is important to state at this juncture that it is much easier, in linguistic 
terms, to describe it [consent] as an ‘acquiescence based on limited 
knowledge’ rather than a ‘true’ consent which would require codifying as part 
of the legal framework. This stance is, to a degree, supported by Dixon, Cole 
and Bottomley who, in 1990 stated, ‘....our conclusion is not that an attempt 
should be made to regulate consent out of policing. On the contrary, the 
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issue’s complexity partly stems from the desirability of (in a general sense) 
consensual policing, which may often (specifically) entail operating with 
consent rather than invoking legal powers’ (Dixon, Cole and Bottomley, 1990: 
p.358).  
Additionally it would be unreal to expect that the very minutiae of day to 
day policing would be carefully scrutinised at the commencement of every 
police/public interaction to ensure that a recognisable form of consent to what 
is taking place is present. The fact that it is taking place indicates that there is 
a tacit element of consent or at least acquiescence from both parties involved 
in the encounter. 
If we accept that, in essence, Rowan and Mayne were the authors of 
the doctrine of ‘policing by consent’ then over the last 200, years it has 
become, to some, a byword for fairness and even-handedness in the 
pursuance and prosecution of offenders. It is, however, in many respects, an 
abstract concept which only comes to mind or to notice when it is withdrawn; it 
is there everyday and everywhere and in all circumstances until it is taken 
away or, worse still, denied, then it becomes noticeable by its absence.  
Conversely its regular use by politicians, both locally and nationally, 
more particularly when they are introducing measures which may not have the 
approbation of the community but are nevertheless deemed to be necessary, 
has led, in this respect to it becoming a piece of much devalued institutional 
rhetoric, almost to the point of evisceration, by its constant and hackneyed 
use. ‘The police are able to secure the consent of the public in a democracy 
to the extent that they police towards morally worthwhile ends in a morally 
  34 34  
acceptable manner. The moral quality of both ends and means of policing are 
critical for effective policing’ (Richards, 2003: p.70. added emphasis).  This 
statement was made in 1992 by Neil Richards, the ‘primum mobile’ in policing 
ethics at the National Police College, Bramshill who, incidentally, was 
instrumental in drafting the European Police Code of Ethics. He was, at the 
time, conducting an appraisal of the police service ‘Statement of Common 
Purpose and Values’ published by ACPO in 1992 and it is interesting to note 
that the theme of ‘consent’ figures quite prominently in his appraisal. 
The notion of policing by consent also has its opponents and in 1999 
consent was questioned, albeit from a very different political perspective, by 
Peter Morgan, who at that time was employed as a journalist by the Socialist 
Review, of which he subsequently became editor. He stated: ‘policing by 
consent has served the ruling class well for a long period of time. ….that is 
why we see the constant harassment of working class people – and in 
particular blacks – by the police’. (Morgan, 1999: p.5)  
    It is obvious that ‘policing by consent’ is only one facet of the vast 
quantity of research on the police since Banton’s seminal work but it is a 
subject area that has come under intense scrutiny by a number of 
researchers; however the bulk of their research on this important topic has 
been directed to investigating consent from the viewpoint of the legislature 
and the public. This research differs considerably in that it will obtain ‘insider 
information’ to illuminate the question from the police side.  It is notable that 
the concept is regularly aired when either the police or politicians, at both local 
and national levels, are seeking to defend the excessive use of force, the 
  35 35  
deployment of covert surveillance or as a means of softening the impact when 
introducing contentious measures. In these and other situations the vast 
majority of police officers throughout the service use the phrase without even 
giving its utterance a second thought.  
One of the emerging themes of this work will be an attempt to define a 
‘jurisprudence of consent’ which relies, in part, upon the recognition that there 
only exists at present a ‘doctrine of consent’. It is contended that the two are 
inextricably linked and without a doctrine’ no ‘jurisprudence of consent’ can be 
developed. The absence of any philosophy of police, or even a doctrine of 
consent, which was identified by Adlam in 2003, has already been noted 
earlier in this chapter.  
However, it is contended that consent, in its many different forms, 
which include the legal, moral and theoretical positions, is a ‘golden thread’ 
which runs throughout the whole continuum of policing in this country. This 
thread will be identified throughout this work and  developed as  a 
‘jurisprudence of consent’,  having due regard to, amongst others, Kant and 
the Categorical Imperative which can, in turn,  be linked to a logical construct 
of ‘reason’ and ‘duties’.  
In the later chapters the interview data will be analysed in order to 
adduce evidence for the existence, within the confines of the police service, of 
a doctrine, or perhaps even a jurisprudence of consent if indeed such a 
concept exists. If the existence of such a concept cannot be found it is 
proposed that a jurisprudence of consent could well be a set of behaviours 
taught to all police officers of all ranks. It should generate a set of rules and/or 
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procedures to guide and monitor police performance, particularly in the 
exercise of discretion, autonomy, power and control. It should also be 
designed to provide an open and frank forum to enable the critical 
examination of all police practices. This may necessitate the introduction yet 
another totally impartial ‘body’ to carry out and oversee these functions. The 
main caveat however is that this could, in turn, become yet another layer of 
bureaucracy which may well become mired in inefficiency. 
The Police and the Public - Discourses of Power 
  
It is recognised that both inside and outside their spheres of operation 
Chief Constables wield a great deal of power over the population. This 
exercise of power can also be extrapolated across all ranks of the police 
service.  In 1956 Mills stated ‘that the powers of ordinary men….often seem 
driven by forces they can neither understand nor govern’ (Mills 1956 in Lukes, 
2005: p.1). This view, to some extent, accords with the views of Foucault who 
stated that power 
 ‘....operates within people through internalised 
disciplines and normalised identities, routines and practices. 
Power is everywhere, as is resistance to it, it is not simply 
the province of privileged or ‘legitimate’ authorities.’ 
(Foucault in Layder, 1994, p.107). 
  
There are frequent, large and violent disturbances that take place in 
our capital during allegedly ‘peaceful protests’ that are testament to this 
resistance of power. 
This view was further supported by Layder when he stated, in contrast 
to Habermas who ‘....viewed power as if it was a single type of phenomenon 
rather than something which takes on different forms and functions at many 
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different locations in society’ whereas ‘....Foucault manages to capture 
something of the way in which power enters into the domain of everyday life in 
a more convincing manner’ (than Habermas – text added). (Layder, 1994: 
p.204). 
  
 This employment of power, involving as it sometimes does, a failure to 
act, was identified by Lukes in 2005 when he highlighted Mills’s explanation 
that ‘….all men are not in this sense ordinary….whether they do or do not 
make….decisions is less important….that they do occupy pivotal positions; 
‘….their failure to act….is often of greater consequence than the decisions 
they do make’ (Mills in Lukes, 2005: p.2). There is a notable occurrence which 
highlights this ‘failure to act’ where a past Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 
Sir Ian Blair, refused to resign in 2008 over the shooting of John Charles De 
Menezes and the MPS’s totally inept handling of the aftermath (see  
Introduction).  
  
Contrast this with the resignation of his successor, Sir Paul 
Stephenson as well as his Assistant Commissioner John Yates in July 2011 in 
the wake of the ‘phone-hacking’ scandal that involved the global media 
organisation News International, the demise of one of their UK news titles and 
the setting up of a judicial enquiry under Lord Levison to investigate the whole 
affair. The recent new bill, which several members of the House of Lords have 
recommended, should be enhanced by the addition of Levison’s proposals in 
order to give them legal teeth. This view was contrary to that of the incumbent 
Prime Minister who stopped short of recommending the whole of the control of 
the press should be governed by legislation.   
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It can be readily appreciated that this explanation of power and 
discourse theory juxtaposes easily with the locus of police officers within 
society but there is, at once, a dichotomy. This is revealed in chapter five 
where one Chief Constable, outlining his accountability stated: 
I’m accountable....to the Queen, a crown agent as I 
am, ....to my police authority who  conduct, with HMIC, 
my PDR....The key stakeholders.. who have a view on 
how I am performing, on some of the decisions I take.... 
MPs, who I regularly speak to,....the Home 
Office....government, who will exert a certain degree of 
influence over chief constables. Constitutionally, we’re 
in an interesting position because we don’t have a 
boss. (added emphasis) CC4/M/51/32/3 
 
At once we can appreciate that, even with the apparent trappings of 
power particularly those held by Chief Constables, the broad-based 
accountability factors or what could be termed as ‘discourses’, which Foucault 
described as ‘knowledge based ways of thinking and acting’ (Foucault in 
Jones, 2003: p.125) and which we are powerless to resist, seem, in essence, 
to render them, in many ways, ‘prisoners of their own discourses’. In this 
respect Foucault then went on to posit that ‘.... because as humans we 
constantly assess what we should and should not do in relation to the cultural 
knowledge we have acquired – because we police ourselves – the delivery of 
discursively directed order is ensured’ (Foucault in Jones, 2003: p.136). 
 We therefore, according to Foucault, become as those imprisoned in 
Bentham’s Panopticon where something takes place which he (Foucault) 
describes as ‘self-surveillance’ ‘.....which each individual....thus exercising this 
surveillance over and against himself’ (Foucault, 1980: p.15) and, as a 
consequence find themselves unable to escape in a discourse-directed world.   
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In 2007 Hough highlighted the New Policing Management Culture 
whereby the police were duty bound to record and explain almost every action 
that they take, and that as a result, the recording process itself had become 
more important than the outcome. It is almost a Benthamite situation where 
they find themselves within a Panopticon type structure where their every 
move is, or can be observed and minutely examined.  
   
There is, however, an alternative view that escape from this discourse-
directed world is possible. That means of escape was identified by Giddens in 
his theory of ‘structuration’ where he proposed a ‘dialectic of control’. This, he 
stated, was always at work wherever power existed and that it (the dialectic) 
referred to the alterations in the balance of power over time and 
circumstances. He emphasised that this occurred at the individual as well as 
the group levels in order to ‘….underline the fact that people are never simply 
the helpless playthings of social forces beyond their control’ (Giddens in 
Layder; 2006: p.170). This dialectic was constructed to highlight Giddens’s 
belief that Foucault had made an erroneous assumption in his discourse 
theory insofar as that we are powerless in the control of these social forces.  
The dichotomous nature of these themes and the tensions between the two 
different interpretations will be explored in greater depth as the chapter 
develops. However it should be noted that Foucault did talk about resistance 
so he has at least addressed the idea that humans are not just ‘victims’ of 
discourse.   
 
Societal Influences 
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The changes within the police service, some of which were occurring 
during the data collection phase of my research were, of course, a mirror of 
what was happening in society at this time. Additionally within the last three 
decades, a number of major societal upheavals, and their attendant 
consequences upon the police service, included the miners’ strikes of 1972 
and 1984 and the Brixton riots in 1981 which were a direct result of racially 
insensitive policing3 resulting in an independent enquiry chaired by a law lord, 
Lord Scarman. In his report Lord Scarman, whilst not branding the 
Metropolitan Police as ‘institutionally racist’, recommended that every officer 
receive extra equality and diversity training. He further recommended that the 
initial training course for all police officers should be extended to provide this 
training and this was later introduced. 
The death of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and the unsatisfactory 
conduct of the investigation into his death was later the subject of the 
Macpherson enquiry. The report, published in February 1999, in contrast to 
Lord Scarman’s earlier report, did identify the Metropolitan Police as an 
‘institutionally racist’ organisation. This institutional racism was also described 
by the black activist Stokely Carmichael as "….the collective failure of an 
organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to people 
because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin". (Carmichael in Bhavani, 
Mirza and Meetoo, 2005: p.235). This issue, it was felt by many 
commentators, had been effectively side-stepped by Lord Scarman. It also 
raised questions as to the effectiveness of his (Lord Scarman’s) 
recommendations and the lasting effect, if any, that they had on the equality 
                                            
3  Particularly the MPS’s  use of the infamous ‘sus’ law which appeared to give officers almost carte-blanche 
powers to stop, question, search and even detain youths, particularly those from ethnic minorities, on nothing more 
than a whim. 
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and diversity training of the police service and its working practices. It is 
worthy of note that some thirteen years further on the same questions were 
raised by Lord Macpherson leading to an impression they (Scarman’s 
recommendations) had never penetrated the organisation to any great depth.  
Other serious public disorder incidents, which were undoubtedly 
escalated by intensive, over-bearing and insensitive policing, occurred at 
Broadwater Farm in London and in Toxteth, a district of Liverpool, culminating 
in a series of crises in public confidence in the police service which 
undoubtedly led to some very personal crises of consent within the service.   
It is against this background of major upheaval in the policing of this 
country that the choice of the subject under research and its raison d’être has 
been clearly signposted notwithstanding a long and varied policing career. My 
locus within the research places me in a position that can be described as an 
‘insider researcher’ and this will be explored in depth in chapter 4, the 
methodology chapter. A number of recognised methodologies for analysing 
qualitative data will also be briefly examined and then a rationalisation to 
justify the choice of the interview method selected. It will also serve to 
highlight the both the survey and interview methods identified as being 
apposite for the work. 
In Chapter 3, the Literature Review will further examine some of the 
extensive literature on policing by consent and, as a means of comparing and 
contrasting the theory and its practice in England and Wales, it will also briefly 
examine the concept in several other countries. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review  
 
‘The police are able to secure the consent of the 
public in a democracy to the extent that they police towards 
morally worthwhile ends in a morally acceptable manner. 
The moral quality of both ends and means of policing are 
critical for effective policing’ (Richards, 2003: p.70, added 
emphasis). 
  
This statement was made in 1992 by Neil Richards, the ‘primum 
mobile’ in policing ethics at the National Police College, Bramshill who, 
incidentally, was instrumental in drafting the European Police Code of Ethics. 
He was, at the time, conducting an appraisal of the police service's ‘Statement 
of Common Purpose and Values’ published by ACPO in 1992 and it is 
interesting to note that the theme of ‘consent’ figures quite prominently in his 
appraisal. However it is an interesting comment because it assumes a moral 
consensus in society. Whether that ‘consent’ can be translated into a 
‘jurisprudence of consent’ or, indeed a ‘philosophy of police’  is open to 
considerable conjecture; a survey, carried out in 2001, among delegates 
attending the police Senior Command Course, which is an essential course 
for senior officers who achieve ACPO rank, at the National Police College, 
Bramshill,  found that many confused a ‘philosophy of police’ with ‘….some 
orthodoxies of police doctrine such as….we police by consent’ (Adlam, 2003: 
p.39) with one student (a Superintendent) stating ‘I don’t think we, as an 
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organisation, know what a ‘philosophy of police’ actually is’. (Adlam, 2003: p. 
39). 
   
Having set out to examine the views and perceptions of a number of 
serving and retired police officers on the subject of policing by consent it is 
interesting to note the comments made in the previous paragraph about a lack 
of awareness of a ‘philosophy of police’. In this chapter the literature on the 
theme of policing by consent will be examined and also present the findings of 
a number of other authors who have already explored the subject, albeit from 
a different or ‘outsider‘ standpoint.   
In 1990, Dixon Cole and Bottomley, whilst acknowledging the 
voluminous mass of philosophical, theoretical and practical literature on what 
constitutes consent, made no attempt to review that literature but, instead, 
proposed  that there are ‘…. two significant components of consent which 
must be considered….These are (i) knowledge: that is, information about 
what is requested; and (ii) power: that is an ability to make choices on the 
basis of knowledge and to use the available information’ (Dixon, Coleman and 
Bottomley, 1990: p.346). They went on to examine the relationship between 
the police and citizens, stating that, because of the inequality of power 
between the police and the policed, regardless of whether they were suspects 
or not, that ‘….full consent, is….in practice, unobtainable’ (Dixon, Coleman 
and Bottomley, 1990: p.346). 
There are a number of other concepts that are both parallels of and are 
necessarily connected with consent and these will be subject to equal 
scrutiny.  The first of these ‘additional’ concepts is discretion; at its ‘lowest’ 
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level from an operational viewpoint, it is the discretion exercised on the streets 
where individual officers still have a day-to-day discretion, or some would 
argue, a preference based on personal prejudice, in whom they stop, in whom 
they decide to warn and in whom they decide to prosecute, proceeding by 
way of summary jurisdiction (summons) or by arrest and charge. In 1995 
Weinberger highlighted this unusual positioning when she stated that 
‘….uniquely, those at the bottom of the police hierarchy have wide 
discretion….their actions become some of the most critical in the whole 
criminal justice process’ (Weinberger, 1995: p.3).  
 
It can therefore be appreciated that, within policing, power and 
discretion are inextricably linked.  As previously stated Austin Turk, in 1969, 
viewed the social order as consisting of‘….powerful social groups who 
successfully control society in their own interests.’  He argued that social 
control is exercised by providing ‘….justification for the law which is then 
enforced by agencies such as the police’ (Turk, 1969 in Burke, 2003: p. 148). 
Turk had also argued that there are degrees of discretion in how the law is 
exercised ‘….which allows the powerful to manipulate the legal 
system….while still preserving an image of due process and impartiality.’  
(Turk 1969, in Burke, 2003: p.149).  Whilst the ‘street’ level of discretion 
involves a great deal of trust in the individual officer’s honesty and integrity, 
and the concomitant legitimation of the doctrine of consent, it is nevertheless 
an area of police operations which always has, and will continue to provide, 
the fuel for both rational and irrational debate about the elements of social 
control that are forever present in the minutiae of policing, which, Waddington 
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so succinctly described, stating that ‘….the police use the law rather than 
enforce it, as a means of achieving social order’ . (Waddington, 1999: p.94) 
Within this equation consideration also needs to be given to the 
exercise of ‘power’, in its most empirical sense, that is the exercise of control 
by individual police officers over the people that they deal with when seeking 
their compliance; parallels can be found in the ‘two dimensional’ view of 
power, as identified by Bachrach and Baratz, where it involves ‘….coercion, 
influence, authority, force and manipulation’.  In their view compliance can, 
and, in many cases, no doubt is, secured by the application of  one or many of 
these factors; coercion exists where compliance is secured by the ‘threat of 
deprivation’; 'influence is used ‘….without resorting  to either a tacit or an overt 
threat….’; authority is legitimated because the subject recognises the 
reasonableness of the command ‘…..either because it is legitimate and 
reasonable or because it has been arrived at through a legitimate and 
reasonable procedure; manipulation is identified as ‘….being an aspect or 
sub-concept of force…. since compliance is forthcoming in the absence of 
recognition….of the exact nature of the demand’; and  finally, force, usually 
the last resort, is applied by removing the subjects ‘….choice between 
compliance and non-compliance….’  (Bachrach and Baratz in Lukes, 2005: 
pp.21-22).   
Turk (1969) also identified coercion as a means of controlling society 
by using ‘….the threat and exercise of physical force….the most obvious form 
of control’  but added the caveat that, the more force is applied, the less likely 
it is to be accepted as legitimate, thereby  making the control of society more 
difficult’. (Turk, 1969 in Burke, 2001: p.148).  In 2007 McLaughlin highlighted 
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coercion, as used by the police, to validate and justify their work through the 
agency of the police officer as a ‘ruler’ in a ‘moral enterprise’.  Other authors, 
including Holdaway in 1984, have explored the use of force, both in its legal 
use in effecting an arrest and as an (illegal) means of re-enforcing an officer’s 
personal authority when it is called into question. However, even within this 
‘illegal’ use of force there are rules which have ‘….specific connotations, and 
these have to be described and analysed within the context of the 
occupational culture”….however the behaviour has to be understood against 
a background of acquiescence, if not overt support, of colleagues’   
(Holdaway, 1984: p.120).  The parallels with ‘street’ policing are both obvious 
and readily identifiable within these paradigms. 
 
At an early stage in the research indications emerged from the 
interview data that discretion appeared to be diminishing because of the 
bureaucratization of more and more aspects of an officers daily routine;   
however, as Lord Scarman pointed out, in the introduction to his report in 
1981 ‘It, discretion, is the policeman’s daily task’. (Scarman,1984. p.1).  The 
concept of discretion will be explored in depth in chapter four.  
The second concept, which can rightly be labelled as the opposite of 
discretion, particularly in the world of policing, is control. If the structure and 
resources existed, every officer, from the beat constable to the chief officer 
would be subject to regulation and procedures which would, in effect, negate 
any vestige of discretion whatsoever.  It could be legitimately argued that , in 
fact, this is already the position and that the police discipline code coupled 
with the statutory duties of the police that are enshrined in a multitude of 
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statutes already create a situation that has no place for the exercise of 
discretion. The premise that the police are but one means of social control, 
and that they are by no means the only or most important one in the 
regulation of daily life, was also made earlier by Banton, in his seminal work 
on policing, who recognised, amongst others, that ‘…. the police did not 
create social control by themselves, and were but one component of a diverse 
regulatory framework drawn from a patchwork of informal, formal, state, 
private and community sources’.  (Banton, 1964: p.2). There is an identifiable 
fusion here between managerialism within the police and control of society. 
Both could have the same political origins, mistrust of professional autonomy 
and of the public in general, but in effect they are two different but parallel 
agendas. However, I am more interested in the control, or perhaps better 
described as the autonomy that individual officers exercise over the daily 
performance of their duties; this leads readily to the next concept, that of 
accountability. 
 
To whom are the police accountable? It could be argued that, at the 
lowest level, they are accountable to themselves, that they make decisions 
every day which will see one offender being arrested and charged, another 
being given a fixed penalty notice, another being given a formal warning and 
another being ignored as being either not worthy of further attention or whose 
minor breach of the law is viewed by the officer concerned as part of the 
social milieu. This ‘action’ or ‘inaction’ that is so much a part of an officer’s 
daily routine is explored later in this chapter. Once again, as we progress 
through the rank structure, accountability becomes a high priority, and indeed 
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a higher profile priority, with both local and national politicians, in the form of 
the police authority or the Home Secretary who are able to call Chief 
Constables to account. In addition to these means of control there is also the 
quasi-independent HMIC, the national police inspectorate, which follows the 
model for external inspection set by prisons, education and factories; this, 
however, is about to change to some degree whereby HMIC will be disbanded 
and a new Criminal Justice Inspectorate, encompassing the whole Criminal 
Justice System, will come into being; however, at the time of writing (July 
2014), this new inspection body had not yet come into being.  
One fairly recent and notable example of central intervention and 
accountability can be found in the failings of Humberside police, which were 
revealed in the Bichard Report4 into the police handling of the Soham Murders 
in 2002. These particular failings led to the then Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett ordering Humberside Police Authority to suspend David Westwood, 
the Chief Constable of Humberside over his force’s alleged mishandling of 
‘intelligence’ concerning Ian Huntley, who was subsequently convicted of both 
murders, with regard to his attraction for early and pre-teen schoolgirls. In the 
ensuing ‘power’ struggle, which was accompanied by the almost obligatory 
media frenzy, the Chief Constable was suspended; however, he was later re-
instated with the caveat that he tendered his resignation, which he did so, 
leaving the force in March 2005.    
This exercise of power, obviously at a much higher level, can be equated to 
Luke’s three-dimensional view of ‘power’ whereby the focus is on ‘….decision 
                                            
4  Following publication in 2005 the police instigated the ’MoPI’ (Management of Police Intelligence) system 
with rules for recording and retaining information/intelligence in line with the recommendations of the Bichard report. 
As a direct result the PNC (Police National Computer) by 2012  will metamorphose into the PND (Police National 
Database) and will contain ‘live’ intelligence as well as being a repository of historical information.   
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making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through 
decisions)’. (Lukes, 2005: p.29) 
Whilst each of the three concepts of consent, control and accountability 
may be viewed as separate entities, within the context of modern policing they 
are inextricably linked; there are elements of each present in the other and it 
would serve no useful purpose to examine them in isolation.  Indeed the 
literature under review does not even attempt to examine them individually 
because they are so intertwined.  
Whilst the main research question seeks to garner the views of both 
serving and retired police officers on the concept of policing by consent in 
England and Wales it is nevertheless important that an exploration, albeit a 
brief one, is made of the international arena in order to both parallel and 
diversify the main theme of ‘policing by consent’ so, that by drawing 
comparisons across the globe, a rationale can be identified for its 
continuance. In respect of this rationale a continuum has been drawn across 
the spectrum of policing world-wide in order to provide a measurement of 
contrast in policing styles.  Whilst it will be recognised as a fairly subjective 
view the intent is to highlight both similarities and differences, which in turn, 
will illuminate the British model. 
International Perspective   
 This brief continuum is based on five examples: firstly the Hong Kong 
police, a body which is seen as a para-military and coercive force which pays 
lip service to community based policing; policing in the United States of 
America where the  majority of senior appointments within both the police and 
the prosecution agencies are subject to local election processes, or are 
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‘political’ appointments, and as such are viewed as both powerful and 
corrupt/corrupting; policing in Japan where the co-operative attitudes of 
citizens, an acceptance of questioning by those interrogating them and 
confessions, made by suspects through personal remorse and the Japanese 
obedience to authority, helps to retain public confidence in the police; the 
People’s Republic of China, which is undergoing a police legitimacy crisis 
whereby evidence is emerging that passive non-co-operation or active 
obstruction are the signs that the police are losing the support of the people 
and, obviously, without legitimacy, the exercise of authority by the police is 
increasingly likely to be challenged. Finally the position of the British police 
will be established within this continuum. 
The Hong Kong Police 
  The Hong Kong Police, formed during the years of colonisation has 
demonstrated that, within its structure, it is more closely allied to the colonial 
model of military rule which could be found across the British Empire but   
adopting the same doctrine as the British police whereby they (the police) are 
the representatives of the government in policing society. In its 150 years of 
history, the (Hong Kong) Police have moved little towards the ideal of 'policing 
by consent' and although there are conflicts within the service because of its 
‘….colonial, bureaucratic and hierarchical structure’. (Choi, 1995: p. 74) there 
is an increasing acceptance of policing by consent.  
At the same time, despite some hopeful signs, ‘….its coercive 
capability has been strengthened, the development of its command and 
control it is closely related to and associated with para-militarism….’ (Choi 
1995: p.75); there is still little integration with the local community.  Recruits 
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are taken in as a body, posted to a barracks and given a militaristic training 
with little emphasis on professional ethics, social awareness and human 
behaviour. Corruption, despite the best efforts of the anti-corruption 
commission, remains a problem.  
In 1997 control of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong was ceded to 
mainland China in accordance with its constitution, and whilst it was, without 
doubt, viewed  world-wide as a ‘decolonization’ process, described by 
numerous commentators as the ‘setting of the sun on the British Empire’ it 
was not, in any way, a democratization process. As Choi stated in 1995 The 
Hong Kong Police appears set to remain a ‘….para-militaristic and coercive 
arm….of the Chinese Government with little or no public scrutiny or 
accountability’ (Choi, 1995: p.14). 
United States of America 
  Over the last fifteen years in America the police have undergone, and 
continue to undergo, enormous changes, particularly in accountability.  
Having said this, police reform is nothing new and even at the start of the 
twentieth century  the American police system was ‘….mired in corruption, 
brutality and inefficiency’  (Walker, 2005: p.20) despite the number of police 
reform movements that had been in existence over the same time period.   
However, the overall feelings are that police reform has concentrated on 
‘notorious incidents and misbehaving individuals’, (Armacost, 2004 in Walker 
2005: p.455) rather than on the dysfunctional aspects of police organisations 
that sustain and, in some ways, even promulgate serious misconduct. 
Although in many respects the system that allows public offices such 
as Chief of Police or District Attorney to be ‘elected offices’ and thereby 
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subject to the vagaries of election procedures, appears to be fundamentally 
flawed, it must be said in its defence, that following the reformation of the 
whole electoral system, the first black sheriffs were elected in the southern 
states, once, in an historical sense, the bastion of slavery and repression of 
the black minority.  
It is worthy of note that elections for the first Police and Crime 
Commissioner appointments did take  place in November 2012 and most 
forces in England and Wales, with the exception of the MPS, now have 
independent Police and Crime Commissioners.  
Japan 
As already indicated, the police in Japan have traditionally relied upon 
the co-operation of the citizens and that whilst a minute examination of 
evidence is carried out during court procedures any failure to convict has, in 
recent years, been laid more and more at the door of the police where most 
citizens equate ‘arrest’ with guilt.  
Under fairly recent reforms the police were required to treat citizens’ 
requests and complaints in an honest fashion and ‘…..to document their 
responses’.  (Masakatsu, 2003: p.139).  They are also charged with 
continually reviewing the relationship between the police and the citizens.  
However investigations by the police in Japan are sometimes criticised for 
‘involving too much interrogation’ (Masakatsu, 2003: p.137), where a suspect 
can be held for a maximum of 23 days before indictment; witness the current 
debate in England where the police are seeking a maximum time of 42 days 
detention without charge in order to deal with the ever increasing threat of 
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international terrorism but which is being resisted in some quarters and is 
seen, in some respects, as a ‘bridge too far’.   
 
The relatively recent (2002 – 2003) increases in serious crime in Japan 
have seen a government decision to increase police numbers by 10,000 
officers but this is still not recognised as addressing all problem areas and has 
resulted in a shift of attention to the more serious crimes.  This has resulted in 
new laws to control stalking, child abuse and domestic violence which have 
been shaped by public requests and indeed mirror the situation, certainly in 
respect of domestic violence, which has seen many UK police forces adopt a 
policy of ‘positive action’ whereby any domestic violence incident is expected 
to have a ‘positive’ outcome i.e. the arrest of the perpetrator.   
 
The People’s Republic of China 
The data on the abuse of powers by police officers in China highlights 
what is obviously a serious problem and in the years between 1993 and 1997 
there were a total of  40,846 officers involved in violations of both the law and 
discipline procedures. Amongst the more ‘notable’, or perhaps notorious, 
cases 1,272 officers received a criminal sentence, nineteen of which were life 
terms and ‘107 of which involved the death penalty’. (Wong, 2004: p.201). It is 
felt that raising the legitimacy question and exposing the problem will 
‘….improve the police’s law enforcement standards and enhance the public’s 
legal education’ (Wong, 2004: p.205).  In other words if the police themselves 
follow the law then the people will respect the law.  This concept however was 
totally disregarded in June 1989 when the repressive arm of the state, in the 
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form of the army, complete with tanks, rather than a lightly armed police force, 
brought a bloody and fatal end to a peaceful student demonstration in 
Tiananmen Square. This appears to demonstrate that there may be, at most, 
a nod in the direction of the concept of policing by consent. 
England and Wales 
Emerging from this brief selection of policing research it is obvious that 
there are many different interpretations of the concept of policing by consent 
but I must return to the British police who sit somewhere in the middle ground, 
almost at the fulcrum of this continuum. Since the formation of the ‘new police’ 
they have moved, in an historical context, from the reportedly ‘bitter and 
divisive process’ (Phillips and Storch, 1999: p.75) which saw their formation in 
the early to mid-19th century, through the so called ‘golden age’ of policing of 
the late 1940s and early 1950s to the present day where they were deployed 
by the Thatcher Government during the miners’ strike of the 1980s.  In this 
context they now appear to have moved from a policing only regime and have 
widened their scope of activities to carry out a social control role. This 
situation appears to be causally linked to the introduction of the 1998 Crime 
and Disorder legislation because of the increasing concern over ‘anti-social’ 
behaviour and its attendant consequences. This highlights what appears to be 
a social control role for the police within a network of agencies which, 
although quite loosely formed, appears driven towards a societal rather than 
an individual response, to both victims and offenders.  Placing them [the 
British Police] in this position, it is felt, is neatly adjusted to the British, or 
perhaps more accurately, the English sense of compromise. 
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Literature Review on Consent and Accountability  
In the remainder of this chapter some of the major literary works on 
consent, discretion, accountability and police culture are reviewed and in 
order to present a cohesive time line they are dealt with in date order. This will 
also help to demonstrate the chronology of the many and varied 
developments that have taken place in policing from the beginning of the new 
police up until the present decade.  They serve, not only as barometer of the 
changes in policing, but also as a sociological calendar charting the changes 
in government policy.  
It has always been recognised that Sir Robert Peel’s principles of 
policing for the ‘new police’ can be found in a number of different guises 
throughout the democratic world and many governments have established a 
police based on similar principles. However the British police still maintain a 
unique position in so far as there are no overtly armed uniformed officers 
patrolling our streets on a daily basis.  This force, or service as some would 
wish it to be called, is quite overt and the fact that they are unarmed appears 
to be a standpoint that other countries and states would aspire to. Again it is 
also accepted that there are armed officers available and on immediate 
response in every police force in the country but it must be stated that this 
was a reactive rather than a pro-active move in response to the growth of the 
illegal use of firearms that has occurred especially during the last thirty or so 
years.  
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There have been a number of other areas where certain aspects of the 
policing function, as performed by sworn or warranted officers, has seen the 
addition of Police and Community Support Officers (PCSOs). They were first 
employed by the MPS in 2002 under the auspices of the Police Reform Act 
2002 and later recruited by the majority of police forces in England and 
Wales. They perform front line patrols and are deployed to handle low-level, 
high volume nuisance in order to release warranted officers for the aspects of 
police work that include the arrest and detention of suspects.  
Privatisation of other aspects of the policing function has seen private 
security firms being contracted to transport prisoners between police stations, 
courts and prisons. Additionally both the Jailer and Custody officer roles, at 
one time the preserve of sworn officers, have been civilianised, and a number 
of forces now employ civilian investigative officers, who, in many instances, 
once a sworn officer has made an arrest, take over the background 
preparation of the case by obtaining witness statements and completing the 
necessary paperwork for case presentation. However it is important to note 
that front line policing, or at least the confrontational and coercive aspects of 
front line policing are still dealt with by sworn, unarmed, uniformed officers. 
Similarly the police do, in many different guises, work undercover and 
in secret, employing specialist officers and the confidentiality of what they deal 
with is governed by the Official Secrets Act. Having examined the unique 
position that the British police occupy it is, as I have already stated, well 
documented that the introduction of the new police was a long and difficult 
process. Within this process there are two contrasting sides of police reform; 
the ‘popular’ and ‘official’ views on the ‘Birth of the Blues’ (Reiner, 1985: p.10), 
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which highlights the long, arduous road that saw a seismic shift from the rag-
bag collection of diverse enforcement agencies including village or parish 
constables, docks police and paid watchmen, to the formation of the 
Metropolitan Police in 1829.  The introduction of a full time, uniformed and 
paid ‘police’ which had policing by consent at its heart, was not without its 
problems and Sir Robert Peel’s bill for the establishment of such a force for 
London was laid before parliament on no less than five occasions, it was a 
bitter, hard fought contest which polarised the rival factions and resulted in 
notable occurrences of social disorder throughout the country.  
 
These problems were mirrored in the social disorder that oversaw the 
Constabulary Force Commission, led by Lord John Russell which led to the 
formation of County police forces under the auspices of the County Police Act 
of 1839.  Factions opposed to the introduction of County forces feared ‘the 
spectre ….of paid police and stipendiary magistrates replacing the unpaid 
parish constables and JPs throughout the country’. (Phillips and Storch, 1999: 
p.61).  It was seen as a threat to their own governance of the diverse parishes 
and counties which would ultimately involve greater control by central 
government with its accompanying bureaucracy.  The influence of the various 
political parties, presenting as they would, their own views on the merits and 
de-merits of a full time paid police coupled with the influence of the landed 
gentry who had no wish to disturb the status-quo provided that they remained 
in a position of both power and authority all added to the difficulties that 
accompanied the introduction of the County as well as the Metropolitan police 
as we know them today. 
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Prior to that period, as a study by Kent (1986) shows, part of that rag-
bag collection of enforcement agencies was the village or parish constable, 
who was viewed by the majority of historians in a comedic light.  Indeed 
‘Shakespeare’s Dogberry, Dull and Elbow dominated historians’ views of 
constables as well as those literary scholars who discussed the 
constableship’. (Kent, 1986: p.2). The office was seen as an unpopular one 
and some villagers, who were in a more substantial position, sought 
exemption from the office, usually by employing a paid deputy to carry out the 
duties of the office on their behalf.  To the remainder, those that had neither 
the financial acumen nor the wit and who almost always occupied the lower 
strata of village society, fell the lot of carrying out the office.  In some areas 
however they were often elected, or at least selected by the village 
ratepayers, who represented about 45% of most (male) village householders. 
In 1977 Critchley compounded the majority view when he claimed that 
by the late seventeenth century the office (of village/parish constable ‘was 
regarded as suitable only for the old, idiotic or infirm’  (Critchley, 1977: p.10) 
and, that as previously stated, the wealthier farmers, tradesmen and 
merchants bought their way out of serving. Parish constables did, throughout 
their long history attract a great deal of opprobrium and even into the 1990s, 
they were stigmatized by reformers, government ministers and justices as 
being ‘lazy, recalcitrant, illiterate , officious, aged, bumbling, mercenary and 
corrupt, often perfect Dogberries’. (Phillips and Storch, 1990: p.12).  
Kent, in tracing the history of the office, devoted a substantial 
proportion of her findings to a social profile of the communities and their 
constables. She proposed that the views held by a number of historians were 
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wrong and that, in recent years, further research has demonstrated that 
‘….constables were more substantial and better qualified for the position than 
earlier writers contended’.  (Kent, 1986: p.80). It is also noteworthy that, even 
this early in police history, there was recognition of an informal consent to the 
policing carried out by the village constables. She (Kent) noted that ‘….the 
absence of a bureaucracy in the provinces does not seem to have constituted 
as a great weakness in the English polity as some have suggested’ and that 
‘….government by the informal mechanism of consent….’ (Williams, 1979 in 
Kent 1986: p.101) appears to have worked during most of the period. That it 
did indeed work is surely testament to this very early appearance of 
something akin to policing by consent.  
Moving forward from the 15th and 16th centuries and into the 17th and 
18th centuries there were, according to Wrightson (1980), two distinct 
concepts of order.  
The ideal of order was firmly embodied in the regulative penal 
legislation to which parliaments of the time devoted so much 
energy whereas, on the other hand, in the day to day 
relationships of neighbours in a community order was seen as 
less a positive aspiration towards a national condition of 
disciplined social harmony than a negative absence of 
disruptive conflict locally, which, in essence, meant  little more 
than conformity to  a fairly malleable local custom which was 
considerably more flexible than statute law. (Wrightson, 1980: 
p.34) 
 
In essence this indicated that social peace was preferred to the strict 
enforcement of the law and that people preferred to settle their many disputes 
in an informal and somewhat friendlier than manner than resorting to 
prosecution, the cost of which they invariably had to bear themselves. This 
situation accords with the views expressed by both Kent and Williams and it 
could by convincingly argued that, even in these early times, the British mind- 
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set was adjusted to social and judicial compromise with a concept of something 
very similar to the concept of consent, which although not expressed as such, 
was ever present.  It would therefore appear, according to the views expressed 
by both Kent and Williams in the previous paragraphs, there are indications  
that perhaps, in some cases, the restoration of social peace took precedence 
over the prosecution of offences. That trend continues to this day whereby 
neighbourhood Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) are issued in an attempt 
to control this type of behaviour and, in some instances, domestic violence is 
tackled with a view to restoring order rather than prosecuting offenders.    
In 1967, Critchley published one of the first full length histories of the 
police in England and Wales in over seventy years. It examined, amongst 
other areas, the structure of the police, the training they receive, their 
relationships with the public and the challenges they face. In many respects 
Critchley, very much in line with his post within the Police Department of the 
Home office and as Secretary to the 1960-62 Royal Commission, presented a  
fairly orthodox view of police development which was almost Reith like in the 
picture painted of the police; a straightforward, linear development which took 
no cognisance of the various social, sociological and legislative difficulties that 
accompanied the introduction of the ‘new’ police.   
It was, nevertheless, a very comprehensive study of the police that 
included a history of the reasons which lead to the formation of the Royal 
Commission on the Police of 1964. The report of that commission gave rise to 
the Police Act 1964 which, on its enactment, resulted in a series of 
amalgamations that saw the number of police forces in England and Wales 
reduced 112 forces to the current structure of 43 forces.  A recent (2006) 
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government proposal would have seen this number reduced to twelve 
‘strategic forces’, providing economies of scale to deal with what are now 
regarded as ‘strategic’ policing areas5 whilst the day-to-day local policing 
would have retained the current BCU model.  The proposal failed for a 
number of reasons not the least of which was the lack of planning as to how it 
would be financed. 
It is recognised that Critchley produced what is regarded as an 
establishment view of the police service, supporting the Reith-like concept of 
the ‘golden age of policing by consent’, which was generally regarded as 
having occurred in the late 1940s though to the early 1950s. It is, however 
interesting to note, that in the preface to the second edition, published in 
1978, Critchley very presciently stated that:  
‘The task of the police is becoming increasingly 
hazardous, they can no longer count on the support of 
some minority sections of the public and the 
Government….which has come perilously close to 
forfeiting the confidence of the federated ranks.’ 
(Critchley 1978: preface p. xv) 
 
 
 Subsequent research however has de-bunked the ‘golden age’ 
paradigm and in a Guardian newspaper article in 2005, Robert Reiner, a 
noted author on the police, claimed it was a ‘Cop-sided’ view of history’. He 
wrote; 
The supposed golden age of British policing by consent 
(most of the 20th century, but particularly the 1940s and 
50s) was a confidence trick. Crime and order were 
maintained by informal social controls, above all the gradual 
inclusion of the whole population into common citizenship. 
                                            
5  There are seven groups listed as, counter terrorism and extremism; serious organised and cross-border 
crime; civil contingencies and emergency planning; critical incident management; major crime (homicide); public 
order; strategic roads policing i.e. those services where the public depend on police for Level 2 Services – cross-
border issues, usually of organised criminals and major incidents affecting more than one BCU. 
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However, the police took much of the credit. In myriad 
individual cases police helped people in distress, although 
there was also rampant corruption and brutality. But the 
contribution of policing to the maintenance of order overall 
was primarily symbolic. Much research evidence shows that 
policing had little effect on levels of offending. (Reiner, From 
an article entitled ‘Be Tough on a Crucial Cause of Neo-
Liberalism’. (The Guardian Newspaper, 24th November 
2005) 
In 1977 Brogden wrote about policing and in particular the problem of 
consent and the class nature of the police.  He stated that police autonomy 
depends on the consent of the people being policed i.e. the public, insofar as 
their acceptance of authoritative control over their lives thereby gives 
legitimacy to police practices. Later, in 1982, he developed this particular 
theory in much greater depth in a later work on autonomy and consent. 
Doubtless public acceptance to both the police and being policed is crucial to 
the concept of   police power but the public’s view is, at best, ambiguous and 
consent is always tentative, conditional and easily withdrawn.  It continually 
undergoes re-interpretation and adaptation and is usually negotiated within 
the context of the current situation.  
What then are the limits of consent, especially at the lowest levels, the 
interaction between police and public during the day to day contacts on the 
streets?  Is it a consent legitimated by a public knowledge that the police are 
accountable for their actions and, by their (the public’s) acquiescence, are 
therefore facilitating the doctrine of consent?  On the other hand, in these 
situations, it could be, and often is, viewed as a coercive use of both legal 
powers and unregulated/illegal activity that is practised on people who remain 
ignorant of both the law and the powers of the police as laid down in statute. 
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From a slightly different historical perspective, but still keeping the 
principles of policing by consent to the fore-front, the ‘Unit Beat’ policing 
model, introduced in the mid to late 1970s, was sold as ‘all things to all men’ 
[sic]. The model was designed to provide a number of ‘home’ or unit beat 
officers carrying out foot patrols on their own local or ‘home beat’ with a 
number of ‘area’ cars superimposed over the beat structure.  The principle 
behind the system was that the foot patrol constables would attend to the 
‘community needs’ by being a visible and reassuring presence as well as 
liaising with the local community groups. The area cars, in the tier above the 
foot patrols, were designed as additional mobile cover as well as providing a 
swifter response to those situations that demanded it.  
Unfortunately, in the area that I served in at that particular time, the 
opposite was achieved and there was, in many cases a reduction in police 
visibility and a diminution of foot patrols when there were insufficient 
resources to man the vehicles.  The system rapidly became open to much 
criticism and the allegation that officers were ‘working it to suit themselves’. 
This may also have indicated the nascent beginnings of the audit culture 
within the public service whereby ‘provider interest' would shape the system 
rather than the needs of the 'customers' – hence market systems would 
discipline the self-interested professionals of the public services. 
Having been involved at ‘ground level’ during the introduction of the 
Unit Beat system I can honestly state, that in my experience, the negative 
aspects of the system were highlighted particularly by the loss of the essential 
day-to-day contact with the public; indeed it has, to this day, remained lost, 
much to the detriment of the public persona of the police.  However, 
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reclamation of the ground which was lost began with the relatively recent 
introduction of Neighbourhood Policing, which, in itself was a re-introduction, 
or perhaps more of a re-working, of the ‘community policing’ initiatives that 
were first introduced in Exeter by the then Chief Constable John Alderson 
who was of the opinion that the cultivation of good community relations was 
‘….a task, not for some but for every (added emphasis) police officer’ 
(Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982: p.225,). 
Now Neighbourhood Policing (NHP) teams, which include PCSOs, and 
involve partnerships with community groups and local authority services all 
endeavour to provide a ‘local’ policing presence, particularly in the high 
visibility presence patrols performed by the PCSOs. This joint approach has 
seen the reduction of low level, high visibility vandalism and annoyance as 
well as providing a measure of community reassurance.  Notable 
achievements have been made in the policing of anti-social behaviour by local 
youths particularly in one of the forces from where a number of interview 
subjects were drawn. This partnership, consisting of the police, local authority 
members and community representatives has enabled the clearing of graffiti 
and the provision of extra street lighting where required. It has also involved 
the planting of dense and particularly anti-personal shrubbery (Pyrethrum) as 
well as the provision of youth activities introduced to discourage groups 
congregating on street corners, church yards and public parks, causing 
general nuisance, drinking alcohol and, in some instances, indulging in drug 
taking. The success of this initiative was measured by a full internal 
evaluation. Unfortunately I was unable to gain access to the report which, in 
my position as an evaluator, I had researched and compiled. 
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   Returning to the question of consent, it is a well recognised fact that 
police officers of all ranks and the majority of politicians, of whatever  
persuasion, regularly espouse the notion that, in this country we have policing 
by consent, without even giving thought to what they are saying.  However, 
developments in policing policy in the 1970s and 1980s ‘….called such, 
possibly glib, assertions into question.’ (Morgan, 1989: p.217).  Within this 
same framework it is also questionable to what degree policing can be ‘by 
consent’ because of the politicisation of the police.  
The PACE Act 1984 introduced, for the first time, community 
consultative committees; this particular section, (106 of the Act) was designed 
to ensure that police forces consulted with the communities they policed as to 
the way they would carry out that duty. However, there was a divergence of 
views as to whether they were designed to provide a measure of local control 
over police policy or simply a forum for consultation ‘….without power and 
formal political accountability’ (Morgan 1987:p 32).   Morgan, in explaining the 
structure of these committees, highlighted the dichotomy wherein;  
‘….members are seldom under 30 and are active 
‘respectable’ members of the community….not people who 
have been in conflict with the police….Groups hostile to the 
police typically dismiss consultative committees as a 
meaningless charade on the grounds that they lack 
power….’ (Morgan, 1987: p.33). 
  
  
Indeed Morgan went on to comment that during the 1980s the claim 
‘….that there is an acceptable level of consent, in all four senses of the term 
legal, political, operational and attitudinal – has been seriously  challenged.’ 
(Morgan, 1989: p.219). 
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It was also well recognised by Smith that there was never going to be a 
consensus about the kind of policing the community wants because of the 
conflicts present within and between the various groups of the public within 
that community. ‘The idea of community cannot be successfully applied to 
policing if it is used to avoid finding the forms and institutions needed to strike 
a balance between conflicting demands’. (Smith, 1983: pp. 63-4).  
 
The Brixton, Toxteth and other inner city public disturbances, together 
with an increase in the ‘public’ face of chief police officers focussed attention 
on the police/public relationship and led to an examination of police 
accountability from the development of the ‘new’ police up until the 1980s. It 
drew historical material from the formation of one of the first provincial police 
force in Britain, the Liverpool Police, and demonstrates the freeing of the 
police from central political influence contending that ‘….the attainment of 
autonomy owes much to a particular ideological conception of the legal status 
of police officers’. (Brogden, 1982: p.2)  The new police, during their 
formation, were always viewed as instruments of the ruling classes and were 
therefore used as a form of social control. As was the picture throughout the 
country during the 19th century the concerns of the middle and ruling classes 
were what shaped policing policy, especially in Merseyside, not the concerns 
of the lower social orders. 
In 1982 Baldwin and Kinsey carried out research on the local politics of 
accountability and such police practices as intelligence gathering, unit beat 
policing and community policing now currently known as ‘Neighbourhood 
Policing’. In the late 2000s this became the preferred model of central 
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government who drove its introduction and continuance through the auspices 
of the HMIC.  The force that I was employed by until the finalisation of my 
contract, underwent the inspection process entitled ‘Embedding 
Neighbourhood Policing’ and I was responsible for carrying out an audit of the 
process. It has also been said that there was a dilemma as to whether the 
police practices in 1982 were reforming the law or legalising abuse.  This 
created a dilemma for the legislature as to whether the then current political 
and social environment would create a situation whereby forces would have to 
make a conscious decision to police by confrontation or consent. Given that 
sworn officers now deal more and more with the coercive and confrontational 
aspects of policing it would appear that decision has been, as premised, 
forced upon the police service. 
 
 In 1989, Reiner, in furtherance of the accountability debate, stated that 
‘The position of chief constables has always been central to the accountability 
debate’.  (Reiner, 1989: p.195).  He later produced a work entitled ‘Chief 
Constables, Bobbies, Bosses or Bureaucrats’ which was published in 1992.  
In the introduction Reiner stated that “a series of scandals” led to the 
formation of the 1960 Royal Commission on the Police, which, under the 
Chairmanship of Sir Henry Willinck QC, was appointed, 
 ....to review the constitutional position of the police 
throughout Great Britain, the arrangements for their control 
and administration and, in particular, to consider:- (1) the 
constitution and functions of local police authorities; (2) the 
status and accountability of members of police forces, 
including chief officers of police; (3) the relationship of the 
police with the public and the means of ensuring that 
complaints by the public against the police are effectively 
dealt with; and (4) the broad principles which should govern 
the remuneration of the constable, having regard to the 
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nature and extent of police duties and responsibilities and 
the need to attract and retain an adequate number of 
recruits with the proper qualifications. (Interim report of the 
Royal Commission on the Police, 1960: pp. 1-2). 
 
That the question of police accountability still occupies the foreground 
of public debate is beyond question.  The killing of a Brazilian national, John 
Charles de Menezes, during a police operation to identify and arrest the 
people connected with the attempted London bombings of  2005 identified is 
one of a series of highly publicised police ‘mistakes’ in recent years. The 
IPCC report on the shooting identified what it regarded as systemic rather 
than individual failure but the Metropolitan Police Authority overtly criticised 
the Commissioner Sir Ian Blair over the debacle at Stockwell underground 
station, indeed some members called for his resignation but he took refuge in 
the evasive tactic of refusing to take personal responsibility, stating that if he 
had been personally responsible he would have resigned.   
The subsequent prosecution of the Metropolitan Police by the Health 
and Safety legislature over the Stockwell shooting identified the ‘systemic’ 
failures in procedure which were listed in the judgement, although the judge 
specifically directed the jury to absolve the Gold Commander, Commander 
Cressida Dick, from blame.  The subsequent IPCC report made sixteen 
recommendations in the general areas of Police use of Firearms, Operational 
Considerations, Surveillance Operations, Post-Incident Management, 
Communications Infrastructure, Training and Exercises and finally Community 
Reassurance (See Appendix ‘B’).  They were addressed to HMIC, the Home 
Office, ACPO and the MPS.  
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Further work on accountability, or more correctly the lack of 
accountability, particularly in sector or BCU policing, was carried out in 1994 
by Dixon and Stanko. They found that: 
What is needed, in the brave new world of de-centralised 
policing, are local forms of accountability capable of yielding 
a new set of relationships between police and people at 
sector or neighbourhood level. Only in this way can 
substance be given to the rhetoric of policing by consent. 
Sector policing sets off….by establishing a new institutional 
structure….as a means of increasing accountability and 
promoting consent.  (Dixon and Stanko, 1994: p.182). 
 
It is worthy of note that the authors link successful and open 
accountability with the principle of policing by consent, both of which, as I 
have already premised, are inextricably linked.  It is also worth noting that the 
‘sector model’ has since been replaced by the ‘neighbourhood policing 
model’, and whilst it is out-with the scope of this research, it is nevertheless a 
development worth monitoring in order to gauge whether it will be any more 
successful than the preceding schemes. 
Vocabularies of Motive 
As a caveat to the theme of consent, and in order to assist in the 
interpretation of the interview data, I have examined a relatively early 
sociological theory of C Wright-Mills in 1940 entitled ‘Situated Actions and 
Vocabularies of Motive (Mills, 1940). Mills’s theory was a massive volte-face 
from the original theory that the main function of language was already 
expressed as ‘prior elements’ within individuals. Mills postulated that ‘….we 
must approach linguistic behaviour, not by referring it to private states in 
individuals, but by observing its social function of co-ordinating diverse 
actions.” Rather than expressing something which is prior and in the person, 
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language is taken by other persons as an indicator of future actions.’ (Mills 
1940: p.904). This is what he termed ‘situated actions’ and ‘vocabularies of 
motive’, or to put it somewhat more simply ‘how do we know this is the real 
reason?’ According to Mills all reasons given are the outcome of the situation 
in which they are produced to the people asking the questions and that no 
answers are either ‘real’ or more real’ than any others. We must then decide    
how we interpret the reality expressed within those expressions of motive. For 
example if, in reply to a question about the control of public disorder, a chief 
officer stated that he believed that we (the police) have the consent of the 
public to use what are virtually para-military tactics in the control of public 
disorder. According to Mills’s theory this answer is neither a real and factual 
response, or is believable as a sincerely held view because the subject clearly 
apparently believes it. It is simply nothing more than a convenient verbal 
strategy in a particular context.  
In 1997 Campbell suggested that it would be worthwhile re-visiting Mills 
on motive and carrying out the research that Mills originally recommended 
but, importantly, recognising that “vocabularies of motive” encompasses 
concepts that relate to both roles and persons.  
In order to test Mills’s theoretical framework thereby providing a means 
to anchor his original theory of ‘situational actions and vocabularies of motive’ 
the motives that have prompted the interview subjects will be identified, firstly 
in responding to the interview request, and secondly in the nature of their 
replies, given that they were talking to a distanced ‘insider’ researcher. This   
may, in itself, create yet another ‘vocabulary of motive’ arising out of that 
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particular situational action. Mills’s concepts will be explored more fully in the 
methodology chapter. 
The principles of autonomy will also be explored in greater depth in 
Chapter 4, suffice to say at this stage, it is well recognised and accepted that 
the greatest autonomy, particularly in the milieu of day-to-day policing, is 
practised by the most junior (in rank) officers, the constables.    This was 
supported in 1991 by Shearing and Ericson who explained this particular facet 
of policing which they termed ‘….culture as figurative action….’ (Shearing and 
Ericson,1991: p.481). In effect they demonstrated that they viewed police 
activity as an act or actions that might have taken place but, in fact, did not.  
This can be illustrated by the following set of circumstances.  A patrolling 
police officer sees a youth standing in a car park where a number of vehicle 
thefts have taken place but decides, for whatever reason, not to take any 
action. What else might the officer have done; he may have spoken to the 
youth in general terms and, depending on the response received, carry out a 
‘Stop and Search procedure under the auspices of the PACE Act 1984. He 
may also have carried out both local and national computer checks to 
establish whether or not the youth was either a wanted person or a missing 
person; however, these are only a few of the actions or more correctly in this 
context ‘inactions’ that may or may not have taken place.  
The type of decisions taken by those involved in the ‘craft of policing’ 
demonstrate that police work is done from ‘….moment to moment….often 
without reflection’ (Shearing and Ericson, 1991: p.487) whereby the officer 
grasps the essentials of what is required, getting to the heart of the matter 
almost immediately. Officers have been interviewed about how police work is 
  72 72  
‘done’ and, according to Shearing and Ericson; they invariably cite previous 
experience as being an almost infallible guide. 
 
Returning to the continuing development of the new police further 
research was conducted by Taylor in 1995 when he examined the formation 
of the Middlesbrough Borough Police. This force, according to Taylor, did not 
have the approbation of the citizens of Middlesbrough; indeed their 
development mirrored the development of other police forces in this period 
with the over-riding concern of the ruling class being to exert some form of 
social control over the ‘working classes’, who were doubtless the people most 
affected by the ‘increasing regulation of everyday public life’ (Taylor, 1995: 
p.45). 
From the 1850s when, in the main, the force consisted of men who 
viewed the office as a short term casual measure, to the 1880s and 90s, 
where it was viewed as a career rather than yet another form of casual 
employment, highlights the development of the force.  This growth in stature 
was due in no small measure to a form of social cohesion within the force, 
almost an esprit de corps, a sense of belonging and a sense of pride in being 
a police officer. Whether or not they aspired to the Peelian principles of 
policing by consent is a matter for conjecture and it would be wrong to ascribe 
those principles to them.   
 
That same development of policing during the nineteenth century was 
further examined by Taylor in 1997 when he identified three main strands of it 
[that development]. The first, he termed the ‘orthodox or Whig interpretation’ 
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(Taylor, 1997: p.2) where authors such as Charles Reith, Sir Leon 
Radzinowicz and T. A. Critchley viewed the development of the new police as 
having the consent of the public, which, in turn, had developed in response to 
the concerns of the public in the most appropriate way. The lawlessness on 
the streets of 19th century London being a notable case in point became, 
according to these commentators, the driving force behind the introduction of 
the Metropolitan Police.  However this view is flawed on several counts by 
failing to satisfactorily account for the dichotomy which existed between both 
sides of the argument for police reform. 
The second strand, which Taylor identified as the ‘….revisionist school’ 
(Taylor, 1997: p.2) is based on the conflict within society  where the working 
classes presented both moral and physical threats to the stability and good 
order of that society with the ruling classes seeking to extend a form of social 
control over the under-class. However, there are problems in this 
interpretation in so far as the triumph of good over evil, as identified in the 
orthodox view,  and distinctions between ‘rough and respectable’  are far to 
simplistic and say little or nothing about the complex social relationships that 
are present within any society. Indeed whilst the reformers sought to direct the 
police towards the control of drunkenness and prostitution with an almost 
messianic zeal, some chief officers turned a blind eye to these problems 
provided that ‘….it did not involve violence or blatantly indecorous behaviour 
on the streets’. (Taylor, 1997: p.4). 
The third strand concentrates on more recent research which, in 
general terms, presents a much more complex view than those of the two 
previous strands, by identifying the multi-layered variations which occur 
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throughout society and, by default, the same variations which in occur in the 
development of the ‘new police’. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(With thanks to Malcolm Young) 
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The control of public order and the implications on the nature of 
consent. 
Virtually every police force in England and Wales now provides armed 
response units on a 24/7 basis. In addition, during periods of heightened 
national security and often in response to terrorist threats, heavily armed 
officers overtly patrol high-risk locations such as airports. The rise in what 
some commentators have termed para-militarism can be found in the 
equipment that officers don to police public order situations; crash helmets 
complete with radio communications, flame-retardant overalls, shin and arm 
guards and polycarbonate shields. The equipment (see Fig.1 above) was 
improved following the number serious injuries to officers during the Brixton 
riots. The illustration neatly encapsulates the historical significance of the 
equipment.   
Within the service this is viewed, not only as a Health and Safety 
measure designed to prevent officers being injured by the increasingly 
sophisticated tactics of rioters, but also to provide a high profile, robust and 
measured response to large scale public disorder. 
Emerging evidence from the Chief Officer’s interview data, whilst 
indicating broad support for the Health and Safety aspect, does not, in any 
way, support the formation of a ‘third force’ to deal solely with public disorder, 
and those views will be fully explored in later chapters; however such para-
military or ‘third forces’ already exist in one form or another on mainland 
Europe.  In France the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), are 
seen principally as a riot control force, deployed to disperse rioters with the 
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use of CS Gas grenades and water cannon6. They are the  general reserve of 
the French National Police, who themselves are part of the much older 
Gendarmerie, a semi-military force which found favour in the times of 
Napoleon III and  ‘….who had responsibility for policing outside the major 
towns of metropolitan France….and providing the first line of defence against 
insurrection in his capital’. (Emsley, 1999: p.2). A gendarmerie also provided, 
according to Napoleon 1st ‘….a surveillance half civil, half military spread 
across the whole territory….’. (Correspondance de Napoléon 1re, Paris, 1862 
in Emsley 1999: p.2). Indeed the Gendarmerie can boast a lineage of some 
‘….eight centuries of history’ (Emsley, 1999: p.13). The Carabinierie in Italy 
perform a similar function and the Guardia Civil in Spain provide an 
overarching or Federal armed police function.   
There is a commonality in the para-military appearance of all of these 
‘third forces’, bearing in mind their military ancestry; they usually reside in 
some form of regimental barracks, and certainly, in respect of the CRS, 
operate away from their base town, being deployed only when the situation 
warrants it.  Lack of local accountability is the principle danger inherent in 
deployments of this nature whereby they are not seen as ‘ordinary’ members 
of the community fulfilling a policing function but more as a repressive arm of 
the state that will deal specifically with the disorder and then withdraw leaving 
the ‘local’ police to clear up the detritus and endeavour to restore whatever is 
regarded as the norm in day-to-day police/public relations. 
                                            
6  At this juncture it is important to note that in early 2014 an ACPO commissioned report regarding the 
purchase of water cannon for use in the Metropolitan Police area, and if required in other force areas within England 
and Wales. It did not meet with overwhelming approval and there were a number of major dissenters. In Chapter 9, 
Conclusions, the report is examined in more detail. However in June 2014 the purchase of three second-hand water 
cannon for use by the MPS was authorised by the Mayor of London Boris Johnson.  
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In 2002 Rowe examined what had become a ‘….pre-eminent theme in 
current debates about policing’ (Rowe, 2002: p.424), that of policing diversity. 
He further argued that the requirements of policing diversity were such that 
they may even represent a ‘….fundamental break with long-standing notions 
such as ‘policing by consent’ (Rowe, 2002: p.424).  
The policing of diversity in England and Wales has had a long and 
sometimes troubled history with the Brixton and Toxteth riots in the 1980s, 
and, notably, the Broadwater Farm riots in 1985, which were the triggered by 
the death of Cynthia Jarret whose death was accelerated ‘….by a negligent 
push from one of the searching officers’ (Gifford, A. (Lord) 1986: p16)  during 
an unjustified search of the Jarret home following her husbands’ arrest. The 
subsequent riots culminated in the murder of PC Keith Blakelock. A number of 
people have been brought to trial as recently as 2014 but as yet, there have 
been no convictions. The murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and the 
subsequent mishandling of the investigation into his death have also proved 
to be a long and protracted process, which, twenty years on, continues to 
provide evidence that the MPS were, and still are, guilty of mismanaging the 
whole affair. 
Notwithstanding these notable cases Rowe still argues that the ‘notion 
of policing diversity appears to encapsulate and further the principle of 
policing by consent that has informed the development of policing in Britain 
since the establishment of modern police forces….’(Rowe 2002: p.439). As 
the reader is already aware, the principle of policing by consent has been in 
existence for many, many years and is often expressed in a straightforward 
and simple manner whereby if the police live up to public expectation, using 
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as little force as possible, at the same time dealing fairly and equitably with 
the general public then that consent, in the majority of cases, will be secured. 
However the policing of diversity has demonstrated, singularly and 
clearly, that the police cannot achieve that fairness by treating all groups or 
communities in a similar manner. Rowe opines that diversity, particularly to 
the police, equates to racial and ethnic minorities and that their training and 
focus has seen an over-concentration on this particular aspect of policing. 
This has been to the overall detriment of the policing of the many other 
communities which are based on many other social factors rather than just 
ethnicity. 
Surely then this has implications for a proposed jurisprudence of 
consent whereby the make-up and variety of the many differing communities 
in Britain must be taken into consideration in order to ensure, that if such a 
jurisprudence is feasible, then cognisance must be taken of the much wider 
‘community diversity’ which Rowe has identified.       
  
   Also in 2002 Sir (now Lord) John Stevens, gave an interview in which 
he explored his career and expounded his philosophies. The interviewer, 
Westmarland, identified his underlying approach to his work, including his 
often forthright views on policing philosophy and practice, young people and 
crime, the legalizing of drugs, the impact of terrorism, collaboration between 
research and practice, police subculture, racism and ethnicity, police 
corruption and last but by no means least his views on consent and 
autonomy.  When asked if it was possible to have a ‘fair’ police service Lord 
Stevens commented ‘….the principles of this country are the principles of 
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policing by consent and the independence of our actions’. (Westmarland, 
2002: p.6) 
Further to this in 2013, at the request of Her Majesties’ opposition, Lord 
Stevens produced a report regarding the future of policing which, it is widely 
recognised, will form part if not all of the Labour Party manifesto for the 2015 
General Election. The key findings of his substantial report are summarised 
as follows;- 
1. The new governance system, that of the Police and 
Crime Commissioner regime, has ‘fatal systematic flaws’ 
(p13) and should be replaced. Three options are given 
with the recommendation being that policing boards 
should be established, the members being the leaders of 
local authorities in each force area.  Building greater 
accountability at the lowest tier of local government is 
also advocated. (pp.72-91). 
2. Policing should be ‘grounded in values that are widely 
shared among the British People’ (p.14) and revised and 
updated ‘Peelian Principles’ are proposed (pp.29 -35). 
This particular recommendation would appear to be 
somewhat similar to my propopsed ‘jurisprudence of 
consent’. 
3. Neighbourhood policing is under threat, largely as a result 
of austerity cuts and a narrow focus on crime reduction 
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and consequently  a ‘social justice model of 
neighbourhood policing….should be enshrined in law 
(p.26) and a ‘local policing commitment should be 
introduced’. (p.14). 
4. Officer morale was at ‘rock bottom’ (p13) and 
recommendations are made for a ‘new deal for police 
officers and staff’ and for ‘building a police profession’ 
and new standards and misconduct procedures are 
proposed. (pp. 94-136). 
5. The importance of ‘creating effective partnerships’ is 
emphasised. (pp. 56-67). 
6. The current force structures need to change, all three 
options considered will result in fewer but larger forces or 
a national force. The commission recognised that there is 
no consensus on a way forward. (pp.139-154). It is 
interesting to note that this recommendation is in line with 
similar proposals made by Charles Clarke, the then 
Home Secretary under the Labour Government in 2005, 
for the establishment of ’11 or 12’ regional forces, 
coupled with the retention of BCU policing at a local level. 
Whilst there was no consensus for this proposal there is 
now a model for a national police service following the 
creation of Police Scotland on April 1st 2013. 
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7. Technology is considered with recommendations 
focusing on procurement but also examining mobile 
technology, on-line reporting of crime and opportunities 
for a shared intelligence platform. (pp. 171-172). 
8. Recommendations are made concerning the use and 
procurement of forsensic science services. (pp. 171-172) 
9. Principles are proposed for private sector involvement in 
policing. (pp.177-179). 
10. A recommendation is made to merge the IPCC  and the 
HMIC. (p.138) 
11. Media and police relations would be improved by a more 
trusting and confident relationship, with recording of 
contacts but not restrictions. (p.125). This 
reccommendation is would appear to be directly 
connected to the revelations made during the Lord 
Levison7 public enquiry into the conduct of the press 
which is still on-going.         
As stated, accountability has also been the subject of considerable 
research and in 2005 Cheung carried out a review of current literature in an 
attempt to find a generic definition of police accountability. She examined the 
                                            
7  The Leveson Inquiry is an on-going judicial public inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the 
British press following the phone hacking scandal within Rupert Murdochs’ News International conglomerate. The 
inquiry is chaired by Lord Justice Leveson who was appointed in July 2011. During 2011 and 2012 a series of public 
hearings were held and the Inquiry published an interim report in November 2012. This report reviewed the general 
culture and ethics of the British media and made recommendations for a new, independent, body to replace the 
existing Press Complaints Commission. The terms of reference for this new body would be enshrined in law. Part two 
of the inquiry has been deferred until after the criminal prosecutions arising out of the conduct of the editor and staff 
at the News of the World.  
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origins and meaning of accountability and developed a conceptual theoretical 
framework for ensuring it (accountability) particularly in relation to the policing 
of Hong Kong. Whilst there are, as I have already explored, similarities in 
policing in Hong Kong and in Britain based on the creation of Hong Kong as  a 
Crown Colony, there are also major differences. However the creation of a set 
of accountability principles can provide guidelines to ensure a similar set of 
principles in Britain which would incorporate ‘….an understanding of the wider 
political system and political developments in society….rather than focusing 
too narrowly on the police organisation itself (Cheung, 2005: p.24). Once 
again I would expect to incorporate these accountability principles in order to 
underpin my proposed jurisprudence of consent.    
Further to this, and again in 2005, Wood and MacAllister examined the 
relevance of police independence in view of the accountability mechanisms in 
the UK which encourage the police to be more locally responsive. 
 
At first glance this concept could easily viewed as oxymoronic insofar 
as that encouraging and promoting local response from a national  
(governmental) level will tend to negate at least the impression of 
independence. They carried out a close investigation into the relationship 
between accountability and independence, and argued that, although they are 
separate entities or opposites, we should view them as ‘….separate, albeit 
related, aspects of an officials relationship with others’. (Stenning, 1999 in 
Wood, D. and McAlister A. 2005: p.338). From this interpretation it is 
suggested that ‘….there must always be a ‘trade-off’ between these 
competing concerns; the more accountable we make the police the less 
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independent they become and vice-versa.’  (Stenning, 1999 in Wood, D. and 
McAlister A. 2005: p.201).  
 
In 2005 Goldsmith opined that because of the fact that the salient 
feature in police-public relations is a lack of trust there have been a large 
number of police reforms carried out, particularly in developing and post-
authoritarian countries. This, in turn, makes policing by consent, or even the 
introduction of the concept, almost impossible to implement.  Indeed before 
such a concept can be introduced there must, at all costs, be a framework of 
trust in the police which can be built through a provision of security to the 
population. This, in turn will then, according to the National Research Council, 
ensure that the legitimacy of the police is enabled by ‘….the judgements that 
ordinary citizens make about the rightfulness of police conduct and the 
organisations that employ and supervise them’ (National Research Council, 
2004: p.291). 
As already premised earlier in this chapter the increasing privatisation 
of parts of the police service in relatively recent times have been viewed by 
many as an attempt by chief officers to ensure that sworn officers are able to 
fulfil the daily requirements of the duties that require their particular expertise 
and exercise of their legal powers. The dichotomy that this presents was 
highlighted in 2007 by Ericson who drew comparisons between the use of 
police power, with its attendant strictures and procedural rules governing the 
majority of police/public interactions and how a number of public, private and 
regulatory bodies now operate in the field of enforcement without the same 
strictures. 
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  These procedures, which Ericson called ‘Counterlaw I’, which passes 
laws ‘that negate the traditional principles, standards and procedures of 
criminal law’ and ‘Counterlaw 2’ that takes the form of ‘….surveillance 
infrastructures  that facilitate direct behavioural control  and self-policing 
without recourse to legal regulation’.  (Foucault, 1977: pp.221-3).   
 
This counter-law environment of  “policing networks, legal exceptions 
and surveillance technologies (see pages 87 to 89) is increasingly relied upon  
to ensure that ‘….the police are watched as well as watchers’ (Ericson, 2007: 
p.367) “quis custodiet, ipsos custodes?”.  Literally, who will guard the guards?  
(Juvenal, 56 AD).  
Public confidence in policing has always been an essential element in 
the building of trust and the acceptance of policing and in 2007 Jackson and 
Sunshine examined the sociological and social-psychological processes that 
underpin support and trust in the police in an English rural setting.  According 
to them, from a neo-Durkheimian perspective, confidence in the police is not 
driven by worries about becoming a victim of crime but rather, concerns about 
social cohesion where the police are judged more on moral order and social 
stability rather than the fear and threat of crime.  In addition the police, in 
order to gain public confidence,  must not only be seen to possess the same 
moral values as those whom they police but that they must treat that same 
public with fairness and dignity.  Again this demonstrates a return to the fact 
that gaining the public trust becomes a major plank in the social and moral 
development of the police. Additionally these factors surely would tend to 
indicate support for at least a doctrine, if not a jurisprudence of consent.   
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Pluralism was further also looked at by Vaughan in 2007 when he dealt 
with the question of legitimacy in public policing. He also questioned which 
individuals or activities should be policed, which in itself causes public 
disagreement over what and who should be policed; policing priorities often 
conflict with public demand therefore giving rise to discontent. The article 
analyses how three major political theorists, John Rawls, Michael Walzer and 
Friederich Von Hayek dealt with these issues with their insights being utilised 
to define a principal of non-domination which is regarded as  ‘….a freedom 
from interference on an arbitrary basis as best suited to  justify policing in an 
era of pluralism’ (Vaughan, 2007: p.347).   
In an article published in 2005 in Theoretical Criminology entitled 
‘Police Reform and the Problem of Trust’   Goldsmith researched a number of 
police reforms, particularly in post-authoritarian states. In 2007, Chan, 
returned to the theme of reform, and, in particular, examination of reforms that 
have been applied to police practices and procedures which have failed 
because ‘….the idea of a recalcitrant police culture being an impediment to 
reform is one that has general currency’ (Chan,2007: p.324). The bulk of 
Chan’s enquiry centres on a survey on the introduction of new accountability 
procedures in New South Wales Police. The survey population was drawn 
mainly from the rank and file where the new procedures are seen as yet 
another administrative burden which, in turn, removed resources away from 
front-line policing.   
Parallels to this can be found in policing in England and Wales 
whereby the recording procedures contained in the PACE Act of 1984, which 
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although designed to protect both the police officer and the suspect  and to 
provide a framework enshrined in the Codes of Practice annexed to the act,  
has seen yet another administrative burden placed on the police.   
Officers are now bound by that same legislation and the processes 
contained within the ‘New Public Management Culture’ (Hough 2007: p.66)  
which appears to regard the process of recording as the most important part 
of any encounter, a process which Hough feels may well have a negative 
effect on police legitimacy.  Within that same culture forces now have to 
adhere to the Home Office National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) 
introduced on April 1st. 2002, which are aimed at recording crime in a more 
victim-focused way and maintaining greater consistency between police 
forces in the recording of crime.  It has, in some instances,  resulted in the 
‘criminalisation’ of schoolchildren involved in minor assault cases whereby in 
order to record the offence as a sanctioned detection, statements have to be 
taken and the aggressor arrested and processed, with the usual outcome 
being at the level  of a juvenile caution.  
 
As with any other subject, the focus of research and subsequent policy 
making in policing changes over decades; witness the 1970s and 1980s when 
both academics and police leaders sought to legitimate policing and espoused 
the concept of policing by consent.  These ideas were rapidly overtaken in the 
1990s by a culture of ‘….crude managerialism from which we are only now 
emerging.’ (Hough, 2007: p.64).  As Jackson, Bradford, Hough, and Murray, 
stated in 2012, there has been ‘…. a resurgence of interest in ensuring that 
the public a) find the police trustworthy b) think the police are a legitimate 
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authority, and c)  believe it is morally just to both obey the law and cooperate 
with legal institutions’ (Jackson, Bradford, Hough, and Murray, 2012: p.29). 
They also went on to say that if they  ‘….demonstrated moral authority….the 
police can embody, in more general terms,  a shared sense of right and wrong 
and a commitment to the rule of law. This does no require them to be 
moralists, or to demonstrate moral superiority. But it does require them to 
negotiate order in a way that maximises consent’ (added emphasis) 
(Jackson, Bradford, Hough, and Murray, 2012: p.34). Surely a demonstration 
that, once again, both the climate and time is right to further explore the 
design and implementation of a jurisprudence of consent.     
It is well recognised that, according to Hough in 2008, the attempts to 
modernise the British police via the means of the New Public Management 
Culture, ‘….have narrowed police function in a way that has damaged public 
satisfaction with and confidence in the police’ (Hough 2008: p.63). There is 
also little doubt that within the rush to embrace this particular culture severely 
damaged the legitimacy of the police, but fortunately a number of chief 
officers had already recognised this prior to government and political 
awareness of the damage being caused and, in order to counteract its effects 
they ‘….initiated a new Reassurance Policing Policy’ (Hough 2008: p.63). The 
police are usually granted legitimacy because they are seen to embrace 
legitimating values insofar as the fairness of the process of justice itself, and, 
equally important, outcomes that are satisfactory to all parties involved. Again 
this fairness and legitimacy are worthy of serious consideration within the 
auspices of the proposed jurisprudence of consent.   
Surveillance 
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s criminologists developed what was to 
become an influential concept in preventing crime by means of environmental 
design by proposing that ‘….the nature of the built environment can effect the 
level of crime by influencing potential offenders and by affecting the 
ability ….to exercise control over their surroundings. There is essentially a 
powerful belief in the capacity of surveillance to help control crime’. (Burke 
2001: p.196).    The fact that Britain has the highest concentration of 
CCTV surveillance in Europe is testament to the exponential growth of 
intrusive surveillance, which, in turn, prompted the Information Commissioner 
Richard Thomas to comment in an article in the Times Newspaper (August 
2007) that ‘the UK could sleepwalk into a surveillance society as a result of ID 
cards and other plans’.  
It is particularly interesting and notable that, despite the concentration 
of intrusive surveillance in these islands, no government to date has seen fit 
to introduce any legislation to control either its use or its growth. Whilst it is 
accepted that there are security industry bodies which lay down codes of 
practice for the installation, operation and monitoring of these systems as yet 
there has been no serious parliamentary debate about the introduction of 
primary legislation to control and properly monitor both surveillance 
equipment and its operatives. It is more than fair to posit that the government, 
of whatever hue, is content with the status-quo and that regulation, and the 
subsequent monitoring required, would somewhat lessen the preferred 
‘governmental light touch’ which also, in turn saves them from being bound 
and restricted by the self-same legislation.    
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Further to this, in a radio interview on BBC Radio Five Live on Tuesday 
23rd October 2007, Thomas stated, that in mid 2006, his office had produced 
a report highlighting the use of pilot-less drone (See Fig 2, p.89) aircraft that 
carry equipment which is able to oversee ground events and home in 
pictorially on individuals.  He envisaged that this kind of technology might well 
be in use by the police during the London Olympic Games in 2012; however, 
in interview, he was ‘staggered’ to find that in August 2007 one police force 
(Staffordshire) had actually deployed one of these drones at the ‘V’ Festival, 
held in Weston Park, Staffordshire, ostensibly to monitor the car parking area 
in connection with vehicle theft and associated vehicle crime.  
Even more disturbing, these drones can also be fitted with additional 
equipment that has the capability of using Smart Water, a unique chemical 
signature, to mark selected individuals on both skin and clothing, enabling 
them to be traced at a later date. (The Guardian Newspaper, 21st August 
2008). 
Figure 2 
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Police Culture 
‘Police culture refers to the values and assumptions 
shared by police officers as a group or as an occupation. 
These shared values underpin how officers see the role of 
the police, their judgement about people, how they relate to 
each other and how they interact with the public….It also 
includes special knowledge and skills, ways of thinking and 
working, rituals and rules of thumb, language and 
vocabulary….that the police have developed in their work.’ 
(Chan in Wakefield and Fleming, 2009: p.72). 
  
A number of authors have examined the phenomenon of police culture. 
They include, amongst many others Manning and Van Maanen (1978), 
Holdaway (1984), Shearing and Ericson (1991), Chan 1997, Reiner (2000), 
Foster (2003), Chan, Devery and Doran (2003), O’Neill, Marks and Singh 
(2007), and Bradford and Quinton (2014). These authors have all, in 
numerous ways, explained police culture in a way that is synonymous with 
Chan’s explanation.  However, even within those many cultural types that 
have been identified, there are also numerous sub-cultures which exist and 
which appear to assist in both driving and directing the day-to-day actions of 
patrolling police officers. This area has also been subjected to dedicated 
research by a number of authors.  
However it is fair to say, without listing every sub-culture that has been 
revealed and analysed by the authors listed above and others, that there is 
ample evidence to identify the existence of something that has often been 
termed the ‘canteen culture’. Anecdotal evidence for its existence can be 
found in the ‘advice’ given to newly trained police officers by their mentors on 
their first operational posting, of which I had first hand.  In general summation 
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the recruit(s) were advised to forget ‘all that rubbish you learned at training 
school, this is the way we do it here to make the job work.’ Doubtless this will 
strike a cord within the memory of most police officers, certainly of my 
generation, and anecdotally, the policing generations that followed. It is also 
worthy of note that there are also many ‘givens’ or tacit agreements that exist 
within police work. For example, whilst it may never be stated outright, you will 
always support a colleague, even if they are in the wrong. This (support) can 
either be by demonstrative positive support and action or, at the very least, by 
inaction, a situation highlighted by Holdaway in 1984. 
It is also important to mention that many of the self-same authors have 
proposed various solutions to the elimination of certainly the more contentious 
and almost unlawful aspects of police culture. The solution proposed in 2000 
by Reiner, who, in echoing the views of many others, stated that; 
 ‘….the nature of police work does seem to generate 
a recognisably related culture…. Fundamental change in 
this requires not just changes aimed at individual officers 
(for example in selection and training), nor grand policy 
declarations, but a reshaping of the basic character of the 
police role as a result of wider social transformation.’ 
(Reiner, 2000: p.106). 
   
In 1997, Chan conducted a research study of the New South Wales 
Police in which she first identified and itemised a number of different aspects 
of police culture and then identified strategies for change. Chan recognised  
that the debate on police reform, either through legislation or cultural change 
‘….has been stymied by an inadequately theorised notion of police culture. 
(Chan 1997: p.65). She then went on to reconceptualise police culture in 
order to understand why reforms, both legal or cultural ‘….often make little 
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difference to police practice.’ (Chan 1997: p.65). Her cognitive model of 
culture  adopted Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘field’ and ‘habitus’ ‘….to represent 
the structural conditions of policing and the learned dispositions of police 
culture respectively.’ (Chan,1997: p.65). It is Chan’s model of culture, an 
explanation of which follows, that will be employed to identify underlying 
themes. 
The linear model of police practice, demonstrated below, indicated that 
it was possible to ‘….change cultural knowledge and police practice and 
police practice simply by changing structural conditions’ (Chan, 1997: p.73). 
Figure 3 
 
STRUCTRAL  CULTURAL    POLICE 
CONDITIONS  KNOWLEDGE   PRACTICE 
   (The field)       (Habitus) 
 
Figure 3: A linear model of police practice (Chan, 1997: p73) 
However this model ‘….neglects the centrality of police officers as 
active participants in the construction and reproduction of cultural knowledge 
and institutional practise’. (Chan, 1997: p. 73). Her amended model was 
based on whether ‘….structural change results in any change in cultural 
knowledge or institutional practice depends….on the capacity of officers to 
adapt to the change’. (Chan 1997:p.74). See figure 4 (below).  
 
 
Figure 4 
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                Figure 4: An interactive model of the production of police practice (Chan, 1997: p.74) 
 
It is important to note that the relationships between the elements are 
neither  uni-directional nor deterministic. (Chan,1997: p.74). The centrality of 
the ‘police actors’ in this model, as opposed to the linear model demonstrated 
on the previous page, enables or helps to enable changes in both cultural 
knowledge and institutional practice provided, as Chan recognised, that the 
officers involved have the capacity to change.  
According to Chan, in her discussion on habitus, she reveals that:  
‘….there are four dimensions of cultural knowledge in 
street-level police work: axiomatic knowledge (which 
constitutes the basic rationale of policing), dictionary 
knowledge (which sets up categories about people whom 
police come into contact with), directory knowledge (which 
informs officers on how to go about getting their work done), 
and recipe knowledge (which prescribes the menu of 
acceptable and unacceptable practices in specific 
situations). (Chan, 1997: p.76).  
 
Axiomatic Knowledge. 
POLICE ‘ACTORS’ 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  CULTURAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
      (Habitus) 
  POLICE 
PRACTICE 
STRUCTURAL 
CONDITIONS 
    (The Field)    
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This deals with one of the fundamental assumptions regarding the why 
and the wherefore of the way actions are carried out within an organisation. 
Traditionally, police officers view their daily routines and work ‘….in terms of 
waging a ‘war against crime’, maintaining order and protecting peoples life 
and property.’ (Chan, 1997: p.76). It is interesting to note that echoes of these 
three axioms can be readily identified in both the constables ‘oath of office’ 
taken by every police officer at the start of their policing career, and in Sir 
Robert Peels nine principles of policing. Other authors, including Reiner 
(1992) and Manning (1978) have identified that officers often develop a sense 
of mission towards their work and, that without their intervention, the social 
fabric would be destroyed. Because of the way police officers have portrayed 
themselves as professional enforcers of the law, without recourse to any 
political implications, the public have grown to expect a level of service, 
particularly from those self-identified guardians of public order and crime 
fighters, which cannot support their expectations. Manning termed this 
particular situation as ‘….the impossible mandate’ (Manning, 1978 in Chan 
1997: p.76). In addition officers themselves tend to categorise their work into 
‘proper police work’  such as arresting the perpetrators of crime, preventing 
crime and saving lives; the other routine tasks which, in reality, form the bulk 
of their working day then becomes unworthy of their attention. 
Dictionary Knowledge 
In many of the situations that arise during an officer’s working day they 
are called upon to rapidly assess those situations and then to take action to 
resolve them if possible. In this respect research has shown that officers 
develop an awareness of what they see during their patrol time and that this 
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awareness is translated contextually into notions of normality and abnormality. 
Indeed through this often highly developed awareness officers infer; 
 ‘….the probability of criminality from the 
appearances persons present in public places….What is 
normal for a place is normal for the place at a time. The 
meaning of an event to the policeman at a place depends 
on the time it occurs.’ (Sacks, 1978 pp.190-194 in 
Chan,1997: p.77).  
 
Research has also revealed that many officers tend to categorise 
people they deal with into those they feel are respectable and those that are 
more representative of a class of people who would challenge an officer’s 
authority. Ethnic stereo-typing has also been seen as part of this ‘dictionary 
knowledge’ and the Brixton riots are testament to the MPS’s over-enthusiastic 
application of what become colloquially known as ‘Sus’ Law. In order to 
combat this stereo typing an official internal campaign took place within the 
police service in the mid-1990s. One of the most powerful features of this 
poster campaign showed a young black man in a BMW, who, according to 
Chan’s description of ‘dictionary knowledge’ was worth, in officer parlance, a 
‘stop’. The poster then stated that in fact the driver was a police Chief 
Inspector thereby highlighting the dangers of ethnic stereo-typing.    
 
 
 
Directory Knowledge 
This knowledge, according to Chan, informs officers how operational 
work is routinely carried out and, in many respects, follows on from the 
categories which were revealed in the area of dictionary knowledge. This can, 
and often does, lead to officers targeting those whom they regard as less than 
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respectable, including groups of young people who habitually ‘hang about’ in 
shopping centres, fairgrounds and amusement arcades. 
The use of force, which has already been explored earlier, is also a 
particularly salient feature of police work and Bittner (1978) considered it to be 
one of the core roles of the police stating that ‘….every conceivable police 
intervention projects the message that force may be, and may have to be, 
used to achieve a desired objective’. (Bittner, 1978 in Chan, 1997: p.78). It is 
also worthy of note that the use of force is viewed by officers as a legitimate 
means of taking charge of a situation, however more often than not it is the 
threat to use force rather than its overt use which is employed to resolve 
those situations where the officer deems it necessary. 
In summation most officers contend that they never know what they will 
be dealing with when they ‘walk round a corner’ and that their own instincts, 
experience and common sense will see them through rather than relying on 
theoretical knowledge of the law and policing regulations. 
 
Recipe Knowledge – Police Values 
This section deals with ‘….the normative dimension of cultural 
knowledge’. (Chan, 1997: p.79). and covers the action i.e. what should or 
should not be done in certain situations as well as providing coping strategies 
for the officer(s) concerned. It also introduces the concept of solidarity among 
police officers whereby they view themselves as working in isolation, but at 
the same time, being able to rely on colleagues to ‘cover their backs’ in 
difficult and often dangerous situations. Attitudes to police mis-conduct also 
are also features of ‘recipe knowledge’ and, as Holdaway and others have 
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previous highlighted, officers will often ‘turn a blind eye’ to a colleagues 
malfeasance in order to preserve their solidarity. 
Whilst there are a number of parallels in Reiner’s theories on police 
culture there are also a number of differences, particularly where he highlights 
the ways that ‘cop culture’ is often seen to subvert or even defeat the official 
purposes of the police function. According to Reiner; 
Cop culture has developed as a patterned set of 
understandings that help officers cope with and adjust to 
the pressures and tensions confronting the police. 
Successive generations are socialised into it….mediated 
by stories, myths, jokes, exploring models of good and 
bad conduct, which through metaphor enable 
conceptions of competent practice to be explored 
prefiguratively. The culture survives because of its 
elective affinity, its psychological fit, with the demands of 
the rank-and-file cop condition. (Reiner, 2000: p. 87). 
 
According to Reiner one of the central features of cop culture is a 
sense of mission. It is not just another job; rather it is more a vocation with a 
worthy and worthwhile purpose. This, however, is not regarded as being 
problematic indeed it is often viewed by its actors as ‘….fun, challenging, 
exciting, a game of wits and skill.’ (Reiner, 2000: p. 89).  He also highlights 
the ‘machismo syndrome’ involved in the thrill of the chase and the violence 
used to affect an arrest, which although they form only a small part of the day-
to-day routines of patrol work, they are worthwhile because officers see 
themselves as ‘….one of the good guys’ (Reiner, 2000:p. 89), which in turn 
facilitates them to act in this manner. Furthermore ‘….it is important in 
understanding police work that it is seen as a mission, as a moral imperative, 
not just another job. This makes its established practices much more resistant 
to reform than if they were merely self-serving.’ (Reiner, 2000: p. 89). 
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However, most officers, through the socialisation processes already outlined, 
readily acquire a cynical and pessimistic set of values. 
‘The core of the police outlook is this subtle and complex intermingling 
of the themes of mission, hedonistic love of action and pessimistic cynicism. 
Each feeds off and reinforces the others, even though they may appear 
superficially contradictory.’ (Reiner, 2000: p.90). It is apparent that, by 
applying  these sub-cultures to their role, police officers are, in many ways, 
subjugating the normal day-to-day reality of police work, which, in many 
respects, is ‘….often boring, messy, trivial and venal.’ (Reiner, 2000: p.89). 
Additionally the sub-cultures and mores which underlie the more dominant 
features of police culture and the adherence to and the practise of them, in 
many instances without conscious thought, allow the police in seeing 
themselves as guardians of the social fabric of society. 
Police officers are, from the very beginning of their careers, 
encouraged to view everything with suspicion which encompasses the need 
to be constantly aware of any signs that trouble may develop, or that a person 
(s) may be about to commit an offence. This attitude can and indeed has lead 
to police stereotyping of different groups within society, which, although can 
be an aid to carrying out the police function, can also lead to an increase in 
arrests of these particular deviants, in other words the self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Reiner also goes on to identify various categories of citizens who fall 
within the police purview, many of whom are viewed as people who interfere 
with the policing purpose and, as such are to be wherever and whenever 
possible, disregarded. 
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Earlier in 1984, Holdaway also looked at police organisational culture 
and his findings mainly deal with the stories and jokes that police officers use 
to inform and enlighten both their colleagues and, to a lesser degree, their 
supervisors about courses of action they have taken. These stories are often 
embellished, usually in favour of the teller, in order to make themselves feel 
better if they have had the worst of the encounter, or conversely, to put the 
recipient in a bad light if they feel that they have gotten the better of them.               
In summation, the utilisation these particular models of police culture, 
together with the life history narratives of the officers concerned will help to 
illuminate the study.  
This position was summed up by Gelsthorpe who stated that ‘….social 
researchers want to say something about the subjects….whom they are 
studying who then become the ‘objects’ of their study….in engaging in this 
process, however, researchers may actually be saying something about 
themselves.’(Gelsthorpe, 2007: p.518).  
The study will also provide an authoritative ‘inside’ or alternative view 
of what has been variously described as the social practice or orthodox 
doctrine of ‘policing by consent’ which is distinctly different from ‘policing by 
law’ as well as ‘….assessing the Janus-like task of the police in protecting the 
rights and liberties of the public while fulfilling the policing requirements of the 
state’ (Emsley and Weinberger, 1999: introduction p.xiii). 
Conclusions on Consent 
Having traced the development of the ‘new police’ particularly in 
respect of the three main themes it is still notable that, to this day, as Brogden 
commented in 1979,   
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….the general consent to policing is tentative….that 
consent is subject to continuing interpretation, re-
interpretation, adaptation and negotiation – an endless 
testing and resolving of the contradictions and 
ambiguities and contemporary experiences….”  
(Brogden, 1979: p.7).  
 
Later, in 1982 he expanded on his earlier work, stating that; 
 
   ‘In….England policing by consent has not merely 
been an artificial construct, an ideological conspiracy, 
deliberately manufactured as a rationalisation, or a 
concealment for maleficent practices….’ ; rather, he has 
argued that ‘….it represents a concrete ideology, a major 
substantive review of the relation between civil society and 
the police as affirmed by senior police officers, and 
repetitively reiterated in a myriad of  public and private 
statements’. (Brogden, 1982: p.170). 
  
This is a view supported by many other authors including Dixon, 
Coleman and Bottomley, who concurred with Brogden’s view, stating that 
‘….consent should be seen as an area of negotiation over shifting elements of 
knowledge and power;….practical implications….include the need to see 
‘policing by consent’….as requiring attention, and when appropriate, 
regulation just as much as the use of police powers’. (Dixon, Coleman and 
Bottomley, 1990: 347).  
Others, who have also been reviewed in this chapter, have explored 
and continue to explore the concept at some length and to considerable 
depth; however, to re-iterate, none of them, so far as far as I am aware, have 
considered or examined the concept from a police officer’s viewpoint, an 
omission that will be rectified by this work. 
Thus the current situation with regard to the large number of works 
already researched and published on both the police as a body and the 
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concept of consent has, as a natural consequence, provided the both the 
rationale and the impetus for the research. 
 
Summary of Police Culture 
Having examined Chan’s model with its four levels of knowledge, 
Reiner’s model of police culture with its many facets of both the protagonists 
and the people they deal with on a daily basis, and, finally Holdaway’s earlier 
findings on stories and jokes, cognisance must also be taken of the many 
other authors who examined in some depth other facets of police culture. 
They include Manning and Van Maanen (1978), Holdaway (1984), Shearing 
and Ericson (1991), Chan 1997, Reiner (2000), Foster (2003), Chan, Devery 
and Doran (2003), O’Neill, Marks and Singh (2007), and Bradford and 
Quinton (2014).  
Holdaway was concerned, amongst other things, with the unwritten law 
of ‘guarding a colleague’s back’ and in recording and recounting the stories 
and jokes that officers relate about their diverse daily encounters. In 2000 
Reiner devoted a chapter to what he regarded as the core characteristics of 
‘cop culture’ (Reiner, 2000: pp. 85 – 106). His research identified a series of 
personal attitudes both to the job and to the people they dealt within their daily 
policing tasks. 
It is readily apparent that a lot of the studies mentioned have assumed 
that police culture  has a negative effect upon both the probity and the work 
ethic of its proponents and therefore becomes an obstacle to change, which is 
in itself a feature of police management ‘speak’ voiced on numerous 
occasions, that the ‘culture needs to be changed.’ Other studies, such as 
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Chans, are more subtle and she points to the fact that a wide variety of 
cultures and sub-cultures can and indeed do exist at any one time within the 
organisation and that they either knowingly or unknowingly affect the outcome 
of many police/public encounters. 
In summation it is fair to say that most of the concepts are in fact trying 
to define the same problematic elements of work-place cultures. For example, 
Polanyi’s concept of ‘tacit culture’ seems to bear a striking resemblance to 
Schutz’s idea of the ‘taken for granted’ typifications that a group employs in 
order to make sense of their everyday world. Similarly Chan’s identification of 
the four facets of police knowledge is trying to analyse the way a profession or 
occupational group produces a collective set of values, ideas and practices in 
order to make sense of their daily routine, and, in their view, to make the job 
work. Chan’s approach is more subtly nuanced than the others insofar as she 
breaks the knowledge into different elements, for example highlighting the 
‘recipe knowledge’ that a group may acquire during informal training which is 
gained by different ways of interpreting some of the problems revealed in day-
to-day routine police work. However, she does not emphasise the way this 
knowledge is produced, nor does she identify whether it is counter to the 
official aims of the organisation. 
In marked contrast to Chan’s findings, the concept of the ‘canteen 
culture’ (Holdaway 1984, Reiner, 2000) appears to be closer to a delinquent 
sub-culture, insofar as it credits police officers with the ability to create their 
own world view, indeed they are not merely making passive acceptance of 
their position within the confines of this particular model. However, in marked 
similarity to participants in delinquent gangs, the sub-culture is both creative in 
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adapting to new problems and coercive insofar as it socialises the new recruit 
into accepting its values rather than accepting the official principles and 
rhetoric of the police organisation.        
             
These are some of the key elements that will be utilised to assist in the 
analysis of the data and in Chapter 4 the methodology adopted to carry out 
the analysis will be explained.   
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 some of the key theoretical factors involved in police 
practice were identified including accountability, discretion (autonomy), control 
and consent. In Chapter three, as well as an examination of the main 
literature on policing by consent, police culture was also examined as was 
Mills’s theory, albeit briefly, on situated actions and vocabularies of motive.  
The purpose of chapter 4 is to establish a sound method of obtaining 
the ideas that police officers, both past and present, across the continuum of 
rank and service, have about their role without recourse to conventional 
professional rhetoric that they often adopt as a default position when trying to 
explain how things have gone, in some cases, spectacularly wrong.  
Within my knowledge no other researcher has conducted such a cross 
rank survey of ideas and attitudes. Whilst, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, the Literature Review, there is a considerable body of work on 
policing by consent, it has, in many important respects, been neglected. 
Indeed no one has actually asked officers whether in fact it works in practice. 
However, it must be stressed, that whilst searching questions were asked, 
particularly on consent, they were not designed to trip up the respondents or 
to get them to make any damning admissions; rather they were designed to 
encourage them to reflect upon their experiences, without recourse to official 
rhetoric thereby representing their personal as well as professional views. 
In the previous chapter Chan (1997) highlighted her views on the main 
factors identified within police culture and how those factors impinged upon 
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and in some cases interfered with the impartial and fair dispensation of 
justice.  Briefly those factors can be summarised as follows:- 
Axiomatic knowledge deals with one of the fundamental assumptions 
regarding why things are done the way they are in an organisation. 
‘Traditionally, police officers view their daily routines and work ‘….in terms of 
waging a ‘war against crime’, maintaining order and protecting peoples life 
and property.’ (Chan, 1997: p.76). Surely this is both classic and tacit 
axiomatic knowledge which, although not actually stated, is nevertheless 
revealed by the view expressed.  
Dictionary knowledge encompasses many of the situations that arise 
during an officer’s working day. They are called upon to rapidly assess those 
situations and then to take action to resolve them if possible. In this respect 
research has shown that officers develop an awareness of what they see 
during their patrol time and that this awareness is translated contextually into 
notions of normality and abnormality.  
Directory knowledge, according to Chan, informs officers how 
operational work is routinely carried out and, in many respects, follows on 
from the categories which were revealed in the area of dictionary knowledge. 
This can, and often does, lead to officers targeting those whom they regard as 
less than respectable, including groups of young people who habitually ‘hang 
about’ in shopping centres, fairgrounds and amusement arcades. 
Finally there is Recipe knowledge linked to police values and it deals 
with ‘….the normative dimension of cultural knowledge’. (Chan, 1997: p.79). It 
covers the action i.e. what should or should not be done in certain situations 
as well as providing coping strategies for the officer(s) concerned. These 
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concepts of the hidden cultures of the police will be methodologically 
examined in order to evaluate the impact, if any, they have had upon the 
decisions that have been made, as well as a means of revealing any 
particular themes that emerge.   
The ‘coping strategies’ also include the concept of solidarity among 
police officers whereby they view themselves as working in isolation, but at 
the same time, being able to rely on colleagues to ‘cover their backs’ in 
difficult and often dangerous situations. This ‘back covering , whereby officers, 
in an expression of that solidarity,   either by positive action or inaction (saying 
nothing) will support a colleagues position, whether right or wrong, was also 
highlighted by Holdaway in 1984 and also referred to by Reiner in 2002 where 
he also identified a number of aspects of ‘cop culture’.  
Having highlighted the problems associated with police culture it is 
appropriate to state that the methodology to facilitate revelation of how those 
factors impinge upon their daily professional and in some cases personal 
lives, will be based upon the effects that Chan’s four facets of police culture, 
Reiner’s in-depth examination of the same subject, and supported by 
Holdaway’s earlier findings. As an important adjunct the rhetoric versus reality 
argument found in Mills will be employed in order to facilitate the exploration 
of their ideas and to see beyond the effects of both rhetoric and culture.  
 
Data Analysis  
In order to enable selection of the most appropriate data analysis 
methodology a number of major theories on data collection and analysis have 
been researched and examined They include Life History, Oral History 
(Memory and Retrospection), Discourse Analysis (DA), Critical Discourse 
  107 10
 
 
Analysis (CDA) Conversational Analysis (CA), Grounded Theory (GT) and 
Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive. Having examined the majority of 
these approaches and having extracted the basic tenets and principles of the 
various research paradigms they were then applied to the interview data in 
order to establish their suitability. It became readily apparent that, in essence, 
most of the aforementioned methodologies involve a deep immersion within 
the data, which, particularly in the case of CA (see Glossary) involves the use 
of very sophisticated computer software.  
Whilst there are a number of valid reasons for selecting a particular 
methodology both time and logistical constraints impacted upon the final 
decision to utilise a methodology which could best be described as textual 
analysis and which is best described as an amalgamation of the major 
features of each theory. It is based on the semi-structured interview, relies, to 
a considerable extent, on Mills’s Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive 
as well as Chans four factor model of police culture as previously 
demonstrated in the Literature Review.  
Vocabularies of Motive 
  
It is a salient feature of the majority of qualitative research, particularly 
where a subject’s recall of past incidents is tested, that there is an ever 
present dichotomy between rhetoric and reality; between the view as it was 
and as it is now. This raised further concerns regarding the approach insofar 
as what was being said may not be either the truth of the matter, or an 
approximation which might be as near to the truth as was likely to emerge. 
Both the questions and the responses were analysed to identify whether the 
subject(s) revealed either their true feelings or their motives; did they in fact 
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produce, in most cases, what they thought the questioner or ‘other party’ to 
the conversation ‘wanted’ to hear or what was specific to the current situation. 
On a number of occasions it was noted that their rhetoric appeared to 
be at variance with their (the interviewee’s) true feelings. On these occasions 
the extensive knowledge as a ‘distanced insider’ knowledge’ based on the 
long history of service with the police enabled its identification as such. This   
has been classified as conventional professional rhetoric insofar as the 
officers are saying that they carry out these processes in order to deliver a 
service (similar to other public utilities) to the public. In effect it was simply 
employed by them as a tool to provide a response to the question without 
really answering it.  
Further concerns with regard to the research were also inherent within 
these cases with the added difficulty that the responses would be revealed to 
be merely formulaic, especially when they were compared to their actual 
experiences and their reactions to them. It was also possible that their 
responses were simply anticipatory and that they were either producing a 
response by saying what they felt the interviewer wanted to hear or were 
responding, particularly in respect of an organisation like the police, with the 
official response vis ‘a police spokesman’ commented.   
In respect of the methodologies employed by social actors in response 
to being questioned about past actions Mills hypothesised that;  
‘…. we must approach linguistic behaviour ….by 
observing its social function of co-ordinating diverse 
actions….language is taken by other persons as an 
indicator of  future actions’  (added 
emphasis)….Rather than fixed elements ‘in’ an 
individual, motives are the terms with which 
interpretation of conduct by social actors proceeds…. 
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The differing reasons men give for their actions are not 
themselves without reason.  (Mills 1941: p. 904). 
 
 In other words, according to Mills, the answers are the product of both 
the situation and the relationship. In effect, none of the reasons or 
explanations of past conduct given are truer than any others and it is therefore 
not possible to divine the truth of given explanations with any certainty. This 
will always be an ever present difficulty where qualitative interviewing is 
involved and which highlights the concerns about correctly locating and 
interpreting the responses given during interview. If they are purely the 
anticipatory responses, as demonstrated in the previous paragraph then if 
Mills’ theory is correct, within the context of this work, there is no truth. 
Indeed, based on this interpretation the research interviews simply become 
situated actions, and, within each of those actions there will be vocabularies 
of motive produced purely in response to the interview situation.  
Mills Re-Visited 
 
Mills's work was neglected for a number of years then in 1972 Taylor 
studied the significance attached to motivational accounts by social scientists 
with more than a passing nod to Mills; however Taylor’s work was concerned 
with sexual deviancy, which, he suggested, in effect, deprives the ‘actor’ or 
deviant to describe his behaviour in anything other than a ‘….deterministic 
vocabulary of motives’ which was, in turn determined by and derived from 
their interrogators, medical inspectors and lawyers’. (Taylor 1972: p. 23) It is, 
of course, entirely possible that this category of offender either did not, 
because of their condition, or were not allowed to, possess their own 
narratives of motive. This of course is in direct contrast to my interview 
cohorts who were free of any such strictures. 
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In 1983 Bruce and Wallis concluded that inferring motives in an attempt 
to explain social action is a precarious enterprise and that it should be 
avoided. Whether it is a precarious enterprise or not it is still worthy of both 
exploration and explanation as it goes to the very core of my methodological 
approach.   
 
Further to this,  in 1991 Campbell suggested that it might be worthwhile 
re-appraising Mills on motive and carrying out the research that Mills originally 
recommended but, with the caveat of recognising that  ‘….vocabularies of 
motive encompasses concepts that relate to both roles and persons’ 
(Campbell 1991: p.89). By this he meant that there needed to be a recognition 
that the role and the person were inextricably and could not therefore be 
separated out in order to assign vocabularies of motive.  
However, in 1996, Campbell re-visited Mills arguing that sociologists 
tended to be overly pre-occupied with the relationship between the actors’ 
explanation for behaviour and that offered by the sociologists. He questioned 
whether in fact there were any causal links between motives and conduct and 
he also argued that many objections could be raised against the Millsian 
arguments for his ‘vocabularies of motive’  
   
This situation presents an ideal opportunity to test Mills’s   theoretical 
framework as well as providing evidence which will either support or reject his 
original hypothesis. As Campbell further identified ‘….there should be an effort 
to plot such vocabularies by institutions, societies and historical periods as a 
necessary preliminary to a more sophisticated understanding of the variety of 
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substantive motive forms that have in fact guided action’ (Campbell 1991: 
p.96). Certainly the police institution is rich in its own vocabulary, which has, 
on many occasions caused the generation of those very formulaic responses.   
 Serendipitously, what better way is there of testing the theory than by 
identifying the motives that have prompted the interview subjects, firstly in 
responding to the interview request, and secondly in the nature of their replies 
given that those questions were being posed by a distanced inside 
researcher? Indeed it is felt that these situated actions have provided a 
rigorous justification of the research position adopted, that of a ‘distanced 
insider researcher’, in whose presence the subjects undoubtedly felt relaxed 
and at ease.  
This part of the analysis, based on Mills’s original hypothesis, 
postulates that, in any given situation, the ‘actor’ or in this context, the 
interview subjects, will react accordingly to both the situation and the 
questioner and produce talk.  This ‘talk’ has already been classified as 
conventional professional rhetoric and, in order to allow the reader to see 
beyond this rhetoric, they have been asked for detailed accounts of their 
professional experiences particularly on the (many) occasions when they felt 
they had lost the consent of the public for what they were doing. Some of the 
situations quoted, for example during the miners’ strike in May 1984 where, at 
Orgreave depot in the midlands, ‘….1700 officers….confronted 1500 
pickets ….such tactics increase the risk of violent confrontation….baton 
charges were made on horseback by helmeted riot squads.’ (Uglow,1988: p. 
82) the overall conclusion was that ‘public consent’ during that particular 
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dispute, particularly in respect of the outwardly aggressive form of policing, 
had been well and truly lost. 
 
It would appear that ‘putting them on the spot’ also facilitated the 
assessment of what was being said and which then enabled a value 
judgement of their responses using these criteria. This, in turn, coupled with 
the inside knowledge, enabled ascertation, at least to a degree, of the veracity 
and validity of their replies. On further examination it also, in many ways, 
provided an antidote to the rhetoric because they were being asked to recall 
something which in most cases, may have caused them some personal 
embarrassment. Once again by employing personal knowledge of those self-
same scenarios enabled arrival at a position where something close to the 
truth was emerging. 
Qualitative Data 
Justification for the Collection of Qualitative Data. 
 
Both the method of collection and the nature of the data collected 
through a series of semi-structured interviews from a number of highly specific 
and targeted groups of both serving and retired police officers will be justified.  
The choice of collecting qualitative rather than quantitative data will be 
justified by the fact that the interviews would, and indeed did, facilitate the 
expression of some honestly held and often forthright views on the nature of 
police autonomy, police accountability and particularly ‘policing by consent’.  
This self-revelatory process could then, in turn, reveal some hitherto 
undisclosed facts about both the successes and failures within the careers of 
the interview subjects. The choice of data collection methodology is vindicated 
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and amply demonstrated in chapters 5, 6 and 7, the data analysis chapters, 
which follow.  
In 2004 Kincheloe and Berry argued that ‘….quantitative data collection 
is superior to philosophical enquiry….’ (Kincheloe and Berry 2004: pp.14-15). 
On the other hand it is argued that statistical proof is needed in order to 
support a theoretical stance and that this is the most rigorous method of 
enquiry. However, in direct opposition to the quantitative approach, the use of 
qualitative data, by its very nature, brings the work ‘to life’ by allowing the 
reader to ‘hear’ the voices of the various social actors who, in this case, are 
the police. It (qualitative research) also provides opportunities to explore how 
people make sense of their lives particularly with regard to meanings, 
understanding and perceptions. Therefore, in this context, in many ways, 
helps the police to make sense of their work, particularly in relation to the key 
concepts of autonomy, accountability and consent.   
Additional support for the collection and analysis of qualitative data was 
identified by Kvale and Brinkman in 2009. They opined that the qualitative 
interview is designed to “....understand the world from the subjects’ point of 
view, to unfold the meaning of their experiences, to uncover their lived 
world....” (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009: p.1) and the interview questions 
employed were designed to do just that ‘….to uncover their lived world.’  
As previously iterated there are other attendant problems associated 
with the collection of qualitative data in that people’s recollections of the past 
are often based on what their current world view is and not a true recall of 
what happened in the past. In 1999 Rubin recognised this problematic area 
when he stated that ‘….replies are neither accurate or inaccurate, but that 
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they are not encoded, stored and retrieved as wholes but rather are created at 
retrieval….the construction is guided by the persons goals at retrieval….’ 
(Rubin, 1999: p.4). This supports the theory that the experiences spoken of in 
interview are viewed ‘through the eyes’ of today rather than being true and 
factual recall of the incident, which, in turn demands that further and differing 
proofs are identified in order to provide some validation of the accuracy of 
what is being said.   
 
Having explored the use of both biographical and autobiographical data 
in a previous work (Robertson, 2003, unpublished)  it was recognised that the 
validity and veracity of any data collected ‘….relies heavily on a process 
known as triangulation ….which helps to eliminate bias ….and detect errors 
and anomalies in your discoveries….’   (Anderson 1998: p.131). This 
particular view was supported by Cohen, Manion and Morrison who echoed 
Anderson’s concerns when they stated ‘….reliability in life history hinges upon 
the identification of sources of bias and the application of techniques to 
reduce them.’ (Cohen, Mannion and Morrison, 2001: p.167). 
It is therefore imperative that further means to validate qualitative data, 
especially data based on subjective memory recall, is identified because, as 
Grumet recognised, ‘….a failure to engage in some analysis of the 
autobiographical texts beyond celebration and recapitulation leads to 
patronizing sentimentality…. resonant but marginal because it is not part of 
the discourse that justifies real action’. (Grumet, 1990: p.3). This view was 
later supported by Rubin who proposed that memory recall was based on 
what the subject feels at interview, not what actually occurred.   
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In 2000 Lucius-Hoene and Depperman also identified a possible 
means of validation when they stated that ‘….the interview as an interactive 
process calls for a communicative and constructionist approach to oral 
narratives which reveal different levels of the listener’s conceptions of himself 
or herself and the research situation in that narrator’s story.’ (Lucius-Hoene & 
Depperman, 2000: p.1). In other words they suggest that the interviewee 
should place or ‘construct’ his or her interpretation of what is being said at the 
fore-front of what they are saying. 
 
The Interview 
 
What is an interview? What is its purpose? 
‘If you want to know how people understand their world and their lives, why 
not talk to them?....In an interview conversation the researcher asks about, 
and listens to, what people themselves tell about their lived world’  (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2009: p. xvii). That simple, but not simplistic explanation provides 
a sound basis and a starting point to initiate and negotiate entry into the world 
of qualitative research interviewing. Once that starting point has been reached 
then further research is required in order to identify the various types of 
qualitative interview of which there are many. Indeed the type of interview 
chosen will often be dependent upon the sources of research that are chosen.   
In one particular source, that of  Cohen, Manion and Morrison in 2001 
they, in turn, list a comprehensive list of sources that have identified various 
interview types from a number of authors as follows; 
LeCompte and Preissle (1993) give six types: (a) 
standardised interviews; (b) in-depth interviews; (c) 
ethnographic interviews; (d) elite interviews; (e) life history 
interviews; (f) focus groups. Bogdan and Bilken (1992) 
added to this; (g) semi-structured interviews; (h) group 
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interviews. Lincoln and Guba (1985) add (i) structured 
interviews; and Oppenheim (1992: p65) adds to this (j) 
exploratory interviews. Patton (1980; p206) outlines four 
types: (k) informal conversational interviews (l) interview 
guide approaches; (m) standardized open-ended 
interviews; (n) closed qualitative interviews. (Cohen, Manion 
and Morrison, 2001: p.207). 
 
A similar research problem was encountered earlier in this chapter 
where a diverse plethora of data analysis methodologies were identified and 
briefly outlined. In this instance, as in the former, the same techniques were 
applied to each of the methodologies in order to arrive at a method that would 
gather the information in a relatively structured way, bearing in mind both the 
time and logistical constraints that were faced. However, it is necessary to 
make some further exploration into the overall concept of the interview in 
order to assist in identifying the most suitable for this work.   
 
 
In this respect, Kitwood, in 1997, contrasted three conceptions of the 
 
interview;  
 
‘….firstly as a potential means of pure information 
transfer and collection; secondly as a transaction which 
inevitably has bias, which has to be recognised and 
controlled…. The interview is best understood in terms of a 
theory of motivation which recognises a range of non-
rational factors governing human behaviour.’….;an 
encounter necessarily sharing many of the features of 
everyday life. What is required….is not a technique for 
dealing with bias but a theory of everyday life that takes 
account of the relevant features of interviews. (Kitwood, 
1977: p.40)   
 
It is interesting to note what appears to be an echo of Mills’s work on 
‘vocabularies of motive’ when Kitwood talks about ‘….a theory of motivation 
which recognises a range of non-rational factors governing human behaviour’.   
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The Semi-Structured Interview  
 
Within this work it was decided to employ a format of questioning 
known as the semi-structured interview. (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2001; 
p.271). This particular methodology involves giving prior written notice to the 
interview subjects about the main topics that the interview will cover; it does 
not pose the specific questions that will be asked which, in turn, helps to 
eliminate a response which would be in all likelihood the ‘conventional 
professional rhetoric’ which has already been identified. Specifically in this 
work, prior notification was given that a number of questions would be posed 
on the topic of policing by consent. It was not indicated that the questions 
would include asking for their perceptions and views about consent or the 
PACE requirement to consult the public about policing in their area or the 
specific occasions when they felt consent had been lost. This was left until the 
interviews commenced when the individual questions within the topic of 
consent were introduced in turn. This, in turn, facilitated a more in-depth 
discussion, whereby all of the variables and nuances of the subject could be 
teased out and, where necessary, explored in greater depth with spontaneous 
questions allowing the pursuit of anything within the boundaries of the subject 
matter which were thought was worthy of further exploration. 
The strengths of this particular method enable the collection of more 
comprehensive data in a systematic manner and it also allows the researcher 
to immediately identify gaps in the data and to subsequently fill them. 
Additionally the interview remains on a conversational level. It must also be 
recognised that there are weaknesses in the methodology. As Cohen, 
Mannion and Morrison stated: ‘Important and salient topics may be 
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inadvertently missed or omitted. Interviewer flexibility in sequencing and 
wording of questions can result in substantially different responses, thus 
reducing the comparability of responses’. (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 
2001: p.271).   
It was still felt however that, provided care was taken to ensure all the 
salient topics were included and that the order of questioning was rigorously 
maintained, utilising the same wording, that the data provided would facilitate 
a readily comparable series of responses.   
 
 In order to ensure that the semi-structured interview would be the best 
methodology for this work further justification in support of its selection was 
provided by the following facts. The gaining of unfettered access to all four 
cohorts was in no small part a recognisance of the position of both my current 
and previous positions within the organisation, which, in turn, also facilitated 
identification as the ‘distanced insider researcher, a position which was briefly 
demonstrated in the Introduction chapter and which will be explained more 
fully later in this chapter. The working schedules of all four cohorts 
necessitated carrying out interviews at a variety of times within the working 
day and indeed they were sometimes interrupted, especially with the more 
junior (in both rank and service) officers due to the pressures of ‘removing’ a 
working resource from the station manpower.   
The senior and particularly the ACPO officers, Chief, Deputy and 
Assistant Chief Constables, were different in other aspects of accessibility 
where, following initial contact, it became necessary to stipulate that the 
interview would take a maximum of two hours per interview. Whilst it can 
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readily be appreciated that any time limitation precludes a free-form interview 
it is my contention that the semi-structured interview facilitated more focussed 
and productive interviews. The fact that several chief officer interviews 
exceeded this time limit is testament to the fact that they obviously felt 
strongly enough about the issues raised and were quite happy to extend    the 
interview time to allow the introduction of some supplementary questions 
which had never even been outlined in the pre-interview schedule.  
Finally,  support for the semi-structured interview was supported by 
Denscombe in 1998  who stated that ‘….the interviewer still has a clear list of 
issues to be addressed….and is prepared to be flexible….to let the 
interviewee develop ideas and speak more widely on the issues raised…. The 
answers are open ended.’ (Denscombe, 1998: p.113). This was the final 
vindication of choice. 
Outline of Methods/ Forms of Analysis. 
  
The cohorts were drawn from across the police continuum in order to 
gather the differing views of autonomy, accountability and policing by consent   
through the range of participants in an effort to establish if a ‘doctrine of 
consent’ did in fact exist, and, it did exist how it is arrived at and applied. 
 Within QSR NVIVO, attributes were created for each interviewee 
defined by the following: rank, department (or force), gender, education, 
ethnicity, years of service within their current or final (in the case of retired 
officers) police force and total years of service within the police organisation.  
These cases generated individual, organisational and cross-border insights 
into learning, training and development. Additionally the combined use of 
cases with extensive coding uncovered the central themes occurring across 
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the interviews and this established the relationships between the particular 
sets of attributes. This also helped to establish that gender, previous 
education and ethnicity were important influential factors in an individual’s 
experience of learning and training and development in the police 
organisation.  
Cross organisational analysis 
 
The cross-organisational analysis was derived from each single case 
analysis and focused on senior management support, resource allocation, 
organisational expertise and staff appraisal. Also included were individual and 
team development, strategic integration, breadth, depth and relevancy and 
overall job satisfaction. Many of these themes emerged from the data through 
the medium of the initial coding that was performed whilst other themes 
emerged from the discussions with the interview subjects themselves. This 
also facilitated an in-depth understanding of capability gaps across current 
roles and functions. 
 
 
The ‘Insider’ Researcher 
 
There are a number of studies that have examined the ethical position 
of those who are carrying out research within the organisation where they are 
working and other studies have been carried out concerning the inherent bias 
that may be present in the data that are collected.  
 In 1998 Morse commented: 
 
‘It is not wise for an investigator to conduct a qualitative 
study in a setting where he or she is already employed 
and has a work role. The dual roles of investigator and 
employee are incompatible, and they may place the 
researcher in an untenable position’ (Morse, 1998: p.61).  
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It is worth noting however that this caveat was contextually specific to 
funded qualitative research. 
  
In 1993 Hockey suggested that being an insider ‘may potentially 
influence the whole research process….site selection, method of sampling, 
documentary analysis, observation techniques and the way meaning is 
constructed from the field data’ (Hockey 1993: p.200). Similarly, in 1998, 
Griffith claimed that an insider produces ‘a different knowledge from an 
outsider’ (Griffith 1998: p.362). Unfortunately Griffith did not expand, explore 
or evidence this statement any further. In 2007 Mercer remained ‘….unsure 
about the extent to which differing degrees of insiderness (or outsiderness) 
affect research processes and findings’ (Mercer, 2007: p.14). In 2009 Kvale 
and Brinkmann also drew attention to the dangers inherent in the ‘....close 
interpersonal interactions with their participants....’ whereby ‘....they do not 
maintain a professional distance....and interpret everything from their 
participants perspective.’ This they described, in an anthropological sense as 
‘....going native.’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009: p.75).  
The choice to research in this manner, as it were from the inside, was 
made with full acknowledgement of the inherent dangers of bias. Having been 
part of the police organisation for most of my working life there was 
cognisance of the rank-based structure and its attendant strictures. The 
‘insider’ knowledge also enabled the interviews to take place in a mutually 
agreeable atmosphere where there was no need to establish job credibility; it 
was already inherent from my career history. However, steps were taken to 
ensure that they were well aware it was not just a cosy informal conversation 
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between colleagues; it was a piece of serious research which required open 
and honest responses. However, at the same time, it did not preclude the 
posing of the ‘hard questions’. The positions which had been and were 
currently held within the organisation facilitated re-entry into the world of 
operational policing but without being drawn back into the position of being 
relatively junior in rank whilst serving.  
As a counterweight to the concerns expressed by Morse, Hockey, 
Griffiths, Kvale and Brinkmann, and,  to some extent Mercer, other insider 
research theorists have demonstrated that, provided the biases inherent in the 
situation are guarded against and objectivity is maintained, then the unique 
positioning of the insider  can prove to be both insightful and valuable. 
Coghlan (2001) and Zuber-Skerrit & Perry (2002), drew attention to the 
increase in insider research by individuals who, whilst working full time for 
their organisation, were engaged in a part-time academic study, who, they 
reasoned, selected their research site on ready access, familiarity and as a 
more than adequate field setting for their research. However, the major caveat 
expressed by other researchers would suggest that it is too difficult to 
untangle the contradictions inherent in the situations whereby an empathetic 
researcher can possess sufficient objectivity to overcome the dangers of 
inherent bias.   
In further support of the positioning as a ‘distanced insider researcher’ I 
turned to Ninian Smart, a leader in the field of secular religious studies, who, 
in 1983,  introduced a new method of examining any subject, which was not 
necessarily exclusive to religious studies, which he identified as  Worldview 
Analysis. It involved a further concept which he termed structured empathy 
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and he opined that ‘….structured empathy is a necessity in the understanding 
of Worldviews in order to understand views other than our own’. This, in turn, 
provides an openness of mind, which Smart said allowed the retention of 
‘….one’s own perspective but, at the same time, recognising the perspectives 
of others’ (Smart, 1983).  
In essence Smart’s concept adds further weight to the ‘distanced 
insider’ position; the structured empathy he identified is the principal of both 
interpretive and directed enquiry. In simple terms this, in essence, means that 
whilst able to empathise with the subjects the ability to pose the difficult 
questions remains intact.  
In 2007 Brannick and Coghlan further examined the implications for 
insider researchers. They concluded that, provided   researchers were able to 
address the duality of roles involved, with cognisance of their practical 
experience of the organisation allied to their theoretical knowledge;   ‘there is 
no inherent reason why being ‘native’ is an issue and that the value of insider 
research is worth reaffirming’ (Brannick and Coghlan 2007: p.59). They also 
highlighted the unique position of the ‘insider’ researcher and the dynamics of 
that positioning which were grouped under the headings of ‘….access, 
preunderstanding, role duality and managing internal politics.’  (Brannick and 
Coghlan, 2007: p.59). This positioning  was also highlighted by Kanuha 
(2000) when she recognised the ‘....complex and inherent challenge of being 
both and ‘insider’ with intimate knowledge of one’s study population and an 
outsider researcher....’ (Kanuha, 2000: p.1)  
Evidence to support qualitative ‘insider’ research, particularly within the 
police service, can be found in the works of Holdaway (1984) and Young 
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(1991 and 1993). Their research, far from placing them in an untenable 
position, enabled them to arrive at a distanced and critically balanced view of 
the organisation, more particularly, the actions of its employees. That said 
however, there are a number of caveats attendant upon the views of the 
supporters of ‘insider’ research. Not the least of these is the continuous effort 
that must be made to ensure complete objectivity on the part of the 
researcher as well as imposed strictures to guard against the biases inherent 
in the circumstances. 
 
The ‘Distanced Insider’ 
   
It is well recognised that because of the unique position as an insider 
researcher unrestricted access was gained to a wide variety of officers, 
ranging in rank from Chief Constable to Police Constable, from a number of 
different forces, spread over a large geographical area. It is, however, 
incumbent upon me at this stage to fix the locus within the research. Whilst 
not being, in the truest sense, an ‘insider researcher’ because the research 
topic is not part of the daily work schedule, unlike teachers, as Mercer 
expressed, who are researching their own practices, it is a logical step to be 
described as a ‘distanced insider’.  
This simply means that whilst I am no longer a practitioner, the insider 
knowledge of the organisation and its inner workings, together with my prior 
working relationships with some of the respondents, placed me in an 
extremely valuable locus to carry out the research. Indeed it was because of 
these facts that the data collection was facilitated and ensured the inclusion of 
both authority and authenticity within the interview proceedings.  
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The analysis of this data in later chapters reveals just how rich, multi-
layered and complex it is. Indeed in many respects it is as revelatory, 
personal, and in many respects unhindered by any need, especially in the 
case of Chief Officers, to use an interview situation as a means of airing the 
official, that is the Home Office, view in a relatively public forum. It must also 
be said however that, generationally, certainly in the case of the interviews 
with the younger, newly appointed8  student officers, even the possession of 
insider knowledge does not always allow the sharing of experiences because 
of the changes in both legislation and society experienced by me but not 
necessarily by this particular group.  
However there was no concern with regard to the views of the 
organisation, the interest was directly concerned in the interview subjects’ 
individual responses to a series of questions and was seeking personal as 
opposed to ‘official’ views. This is most apparent in the responses made by 
the student officer population whose replies demonstrate an almost refreshing 
naivety in certain areas and without the all-pervading cynicism, or indeed the 
unknowing and unthinking acquiescence to the mores of police culture, that 
tends to colour the views of officers who have a considerable amount of 
service. On the other hand, the views of Chief Officers tended to be in line 
with official thinking. That said, however, they themselves did not appear to be 
constrained or bound by any official view and frequently ventured outside the 
safe haven of the ‘police spokesperson’ official position voicing something 
already identified earlier as conventional professional rhetoric.  
Sources 
                                            
8 Officers whose appointment has been confirmed following their two year probation period  
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A proportion of the interview questions employed in my work are based 
on those asked by Robert Reiner in pursuit of the research he conducted on 
Chief Constables in England and Wales between 1987 and 1989 and 
published in 1991. (Reiner,1991: p.p. 356 - 361). Whilst there are broad 
based similarities in the questions I employed, I have, where necessary 
expanded the range of some of the questions in order to accommodate 
changes in policing that have occurred since its publication. More importantly 
however, and the factor which adds the unique aspect to my work, is that the 
questions asked, particularly in the three areas highlighted , are concerned 
with gaining a personal point of view, which, in turn, will provide insight into 
how their views impinge upon their actions as police officers. 
  
Societal Influences  
As previously highlighted this study is limited insofar as it is a 
‘snapshot’ of the interview subjects’ views at a  time when, amongst the  
major socio-political concerns, Charles Clarke, the then Home Secretary a 
proposed major re-structuring of the police. This was covered in chapter 2, 
but, in essence, it involved the creation of twelve regional police forces and, 
during interview, a number of the chief officer’s cohort expressed favourable 
views of his proposal but, in all fairness, there were also those who were 
vehemently opposed. Another major policing milestone was the creation of 
the SOCA which replaced the Regional Crime Squads. It was not staffed 
exclusively by police officers but drew the majority of its personnel from the 
police service, the Immigration Department and HM Revenue and Customs. 
Its remit was to combat cross-border and international crime. In 2011 SOCA 
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was disbanded and the NCA was created. It deals with border control, 
economic crime, organised crime, cyber crime and is also dedicated to 
preventing the sexual exploitation of children.  
 
 
Core concerns 
 
Some of these concerns occurred whilst the fieldwork was in progress 
and doubtless influenced some of the answers; however, in turn, these same  
influences helped to identify the core themes of the research which was 
concerned with autonomy, accountability and perhaps, most importantly, a 
practitioners view of policing by consent. 
  
 The Four Cohorts 
 
The core of this study rests heavily on the collection of qualitative 
biographical data from each of four cohorts. They consist of both serving and 
retired police officers drawn from a number of police forces in a geographical 
area extending from the Scottish Border to the south east of England. Each of 
the cohorts consists of a carefully selected and highly structured sample of 
officers who fall within the parameters set. They were selected as being 
representative of the continuum of rank, service and experience within the 
police service based on the principles of non-probability sampling. 
Non-probability sampling does not involve random selection but it does 
not however indicate that they are not representative of the overall survey 
population. However, because of the inside nature of the research, coupled 
with the need to represent the police across the continuum expressed, it was 
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neither feasible nor supportive to use random or probability sampling. 
(www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/sampnon.php).  
The four cohorts, based on the principles expressed above, comprise 
as follows:- 
 
Cohort 1 - 10 Chief Constables.  
The selection of the Chief Constable cohort was initiated by an 
approach to a serving Chief Constable who was a student at Dishforth (No. 2 
District Police Training Centre)9 in North Yorkshire in the early 1980s where I 
had been employed as a trainer. As a consequence of my initial approach the 
Chief Constable then contacted a number of ACPO colleagues who 
expressed both an interest in and a willingness to participate in the research.  
 
Cohort 2 - 10 Senior/Middle Management Officers. 
 This cohort ranges across the rank structure and include 2 Deputy 
Chief Constables (DCC), 3 Chief Superintendents, 1 Superintendent, 1 Chief 
Inspector, 2 Inspectors and 1 Sergeant. The selection of the two DCCs in the 
Senior/Middle Management group resulted from the situation whereby two of 
the Chief Constables indicated that, should their deputies be available on the 
day chosen for interview, they would ensure that the invitation was extended 
to them if it was felt desirable to include them; an effect which can be 
described as ‘snowballing.’ This involves the identification of those that you 
wish to include in the study, and rather than asking them to recommend 
                                            
9  This Centre was part of the NPT (National Police Training) organisation that was responsible for all police 
recruit training, to a national (one size fits all) programme, at this time. This was replaced, in 2001 by CENTREX 
which, in turn was replaced by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) in 2007 who introduced the Initial 
Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP) a ‘generic’ programme of core training which was suitable for 
adaptation by individual forces to suit local conditions and practices. 
 
  129 12
 
 
others who meet the criteria they themselves recommended other chief officer 
colleagues who also met the selection criteria. This enabled the numbers in 
this particular cohort to be brought up to its strength without any further 
requests for interview being made. The remaining officers in this particular 
cohort were selected from officers with whom I had both worked with and 
served under and also included senior colleagues who had been on both 
regional and national working groups and joint interest forums within the 
service that I had also been involved in. 
 
Cohort 3 – 10 Retired Officers. 
These officers represent my peer group. The cohort includes 1 Chief 
Superintendent, 3 Superintendents, 1 Chief Inspector, 2 Inspectors, 2 
Sergeants and 1 Constable. They were selected from three forces that I 
served with, namely South Shields Borough, Durham Constabulary and 
Northumbria Police, as well as those I worked with at No. 2 District Police 
Training Centre  in the mid 1980s and those with whom I worked in both 
regional and national police computing forums. In this respect it contains an 
eclectic blend of rank and experience across the continuum of policing since 
the mid 1960s. 
Cohort 4 - 10 Student Officers. 
These ten officers were, prior to the Initial Police Learning and 
Development Programme IPLDP, colloquially known as probationers, but are 
now known as student officers until the completion of their two year probation 
period.   Some members of this cohort are officers who, in my capacity as 
both a National Police Trainer and later as an IPLDP  trainer I delivered initial 
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training to. The remainder, including the High Potential Development Scheme 
(HPDS - see glossary) officers were chosen through contact with the 
individual force training managers with whom prior professional and personal 
contact had already been established. 
To enable the reader to identify the rank, gender, length of service and 
service in the rank the nomenclature, which can be found in appendix ‘D’, was 
employed This will not only assist in giving an insight into the age and 
experience of the subjects but will also enable the reader to evaluate the 
statements which are undoubtedly indicators of the social, political and 
professional morés of the time which influenced their thinking and decision 
making. The tables (Figs. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4) shown on the following pages 
illustrate briefly the personal and professional characteristics of each of the 
cohorts. A series of targeted interviews were carried out with the four cohorts, 
who are all at different levels of the police service and encompass the 
differences in rank, gender, ethnicity, length of service and specialist 
experience. This, in turn, provides a snapshot in time of the ideas and 
experiences of the different 'generations' of officers in the context of rapid 
change in the organization and direction of the police service as a whole. 
 
As can be seen from the make up of the four cohorts I had indeed 
worked with a number of the officers, particularly within the peer group cohort, 
throughout my service as a ‘sworn officer (30 years) which commenced in 
1964. Whilst, on many occasions this facilitated a more easy-going interview 
care was taken to ensure that it did not turn into a cosy chat between friends 
and that constant vigilance was employed in order to maintain objectivity. The 
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interviews with the subjects, not previously known, were also treated with the 
same constant vigilance together with an awareness of any bias that may 
have arisen and which was successfully eliminated.   
 
Figure 5.1 – Chief Constables 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Senior/Middle Management 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Gender Age Years 
Service 
Years 
in Rank 
Education  
Chief  Constable 1 Male 51 24 2 BA (Hons.) 3  
Chief  Constable 2 Male 54 31 3 M.Phil.  
Chief  Constable 3 Male 53 29 4 Masters  Criminology  
Chief  Constable 4 Male 51 32 3 BA (Hons) 2.2  
Chief  Constable 5 Male 52 31 1 BA (Hons) 2.1  
Chief  Constable 6 Male 52 33 8 M.Phil. (Psychology)  
Chief  Constable 7 Male 54 31 3 BA (Hons) 2.1  
Chief  Constable 8 Male 52 29 4 BSc 2.2  
Chief  Constable 9 Male 56 36 5 BA (Hons) 1st   
Chief  Constable 11 Male 48 27 1 BSc. Economics  
  
Rank Gender Age Years 
Service 
Years 
in Rank 
Education  
1. Inspector  Female 48 27 10 years BA (Hons) Combined  
2. Sergeant Male 49 29 6 years Secondary Education 
– no formal 
qualifications 
 
3. Dep. Chief Male 47 21 1 BA Theology 2.1  
4. Chief Inspector Male 53 23 7 PhD Ecology  
5. Chief Superintendent Female 42 15 1 MSc (Police 
Leadership 
 
6. Inspector Male 42 23 5 LLB  
7. Chief Superintendent Male 44 25 1 MSc  
8. Chief Superintendent Male 50 31 3 BSc (Hons)  
9. Dep. Chief Male 57 30 4 BA (Hons)  
10. Chief Superintendent Male 40 20 1 BA (Hons)  
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Figure 5.3 – Peer Group 
 
NB The (R) indicates the officer has retired 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – Student Officers 
 
It is immediately apparent that there is serious under-representation of 
both women and ethnic minorities included in the ACPO officers represented 
here. Indeed it is of no little historical significance that the selection reflects 
the overall composition of Chief Officers in England and Wales at this time.  It 
Rank Gender Age Years 
Service 
Years 
in Rank 
Education  
1. Inspector (R) M 52 30 6 BSc  
2. Constable (R) M 58 30 30 MA (FE&T)  
3. Chief Superintendent (R) M 67 30 3 Nat Cert Engineering  
4.Chief Inspector (R) M 64 30 8 NVQ L5  
5. Inspector (R) M 57 32 10 ‘A’ Level  
6. Chief Superintendent (R) M 68 30 5 ‘A’ Level  
7. Sergeant (R) M 57 30 10 ONC Electrical Eng.  
8. Superintendent (R) M 63 30 6 ‘A’ Level  
9. Chief Superintendent (R) M 56 30 3 Dip. Management  
10. Sergeant (R) M 65 30 12 City & Guilds 7407  
  
Rank Gender Age Years 
Service 
Years 
in Rank 
Education  
1. Police Constable F 23 2 2 ‘A’ Level   
2.  Police Constable M 31 2 2 B Ed.  
3. Police Constable F 28 2 2 NVQ Level 4  
4. Police Constable M 34 2 2 BA  
5. Police Constable F 27 2 2 BA Hons Comb. 
LLB/German 
 
6. Police Constable F 22 2 2 ‘A’ Level  
7. Police Constable F 23 2 2 LLB  
8. Police Constable M 28 2 2 MA  
9. Police Constable M 29 2 2 NVQ Level 4  
10. Police Constable M 27 2 2 HND  
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is even more striking that there was an even smaller percentage of female 
and ethnic minority Chief Constables, who, despite serious effort by the 
researcher, were either unwilling or could not spare the time to be 
interviewed10. The response to the request gave rise to the impression that, to 
them, a form of ‘tokenism’ was being engaged in. This situation had already 
been encountered earlier in the research when a number of requests to 
interview both Black British and British Asian officers produced the rather 
unedifying response that there was targeted and deliberate selection taking 
place in order to ensure a representative sample of a number of ‘token’ black 
officers. This was obviously not the intention but despite a number of re-
assurances no assent to interview them was gained. 
The figures 5.1 to 5.4 also illustrate the educational qualifications 
across the cohorts which ranges from secondary, now comprehensive 
education, through to Doctorate level. With regard to the Chief Constables 
each one interviewed has a first degree and five (47%) also obtained a 
postgraduate (Masters) degree. This is in contrast to Reiner’s 1991 findings 
which revealed that among all the Chief Constables in England and Wales (43 
in total) only ten had a first degree. 
  
The Interviews 
  
In total forty interviews were conducted during the initial data collection 
exercise with the longest being three and a half hours. The decision to carry 
out supplementary interviews with four of the Chief Constables (see also 
Chapter 7) was taken in light of some of the disturbing occurrences involving 
the policing of public demonstrations as well as intense public disquiet and 
                                            
10  In 2008, during the time the interviews took place there were 29  female ACPO Officers, 2 of whom were 
Chief Constables, and 7 ethnic minority ACPO Officers, only one of whom was a Chief Constable 
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media criticism that the Metropolitan Police Service were apparently misusing 
their powers under the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 200011 to carry out stop 
and search exercises. It is critical to note that this particular power is not 
bound by the rules and strictures that apply to PACE conducted stop and 
search procedures. 
It was reported that in 2010 a total of 45,932 stops and searches were 
made in Great Britain under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. And the 
MPS (see Glossary) together with the British Transport Police accounted for 
94% of these searches with 19% being Asian or British Asian and 10% Black 
or Black British. Also in 2010 a total of 898 persons were stopped and 
searched by the MPS under Section 43 of the same act.  
In the same year there were 249 arrests resulting from Section 44 
stops and searches in Great Britain, an arrest rate of 0.5 %. Only two of these 
arrests were identified as terrorism related but details of convictions, if any, 
were not given. A further 30 arrests were made by the Metropolitan Police 
following stops and searches under Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000.  
 
            In 2011 information published by the Home Office showed that of the 
101,248 stops and searches carried out under the auspices of Section 44 of 
the Terrorism Act, 2000 not one person was arrested for terrorism-related 
offences.  
                                            
11  Permission to carry out ‘stop and search’ under the auspices of this act require renewing on a 28 day 
basis. It is interesting to note that the MPS has ‘renewed’ this provision since the inception of the act and continues to 
do so to this day. It is also recognised that this particular course of action diminishes the need for accountability. 
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The additional interviews differ from the main body of interviews insofar 
as they are not semi-structured but free flowing. The Chief Constables 
selected were simply asked whether their views on consent, in light of the 
aforementioned occurrences as well as the information revealed in the Home 
Office data shown on the previous page, had changed. It is intended that the 
data not connected with the main themes (autonomy, accountability and 
consent), will be utilised to facilitate further post doctoral research that will 
compare and contrast the current views of the chief constables role with those 
expressed in Reiner’s book on chief constables published in 1991. 
Additionally the data from the supplementary interviews will, as well as 
establishing any changes in their views, will also form the basis of a post-
doctoral research project employing conversational analysis. An explanation 
of the generic question areas can be found in Appendix ‘C’.     
The questions to each of the four cohorts on autonomy, accountability 
and consent, were precisely the same. However some of the questions in 
other areas had to be different because of both the rank structure and, in the 
case of my peer group, to take cognisance of the fact that they were no longer 
serving all of which had a bearing on the data collection.  
Their responses to these questions were analysed to identify and 
retrieve further perceptions of autonomy, accountability and consent. The data 
was further analysed in order to reveal content specific rhetoric if any was 
used, and to adduce evidence which would either support or negate Mills 
‘vocabularies of motive’ hypothesis.  
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Each of the cohorts was also asked to recall their personal and 
professional experiences resulting from the introduction and implementation 
of specific pieces of legislation including the PACE Act 1984, the Human 
Rights Act (HRA) 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIPA) Act 
2000. The main purposes of these notable pieces of legislation were to 
provide strict governance of police practice during the arrest and interrogation 
of suspects (PACE) and the use of intrusive surveillance (RIPA). The PACE 
act was principally introduced in order to curb the less than esoteric practices 
that had evolved under the auspices of the Judges Rules, the largely 
unwritten but nevertheless binding set of conventions which were developed 
over the years by the judiciary in an effort to codify, standardise and contain 
police practices in this particularly contention area.  It can be convincingly 
argued that the aforementioned legislation undoubtedly had a fundamental 
impact on the conduct of the police.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The data collection took place between November 2007 and December 
2008 during a series of semi-structured interviews (Denscombe 1998) which 
normally took place within the interviewee’s working day. The vast majority of 
the data was collected within that time frame. From the outset, as previously 
highlighted, a number of carefully selected, purposive and highly structured 
cohorts were drawn from across the police continuum. This was done in order 
to appreciate the differing views of consent  through that range of survey 
subjects who, in essence, could be said to give an indication of how, 
organisationally, the ‘doctrine of consent’ is both arrived at and applied.  
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Using QSR N-Vivo® individual cases were created for each interview 
subject defined by the following attributes: rank, force served in, gender, 
education, including schools attended and their highest educational 
achievement, ethnicity, years of service within their current or final (in the 
case of retired officers) rank and the total number of years of service within 
the police organisation. Free nodes were then created within N-Vivo® utilising 
both my question headings and an analysis of the transcripts to identify both 
explicit and implicit references to my core themes. They were as follows:- 
Question Headings 
Answerable to the law. This was the introductory question on consent 
designed to gain an insight into whether they felt answerable to the 
law and, as such, was an important springboard into the remaining 
questions on consent. 
Consent – whose. To discover whom they felt gave them the consent, 
either express or implied, to carry out the policing role. 
Consent A – implied. Dealing with perceptions of consent that were 
contained in other responses. 
Consent B – not implied. Similar to the previous node but looking for 
occasions where a loss of consent was implied. 
Consent of the majority. Do the majority of the people consent to being 
policed? 
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Consent – when it was lost. The counterbalance to the ‘unstated’ consent 
that is usually present in the day-to-day contact between police and 
public; indeed it facilitates those interactions. More importantly, by 
asking them to describe any occasions when they felt that consent 
was lost, would act as a counter argument against Mills’s 
‘vocabularies of motive hypothesis. In other words they would not be 
producing a reply in today’s words, nor producing talk that they 
might think the interviewer, wanted to hear.   
Consent – PACE. To identify their thoughts on the requirement under 
section 106 of the PACE Act 1984 to hold public consultation 
meetings. 
Consent – Surveillance. In view of the proliferation of CCTV monitoring and 
the introduction of the RIPA (see glossary) Act 2000 I wanted to 
garner their views on this piece of legislation which has been used, 
in some cases, by local authorities to monitor dog fouling. 
Accountability – linked to rank. This question simply asked them to define 
what accountability, and to whom, was a feature of their particular 
rank. 
Accountability – perceptions. This node was used to record areas in other 
answers which also contained elements of accountability without the 
actual use of the expression. 
Choices in what you police. In other words the practice of discretion 
including situations where the officer concerned decided either to act 
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or to ‘turn a blind eye’ (Chans ‘recipe knowledge’) to minor 
infringements of the law. This question was particularly targeted at 
the more junior ranks who, according to most researchers, have the 
greatest opportunity to practice discretion. It is indeed a powerful 
tool in the hands of those same officers.  
Discretion – lack or loss. This question was simply a counterbalance to the 
practice of discretion. It was designed to reveal situations where the 
opportunity to practice discretion was either lost or unavailable due 
to the strictures of a particular policing initiative. 
The remainder of the questions that follow were not concerned with the 
major themes but were asked in line with Reiner’s 1992 questions in order 
that post-doctoral work could be carried out to identify any differences in both 
policing and indeed police officer attitudes since they were first posed.  
Bigger social issues. This node dealt with areas which go beyond the 
boundaries of day-to-day policing and sought to identify officer 
perceptions on policing but not just simply as a means of 
maintaining law and order. It was designed to encourage them to 
look beyond that simple but not simplistic view and to examine 
policing as a means of social control, particularly as an arm of the 
state, to be directed at the behest of government into areas that 
would tend to remove the independence and autonomy practised by 
chief constables. The miners strike in the 1980s is a clear example 
of the politicisation of the police.  
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The buck stops here. Based simply on rank, what situations that they dealt 
with remained totally within in their own autonomous control. 
Bureaucratic barriers. Simply a means of identifying the rules and 
procedures which often seem to conspire to make the role of 
policing harder. 
Core versus community. Designed to garner first hand impression of the 
differences in policing namely between Core Policing (the 24 hour 
shifts that respond to calls for assistance) and Community policing 
which has morphed from neighbourhood policing and was a major 
Home Office initiative in 1994. 
Love the job. A simple question designed to establish whether my own and 
many of my other colleagues views on whether serving in the police 
was a ‘vocation’ rather than just a job.   
Transcription 
 
All of the conversations and interviews were transcribed, and as Kvale 
& Brinkmann recommended in 2009, you must ‘....state explicitly in the report 
how the transcriptions were made.’ (Kvale & Brinkmann; 2009: p.180). Some 
of the transcriptions were carried out by a number of police staff colleagues, 
all of whom are employed as tape transcription officers, within the criminal 
justice system.  Their main work involves the verbatim transcription of police 
interviews with suspects as well as the statements of witnesses which form 
part of case file preparation work. The complete files are then employed as 
files of evidence for the prosecution of offences in both Magistrates and 
Crown Courts.  
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Each of the transcribers was supplied with a copy of the ‘Olympus®’  
digital software, a foot-pedal and earphones. A sample transcription format 
was also supplied to facilitate an easy transition into the N-Vivo® software. 
Written instructions were also given to ensure that the format was adhered to 
and that they understood the necessity for verbatim transcription. Prior to the 
commencement of the transcription work a number of face-to-face meetings 
with them to ensure that they were absolutely clear on the requirements of the 
verbatim transcription; however, because of their role within the police 
service, it was felt that there was no necessity for the introduction of a written 
confidentiality agreement.  Nevertheless the confidential nature of the work 
was made abundantly clear to all of them. Two of the original transcribing 
team ‘dropped out’ pleading pressures at both work and home  and, following 
considerable personal difficulties experienced by the one remaining colleague 
transcriber, which incidentally held up the work for a considerable length of 
time, also ‘dropped out,  The outstanding transcription work was completed by 
a commercial company, UK Transcriptions, who have a standard 
confidentiality agreement.  
Once the transcriptions were completed the analysis was commenced, 
utilising N-Vivo®, to deconstruct them into a series of discourses. In this 
context particular themes within the text were identified and given a title or 
heading and a fuller explanation of the discourses is given later in this 
chapter. They also included an appreciation of some wider social issues 
which impinge upon modern policing as well as relating to identities, for 
example a statement that reiterates a view or claim that men are superior 
drivers in comparison to women, highlight gender categories in discourse, 
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especially when comparing the views of male and female interview subjects 
across the continuum of survey populations. It is interesting to note however 
that, within the data, there did not appear to be any differences in 
interpretation which could be identified as gender specific.  
The transcriptions were further analysed to identify codes that were 
associated with how the respondents addressed the key concerns and also 
within the text to identify commonly shared discursive resources (shared 
patterns of talking). This, in turn, facilitated the answering of questions, 
demonstrating for example, how the discourse helps us understand the issue 
under study and how people construct their own version of an event. It also 
provides a direct link with the ‘situated actions’ and ‘vocabularies of motive’ 
contained in Mills’s 1940 hypothesis. In addition it serves to highlight how 
people use discourse to either construct or maintain their own professional 
identity.  
Additionally questions were asked on particularly stressful public 
interactions which, whilst provoking a response that might be viewed as 
conventional professional rhetoric, perhaps might reveal an altogether 
different, underlying theme or motivation that could well negate the rhetorical 
element and present a version of events that will, in many respects, be nearer 
to their own experiences rather than the rhetoric.  
It is against this background that the interviews were conducted and in 
the following chapters 5, 6 and 7 the data will be presented as a series of 
extracts which represent the views of the interview cohorts on the key themes 
of the work. Throughout these chapters the data will be analysed in order to 
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identify Chans four factor model of police culture, and both Reiner’s and 
Holdaways findings to demonstrate how the various facets of those cultures, 
either unknowingly or implicitly, have impinged upon the actions that have 
been, or indeed, have not been taken. In order to ensure that the reader 
keeps the models of culture to the forefront, Figure 6, on page 143 highlights 
the models drawn on together with their key features. The model also 
highlights the passive versus the active dichotomy that is present in its diverse 
elements and it serves to indicate the aim of the data interpretation; are 
officers’ simply reproducing knowledge and habits they have been taught or 
that have been culturally absorbed or are they revealing some originality of 
thought and reflexivity based upon their own, very real experiences. The 
reader should keep these problems in mind, particularly when reading the 
data analysis.  
The analysis will also seek to either support or disprove Mills’s 
hypotheses as well as endeavouring to establish whether there is a common 
perception, or perhaps even a discourse, of policing by consent. Conversely it 
may be revealed that policing by consent  is a societal shibboleth or socio-
anthropological ‘sound-bite’ which has been developed and promoted in order 
to justify some of the less than esoteric practices, or indeed cultural morés 
that have always been present in policing, particularly in western democratic 
countries. 
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Key Concepts of Police Culture 
Fig. 6 
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Chapter 5: Autonomy/Discretion 
Interview Data and Analysis 
 
 ‘....I’ve got a certain amount of operational 
independence and can pretty much tell my guys to  
police how I want them to….I do instil in them a 
philosophy of….discretion....maximum accountability, 
minimum force....(policing with the community, not to 
them, or at them  (added emphasis))12. They 
recognise that.’ (CC (1) M/51/24/2). 
 
It is important to note at this stage that this work is not intended to examine 
how the police service as a whole is perceived to control, or exercise power, 
especially in the Foucauldian sense, over the public; nor indeed how the 
government, the judiciary and the legislature exercise control over the police 
as a body. The research, as already stated, is designed to reveal the 
autonomy that individual officers feel they have over the situations they deal 
with on a daily basis; are they always in control, are they able to dictate the 
outcome of each and every encounter, or are they in a sense, bound by the 
dictates of those Foucauldian discourses concerned with the exercise of 
power and, to an extent, domination? According to Layder ‘....it is a person’s 
ability (added emphasis) to employ the particular discourse of the law that 
allows it to become....the medium through which a form of control is exerted 
and made possible in the first place’ (Layder, 1994: p.97). Surely then the 
ability to employ a particular discourse of the law will inevitably facilitate the 
means to control. 
Support for this view can be found in Bachrach and Baratz (2005) who 
posited that it is the exercise of control by individual police officers over the 
                                            
12  It is interesting to note that the chief’s emphasis on not policing ‘at them’ is also revealed in Chapter seven 
when he expresses a genuine regret that he was indeed ‘policing at’ the youth in his particular force area. 
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people that they deal with when seeking their compliance, involving as it does 
‘....coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation’ (Bachrach and 
Baratz in Lukes, 2005: p.p. 21-22)., which, they argue, assists in securing 
compliance.   This immediately highlights yet another contradiction; this form 
of enforced compliance cannot, and never will be, consent. There have 
however been a number of attempts to ‘legitimate’ the source of power and 
authority, most notably by Weber who recognised that although the motivation 
to obey commands may well coincide with an individual’s self interest, he 
argued that a further element of motivation was the belief in the legitimacy of 
the source of authority, one of his three pure types of authority which 
legitimate that self-same domination. Within this context it is contended that 
the majority of police officers in England and Wales do have a genuine belief 
in the legitimacy of the sources which ultimately drive their actions i.e. the 
government and the legislature. It also stands to reason that having conceded 
authority to the same sources the general public have, in effect delegated 
their legitimate rights of authorities to the police. Conversely, Giddens argued 
that subordinate groups are not always subjugated by the exercise of power 
and forces beyond their control and that his ‘dialectic of control’ could facilitate 
alteration of the balance of power by protest and action. 
These important considerations provide both a philosophical locus and a 
means of allowing the interviewees to juridically contextualise the next range 
of questions. They are concerned with the way individual officers apply 
discretion, and more importantly, their views on how that same practice of 
discretion also, in turn, can facilitate a paradigm which will support the 
doctrine of ‘policing by consent’. It cannot be denied that, in many respects, 
  147 14
 
 
the practice of discretion is both fundamental and essential to the acceptance 
of policing; indeed, in many respects, day-to-day policing could not function 
without its being practised; however, we need to ensure that the application of 
discretion is inextricably linked to an element of trust in the officers who are 
practising it. 
A number of writers, including Reiner and Weinberger, have identified that, 
across the police service, the greatest exercise of discretion is practised by its 
most junior ranking officers (see also Chapter 2). However as officers 
progress in seniority, their ability to exercise discretion reduces incrementally 
through the rank structure. This feature emerges quite strikingly from the data 
gathered from all of the sample groups.  It is of course incumbent upon me to 
examine the other side of this question and to ask them if they felt they were 
always in control of what they were doing, i.e. were able to practise discretion, 
or were there situations where they felt that control had been taken out of their 
hands. There are, of course, times when there is no facility to practise 
discretion, when, for example, officers are forming part of a PSU (see 
Glossary) in a public order13 scenario; in these situations an immediate and 
correct response to orders given is required in order to prevent disorder 
escalating out of control. 
Given that chief officers would appear to be in an optimum position to 
maintain control, or perhaps achieve a higher degree of autonomy over their 
subordinate ranks they are, in turn themselves subject to a measure of control 
which is in incumbent in the tri-partite agreement, that means of controlling 
the police service which arose out of the 1964 Royal Commission on Policing 
                                            
13  It is that strange use of the English language that police officers often indulge in whereby ‘public order’ 
actually means public disorder which can escalate to a riot situation if not controlled. 
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and which has been identified by many commentators as being, at best, a 
compromise. Notwithstanding this particular tri-partite agreement one Chief 
Constable indicated that he is ‘accountable’ to at least thirty three separate 
bodies corporate or institutions such as the Home Office (see Chapter 6, 
Accountability, page 180); can he therefore be said to be, in the strictest 
sense of the word, in control? Where does one power discourse end and 
another begin and who, rhetorically speaking, is ultimately in control? 
According to Layder, Foucault himself was ‘....unable to say whether any 
forms and centres (institutional or sub-cultural sites) of power and domination 
are more important than others. If they were, we could ask interesting 
questions about how and why they are related to each other’. (Layder, 1994: 
p.107). Importantly Foucault appears never to have analysed  power and 
domination except to state that ‘....it is ubiquitous and circulates at all levels of 
society’ (Layder, 1994: p. 107). In effect Foucault’s failure to define power 
appears to be a device employed by him to stop him from sitting on the one 
hand with the existentialists or on the other with the structuralists, with whom 
at one time he was associated. Layder summed up Foucault’s notion of power 
by stating that ‘....it makes us more analytically sensitive to the variegated 
nature of power and its effects’....but conversely ‘Foucault is little concerned 
with the exercise of power’.  (Layder, 1994: p. 109). However in order to gain 
a standpoint which may facilitate an empirical view of the discourse theory in 
relation to power and the exercise of it  I have turned to Jones (2003) who 
stated that as a Foucauldian ‘....if you want to understand human behaviour in 
a particular place and time, find out the discourses that that dominate there’ 
and that in order to trace the root of a particular way of knowing or discourse 
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you need to deconstruct and examine ‘....the foundations on which its rise to 
power rested’. (Jones, 2003: pp. 125 – 126).  
Within the interview data that follows the model, Fig 6 on page 143 will be 
employed in order to establish the presence of a particularly dominant culture. 
However, it must also be recognised that within a highly structured and 
hierarchical organisation like the police service the reader will need to employ 
several of the concepts in order to understand the differences between the 
attitudes of the four cohorts as there will undoubtedly be more than one facet 
of cultural knowledge revealed within any given response.  
Whilst this is accepted, the main or dominant themes will be identified; 
however it must be accepted that the responses are those of individuals and 
as such those responses may not fit into any of the many facets of police 
culture It will also help to identify the extent to which conventional responses 
may have dominated the replies, to identify any emerging themes and to 
establish whether the actions of the junior ranks are more or indeed less 
prone to the effects of police culture. 
 
The question posed here asked ‘It has always been recognised that, 
certainly at the lower levels of policing, individual officers have a great deal of 
freedom and discretion in how they approach and deal with individual 
transgressions/transgressors of the law. When do feel you have that 
discretion and conversely where do feel that there is either no discretion or 
that it has been eroded?   
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Cohort 1 – Chief Constables 
It becomes immediately apparent that six of the ten responses of the Chief 
Officers are dominated by the whys and the wherefores of the job, which, 
given their position within the organisation, is to be expected.  
....I think young police officers have got discretion….I 
encourage them to use discretion…. which means I give 
up some control….that’s because I trust them. CC (1) 
M/51/24/2. 
 
 
...where staff were spending more time running around 
administering crime than they were preventing or 
detecting it….madness. Sir Ronny Flanagan’s review14 
recommends giving more discretion.  CC (4) M/51/32/3. 
 
 
….professional ability to make sure that I use the 
frameworks I’ve been given to achieve the end that I 
want to achieve….I have no doubt the pernicious impact 
of government targets and performance frameworks is 
constantly eating away at that control. CC (5) M/52/31/3 
 
....at a macro-level, minimal….at a micro-level, the 
public, the body of law that the police enforces remain 
broadly unchanged ….The huge welter of laws requiring 
the police to....enforce them are largely ignored by police 
officers. CC  (8) M/52/29/4. 
 
A very telling response here by CC (8) ‘The huge welter of laws requiring 
the police to enforce them are largely ignored by police officers….we’ll ignore 
them….as we have ignored all the others’. This response appears to contain  
more than an element of truth and perhaps a true exercise of discretion as 
well as a broadside aimed at the legislature. I do not doubt the either the 
veracity or the sincerity with which this particular comment was made which 
once again highlights this particular chief as being particularly forthright. It 
                                            
14  Sir Ronnie Flanagan, then HMCIC, conducted a year long review of policing which was published in 
February 2008.  
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also highlights Reiner’s debate on cop culture demonstrating, as it does, the 
cynicism regarding the official purpose of the police. 
I’ve got control over policing most of the time….  I think 
the operational independence of chief constables is 
extremely important, it’s some times used as a shield by 
chief constables to stop people from interfering and 
asking why we do things. CC (9) M/56/36/5. 
 
I think ultimately we are still unique as an organisation. 
The people that have the most discretion, i.e. the 
operational constable out on patrol is probably the 
furthest away from the centre….I get to agree once a 
year…. to things like policing plans….with the police 
authority and de facto the communities of (Location 
omitted)….that’s the framework under which I 
agree….what we’re going to do and the direction over 
the next 12 months. CC (10) M/48/27/1. 
Most of the time, although you know as a Chief, you’d 
like to do things….you have to work within....the tripartite 
arrangement.... I think discretion is being misused as an 
emotional argument at the moment. CC (2) M/54/31/3. 
 
There is certainly a common theme to these first comments on the control 
of their own practice i.e. autonomy, that officers are able to exercise. There is 
also recognition that, if discretion were not exercised, then the whole 
apparatus of daily law enforcement would grind to halt under the sheer weight 
of bureaucracy needed to administer that self-same application and 
enforcement against all breaches of the law that any officer encounters in 
their daily routine.  
It appears that because of their seniority, both in service and in rank, seven 
of the replies from this particular cohort appear to be dominated by what Chan 
described as axiomatic knowledge insofar as their is tacit acknowledgement 
of the main functions of the police or ‘….why things are done the way they are 
in an organisation’ Chan, 1997: p. 76).   
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The remainder of the responses of this cohort, still demonstrate  
features of the same axiomatic knowledge. However there is an 
acknowledgement that the greatest of discretion amount of is attributed to and 
practised by  the officers on the ground, who, as already highlighted, have the 
greatest opportunity to practise that discretion. This would indicate that other 
cultural factors such as Reiner’s sense of mission are also present. 
I think the Chief Constable has less discretion than the 
officer on the beat.  The officer on the beat has total 
discretion on what he treats as a priority and what he 
deals with …. For a Chief Constable….it's got to have 
some underpinnings….justified by…. national or local 
requirements. CC (6) M/52/30/8. 
I’m a strong advocate ....of....discretion and that can be 
uncomfortable at some times....at three o’clock in the 
morning if there’s a Sergeant and two PCs on you’ve got 
to be fairly pragmatic....discretion is the wider part of 
valour.....there are times when I wish my officers would 
use a greater degree of discretion and proportionality. 
CC (7) M/54/31/3. 
 
I....direct officers to certain sorts of activity....They 
maintain their discretion within ....parameters that are 
set….motoring, that’s where most of the discretion 
seems to come in….. just because you’ve got a power 
doesn’t mean you have to use it. CC (3) M/53/29/4. 
 
Cohort 2 – Senior/Middle Management 
Once again, given the seniority in both rank and service of the next cohort 
they are, as were the previous cohort, more concerned with ‘….the 
fundamental assumptions about why things are done the way they are in an 
organisation. The police traditionally see their work in terms of waging a war 
against crime, maintaining order and protecting people’s lives and property’ 
(Chan, 1997: p. 76). Both the Chief Officer and Senior Officer cohorts both 
appear concerned about the actions of management in respect of ensuring 
  153 15
 
 
that the official policies are carried out within the budgetary constraints of the 
fixed level of financial resources they are granted in order to enable them to 
direct the overall functionality of the police service.   
I am of the opinion that driven through statistics, target 
managements and Government policies, the individual 
police officer and I take this directly from experience 
within our own county, virtually has no discretion 
whatsoever anymore. Sgt (2) M/49/29/6. 
I usually feel in full control, because I know the options 
available to me. I know the resources available to me, 
and I make the decisions. CI (4) M/53/23/8. 
I think generally, we have controls in place across all of 
the range of policing activities….we do have a number of 
checks and balances in place to ensure that they carry 
out their duties lawfully, proportionately and 
professionally…. CS (5) F/42/15/1. 
 
discretion....has been eroded to some degree because 
of the performance culture that has been imposed from  
the centre ....the control over what we do and do not 
police comes....from our better use of 
intelligence….because it allows us to focus resources to 
tackle....the key problems. DCC (9) M/57/30/4. 
 
I think my position as a senior manager I have a lot less 
control now than when I was a constable. Having said 
that, I feel that constables now are losing their powers of 
discretion, they do not see that as an option, they are 
looking at  increased crime figures. If they can get five 
detected crimes out of an offence, that’s the way and 
they are pushed. I (6) M/42/23/5. 
 
….within the boundaries of the law I’ve probably got an 
enormous amount of control. What you tend to do is 
define along standard practices of policing. CS (10) 
M/40/20/1. 
....in my role I think I’ve got a lot of control over what I 
do…. many officers would say that they don’t have a lot 
of control, they don’t have a lot of discretion…. they’re 
looking for us to be clearer about the parameters within 
which they can operate. DCC (3) M/47/21/1. 
….in relation to the tasking, briefing and the deployment 
of the resources in this area command I am in control all 
of the time. CS (8) M/50/31/3. 
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….in my role I have an awful lot of control over what I 
do…. an operational person that’s interfacing with the 
public….they can have an awful lot of control that’s 
without discretion ….the easiest thing in the world is just 
to deal with things by the book isn’t it….you have to be 
prepared to justify the action you’ve taken. But that 
erodes discretion…. I (1) F/48/27/10. 
I don’t think that police officers have that much discretion 
now….it isn’t right for a police officer to come across 
something in the course of their duty and not deal with it 
appropriately….it can and does lead to problems….I 
question whether it actually ever was a real part of 
policing….if you’re speaking to somebody and during 
that the course of that conversation evidence presents 
itself of an offence, then you take the appropriate action 
for that offence….as opposed to ignoring it and running 
the risk of criticism for not doing your job. CS (7) 
M/44/25/1. 
 
 
 
In common with the Chief Constables, there is a recognition that an 
element of discretion is sometimes necessary in order to ensure that the 
system keeps functioning. This, once again, demonstrates that there are 
cultural forces at play here indicating, as Reiner proposed, that the sub-
culture often runs, or appears to run, contrary to the official police function. 
Evidence of Chan’s axiomatic knowledge in respect of the traditional views of 
police work ‘….in terms of waging a war against crime, maintaining order and 
protecting people’s live and property’ (Chan,1997: p.76), or to put it a little 
more simply, the whys and wherefores of how the job is carried out has a 
tendency to dominate the replies. However, and more importantly, there is 
also recognition that there is a continual erosion of the discretion that officers 
can apply to their daily routines There is also an interesting comment by I (1) 
on page 151 vis;   
….the easiest thing in the world is just to deal with things 
by the book isn’t it….you have to be prepared to justify 
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the action you’ve taken. But that erodes discretion…. I 
(1) F/48/27/10. 
Here the Inspector is seen to be advocating that everything should be 
dealt with by the book in order to justify the action taken, but, in a cultural 
sense, she immediately undermines that particular suggestion with the 
statement that it erodes the practice of discretion, thereby demonstrating 
something akin to regret that the ‘official’ way is not always the best. 
Cohort 3 – Peer Group 
Within this next cohort it is important for the reader to distinguish the 
rank and seniority of each of its interviewees (using the nomenclature 
provided). It is apparent from the responses given that certain aspects of 
police culture that are revealed appear to be directly linked to their position 
within the organisation.  
….there was a lot of pressure….you know they have five 
shifts competing….but we had exercised discretion. I 
(5)M57/30/10R. 
No, I always felt as if I had control over what my officers 
did....I thought that I was being controlled…. so I think 
that answers itself....In our day I think the police officer 
was more in control. Sgt (7) M/57/30/10 R. 
 
I was in particular circumstances with an ethnic 
population and the directions from the command…. so I 
had to do certain things….take some flack….had to put 
resources into certain things….I think that was totally 
wrong. S (8) M/63/30/6 R 
 
This particular reference, according to Reiner, that by ‘taking some 
flack’ this officer appears to be using his ‘cultural knowledge’ in a way that is 
at variance with the official policing purpose i.e. those directions from the 
command.   
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No….the difficulty was it goes back to resources.  I felt 
that I didn't have control….it was all to do with targets 
Police Authority targets Home Secretary’s targets and I 
had my targets. CS (9) M/56/30/3R. 
 
Within these four responses, keeping in mind rank and seniority, 
there are aspects of Chan’s axiomatic knowledge which, once again, appears 
to have a bearing on the way they carried out the job with particular regard to 
the effects of the pressures placed on them from both local and national 
perspectives. In many respects, in their opinion, these pressures had a 
detrimental effect on day-to-day policing, which also demonstrates that it is 
not just the junior ranks who, according to Reiner, have misgivings about the 
official views and orders.    
….the national intelligence model is a good example; it 
creates a lot of intelligence driven tasks. You have little 
control over what patrolling officers happen upon? ….so 
I could certainly control the resources I might allocate to 
something. I (1) M/52/30/6/R. 
 
 ….you had a degree of control in what you did.  That 
degree of control came with responsibility….to use  
discretion effectively, properly and not to discriminate 
against any particular group. PC (2) M/58/30/30R. 
 
  ....there’s less control....police officers were often more 
robust in the past in the way they dealt with issues….it 
was less likely to come to any kind of enquiry…. I’m not 
saying that anything that happens dishonestly or 
violently is acceptable, its not….It’s about dealing with 
people honestly and if you say to me as a police officer, 
‘did you transgress the rules last night when you were at 
work’.  I would say ‘no I didn’t’ and you can look at 
anything you like, because I behaved professionally’. CI 
(4) M/64/30/8(R). 
 
No.  I didn’t have the resources, and I think the control, 
you know.  That was my Achilles heel. CS (3) 
M/67/30/4R.  
  157 15
 
 
Control over what I did, yes….when you were running 
people it was difficult sometimes, unless you were really 
there and pushing them….because otherwise officers, 
because they have this use of initiative they could go 
and do certain things and you've got this imbalance.  CS 
(6) M/68/30/5R. 
 
Community Policing….I had restricted control. When 
there were no other ….I was allowed to get on with my 
own policing, build my bridges with the community and it 
worked very well….but that control was soon taken away 
if the resources were needed elsewhere. Sgt (10) 
M/67/30/12 R. 
 
There is quite a varied reaction in this section where, within a number 
of replies, targets and initiatives had a tendency to lock out the ability to 
practice discretion. Once again we are presented with a contradiction; their 
views are obviously those of the official purposes of the police i.e. the local 
and national policing initiatives and targeted responses identified in Chan’s   
axiomatic knowledge or the ‘whys and wherefores’ of the job. However, on the 
other side of the contradiction, there is the regret at the inability to practise 
discretion, which, as Reiner identified, almost appears to be in opposition to 
the official purpose of the police.  This, it is felt, is more indicative of the way 
policing was practised in the era when this particular cohort was serving. 
However, it must be underlined that I am part of that peer group in that  I 
served at the same time as the majority; the reader needs to be mindful that I 
am not indulging in sentimentality for an era long gone, I am merely 
interpreting what they are saying.   
In this next series of responses, given by the Student officers, it is 
obvious they are aware of their position within the organisation and that that 
positioning provides the greatest opportunity to practise discretion. However 
the caveat to that practice of discretion is the realisation that both the 
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unhindered and unfettered practice of discretion can lead to a number of 
difficulties.   
Cohort 4 – Student Officers 
I think individual officers have….a lot of discretion as to 
how they speak to members of the public…. I would 
always act according to my training….I have quite a lot 
of control in what I do on a day-to-day basis. PC (7) 
F/23/2/2. 
Most of the time it’s my decisions, I’m accountable for 
them. If I mess it up it’s my fault and I am in control of 
every decision that I make, unless I’m other wise 
directed by a supervisor, unless they tell me other wise, 
then I will do what I thought. PC (1) F/23/2/2. 
 
Some things go out of your control….if it’s a  high-scale 
offence….if a robbery came in [was reported] it 
completely goes out of your control. PC (3) F/28/2/2. 
 This officer was indicating that, as is common in most forces, the 
seriousness of the crime indicates the level of response that it will receive, 
and that ‘loss of control’ that she was referring to is simply the fact that once 
the initial response PC has established the seriousness of the offence the 
subsequent investigation will be handled by more experienced officers, 
usually with CID involvement  
 
When the job hasn’t been rung in15 you....have full 
control about what you’re going to do, you’ve got lots of 
options....words of advice , ticket, report for summons, 
arrest....to be honest it’s when a log’s been created that 
your discretion’s gone. PC (4) M/34/2/2. 
 
I suppose....you are making decisions all the time and 
you’ve got control....ultimately you’re reporting back to 
your supervision….they’re reporting back to national 
standards of NCRS or your force policies for what ever it 
may be, but you do have control of just small things, 
                                            
15  The officer simply means that the complainant has not actually telephoned the police so an official ‘log’ 
has not been created. 
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taking the choice in the first place but I think you’re 
always answerable to somebody else. PC (5) F/27/2/2. 
 
Herein lies the essence of the contradiction insofar as this officer, whilst 
stating that she has control over her decisions, she recognises there is an 
ultimate requirement to ‘report back’. The most telling part of this comment 
whilst she stated that ‘you have control of just small things’ is that the officer 
also recognises that she is always ‘answerable to someone else’. This is the 
very situation that Foucault explored within his ‘discourses of power’ that we 
are subjected to and subjugated by without the means of escaping them.  
Conversely however as Giddens stated ‘there are always some resources 
available….to countervail social pressure’ (Layder, 2006: p.171). Perhaps, in 
this instance those ‘resources’ are contained within the words ‘taking the 
choice in the first place’ and may result in a small measure of relaxation of the 
Foucauldian strictures.       
 
 
Pretty much so, based on what, who ever you’re dealing 
with what’s doing, I think you’ve pretty much 
got....control. PC (6)/F/22/2/2. 
 
I feel in control all the time to be honest with you. PC (9) 
M/29/2/2.  
 
….ultimately I can decide whether someone’s arrested 
or not so to that extent I have control. PC (10) M/27/2/2.  
 
....in every situation that I’ve gone into....you can 
establish what level of discretion you’re gonna use.... 
someone parked on a double yellow line, dropping some 
body off….there’s no benefit for the Police....saying, ‘oh, 
£30 obstruction ticket’....But the reality is....it’s not gonna 
improve the consent of the police force you may well 
look at someone driving....in an anti-social 
manner....addressing that in terms of a stern 
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warning....in terms of a Section 59 notice16 and giving 
that person the opportunity to change their ways, has a 
positive effect in terms of the public’s perception of the 
Police force.....I’ve had a fair amount of discretion in how 
I’ve been able to apply the powers that I’ve got....and 
ensuring that discretion....doesn’t have an impact on a 
victim….You can still give warnings….but you've got 
PACE that you've got to adhere to…. Most of the time, 
although you know as a Chief, you’d like to do 
things….you have to work within....the tripartite 
arrangement....PC (2) M/31/2/2. 
 
 
The views on the question of discretion and its continued practice indicate 
that it is still ‘alive and well’, especially in the junior ranks. It starts, as 
Pepinsky proposed ‘….from the premises that discretion is a desirable part of 
policing. It proposes a system of accountability designed to generate 
discretion in a way that reduces the injustice of selective law enforcement’ 
(Pepinsky, 1984: p. 249). 
By its very nature the practice of discretion is quite heavily influenced by 
what Chan identified as both dictionary and directory knowledge, However, as 
Reiner identified,   the need to ‘get the job done’, often without recourse to the 
letter of the law or any local initiatives taking place, was often seen as running 
counter-culturally to the official policing purpose. It also reinforces the fact that 
discretion is, or appears to be, in the main, practised by the officers on the 
ground who deal with the public on a daily basis. It is also important to 
recognise that these same officers could, by being overly officious about 
minor traffic law transgressions, such as the ignoring of double yellow lines, 
quite easily alienate people. In these situations a certain amount of leeway 
                                            
16  Refers to S.59 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (where a vehicle is driven carelessly) an officer can give an 
initial written warning, valid for 12 months, and on any subsequent infringement can seize and destroy the vehicle.  
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and mutual understanding indicates, that in many respects consent could 
almost be said to have been negotiated  or at least tacitly acknowledged. 
Chapter 5.2. 
The next question on control asked in what areas the subjects felt they had no 
discretion or where they felt that discretion had been gradually eroded into an 
environment where there was ever-increasing control. 
Cohort 1 – Chief Constables 
The dominant feature once again within this particular group is the 
close resemblance to Chan’s definition of axiomatic knowledge. The loss of 
control that Chief Officers feel can readily be attributed to the plethora of 
policing ‘initiatives’, performance indicators, both local and national and the 
national policy of ‘sanctioned detections’ (see footnote page 162). However, 
there are also signs of a fairly healthy scepticism regarding the official views 
and guidelines which, once again appears to run in opposition to the official 
rhetoric and, indeed, these emerging patterns demonstrate there is also quite 
a healthy cynicism regarding that same official rhetoric, which according to 
Reiner may even have been against the official purpose of the police. These 
trends seem to be a particular construct of the Chief Officer and Senior/Middle 
Management cohorts and can be attributed to both rank and seniority.  
I can’t think of any real change where I’ve got less  or no 
discretion, we get measured on a massive portfolio of 
performance indicators....it does remove my discretion 
because frankly some of them are meaningless....and all 
they do is....confuse cops.  Now we’ve got about a 
hundred and twenty PI’s for operational policing. you 
don’t have to ....run around....doing everything the HMIC 
says, because we can’t do everything and we 
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sometimes have to tell them that we can’t do everything. 
CC (1) M/51/24/2. 
 
….it’s being eroded by the inappropriateness of the 
basket of targets we’re given….they’re....the wrong 
incentives....there are some rules....around what I can 
and can’t do, but I think they’re….a 
disincentive....Recently....we reviewed our.... capability 
to deal with....the eight or nine....predictors of serious 
events. Now a force of my size....spent an awful amount 
of time, energy and effort building those protective 
services up and we achieve the standard required. I 
could have spent half as much or twice as much, I’d 
have got the same outcome.... CC (2) M/54/31/3. 
 
 
 
....were I to decide in key performance areas, to exercise 
that discretion and putting the resources in the Home 
Office would… …react pretty sharply and rap me and 
the authority over the knuckles and find some way of 
seeking to enforce compliance....whilst individual officers 
have discretion, I probably have less discretion than they 
have. CC (3) M/53/29/4. 
 
  
At this juncture, because of the way the answer was developing, it was 
appropriate to ask a supplementary question, (one of the benefits of the semi-
structured interview), based on the very strong probability that the use of 
discretion, or the application of discretion or the ability to apply discretion, 
proportionately diminishes as the seniority of rank increases. I asked the Chief 
what he would link that to in operational terms. 
 
....if I decided I didn’t want speed cameras, I could have 
them all taken out....but I doubt if I would….its....about 
where I put my resources rather than deciding whether I 
prosecute or not....the outcome of me not putting 
resources in....the prosecutions won’t happen because 
there isn’t anybody there to do them. CC (3) M/53/29/4. 
 
The next and subsequent replies return to the main theme of this question. 
….we’re moving into enforcement when we should be 
into some sort of treatment or rehabilitation....what you 
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can’t do is give police officers carte blanche....no, we 
can’t do that, but actually we’ve taken away too much 
discretion and we need to give it back. CC (4) 
M/51/32/3. 
 
….it is in the public’s lack of tolerance of risk that, you 
know, they rail against the surveillance society but want 
us to counter every risk that is out there….I think 
that…power of hindsight when looking at risk is again 
taking discretion too far. CC (5) M/52/31/3. 
 ….ring fence funding is a removal of discretion and 
externally set targets….It actually creates the need to do 
certain things and therefore takes away the discretion. 
CC (6) M/52/30/8. 
 
....where your professional confidence is under 
challenge….then obviously you feel discretion’s been  
squeezed out of you....  sanctioned detections17, it was 
quite clear from HMIC.... and the Home Office….it 
becomes....a political issue....your room for manoeuvre 
and level of discretion can be squeezed out very quickly 
and you can end up having to ....do things which 
intuitively, professionally you wouldn’t choose to do but 
you have to....we are public servants and it would be 
arrogant of us to turn round and say you are wrong. We 
ain’t going to do it, it’s not do-able. CC (7)/ M/54/31/3. 
 
Yes, absolutely, I do.  If you ask my subordinates,  
further down the food chain, they might feel the answer’s 
different.  But I think if you don’t feel you have control 
over what you do, that’s a failure in yourself, not a 
system error. CC (8) M/52/29/4 
 
I’ve got control over policing most of the time….I think 
the operational independence of chief constables is 
extremely important, it’s some times used as a shield by 
chief constables to stop people from interfering and 
asking why we do things. I am more relaxed about that, 
but I do not feel as though I am constrained to 
investigate criminal activity and if I thought I was, I’d be 
the first to say. CC (9) M/56/36/5. 
 
….I think in terms of an increasing focus around 
inspection and audit where we have crept into what I 
                                            
17  A sanctioned detection occurs when (1) a notifiable offence (crime) has been committed and recorded; (2) 
a suspect has been identified and is aware of the detection; (3) the CPS evidential test is satisfied; (4) the victim has 
been informed that the offence has been detected, and; (5) the suspect has been charged, reported for summons, or 
cautioned, been issued with a penalty notice for disorder (my emphasis) or the offence has been taken into 
consideration when an offender is sentenced. NB The practice of issuing fixed penalty notices for relatively minor 
offences was viewed in some quarters as a ‘quick fix’ to enhance the crime detection rates.  
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would almost call a painting by numbers approach to 
policing which I don’t think is healthy….I think it’s where I 
would argue we need a stronger and better resource 
inspectorate….quite unusual to have a chief saying, 
“You need stronger and better inspectorate resources.”. 
CC (10) M/48/27/1. 
Once again, as in the responses to previous questions, Chan’s 
axiomatic knowledge dominates this cohort’s responses. As already premised 
it appears obvious that Chief Officers are more concerned with why and the 
wherefore of the way actions are carried out within the organisation. This can 
either be at their own behest, or, more commonly, as a result of initiatives set 
by the Home Office.  
Cohort 2 – Senior/Middle Management 
….operationally discretion is much less…. it’s easier to 
just go by the book than to have to answer the 
questions ….as to why you didn’t. I (1) F/48/27/10 
 
….you’re tied in as a constable to a very strict system of 
rules, regulations and guidelines….the discretion of the 
constable….at an individual level, and I don’t think the 
public are aware of this,….has virtually completely gone. 
Sgt (2) M/49/29/6. 
It is not necessarily a bad thing to lose discretion if the 
options are reduced for very good reasons….I think the 
consistency for the public, and also a structure for us 
internally, are both very useful facets. CI (4) M/53/23/8. 
 
I think in terms of targets that are set nationally, 
expectations from government about what we deliver for 
the policing budget....does have a limiting effect or 
impacts upon the type of policing....where we focus our 
activities. CS (5) F/42/15/1. 
 
....I am very concerned with some of the targets set by 
Government which do remove an element of discretion 
from front line officers because we have to achieve 
results....the better discretion is about how you police a 
situation.... enforcement does not always remedy a 
situation....the balance that has to be struck is....about 
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serving the needs of the community against those who 
are in a community who may be disaffected and may 
adversely react to any police input. DCC (9) M/57/30/4. 
 
 
….in terms of discretion….by not taking action a police 
officer can find themselves at the wrong end of a 
complaint….so I think that discretion is going, and police 
officers are so accountable now that that has an impact 
on discretion. CS (7) M/44/25/1. 
 ….the Chief gives me x amount of resources to deal 
with as I see fit….tomorrow….he could take away half of 
those resources….that is when my discretion has been 
affected....all I can do is respond to emergency 
calls….this is all I am providing. CS (8) M/50/31/3. 
If we police to the letter of the law, we would have every 
one against us.  I think there has to be the discretion and 
if we ever lost that discretion, it would be a very sad day 
and that’s not a case of picking on certain members of 
the community I’m a firm believer you treat as you find.  
If that discretion was taken away, we might as well just 
become a dictatorship. I (6) M/42/23/5. 
 
....as a senior manager I have....less control....than when 
I was a constable and used discretion....I feel that 
constables....are losing their powers of discretion, they 
do not see....an option, they are looking at  increased 
crime figures.  If they can get five detected crimes out of 
an offence, that’s the way....they are 
pushed....somebody steals a packet of crisps and offers 
each of their friends a crisp.....you’re looking at getting 
one detected theft of the crisps and four handling stolen 
goods....really criminalising those young people…. the 
majority don’t want to be doing that....the public would 
certainly not want us doing that, because that is bringing 
them into the criminal justice system for the benefit of 
detecting crimes....very difficult, but discretion is one of 
the best things about the police service.  But we are 
gradually losing it. CS (10) M/40/20/1. 
 
 
...the national crime recording standard was absolutely 
needed.....but that meant we went to absurd lengths 
where a couple of kids would fight in the 
playground....you’ve got two assaults on your crime 
books....the cop who goes....will deliver two cautions 
and....then and we’ve got sanctioned detections….a 
woman....reported finding....cannabis in her son’s 
pocket.....she  wants the cop to tell this son off....He 
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arrests this kid.... he crimes it, takes the kid to the police 
station and because the mum reported it, she can’t be 
the appropriate adult, social services have to get 
involved.  It just is a nightmare scenario of somebody 
who actually phoned the police to give her son a telling 
off DCC (3) M/47/21/1. 
 
 
It is important to note that there are a number of fundamental 
assumptions about the ‘whys and the wherefores’, as identified and labelled 
by Chan as axiomatic knowledge, of the job particularly with the current 
situation; however, this presents the reader with a dilemma. It may appear 
from the replies, particularly with regard to that knowledge, that the traditional 
role of the police is being eroded by targets and initiatives, both local and 
national.  There is regret in what is seen as interference which displays a 
collective sense of cynicism about the official rhetoric but there also appears 
to be an undercurrent of self-reflective and professional thinking.  
Whether these replies reflect the influences of police culture per se in 
an effort to boost both the image and the traditional roles of the police or 
whether they are genuine and relatively truthful responses about the way the 
service is being directed needs careful consideration. There is also the 
apparent emergence of a further cultural pattern which is appears to be based 
mainly on rank and seniority, as in the responses of the previous cohort. That 
is not to say however that it is a culture pattern that is restricted to any 
particular cohort.     
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Cohort 3 – Peer Group 
 
 
I want to open those police stations….he [the CC] said 
“Go ahead and do it.”….they gave us the money….I 
think I had enormous discretion. I was very happy to 
have the discretion that I did. CS (3) M/67/30/4 R.  
You’ve got almost no discretion in issues of serious 
public disorder, in issues of pre-planned events....in 
those areas, you’re very much controlled either by local 
briefing or by policy....CI (4) M/64/30/8R. 
 
legislation….for example drink-driving, you'd blow in it 
and you were over the line.  That's it.  ….no 
discretion….you go to court and it's….one year’s 
ban….So all discretion, even for the courts, went 
out.  ….certain legislation came in and stopped 
discretion. CS (6) M/68/30/5 R. 
If PCs….are given discretion and they don’t ….get the 
results the commander wants to put him at the top of all 
the other area commands then it rolls down hill.  The 
Chief Inspector gets it, then the Inspector gets it and the 
Sergeant gets it ….I would suggest zero. I (5)  
M/57/30/10R. 
Discretion ….had been eroded and therefore it made 
you twice about….things….It's….accountability to the 
nth degree where you really started to strangle initiative 
and actually strangle….the objective you're trying to 
achieve. CS (9) M/56/30/3 R. 
I have never felt constrained and blocked in what I have 
done. I have just felt frustrated….in what I couldn’t 
achieve…. through not having the resources. I (1) 
M/52/30/6 R. 
 
....I was working on a residential beat, you’d walk round, 
you’d see some body with a tax disc out....and you 
would go to the person and say....get it shifted or else, 
then in the CID the priorities changed and the control 
changed. PC (2) M/58/30/30 R. 
 
This comment is totally at variance with most of the other officers in this 
and the other cohorts and judging by the tone of voice on the recording it was 
a genuine comment not just a piece of conventional professional rhetoric. 
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Operating at this level he was extremely content with the freedom (within 
budgetary boundaries) that he was given by the chief. The question produced 
this genuine reaction which is appears to be a direct refutation of Mills’s 
‘vocabularies of motive’. 
….where people had been, once they’d got to these 
higher ranks….,they suddenly were trying to close doors 
on things that I may have been doing which they 
considered unacceptable. Because they did them, and 
they knew what people were doing in order to 
circumvent things. Sgt (10) M/67/30/12 R. 
I think officers had some discretion when I was on the 
job, I don’t think they have that much discretion 
now.  …if you believe everything you read it’s all to do 
with targets….I can only speak of what I read in the 
newspapers. S (8) M/63/30/6 R. 
I thought police officers on the street showed a great 
deal of discretion in the manner in which they dealt with 
the public....they made certain decisions. I think those 
decisions have been taken away from them now....minor 
crimes like theft....they’re dealt with over the telephone 
and you don’t see anyone....I think the level of 
discretion’s been taken away from the officer on the 
beat.... in our time if we....couldn’t make a decision, they 
would always go to up the chain of command....Now I 
think they pass it up the chain of command straight 
away. Sgt (7) M/57/30/10R. 
 
 
In many instances the ability to practice discretion at street level has 
certainly been eroded both by changes in legislation, (like driving with excess 
alcohol) and by changes in police procedures which appear more to be driven 
by performance targets and the ‘tick-box’ syndrome which is becoming 
endemic in most public services. This series of replies from the peer group 
also alludes to the situation when they policed and when there certainly was a 
greater ‘freedom’ granted to those at street level who policed in what were 
relatively easier times. Easier insofar as the serious erosion of public trust that 
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has occurred in the recent past had not yet taken place and the legitimacy of 
the police was at a much higher level than it is at present.  
Within this cohort, the more notable ‘cultural’ factors identified fall within the 
ambit of Chan’s model namely in the areas of both dictionary and directory 
knowledge, or, to put it more simply the ways and means of getting the job 
done, which in turn once again as Reiner proposed, often appear to run in 
opposition to the official view. There are also indications of some of the more 
subtle nuances between the ranks within the structure that are also important 
components of the overarching police culture. 
Cohort 4 – Student Officers 
....on the core18....you’ve got a little bit more discretion, 
but so often the police have just got to be seen to doing 
a certain thing, rather than it being the right thing....I had  
a....racially based hate incident....reported by a third 
party....I spoke to the complainant who was not offended 
by any of it....because of the guidelines of dealing with a 
hate incident, I spent longer on that incident than 
anything else....the complainant was so disillusioned 
with the police....(he said) ‘I’ve said to you right from the 
start....I wasn’t offended by it, I don’t want to strain 
community relations any further....it was just an off-the-
cuff remark’....it was reported by his management cos 
his management thought that they should....the crime 
went twice to a hate panel who had to decide whether 
enough had been done.  I can understand why that 
needs to be done in....other cases, but you have to have 
an element of discretion....it’s just, my personal opinion it 
would have been better to speak to the 
complainant....speak to the guy who said it, make sure 
he realises it could have been offensive and that could 
have been the end of it.  ....but it went on for months. PC 
(5) F/27/2/2. 
 
There is no opportunity for the officer to practise discretion in this case; 
there are a set of procedures that she was duty-bound to follow despite the 
                                            
18  Normal (not Community beat officer) uniformed patrol also known as ‘response’ policing 
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obvious concern and upset of the complainant. This is undoubtedly one of 
those situations, where, according to Bradford and Jackson, police legitimacy 
‘….is open to challenge and debate triggered by poor experiences’….and 
although the effects are relatively ephemeral….cumulated experiences may 
result in a more permanent change.’ (Bradford and Jackson, 2009: p. 9). 
Indeed the disillusionment of the complainant was clear to see and may well 
have led to a withdrawal of trust, which according to Luhmann, in 1979, 
occurred ‘….once a specific boundary had been crossed’. (Luhmann,1979: 
p.29) The boundary had indeed been crossed and the whole situation is 
permeated with a series of ‘back-watching’ vignettes which did particular 
disservice to all concerned as well as presenting a challenge, however 
insignificant, to police legitimacy.  
Once again, in a cultural sense, there is a contradiction between Chan’s 
model, particularly in the area of the ‘whys and wherefores’ of the job and the 
organisational role of the police whether they are carried out either 
individually, or as previously highlighted, under the auspices of legislation.  It 
could be reasonably argued that as the officer suggested;  
….it’s just, my personal opinion it would have been 
better to speak to the complainant....speak to the guy 
who said it, make sure he realises it could have been 
offensive and that could have been the end of it.  ....but it 
went on for months. PC (5) F/27/2/2. 
 
 Whilst this course of action is in direct in opposition to the official rhetoric, 
and indeed the national standard for dealing with hate crime, perhaps 
Reiner’s debate on whether these informal cultures are for or against the 
official purposes of the police could inform what appears to be the most 
sensible course of action.  
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I think I have a lot lower tolerance of people than I would 
normally....it’s.... just to do with the sheer amount of 
what you get....some times people do need taking off the 
streets, because.... they are seriously going to hurt some 
body....I just think that....you need a bit of a military 
response, cos then you....back each other up and once 
one person goes to arrest somebody....you don’t 
obviously question what they’re doing. PC (1) F/23/2/2. 
 
This response supports Holdaway’s 1984 findings and indicates that 
both back-up and support, either by action or inaction, of an officer’s 
colleagues, is expected and is almost automatically given in this type of 
situation.  
 
I'm comfortable….where I can give discretion….minor 
crimes, the incidents….maybe where a public order 
offence has occurred….you've got control there 
to….give somebody a chance…. but if they overstep the 
mark you've got to act. PC (2) M/31/2/2. 
I think we do have quite a lot of discretion because we 
are at the forefront. If I didn’t feel like I had that, then I 
would probably confide in a Sergeant…. we don’t have a 
lot of discretion when it comes to missing people. PC (3) 
F/28/2/2. 
I use discretion on a daily basis....you can get called to a 
school where two eleven year olds have been fighting.  
I’m not there to give an eleven year old whose been 
scrapping in the playground a criminal record....that’s not 
to me what policing’s about....but we’re talking about 
ethical recording of crime and obviously when that job’s 
come there’s a log created...you know so you’ve got to 
be careful there....so I think in some respects your 
discretion has gone but in other respects you....can still 
have your discretion….to be honest it’s when a log’s 
been created that your discretion’s gone....you have to 
fill your pink....which records all your statistics for the 
Home Office. Which should give you ethical crime 
recording but doesn’t because of what I’ve said....I think 
in those circumstances you’ve got no discretion. PC (4) 
M/34/2/2. 
 
The whole tenure of this particular reply is concerned with ‘getting the 
job done’ identified in reference to Chan’s model where what she identifies as 
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recipe knowledge ‘….suggests what should or should not be done in specific 
situations….as well as providing recommendations and strategies for coping 
with police work’ (Chan, 1997: p. 79).  However, it is against a background of 
the fact that if a log record has been created (the official purpose of the police 
once more highlighted) then the officer is duty bound to take the necessary 
action which will include an arrest and the creation of a sanctioned detection. 
In the past the officer would have practised discretion by speaking the parents 
of both the children involved and achieved what all parties would have viewed 
as a satisfactory conclusion. This again informs the healthy cynicism that is 
part of Reiner’s cultural model, arguing, as it does, against the official views 
and rhetoric of the organisation. 
 
….domestic situations....you’ve got to....deal with 
something positively....sometimes you don’t have a 
choice....you could probably....just leave the two people 
in the house....because they’ve had an argument doesn’t 
mean that ....one of them’s got to leave for the 
night….but that’s drilled into you that....one of them 
needs to leave that night, just to prevent anything further 
from happening....incidents like that, I don’t think you’ve 
got much discretion any more. PC (6) F/22/2/2. 
 
This particular ‘positive action’ route was introduced following many 
complaints of police officers dealing unsatisfactorily with what were termed 
‘domestic incidents’. The route delineated a series of procedures which had, 
and indeed still have, to be adhered to. They involved a finalisation with a 
positive action which could simply mean the removal of one of the 
protagonists from the premises to the ultimate sanction of arrest, followed by 
a thorough investigation by a specialist ‘Domestic Violence Unit’ staffed by 
specially trained officers. (See also the comments by officer (9) on page 172. 
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I can’t think of any situation where I don’t have any 
discretion. PC 7 F/23/2/2. 
you have to ask yourself.... about the victim....you’ve got 
a duty to investigate....and deal with it accordingly.  I 
think where you’ve got an issue in terms of having some 
level of discretion is firstly who is the victim, if it’s a 
member of the public I think .... you’re duty bound to, to 
investigate. PC (8) M/28/2/2. 
 
If there is a positive action [force domestic violence 
policy] Then you haven’t got any discretion have you, 
you have got to arrest. PC (9) M/29/2/2 
 
….you don’t have much now….I don’t think I’ve ever 
really had it….when....jobs come about now with the 
police, everything is logged.  There’s an incident number 
for everything, so there is a paper trail for everything. PC 
(10) M/27/2/2. 
According to Bradford and Jackson ‘….the best way to improve public trust 
is the demonstration and application of fair procedure….’ (Bradford and 
Jackson, 2009: p. 9). This is almost akin to Weber’s concept of bureaucracy, 
whereby everyone is treated in accordance with a fixed and routine procedure 
thereby guaranteeing equal treatment; however, this would appear to rule out 
the practice of discretion, which, by its very nature, runs contrary to fairness. 
A similar view can be found in Weber’s model of bureaucracy and legitimacy 
where one aspect states that there should be no discretionary activities by the 
administrators who have to follow a rule book to ensure everyone is treated 
the same. Discretion for Weber indicates a structure of personal favours and 
unequal treatment. Thus control over discretion is, he says, fundamental to 
equal treatment. 
However, in 1984, in opposition to the enlightenment (Weber’s) view, 
Pepinsky proposed that accountability actually requires (added emphasis) 
discretion, stating that: 
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If society aims to use regulation to make the police 
accountable, to the citizens they serve, society’s rules 
must not only channel accountability, but must create 
discretion….to reduce the level of class bias in law 
enforcement through accountability, discretionary rules 
must be designed to offer an incentive for the police to 
engage in aggressive non-enforcement. Pepinsky (1984: 
p 249)   
This neatly sums up the conundrum and perhaps points to an area where 
discretion can be practised, as we have already highlighted, by most of the 
lower ranks of the police service. It is a necessity to enable the day to day 
routine tasks to be accomplished in a purely practical manner; if every 
offence, from minor to major were pursued to prosecution, the resulting 
bureaucratic nightmare could undoubtedly result in the whole judicial process 
grinding to a halt. As Pepinsky observed it ‘….would necessitate that just 
about all Americans of legal age, including officials, be jailed or imprisoned 
periodically.’ (Pepinsky, 1984: pp. 265 – 266); it is quite obvious to the reader 
that this situation is readily transferable to any western democratic country 
including England and Wales. 
How do we ask our police officers to differentiate? Can we be satisfied that 
something as apparently dangerous as this can be left in the hands of its 
practitioners. Perhaps Pepinsky’s ‘aggressive non-enforcement’, which social 
work theory called ‘radical non-interventionism’ in the 1970s, could become 
part of the proposed ‘jurisprudence of consent’. This will be explored further 
when I present my conclusions. It is often found that there are elements of 
both consent and answerability where the questions of accountability and 
answerability are posed. 
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In this set of responses the cultural differences displayed, particularly 
between cohorts 1 and 2 and 3 which represent senior officers both by rank 
and age and cohort 4, the junior ranks in both age and service are quite 
striking.  The senior officers are obviously, because of their position in the 
organisation, bound by the need to comply with a basket of initiatives, both 
local and national. Similarly the student officers are also bound by a number 
of ‘positive action’ initiatives, including the domestic dispute scenario, as 
highlighted by both PCs (8) and (9) on page 170. Nevertheless there are 
occasions where, in that unique position that they occupy, they are also able 
to practise discretion, as highlighted by Chan, through a series of work-place 
‘models’, based on the knowledge factors, including both axiomatic and 
directory knowledge, that she demonstrated. This knowledge will have been 
acquired through previous similar incidents that they have dealt with, or 
indeed may have been taught by more senior constables. In turn, this then 
provides them with a number of workable solutions or behaviours, which 
experience has demonstrated, can often be a way of getting the job dealt with 
in a more practical sense.  
The next chapter, Chapter 6, will examine all aspects of accountability, both 
personal and those appertaining to a particular rank, that apply to police 
officers throughout the rank structure.  
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Chapter 6: Accountability 
 
Interview Data and Analysis 
 
This chapter will examine the overall accountability that all police officers 
bear towards their colleagues, their supervisors, at whatever position they 
occupy within the police hierarchy, and ultimately to the legislature. In order to 
gain an empirical view of police accountability it is necessary to outline how 
the structure, briefly alluded to in the previous chapters, and which was 
designed to ensure good management and balanced control, came into being. 
  Currently, the forty three police forces of England and Wales are 
governed by a ‘.... tripartite structure of police accountability established by 
the Police Act 1964 following the deliberations of the 1962 Royal Commission 
on the Police’. (Mawby and Wright, 2005: p. 3). The essence of the paradigm 
is to facilitate evenly distributed governance of the police by a sharing of 
responsibilities between the Home Office, the local Police Authority and the 
chief constables of each of the forty three forces in England and Wales. 
  Legislation enacted since 1964, including the Police and Magistrates 
Courts Act of 1994, the Police Act 1996 and the Police Reform Act of 2002 
has effectively endorsed this tripartite structure. Further to this the Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011, recommended the introduction 
of Elected Police Commissioners19 to replace local police authorities for each 
police area in England and Wales (See glossary for a brief summation of their 
place in the power hierarchy and their role). One of the key aspects of the 
                                            
19  At the time of writing the first elections for Elected Commissioners were planned to take place in 
November 2012. The elections were subsequently held and the post of Police and Crime Commissioner was created 
for each force in England and Wales with the exception of the MPS. 
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legislation was that it would help to strengthen and add value to the tri-partite 
agreement. 
Whilst due cognisance has been taken of the aforementioned structure this 
research is more focussed on the accountability of individual officers, not only, 
in the case of chief constables via it’s (the tripartite agreement) auspices, but 
on their accountability to the officers and staff within the organisation, and 
perhaps of paramount importance, every individual officer’s accountability, 
whatever rank he or she may be, to the public. Having already examined the 
Foucauldian ‘discourse theory’ in respect of control  it is immediately apparent 
that, within the area of accountability, there are a number of separate but 
similar ‘discourses’ or ways of knowing, that are  connected to, and, in a 
number of instances, directly linked to those on control.     
 
Foucault, whilst examining the ‘truth’ surrounding discourses, was of the 
opinion that specific roles 
 ‘....must become more and more important in 
proportion to the political responsibilities which he is 
obliged, willy-nilly, to accept’....it would be a dangerous 
error to discount him politically in his specific relation to 
a local form of power, either on the grounds that this is a 
specialist matter which doesn’t concern the masses (the 
public – my addition), which is doubly wrong: they are 
already aware of it, and in any case implicated in it’ or 
that he ‘....serves the interest of the state or capital 
which is true but at the same time shows the strategic 
position he occupies....’(Foucault in Rabinow, 1984: 
p72). 
  
It requires no great leap of faith to place Chief Constables under this aegis 
and the political responsibilities referred to are amply demonstrated in the 
data which follows. The analysis of this particular data set also demonstrates 
the inextricable links that exist between the accountability process and the 
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exercise of discretion, or indeed, the lack of the ability to practise discretion, 
particularly as progress is made through the rank structure. 
Whilst day to day or ‘low-level’ policing is strictly governed by a series of 
both internal and, where necessary, external procedures and accountability 
processes, which in essence, decrease both the potential for and the practice 
of individual malfeasance, concern has been expressed that ‘high-level’ 
policing, such as intelligence gathering by state agencies such as MI5 is not 
bound by the same strictures which, as a consequence, ‘....has the potential 
to undermine the foundations of democratic policing.’ (Wakefield and Fleming, 
2009: p.3)  
It is important at this stage to briefly examine Weber’s seminal work on 
power and authority. Weber sought to define legitimacy which he stated was 
‘….the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) from a 
given source will be obeyed by a certain group of persons’ (Weber, 1968: p. 
212).  He recognised that although the motivation to obey commands may 
well coincide with an individual’s self interest, he argued that a further element 
[of motivation] was the belief in the legitimacy of the source authority.  He also 
identified what he termed as three ‘pure’ types of legitimate authority: 
traditional, legal-rational and charismatic.  
He argued that legal-rational authority required professionalism, and 
professional bureaucratization to be effective in delivering an equal service to 
everybody. Commitment to the rule book is thus a commitment to do a 
professional job and one that treats people equally (this affects businesses as 
well as state organizations), and provides the personal link with the 
organizational. Bureaucracy, therefore, is fundamental to democratic equality. 
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The rules are transparent to both professional and their clients, not whimsical, 
personal or secret!  
Given the numerous daily interactions between police and public  the 
parallels to Weber’s legal-rational authority can be readily identified in the 
every day compliance by citizens to ‘requests’ , both legal and ‘illegal’, from 
the police. If then, there is a belief in the legitimacy of the authority that the 
police wield, then surely that, in turn, provides a sound footing for a concept of  
a well informed consent to being policed.  
Further to that, if diversity is taken into account, it would suggest the need 
for discretion or, at least, caution in enforcing all laws everywhere in an 
identical fashion. But therein lies a different problem, one of uneven 
enforcement of the law, and for Weber, this was the problem of what he 
contemptuously called the ‘khadi20 justice’ (Weber, 1946: p.p. 219 – 221) of 
England, the amateur untrained judges (JPs), and the unwritten laws of the 
common law system. As a good German theorist, he wanted a systematic law 
code and heavily bureaucratized enforcement so that the law would fall 
equally on everyone!' 
 
The question of the overt arming of the British police service doubtless falls 
within the ambit of Weber’s legitimacy theory and it will be interesting to see 
whether that basis for legitimacy is subjugated by the use of, or at least the 
high visibility bearing of semi-automatic weapons that are seen being carried 
by police officers when the governmental ‘Security Alert’ state moves out of 
the ‘standard’ and into the ‘raised’ (in response to a general threat) or into the 
                                            
20
 The ‘khadi’, for him, was the local Islamic ruler, producing unsystematic decisions without consistent 
principles 
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‘high’ (in response to a specific threat) states.  The current climate of 
heightened threat from international terrorism continues to raise the spectre of 
a totally armed police service in this country; when this happens, and I tend to 
believe, pessimistically, that it is almost inevitable,  then the Weberian  view of 
legitimacy may well be subject to a process of radicalisation.   
With this in mind and given that there are accountability processes through 
all levels of policing which include a formal discipline code, applicable to all 
ranks, it was necessary to establish the degree of accountability uniquely  
attributed to each rank across the cohorts  by simply asking  them ‘At your 
present rank, who are you accountable to?’. Their responses were recorded 
and analysed and following this, further analysis was carried out on the 
interview data in order to reveal if there were any different perceptions of 
accountability which might emerge in their responses to other questions. This 
it was hoped would prove to be more insightful and would, in turn, reveal a 
more valid response which would go beyond the ‘content specific rhetoric’ 
stage and either support or discount Mills’s ‘vocabularies of motive 
hypothesis. 
Cohort 1 – Chief Constables 
….the police authority, Home Secretary, Prime Minister, 
local community and local authority councillors....I don’t 
mind being held to account by my workforce.  I’m not 
bullshitting you Adam, people knock on my door and say 
‘boss....‘we’re not happy about this’. ‘Come in, yeah, no 
problem, let’s have a look at it’. CC (1) M/51/24/2. 
 
....to the police authority....the Home Office....and to the 
public through them....I see my accountability as being 
to the public, but there are two agencies....the police 
authority and....the Home Office....as we saw with Mr 
Blunkett and the Cambridgeshire21 homicide issue, they 
                                            
21  See also Chapter 1 page 13. The Soaham murder case involved the abduction and murder of two girls by 
a known paedophile who was a school caretaker. The Chief Constable of Humberside was eventually forced to 
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can exert a significant influence. I think it’s probably 
thirty seven now, not thirty three....I’m prosecutable now 
for manslaughter through negligence....The prospect of 
gripping the rail22  is far more fearsome than falling out 
with the police authority....I am very comfortable with 
other organisations....that’s where accountability actually 
kicks in. So.... if we say that we want extended powers, I 
would fully expect to justify those and argue them 
against somebody who doesn’t want us to have 
them.  ....that’s accountability….CC (2) M/56/31/3. 
 
It is interesting to note that, in common with his Chief Officer 
colleagues this Chief Constable acknowledges the high levels of 
accountability that he has to the diverse bodies mentioned in his response. 
However, his remark about ‘….gripping the rail’ is appears to be a piece of 
gallows humour that he is employing, as Holdaway noted  to ‘….preserve the 
traditions of the occupational culture.’ (Holdaway, 1984: p.138). Whilst 
Holdaway’s research was conducted with the more junior (in rank) officers it 
nevertheless does not render senior officer immune from the effects of police 
culture.  
I’m accountable to the public, I’m accountable to the 
police authority and I’m accountable to the Home Office.  
but I also feel that I’m accountable to my officers and 
staff, as much as my officers. They certainly....do hold 
me to account. CC (3) M/53/29/4. 
 
I’m accountable....to the Queen, a crown agent as I 
am, ....my police authority who  conduct, with HMIC, my 
PDR.... key stakeholders....who have a view on how the 
chief constable is performing, on some of the decisions I 
take.... MPs, who I regularly speak to....   the Home 
Office....government, who will exert a certain degree of 
influence over chief constables, but actually, 
constitutionally, we’re in an interesting position 
because we don’t have a boss. (added emphasis) CC 
(4) M/51/32/3. 
 
                                                                                                                             
‘resign’ by David Blunkett (Home Secretary) over his forces failure to communicate intelligence on the perpetrator Ian 
Huntley to the Cambridgeshire force.  
22  In earlier times the prisoners dock in most courts was surrounded by a spiked railing and the analogy is obvious. 
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This answer acknowledges the high level of accountability, particularly in 
respect of Chief Constables, but the most interesting section of this answer 
lies within the emphasis; is this an attempt to break the constrictions of the 
Foucauldian discourse of accountability?; is it an implied wish to rid himself of 
all the ‘controls’ he is already subject to or was it simply a piece of 
‘conventional professional rhetoric23’ 
fundamentally to the police authority because they can 
sack me…. one of the benefits of being a “high profile 
chief constable” is that I’m, I’m a well-known figure (town 
omitted]….I cannot go anywhere in this county without 
being stopped, and told by people what they think…. 
and asked difficult questions as well. CC (5) M/51/32/3. 
To the police authority at the local or regional level, 
depending on the size, demographic, and geographic 
profile of the force and, ultimately, to the Home Office 
and Government. CC (6) M/52/30/8.   
....to the Police Authority ....I’m responsible because....I 
get sued as a Chief because things are done 
vicariously ....I’m formally accountable ....to the Home 
Office....I hold myself personally accountable to my own 
workforce....I have a degree of accountability to the 
public, and that’s articulated through the press....through 
personal letters....I see no compromise by my being 
accountable....and answerable to the whole 
Council....it’s all about communication….because the 
more we can get people to understand the challenges 
that confront us....then I think the more support and 
better understanding we can generate. CC (7) 
M/54/31/3. 
 
I’m accountable to the police authority primarily.  I’m 
accountable under law to the Home Secretary, but I 
also, I believe I have the right, if not the authority, to 
challenge demands placed upon me for accountability.  
But, ultimately, I’m accountable to the public through my 
local police authority and that’s more important than any 
thing else. CC (8) /M/52/29/4. 
 
                                            
23  See page 120  
  183 18
 
 
Whilst not, strictly speaking, being an ‘outlier’ this reply once again displays 
a willingness to challenge the boundaries of this particular discourse, but, at 
the same time, it also contains a recognition of the ultimate accountability that 
he holds; that to the public via the auspices of his police authority.     
 
We are accountable to the government and the people. 
We must establish whether local accountability is to stay 
vested in police authorities or whatever they may 
become. The uncertainty must be resolved24. CC (9) 
M/56/36/5. 
 
I’m accountable to the courts, in terms of 
judgements….I’m accountable to the Police Authority 
and the communities of (Location omitted)….indirectly, 
although I’m less comfortable with this….I’m probably 
accountable to the Home Office…. through the 
inspectorate line. CC (10) M/48/27/1. 
The ‘powerless powerful’ have already been mentioned and it is once again 
highlighted here. It demonstrates recognition, in relatively simple terms, of the 
strictures of working within the tri-partite agreement. Indeed it is almost a 
Benthamite Panopticon where the chief constables are literally ‘trapped’ by 
the high office they hold. Undoubtedly in their day-to-day office Chief 
Constables wield a great deal of power, but concomitant with that power there 
is an awareness of the total accountability that accompanies the post. As 
CC10 so succinctly put it, accountability renders him open to the ultimate 
sanction, that of being removed from his post; so, rhetorically speaking, is 
accountability yet another discourse from which there is no escape?  
                                            
24  During this particular interview an urgent and extra-ordinary meeting of the police authority which required 
the presence of the chief was called at extremely short notice. This reply, in all of its brevity, was supplied in written 
format after the interview and, in many respects, is highly indicative of something which was ‘prepared’ as a response 
and something which I feel is indeed that ‘content specific rhetoric’ described. The question he poses about the 
uncertainty may well be answered by the Elected Police Commissioner. 
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It is important to bear in mind that, when the interviews were conducted 
Police Authorities were still in place, they have now been replaced by Police 
and Crime Commissioners. Once again the Chief Officer responses rely 
heavily on ‘….the fundamental assumptions about why things are done the 
way they are in an organisation’ (Chan, 1997: p.76). As in the previous 
chapter these fundamental assumptions have clearly emerged as a dominant 
theme within the replies of this cohort. This is to be expected given their rank, 
seniority and position within the organisation they obviously acknowledge that 
the whys and the wherefores of the organisation is dominant in their working 
lives. It is also interesting to note that only three of the ten mentioned 
accountability to their workforce vis CC (1) on page 177, CC (3) on page 178 
and CC (7) on page 179. Whether this was a conscious omission is open to 
some doubt given that the over-riding pressures on Chief Constables come 
from above. 
Cohort 2 – Senior/Middle Management 
I’m accountable to the head of my department….I’m  
going to stop there because in my role I’m not 
accountable to anybody outside of the organisation. I (1) 
F/48/27/10. 
I’m accountable to Headquarters ….the training 
manager who I’m also accountable to…. the Head of 
Training who’s the Chief Superintendent. I have a very 
clear structure of who….I’m accountable to. Sgt (2) 
M/49/29/6. 
….I consider myself accountable to the Chief Constable 
and the police authority. But....I’m really clear that chief 
officers, senior officers and the staff of the constabulary 
are accountable to the public of [County omitted]. DCC 
(3) M/47/21/1. 
 
                 The head of this department. CI (4) M/53/23/8. 
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In the first instance, to the BCU commander, who’s my 
direct line manager, but I think more generally, to the 
force executive, to the police authority and to the local 
community and there are a number of mechanisms in 
place to hold me to account in terms of operational 
delivery. CS (5) F/42/15/1. 
 
....we are a people organisation, part of the manager’s 
role is to deal with people,  that, to me, shouldn’t be 
perceived as a problem….the problem is the 
bureaucracy, it can be numbers, and figures that you 
have to produce, and what they seem to forget is 
that....we’re an organisation of people for people....I 
don’t see those as a problem at all. I (6) M/42/23/5. 
 
I am accountable to the public of [Location omitted] for 
my performance….to my chief officers. I’m also 
accountable to the chief executive of the local authority 
in terms of delivering my partnership agreement,  CS (7) 
M/44/25/1. 
The Chief Constable gives me strategic direction; gives 
me the resources to provide a policing service in 
(Location omitted). I am accountable on a daily basis to 
the partners and to the public of (Location omitted) ….I 
am answerable to the Chief Constable. CS (8) 
M/50/31/3. 
 
….directly accountable to the Chief Constable ....I have 
a greater interface with the authority...I represent the 
force on the Local Criminal Justice Board....there’s an 
accountability….to deliver in the partnership arena. I 
have....in place  systems which will allow me to get the 
message back to...ordinary cops.... that’s a sharp focus 
and it’s what we were discussing earlier about the 
political nature of the job....you mustn’t forget your 
people and those structures of accountability. DCC (9) 
M/57/30/4. 
 
I’m accountable to my head of department and to the 
executive, but ....I’m accountable to....the public. I think 
I’ve got to be seen that I’m accountable to them and I’ve 
got to put that out as a culture to the rest of the 
staff….that’s ....as I would believe it. CI (10) M/46/26/3. 
 
It is interesting to note that the foremost ‘level’ of accountability that most of 
this cohort acknowledge is their responsibility within the  hierarchical structure 
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that has been, since its inception, an intrinsic part of the police service. The 
discourse revealed here is that of being bound within that structure; there is 
always a duty to report ‘upwards’ and it would appear  to be  a discourse from 
which there is no breaking free without the sanction of the discipline code 
being invoked for those who do not keep within the boundaries. 
Once again the dominant cultural theme is concerned with accountability to 
those bodies that oversee the police, it is part of what Chan described as the 
‘police mandate’ and which she termed axiomatic knowledge.  Given the 
subject of the question, that of accountability, it stands to reason that this 
would be that case, and, additionally, there does not appear to be any 
counter- cultural forces at work in these particular replies. 
Cohort 3 – Peer Group 
I was directly accountable to the Home Office, because I 
was working on national training….at that particular point 
I was directly accountable for both financial and 
management issues. I (1) 52/30/6 R. 
 
     Top to bottom. PC (2) M/58/30/30 R. 
I was very accountable to (CC Name omitted) And I 
think I was accountable to the Police Authority ….I think 
I was accountable to the local authority representatives 
and all these little panels they had….above all I was very 
accountable to my staff.  CS (3) M/67/30/4 R. 
....more or less in order, the law, the public, the 
organisation, the individual. CI (4) M/64/30/8 R. 
 
                 Just my Area Commander. I (5) M/57/32/10 R. 
                 The Chief Constable. CS (6) M/68/30/5 R. 
....I was one of six Detective Sergeants who were 
accountable to the Superintendent and that was it…..I 
was....a Headquarters Officer at an area command, so 
technically I was also accountable to the area 
commanders. Sgt (7) M/57/30/10(R). 
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….DCC, through my Chief Superintendent who would 
usually be bypassed….I was also accountable to the 
police authority….I was accountable to the HMI because 
they would ring me up and ask for things to be done 
without going through command….then you’d have to 
explain to command why things were happening. S (8) 
M/63/30/6 R. 
I felt more accountable to colleagues and the multi –
agency groups.  They were really who I was accountable 
to.  If there had been major public disorder then clearly 
the accountability goes to the Chief Constable. CS (9) 
M/56/30/3 R. 
 I’d like to think I was accountable to the public, but that 
would be a bit naïve of me….my accountability was to 
the person who had the strongest voice within that 
district at the time…. Sgt (10) M/67/30/12 R. 
Once again the accountability, which exists in the hierarchical structure of 
the service, exerts its influence over this cohort and their sense of duty, as 
well as an apparent moral obligation, is strong. Similarly, given the era that 
the peer group policed in there is a fairly dominant cultural theme based on 
Chan’s model. However there is one notable exception, which indicates that 
the culture imbued by a particular senior officer appears to run at odds with 
both local and national initiatives. This can be found in the response above 
where the comment made by the final interviewee, Sgt. (10), who had 
previously been a mid-ranking naval officer, seems initially to be out of context 
with both his previous (naval) role, his role as a serving police officer and his 
role, at interview, as a police recruit trainer. 
 In order to enable the reader to appreciate the reasoning behind this 
response it is both necessary and important to reveal the identity of the senior 
officer concerned. It was in fact Ray Mallon, a Superintendent in Cleveland 
police whose high profile ‘zero tolerance’ policing policy, based on the 
American model, gained considerable publicity (if very little else) at the time. 
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Mallon’s subsequent fall from grace then led to another high profile post as 
elected mayor of Middlesbrough. It is not surprising, given this information, 
that the interviewee was obviously strongly influenced by this somewhat 
charismatic character who had, in his words, ‘….the strongest voice.’ 
It is interesting to note that Mallon was often at odds with both his senior 
command and, on occasion, the Home office. Nevertheless his methods seem 
in many respects, to be a product of the police culture, which Reiner debated 
whilst frequently being at odds with the official view often did facilitate getting 
the job done.      
Cohort 4 – Student Officers  
 I’m....accountable to myself and to my colleagues, 
obviously I’m part of a working shift and we’re busy….it 
doesn’t work if one person’s lazy and one works....really 
hard....it’s the management that I’m accountable to in 
relation to figures KPI’s....all that rubbish! PC (1) 
F/23/2/2. 
 
Once again we see that scepticism and cynicism, identified by both 
Chan and Reiner, about the official purpose of the police. As far as this officer 
is concerned she appears to consider herself accountable to management but 
at the same time denigrates the purpose of KPIs (Key Performance 
Indicators) by referring to them as ‘….…. all that rubbish.’   
 
To my shift Sergeant who is then obviously accountable 
to the Inspector above. PC (2) M/31/2/2. 
Accountable to your sergeants and your inspectors and 
higher, you’ve got to show respect to everyone. PC (3) 
F/28/2/2. 
Accountable to everybody upstairs, basically my 
sergeant and my inspector….the public who I deal 
with …. it’s a public service.…but other than Sergeant 
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and Inspector I don’t think about anyone else to be 
honest. PC (4) M/34/2/2. 
 
I’m accountable to the public, but then I suppose I 
wouldn’t be personally held accountable....I’m 
accountable to all....the management and whether I’m 
accountable to the public or not....would depend on the 
incident as to whether the force would take some kind of 
accountability or responsibility for it or whether it would 
just be – ‘No she’s a loose cannon, standing on her 
own.’ PC (5) F/27/2/2. 
 
 
My sergeant and inspector I think, yeah and then every 
body else above that. Up to the Chief Constable [Name 
omitted] PC (6) F/22/2/2. 
 
Yes, everybody….I just respect the Chief Inspector who 
might not be my area commander….I feel the 
accountability at that level. PC (7) F/23/2/2. 
My Sergeant and everybody above....PCSOs See 
glossary) and Special Constables - not really, I’m not 
accountable to them at the moment, I think I’m moving 
up the ladder, but pretty much everybody. PC (8) 
M/28/2/2. 
 
Whilst there is an element of humour in this particular reply, which, 
according to Holdaway, is one of those joking narratives that officers often 
make about themselves, or indeed their supervisors which help ‘….to 
preserve the traditions of the occupational culture, sustaining it against the 
odds of experience.’ (Holdaway, 1984: p.138). The joke here is that the officer 
has an element of accountability to everyone, including the PCSOs. More 
importantly however it demonstrates his awareness that he is at the bottom of 
the pecking order.  
Everybody who is above….we are accountable to the 
public….inside of it we are accountable to our chief. PC 
(9) M/29/2/2. 
 
Sergeant….Inspector....to some extent the Chief 
Inspector….but I’ve not had any dealing with those…. 
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where I have to account for myself….It’s always been 
the Sergeant or the Inspector. PC (10) M/27/2/2. 
 
Once again the structure of the service is revealed in this set of responses 
and seems to keep the boundaries of the discourses strictly drawn and 
binding on those who are, as it were, within that discourse. It is also of note 
that there were only three replies where accountability to the public was 
acknowledged in the Student Officer population. The reply by PC (5) was 
unique insofar as she immediately acknowledged that her first responsibility 
and her accountability were to the public.  
Culturally, within these responses, it could be said that the overall 
recognition and acknowledgement of their position within the organisation, 
insofar as the way things are done as part of the hierarchical rank structure, 
indicates, quite counter-culturally given the differences highlighted in previous 
responses, they appear to much more aware of the whys and wherefores of 
the job, according to Chan, and how it gets done as part of Reiner’s ‘police 
‘mission. The response by PC (5), on page 185 appears to be at odds with 
her legal position when she states ‘….then I suppose I wouldn’t be personally 
held accountable....’ which, since the introduction of Human Rights legislation 
did make officers individually responsible for their own malfeasance. Prior to 
this legislation Chief Constables were vicariously liable for the actions of their 
officers.   
The following replies are those identified earlier in the chapter and which 
are more concerned with perceptions of accountability drawn from other areas 
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of questioning which were not necessarily about accountability but which, 
nevertheless, highlighted the subject matter.  
Further perceptions - All cohorts 
….the police ultimately have to be nationally 
accountable.  I wouldn’t necessarily object to being 
accountable to local democratically appointed persons, 
but only on matters which were less strategic…. CI (4) 
M/64/30/8 R. 
 
….people are accountable up to chief constable now 
and similarly, if politicians transgress, if millionaires 
transgress….they’re much more likely to be punished for 
it, than they ever were….and rightly so. DCC (3) 
M/47/21/1.  
 
 I’m very keen on accountability, I think the public have 
got a right to expect that crime will be reduced and that 
police should be seen to play our part in that…. 
However….the myriad of counting rules….is less than 
helpful. DCC (3) M/47/21/1.  
 
I am very comfortable with other organisations wanting 
to constrain us….because….if we say that we want 
extended powers, I would fully expect to….have to justify 
those and argue them against somebody who doesn’t 
want us to have them…. CC (2) M/56/31/3. 
 
….we’ve got to have an element of standardisation in 
the way that we go about things….each force has 
certain standards….I think…. the only way that that’s 
gonna be uniform is by it being implemented nationally 
and us being accountable nationally. PC (5) F/27/2/2. 
 
….accountability is the absolute epitome of everything.  
You have got to have accountability….the greater 
problem that I see in many walks of life, there has not 
been enough accountability in anything….CS (5) 
M/68/30/5 R.   
 
….an in-depth scrutiny of our use and abuse of the law, 
we are very much accountable to the….highest courts in 
the land…. we do make mistakes and….we come a 
cropper…..there is real transparency in terms of the 
legal process…. It underpins everything….and we are 
highly accountable through the courts…. CC (1) 
M/51/24/2. 
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This particular reply will immediately strike the reader who will recall that in 
the previous chapters we have already encountered the situation where there 
appears to be on many occasions, a marked reluctance on the part of the 
CPS to prosecute serving police officers; even when prosecutions do take 
place there have been a number of high profile acquittals. They notably 
include that of PC Simon Howard who in July 2012 was found not guilty of the 
murder of Ian Tomlinson in April 2009, during the G20 Summit protests. 
However Howard was subsequently dismissed in September 2012 for gross 
misconduct in a public office.  
This and other cases appear to have run contrary to the principals of 
justice. It could, of course, be argued that results like these are one of the 
salient features of jury trials which, on further examination, seem particularly 
unedifying, but indicates that the jury alone decide on the facts but, crucially, 
without the benefit of knowledge of the accused’s previous history. 
Nevertheless I feel that the chief in this instance truly felt that, as a service, 
the police as a body were, and indeed still are extremely accountable in many 
respects particularly in the current ‘audit culture’ climate. 
 
....let’s have governance and it may well have a National 
Police service providing a lot of the issues that we talked 
about before….but ultimately we are accountable 
to ….the local people. PC (8) M/28/2/2. 
 
I believe in the balance between local and national, 
because I do not wish to work in a police state or fascist 
society. CC (8) M/52/29/4. 
 
….cops parking on yellow lines when they shouldn’t and 
going into travel agents….that all ends up in my office 
for an explanation….I gave evidence at the Victoria 
Klimbie enquiry, I was the one who said sorry on behalf 
of the Met and that gets quite interesting in terms of your 
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digestive system being dealt with by public 
enquiries….it’s real, I’ve been there and ….it is a very 
powerful sort of accountability that. CC (2) M/56/31/3. 
 
….you sometimes feel like Janus, looking in a variety of 
different directions all at the same time.  To whom do I 
feel most accountable?....the police authority. CC (6) 
M/52/30/8. 
  
….it’s that higher degree of accountability which is thrust 
upon all managers….they do have a very important role 
of holding us to account and they are people by large in 
touch with the local communities… because if you look 
at where the funding comes from, it’s got to be an 
element of both and it has to be the kind of tripartite 
arrangement…. DCC (9) M/57/30/4. 
 
….we have to be a bit of both and I know that causes 
confusion, but we have to be accountable to both [locally 
and nationally] for different functions. CC (3) M/56/31/3. 
 
 
….in terms of outputs, how I organise the (Name 
omitted) Police Force to do that, they won’t intervene 
upon the vision I have for the force ….they look really at 
results.  The authority however, would seek to 
intervene ….if they felt that my model wasn’t interfacing 
with communities or was in some way impinging upon 
the relation with local authorities, then  they become… a 
bit more intrusive….mostly they leave you be. CC (3) 
M/56/31/3. 
 
Here again the desire to be ‘left alone’ to get on with the job indicates 
that this officer is expressing a level of scepticism about the ‘official position’. 
He really does appear to have a desire, without official rhetoric or 
interference, to get on with his job which Reiner identified as part of the ‘police 
mission’ and it also has an underlying theme of Chan’s axiomatic knowledge.  
 
I had this discussion once with the MP for (Constituency 
omitted)….no problem at all with a Member of 
Parliament controlling the budget for the police…. 
because at the end of the day, if they underfunded us, 
they’d be out of a job….you can underfund housing, 
health, education; you underfund policing….and you’re 
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going to see the consequences pretty damn quick.  CS 
(10) M/40/20/1. 
 
….we ought to be held accountable….people in local 
communities have got a right to know what level of 
service is being delivered in their area….it’s got to meet 
their needs….answer their questions….about what our 
local police service is delivering. CC (4) M/51/32/3. 
 
It's accountability….to the nth degree where you really 
started to strangle initiative and actually strangle….the 
objective you're trying to achieve. CS (9) M/56/30/3 R. 
 
This particular comment by CS (9) indicates a degree of scepticism 
about the official orders where, in his opinion, the degree of accountability 
expected is starting to interfere with the objectives of policing. It also appears 
to contain  an element of self-reflective and professional thinking.  
 
I’m always accountable and I know from personal 
knowledge and my predecessor knew better than I given 
his experience with the Home Secretary.  There are 
occasions when you know you need to put in a call to 
the Home Office to alert a minister that something’s 
happening. CC (7) M/54/31/3. 
 
I had an element of accountability because of my 
national lead on [subject omitted]. I have a close working 
relationship with the Home Office and with the 
government minister who deals with (subject 
omitted).  ….it’s rather informal accountability…. I 
happen to head a committee….I have no executive 
power but it’s part of that broader… political 
accountability. CC (7) M/54/31/3. 
 
….we’ve got a very good relationship with the councils, 
but they want to see their power over the Chief 
Constable and the accountability of the Chief Constable 
to the local council.  I think that was very important to 
them. CS (10) M/40/20/1. 
 
….people get shot and if they’re injured or if they are 
actually killed, then it is right and proper that we should 
be held accountable, but we’ve got to acknowledge that 
there is a greater degree of weaponry out on the street 
and some of it, frighteningly, frighteningly powerful. CC 
(9) M/56/35/5. 
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I feel that I am held accountable. I care a lot about what 
local people think….I can’t address all of the concerns 
that people have….I recognise the real problems that 
people have about paying more for public services. CC 
(9) M/56/35/5. 
 
The final question on accountability asked all four cohorts if they felt 
they were answerable, or accountable, to the law as opposed to just having 
prosecutions accepted or rejected by the verdicts of a court. Whilst there may 
be a semantic difference about the usage of answerability as opposed to 
‘accountability’ most of the respondents tended to apply either answerability 
or accountability in a similar context.  
Any common themes, or discourses, which emerge from the answers 
given, have been identified and although the manner of expressing them may 
vary it was interesting to note the similarities of expression which would help 
to identify those common discourses. They remain throughout the entire 
interview data and were ‘untouched’ as it were by the associative boundaries 
of age, rank, gender and ethnicity which already separate the four cohorts. 
 
Cohort 1 – Chief Constables 
 
I think there is a lot of transparency in the legal 
system.  ....and by people like surveillance 
commissioners....I think we are highly accountable 
through the courts. CC (1) M/51/24/2.  
 
…. who were we accountable to…. some of them could 
actually prosecute me and send me to jail, as well as 
dismiss me….  So I don’t think there’s a….a public body 
that’s as accountable as we are. CC (2) M/54/31/3  
 
Yes thankfully I do still feel that we’re answerable to the 
law.... and it’s quite right we should be. CC (4) M/53/29/4 
 
I think that you’re accountable to the law.... but more 
importantly we’re accountable to the people out 
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there ….I don’t think we’ve got a major problem with 
accountability. CC (4) M/51/32/3 
 
Every day of my working life I feel as though I am 
answerable to the law....there isn't a day goes by that 
somebody tells me I can or cannot do something….so I 
feel that I am constrained by the law ….it's an iconic part 
of the police service that we have to be seen all the time 
to be compliant with the law. CC (5) M/52/31/3  
So I think….it is that greater framework that I’m 
accountable to rather than success or failure in court. 
CC (6) M/52/31/8.  
 
....I do feel we’re accountable to the law and that’s 
entirely right....the police should never be above the law. 
CC (7) M/54/31/3  
 
Policing by consent is the single…., sound bite that 
sums up different aspects of public control and support 
for policing.  ….it’s one of those things that’s best 
cherished by being kept woolly25.  If you try to tie it 
down….I think you limit its value….it does not exist as 
an inviolable law of the universe. It is entirely, ‘see 
question one26’.... the role….and….control of the police 
are entirely a matter for the democratic process. CC (8) 
M/52/29/4  
....I feel that I am held accountable.  I care a lot about 
what local people think....I never want to be seen 
policing without the unanimous....support of the public.  
CC (9) M/56/36/5  
 
I’m answerable to the law….what’s increased….has 
been the increasing ability of the judiciary and the  
courts to step into what was….purely operational 
decision making. Now I feel more of…. the potential to 
be held to account by the law….that’s been quite a 
major move. What is accountability?....with a number of 
other chiefs….we talked about the notion of 
accountability or do we mean answerability? Is my 
requirement to explain, articulate and provide an 
answer? Or is to account….if it’s to account is the 
ultimate sanction around accountability to get rid of me? 
CC (10) M/48/27/1.  
                                            
25  This, I feel, is probably the clearest, simplest (without being simplistic) summation of what ‘policing by 
consent’ is all about. 
   
26  There is an old (unofficial) maxim in policing which states Rule 1 – The Chief (or whatever rank is under 
question) is always right; Rule 2. In the event of the Chief being wrong Rule 1 applies. In this particular instance it is 
expressed as ‘see question 1’. 
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Whilst the wording used in the question was ‘answerable’ it is 
interesting to note that eight of the ten chiefs used the word ‘accountable’ in 
their replies, two used ‘answerable’ and one used neither.  The distinction was 
drawn by CC (10) who queried whether it actually meant answerability rather 
than accountability. There is a clear recognition that he, and indeed most of 
his colleagues are answerable to the law. They may even be trapped by their 
own and others conventional professional rhetoric insofar as that whilst being 
‘answerable’ to the law, they are still accountable to higher management i.e. 
the Home Office. The cohort obviously gave a lot of thought to their answers 
and the discussion, prompted by CC (10), produced responses which were, in 
many respects, unconnected with any of the issues around consent; which of 
these ‘discourses’ carries the ultimate sanction; that of dismissal?  
We need look no further than two recent incidents. In May 2012, the 
chief constable of North Yorkshire, Graeme Maxwell, resigned following an 
internal disciplinary hearing where he was found guilty of gross misconduct in 
a public office. Whilst he was not dismissed it is clear that he found that to 
remain in post was untenable; almost a dismissal by default! Later, in October 
the same year Sean Price, the Chief Constable of Cleveland Constabulary, 
was found guilty of a similar offence and was dismissed. 
  Answerability, in both of these cases, has led to both of these officers 
falling foul of the ultimate sanction, that of dismissal. It is obvious that they 
have both ‘broken free’ of this particular discourse. This, in turn would appear 
to militate against Giddens’ proposal where structures are created through 
personal actions allowing them to break free. That they have broken free is 
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not in question, one through his own resignation and the other through his 
dismissal, over which his personal actions would have had little or no effect. 
Whilst I accept that they have broken free, it is a Pyrrhic victory; they are no 
longer in charge.   
These replies, from the chief constable’s cohort, display indicate a 
striking commonality of expression and recognition of that accountability to the 
law, which, despite their relatively ‘independent’ position and freedom of 
action, they all are cognisant of the fact that as well as being powerful 
individuals they are also, at the same time ‘powerless’; they are subject to the 
same strictures which bind the majority of citizens and, in turn are subject to 
the forces contained in Foucault’s ‘discourses of power’ over which, according 
to Foucault, they have no control. Indeed, according to Foucault, we apply 
powerful discourses to ourselves, and, as a result the powerful are trapped by 
them as much as the powerless.  
There is, however, a counter to this inability to break the strictures of 
these discourses which Giddens termed his ‘dialectic of control’27 in which he 
stated that people are ‘….never the helpless playthings   of social forces 
completely beyond their control….’ (Layder, 2006: p.170). Therefore by 
personal actions we reproduce structures, as Giddens proposed, could 
facilitate a ‘breaking free’, whilst at the same time allowing them (chief 
officers) to remain in charge.   
 There appears to be little or no rhetoric in any of these responses and 
they display an awareness of their position(s). There is, however, a parallel 
and separate hidden discourse, almost an undercurrent, which indicates an 
                                            
27  See Chapter 4, Methodology for a further explanation of the ‘dialectic of control’. 
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acknowledgement of the power, in the sense of the resources they have at 
their disposal, which they can and indeed often do, wield. The reply from 
CC8/M/52/29/4 on page 190, whilst not at odds with the concept of 
answerability, does indicate that the concept of ‘policing by consent’, at least 
in his eyes, is neither the simple nor the simplistic shibboleth of policing 
attributed to Reith in 1953. 
The influence(s) of police culture, either hidden or unacknowledged, can 
undoubtedly be found within all aspects of policing as is clearly the case 
within these answers, and, once again, the dominant theme is in accordance 
with Chan’s description of axiomatic knowledge.  Additionally, in these 
particular responses, cognisance is taken of accountability which is laid down 
in both local and national legislation and is subject to regulation. It appears 
that there is not a great deal of scope, for officers of any rank, to apply the 
others factors of police culture in this particular area either deliberately, 
inadvertently or even subliminally.  
However the aspects of culture highlighted do not appear to carry 
negative connotations, or indeed to point to a down or dark side of policing. 
Rhetorically speaking, perhaps then there may even be place for particular 
aspects of police culture. It is also worth the reader considering the 
answerability versus accountability argument proposed by one Chief Officer 
when analysing the responses.   
Cohort 2 – Senior/Middle Management 
….this country is very strange….every now and then a 
jury will throw up a decision which will make you think…. 
we really do have a democracy….and we really can get 
somewhere.”  But I would say that….we are under the 
influence….of the judiciary. Sgt (2) M/49/29/6.     
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I think that the police are answerable to the law in terms 
of when things go wrong….We’re answerable to public 
opinion….through the media….and through the police 
authority….so I think there are legal things in place 
that….hold us answerable. CI (4) M/53/23/8. 
....we have to operate within the confines of the law.... 
CS (5) F/42/15/1.  
 
From that legal view point, it has to be the people. I (6) 
M/42/23/5.Ax 
 
I think that the police service is answerable to the law, 
and that it’s entirely appropriate that we are set apart 
from the judicial process. What happens in a court of law 
is and should remain….nothing to do with the police. CS 
(7) M/44/25/1.  
….ultimately I am accountable to the law; but I am also 
accountable to the public….we still have to go to police 
and community forums….which I think is a little bit 
outdated….but we still are answerable to the public for 
our performance…. CS (8) M/50/31/3.  
….I do still believe that we’re answerable to the law.... 
there’s that separation of powers. DCC (9) M/57/30/4. 
....I think we are answerable to the law, as is 
everybody….I’m much more answerable to the people, 
to the public, rather than to the law. But yes ….I do feel I 
am answering to the law. CS (10) M/46/20/3 
….you let the law take its course and I think that is 
ultimately it….any other way is when you start cutting 
corners and being dishonest to….make the outcome the 
way you want it to be and not following….proper 
processes. I (1) F/48/27/10. 
....the whole consent issue and....accountability.... are 
inextricably linked....if we are serious....about 
consent ....then we need to give people a voice over 
influencing what happens. DCC (3)  M/47/21/1. 
 
 
Once again in this section, the senior and middle management officers, 
the difference that was highlighted between accountability and answerability 
by CC 10 was apparent in their answers. It appears more than a little 
convincing that, to most of the cohort, police ‘accountability’ has long had the 
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appearance and substance of ‘conventional professional rhetoric’, indeed it  is 
almost a piece of management slang which can be identified across a number 
of publicly funded bodies. In 2000, Reiner, describing the proliferation of 
policing institutions and processes, recognised ‘….how chimerical the pursuit 
of adequate police accountability has been in the past.’ (Reiner, 2000: p. 198).  
Conversely however there is a clear acceptance of answerability to the law 
(added emphasis) together with a clear delineation from the judicial process, 
which, they rightly recognise as being quite separate and distinct from the 
performance of their duties. Once again emphasis is on Chan’s axiomatic 
knowledge which appears to dominate the cultural aspects of this particular 
set of responses. In this respect it appears to reinforce an almost thematic 
construct of police culture which, in many respects, is driven along the lines of 
rank and seniority within the organisation. There is also a collective solidarity 
of professional people which, in turn, produces a distinctive interpretation of 
the official line.        
Cohort 3 – Peer Group 
  
I found as an individual I was answerable to the law, but 
in my early days, I felt driven….because of the culture in 
the CID, to succeed in prosecutions, rather than a 
search for the truth….on reflection, I think I actually 
believe in the search for the truth. I (1) M/52/30/6 
R[etired]. 
       
.... I was answerable to the law, whether as an individual 
or working for an organisation....that executed the law…. 
PC (2) M/58/30/30/R. 
 
 Very much so….I was answerable to the courts, I was 
answerable to the local authority.  I was answerable to 
the Chief Constable.  I was answerable to my own staff 
and I was answerable to the public. CS (3)  M/67/30/4 R. 
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Yes, I have always felt that the main cornerstone of my 
role....is ultimately controlled or decided by the law....  
The law is the guiding light. CI (4) M/64/30/8/R. 
 
….the police are certainly always answerable to the 
law ….the law’s very fair in the sense that the police 
have got to prove….the suspect hasn’t got to do 
anything.  He hasn’t got to disprove it. I (5) M/57/30/10 
R. 
I am answerable to the law.  I was as a police officer as 
well. You can't assault someone….and not be 
accountable to the law just because you're a police 
officer. People in general….are weak in life.  A lot are 
greedy and selfish….you have to pass laws for the good 
of people.  CS (6) M/68/30/5. 
....we should be answerable to the law, not to a political 
bias….You had to seek the truth in all incidents.... that’s 
the way it’s got to be done. Sgt (7) M/57/30/10/R. 
 
I was always answerable to the law….but we’re back to 
this notion that there are people who wish to be policed 
and those who don’t wish to be policed.  S (8) M/63/30/6 
R. 
Absolutely….you know that Superintendents have their 
own insurance to protect them from the ravages of the 
law when they make a mistake….very much 
accountable to the law….Being part of team of other 
disciplines, other organisations, other public bodies can 
make the area better…. but  the accountability grows.  
CS (9) M/56/30/3 R. 
….where I’ve lost cases at court….I used to get a bit 
uptight about it but….I’d moved on….I knew I could 
probably end up going to pieces over it….I thought, I’m 
accountable to the law, if I stick with what I can do and 
what offences I can investigate….we get to court I get a 
conviction, irrespective of sentence, I’ve done my job 
well. Sgt (10) M/67/30/12 R. 
 
The replies from the second and third cohorts, the Senior Management 
officers and the Peer Group demonstrate a striking similarity with the replies 
of the previous cohort which indicates the emergence of a common theme or 
discourse which may well spread across all cohorts revealing a genuine 
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awareness of the role of the police, and to whom they are accountable, or 
indeed answerable to within the society of which they are also an integral part.  
However it raises a further question insofar as that the ‘accountability 
to the law’ may simply be a rhetorical divergence which facilitates a means of 
avoiding accountability to the public. The history of the modern police service 
is littered with instances where the law itself has not been applied to the 
police.  Recently, the acquittal of PC Simon Howard (see page 191) on 
charges of manslaughter raises the issue of whether the CPS was well 
advised in this particular case. Indeed their application of process against 
police officers has not been stellar, nor does it appear to instil any confidence 
in the independence and vigour of the organisation. In addition, and perhaps 
more worryingly, it also highlights the reluctance of a jury reluctance to convict 
a police officer, even in the face of seemingly overwhelming evidence; the 
feeling left is that convictions, in these cases, would destroy the public’s belief 
in what the police service stands for. On the other side of the coin however it 
also highlights one of the corner stones of the English Legal system, that of 
the right of trial by a jury of your peers where it is the jury alone who decide on 
the facts of the case. This situation is a fairly powerful argument in favour of 
the suggested ‘jurisprudence of consent’. 
In this set of replies there are two clear examples of the ‘inner 
workings’ of police culture; on page 201 I (1) states that ‘….in my early days, I 
felt driven….because of the culture in the CID, to succeed in prosecutions, 
and again on pages 202/203 Sgt (10) acknowledges the influences of those 
same cultural mores whereby he indicated that ‘….where I’ve lost cases at 
court….I used to get a bit uptight about it but….I’d moved on….I knew I could 
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probably end up going to pieces over it….’ There is little doubt that the second 
example owes a great deal to the cultural expectation at one time prevalent in 
most departments, but more particularly in the CID, that results were 
everything. Numerous well publicised and even less well publicised 
miscarriages of justice are ample testament to its prevalence in that particular 
era of policing.      
Cohort 4 – Student Officers    
....I think we are....  if you break the law....you’re just the 
same as everybody else and you can still be 
prosecuted….I’m not untouchable. PC (1) F/23/2/2  
 
I am governed by my supervisors who are governed by 
their supervisors and a lot of politics comes into it.  My 
belief is ultimately, you know, I am working for….the 
force and for the Queen. PC (2) M/31/2/2 
The law….I know you’ve got to answer to your 
supervisors and the Chief Constable….but you are 
answerable to the law. PC (3) F/28/2/2. 
I would like to think that what I do….was answerable to 
the law but we talked earlier about statistics etcetera, the 
laws are there….but it’s not always used. PC (4) 
M/34/2/2. 
 
Personally I do, yeah, I think that the positive aspect of 
the police being a separate entity to the courts....our 
main issue being the implementation of the law rather 
than procedural aspects in terms of convictions. PC (5) 
F/27/2/2 
 
This officer demonstrates that she is well aware of the absolute 
necessity to remove the ‘desire to convict’ from the impartial implementation 
of the law and she draws the absolute distinction, which is not always clear in 
other aspects, that the two should always remain as separate entities. It is 
evident from the interview recording that this is undoubted a strongly held 
view. It would also appear to indicate, in many ways, that the service may well 
have moved on from the ‘convict at any cost’ culture so vividly highlighted on 
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pages 201 and 202/203 in the replies from the peer group cohort. Having said 
that the reply by PC (8) later on the next page appears to return this particular 
aspect of culture back to where it was; however his reply is leavened by the 
final part of answer where he states that ‘I’m not sure….that I’ve got enough 
experience in the service to be able to give that a proper reflective answer. 
Perhaps this indicates the beginnings of a more self-reflective culture 
developing within the service which will be discussed at a later stage in the 
work. 
I think we’re all answerable to the law….it’s important to 
remember that we all should just abide by the law. PC 
(6) F/22/2/2.  
 
….do I feel I’m answerable to the law?  Yes, definitely. 
PC (7) F/23/2/2. 
….the frustration I have is the work effort that we put into 
a prosecution…..finding that person guilty and then the 
trivial sentence….was it really worth it? It’s difficult to 
divorce yourself from the end result….I’m not sure….that 
I’ve got enough experience in the service to be able to 
give that a proper reflective answer. PC (8) M/28/2/2. 
 
I don’t feel I am above the law….if I was to do something 
unlawful….action would be take against me….I don’t feel 
I am above the law….I think the public may think that we 
are because you get the odd comment. “….coppers 
would get away with it….the public may think we are 
above the law, but I personally don’t think so, far from it. 
PC (9) M/29/2/2. 
 
I know I’m definitely accountable.. in a sense, yes.... I 
don’t see it as being accountable to the law….but 
accountable to the system, to my supervisors…. 
obviously I have to be accountable for my actions….so 
whatever I decide is the right option, I have to be able to 
justify that. PC (10) M/27/2/2. 
 
So does the ‘system’ over-ride the ‘rule of law’? Is this a case of two 
irreconcilable discourses meeting in an ‘immovable object/irresistible force 
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dichotomy or is it simply an officer who has a very finely attuned regard for his 
overall accountability. It was in many respects, a genuine comment by a 
student officer who, whilst he recognises his accountability to the system, may 
not be as aware of his over-riding responsibility but, simultaneously 
recognises his accountability for his actions. Again this type of response 
indicates an increasing support for that ‘jurisprudence of consent’.    
 
Overall, the majority replies from the student officer cohort display the 
same awareness of a position and a role within society, part of which is 
inculcated in their initial training, particularly since the introduction of the 
IPLDP. It is worthy of note that one of the major changes, and indeed a new 
concept to initial police training, was to place newly recruited officers, who 
were at the very beginning of their training programme, into some of the 
harder-to-reach, harder to police groups within the communities that they 
would eventually be serving. This particular facet of training was designed to 
enable them to experience the difficulties that such groups faced without the 
influence of the police mind-set, sometimes referred to as the ‘canteen 
culture’ that they would be exposed to  once they had been posted to the area 
that they would police. The decision as to whether they would be overt or 
covert participants was left entirely to the leaders of the various groups. In my 
professional capacity I carried out a number of evaluations, locally, regionally 
and nationally, on this particular programme (the IPLDP) and it is fair to say 
that aforementioned aspect of their training was, in many respects, very 
successful but with the caveat that some decisions to keep an officer ‘under 
cover’ as it were, produced some strident confrontations on either their 
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revelation or discovery.  Their replies also indicate that part of their individual 
make-up and personality that prompted them to become police officers in the 
first instance.  
This question was employed to introduce the concept of consent; it 
produced an interesting if somewhat similar range of responses all of which 
display a number of discursive themes. The emerging themes can be 
summarised as follows. It is obvious that you cannot obtain everyone’s 
consent; there is a genuine requirement that any response made in a policing 
situation needs to be proportionate, which in fact is one of the fundamental 
principles of the HRA of 1998; checks and balances need to be in place to 
prevent or at least limit excesses; the fact that policing by consent is neither 
codified, defined nor part of any legislative process would, they feel, destroy 
the concept or ‘doctrine’ of consent. Bearing in mind the tri-partite agreement 
there is also, especially from the Chief Constable cohort, an acquiescence 
towards the legislature which, once again highlights the ‘powerful yet in some 
respects powerless’ dichotomy that is an integral part of their role. Once again 
aspects of the possible disappearance of a once prevalent aspect of police 
culture, that of convict at any cost, appeared at one stage to be waning in 
influence in the responses of this particular cohort. Whilst another response, 
PC (8), page 208, seemed to be at variance with its disappearance, his 
response was at least tempered by some professional self-reflection which 
the officer indicated, would in due course, facilitate the more desirable 
outcome of seeking the truth rather than a conviction.   
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It is obvious that the vast array of accountability processes that exist 
within the police service, and indeed a number of other publicly funded 
bodies, are part of the ‘audit culture’ that seems in many respects to stifling 
the very nature of policing by the addition of layers of bureaucracy. However 
there is not much doubt that true accountability should and can lead to a more 
open culture of personal responsibility which, in turn, will lead to a more 
genuine public appreciation of policing by consent. 
In the following chapter the views of the police officers will be sought 
on consent and, in order to measure the validity and veracity of their 
perceptions, they will also be ‘put on the spot’ as it were by an opposing 
question which will ask them directly to explain and rationalise the times when 
they genuinely felt that consent was being lost. 
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Chapter 7: Consent 
 
Interview Data and Analysis 
 
This chapter will analyse and interpret the views, opinions and verbal 
explanations of the police officers in the four survey cohorts, with particular 
reference to policing by consent. I will endeavour to establish whether, within 
the confines of the service, there is any evidence of a doctrine of consent, 
which, by its very nature, must have a direct and lasting influence upon both 
the personal and professional conduct of those same officers.   The phrase 
‘policing by consent’, hermeneutically speaking, has variously been attributed 
to Sir Robert Peel, the principal architect of the bill placed before parliament 
which saw the formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 and the first 
commissioners of that same force, Rowan and Mayne28. It has also been 
ascribed to Reith, a noted author on the police in the 1950’s, during a period 
which he termed the ‘golden age’ of policing.  
In 1991 Beetham argued that ‘….consent in the contemporary era now 
has to be popular consent if it is to have any legitimating force’. (Beetham, 
1991: p.151). This is in direct contrast to the contents of a report entitled 
‘Adapting to Protest’, which was conducted at the request of the 
Commissioner of the MPS by HMIC, an examination of the policing methods 
used on 1 April 2009 during the G20 summits in London was carried out. The 
report was highly critical of the tactics used and stated, quite unequivocally, 
that the excessive use of force by the police had been a key factor in 
undermining the historic principle of policing by consent in Britain. When these 
factors are added to the ‘mix of policing’ that is almost unique to England and 
                                            
28   See also Introduction 
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Wales where, according to Reiner ‘….the attempted unification in the same 
organisation of the “high policing” function of regulating explicit political 
dissidence with the “low policing” task of routine law enforcement and street-
level order maintenance’ (Reiner,2003: p.8) presents a  contradiction. It is this 
contradiction, which has already been briefly explored, that makes it an 
integral and inseparable part of any proposed doctrine or jurisprudence of 
‘policing by consent’.  
However in 2012 Tyler, in Jackson, Bradford, Hough and Murray, had 
demonstrated that ‘….public perceptions of the fairness of the justice system 
are more significant in shaping its legitimacy than perceptions of its 
effectiveness….having earned an entitlement to command legitimacy is 
formed via interpersonal interaction….It is the quality of treatment….that is 
more important in encounters with the police than the objective outcome.’ 
(Tyler in Jackson, Bradford, Hough and Murray, 2012: p.32). They went on to 
argue that ‘….by demonstrating ‘moral authority’ the police can embody….a 
shared sense of right and wrong and a commitment to the rule of law….which 
requires them to negotiate order in a way that maximises consent.’ (Jackson, 
Bradford, Hough and Murray, 2012: p.34). 
Doubtless these contradictions present a challenge to the interpretation 
of the interviews; however, the digital recordings of those interviews, together 
with the literal transcriptions assisted in the facilitation of the interpretation, 
which, in turn, helped to reveal any apparent differences between the written 
and spoken words. This enabled me to adduce evidence to support the 
aforementioned doctrine. The interpretation, particularly of the spoken word, 
relies, in no small measure, on personal experience and the insider 
  211 21
 
 
knowledge gained, both as a serving police officer and latterly as a member of 
the extended police family over the majority of my working life. This was   
highlighted in Chapter 4, where the identification of my locus within the 
research was described as being a ‘distanced insider researcher’.  
These concepts assisted in identifying what has been termed as  
‘conventional professional rhetoric’, which was introduced in Chapter 4, and 
which, as already stated, is directly linked to the rhetoric/reality discussion 
inherent in all of the interviews. Indeed it is a salient and usually predominant 
feature of most qualitative interviews. In order to further assist in the 
interpretation of those interviews, and to assist in establishing whether the 
subjects were in fact producing those ‘Millsian’ vocabularies of motive or the 
rhetoric already identified, ‘reality check’, in the form of a contrasting question 
was introduced, which  was designed to mitigate those occurrences. In this 
context the fourth question on the issue of consent simply asked them to 
recall when they felt that they had lost the consent of the public, whereby an 
honest and open answer would undoubtedly reveal some hitherto 
unexpressed and genuine recollections of any personal or professional 
shortcomings.  
The age range across all of the sample groups is between 22 and 68 
years, a very broad spread of years. This indicates that in policing terms, each 
group will draw upon a range of highly context-dependent experiences. In the 
case of the Chief Constables however, where both the age range (48 to 56) 
and the service band is quite narrow there is undoubtedly a comparable range 
of key policing problems over a broadly similar, and relatively short time span. 
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It must also be said at this stage that there are indications that police 
culture, and more importantly the effects of police culture, on how the job of 
policing is carried out are present across all four cohorts and that it not just 
the preserve of the more junior ranks.  
 In order to ensure that the questions on consent were, in a sense, 
limited but without being constrained, some associative boundaries, which are 
within the essence and spirit of the semi-structured interview, were 
constructed in order to facilitate clarity of focus for each of the four cohorts. 
They were introduced by highlighting the fact that, in this particular context, 
policing by consent does not necessarily mean that suspects, or indeed even 
those whose transgressions are relatively minor, give their consent to the 
police to act against them.  Nor does it mean that the police have to obtain 
assent from victims of crime in order to apprehend and deal with the 
perpetrators.   
The first question on the issue of consent simply asked the cohorts 
whose consent they felt was necessary to carry out effective policing and did 
they feel that they had that consent. 
Cohort 1 – Chief Constables 
You can’t ever get everybody’s consent, I think we police 
with the consent of the majority of the people….we’re 
largely unarmed and ….we have to police with their 
consent…. they outnumber us a hell of a lot CC (1) 
M/51/24/2 
  
Within the same answer, however he reveals a dichotomy by confessing that:   
The one area where we don’t police with consent….is 
the young people….they are pretty much policed at, 
very little policed with, (my emphasis) seen as a 
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problem they are seen as....devils by the elderly. CC (1) 
M/51/24/2 
 
This particular section of his response highlights the dominant 
conceptions of order present in society and is indicative of the use of force on 
this particular section of the public, those who are, to paraphrase the Chief’s 
words ‘policed at’. There is every indication from the audio recording that this 
particular officer was expressing a very real and tangible regret that he was 
unable to police this particular group in a more human and humane fashion. It 
also gives lie to the Millsian theory of an ‘actor’ producing talk based on the 
situation he is in, that is to say the interview, and is not, as a consequence 
employing a ‘vocabulary of motive, neither can I identify any ‘convenient  
professional rhetoric’ (see also Chapter 2, and this Chapter )  
Everybody’s....you don’t switch consent on and off…. 
you have to earn your consent for next week, not live on 
the credit of what consent you had last week….CC (2) 
M/56/31/3. 
 
Well it’s the consent of the public….but….increasingly it 
will be individual communities…. CC (3) M/53/29/4. 
 
Well essentially the communities....we have to build a 
consensus that starts at government level....ultimately 
the test is at neighbourhood level. CC (4) M/51/32/3. 
 
….the whole population….I belong to the school of 
thinking which says public confidence in us should be 
our share price. CC (5) M/52/30/3. 
The general populace,  if you've lost that, then it doesn't 
matter if you're acting with the commission of 
government.  And the closest we came to losing that 
was the miner's dispute….the general populace….has to 
give their implicit consent towards carrying out our 
duties. CC (6) M/52/30/8. 
Well the public,  and as I say I struggle with the word 
consent, I know what it means, it’s not a word the public 
support....I still think the vast majority of law abiding 
public ....want to be well policed.... and want us to 
succeed. CC (7) M/54/31/3.  
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The consent of the population as a whole…. I think  it’s 
probably too tenuous to pin down....consent….They 
consent to me enforcing speed limits, when it’s not them 
who are paying the fifty quid…. overall, it is the consent 
of the broadest possible population in an area to the 
policing tactics and doctrine applied with the outcomes 
that are acceptable to the public as well…. CC (8) 
M/52/29/4. 
 
 
 Yes I do believe that it is a fundamental principle of 
policing, but we do....police with the support and 
confidence of the public.  Not necessarily so much the 
consent of the public. CC (9) M/56/36/5. 
 
Well it’s easy to say the public’s consent but I think it’s 
the majority of the public’s consent for policing. I don’t 
think you can ever take 100% consent with you. I think 
you’ve got to take a broad range of public consent with 
you in terms of what you deliver. CC (10) M/49/28/1. 
 
Whilst in general terms the chief constables rightly identify the need for 
the public’s consent, a substantial minority are more than concerned about 
the specificity of ‘consent’ per se and prefer to express it in terms of public 
support; as one so rightly points no one ‘consents’ to being fined for a traffic 
infringement (CC 8) but can still broadly support the principle of policing. A 
similar example was employed to illustrate the associative boundaries to the 
questions earlier in this chapter. Several of them also referred expressly to 
‘communities’ and obtaining the consent of individual communities as well as 
neighbourhoods. At this particular time there were two main elements to the 
concepts of neighbourhood and community policing, the first of which was the 
legal requirement placed upon chief officers to introduce this format of policing 
and the second was the accountability placed upon them by HMIC. It is easy 
to identify, particularly with this cohort, that at the time of the interviews both 
‘neighbourhood’ and ‘community’ policing were at the forefront of the 
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government agenda; it is therefore likely that there is probably a hint of 
‘conventional professional’, as well as an acquiescent nod toward the 
legislature in an effort to demonstrate that they are, as it were, on-side.  
It naturally follows that as Potter (2004) stated ‘....discourse analysis is 
against the assumption that we can treat accounts as true or false 
descriptions of reality....’ it ‘....emphasises   the way versions of the 
world ....are produced in discourse.’ (Potter, 2004, p.202 in Silverman 2011: 
p.301). This is, in many respects, in line with Smart’s ‘Worldviews’ which he 
identified in 1983. (see Chapter 4, page 121).  In this context it is therefore 
worth noting that;  
‘....in studying discourse as texts and talk in 
social practices....the focus is....on language as....the 
medium for interaction; analysis of discourse becomes, 
then, analysis of what people do. One theme that is 
particularly emphasised here is the rhetorical or 
argumentative organisation of talk and texts; claims and 
versions are constructed to undermine alternatives.’ 
(Potter 2004: p.203, in Silverman 2011: p.301 emphasis 
in original,). 
 
 This, I feel enhances and supports the theory of  talk which has been 
identified as ‘conventional professional rhetoric’ which, in Chapter 4, it was  
proposed that it was employed whilst the officers, particularly the Chief 
Constables, were answering, or more correctly not answering, the question 
whilst acting in the ‘police spokesman said mode’.  It would therefore be 
logical to assume that the chief constables, and indeed all of the other 
cohorts, were producing their particular world or worldview of policing. 
There is an overall acknowledgement from this cohort that one of the 
basic rationales of policing is the obtaining of the consent of the majority of 
people that you police. Even if that consent is not expressed verbally then 
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perhaps officers assume that consent is, in most cases, given. However, that 
consent is never universally given and several of the replies rightly highlight 
the fact that people do consent (to being policed) provided that they are not 
on the receiving end of fixed penalty ticket, usually issued in respect of 
relatively minor infringements of traffic regulations; in effect, it becomes a 
conditional consent which, on reflection, is probably the best that is ever likely 
to be obtained.  
It is however interesting to note that this collective view in itself may be 
yet another aspect of police culture; is it a significant modification or a simple 
deviation from the official line?. It does demonstrate that there is a collective 
solidarity amongst professionals which has produced a distinctive version or 
interpretation of the official culture. However it could be argued that there is 
an en masse, almost conditioned response which produces something akin to 
professional rhetoric; are they just producing or reproducing something they 
have been taught? On balance it is felt that, given the caveats placed upon 
consent by a number of them, that the conditional consent obtained, although 
it appears to be counter-cultural to the official purpose, it is perhaps a truer 
reflection of the principle of consent.     
 
Cohort 2 – Senior/Middle Management 
The consent of the vast majority of the law abiding 
members of the public. I (1) F/48/27/10 
 
….every now and then a jury will throw up a decision 
which will make you think to yourself “Wow we really do 
have a democracy in this country….by and large we are 
under the influence far too much of the judiciary. Sgt 
(2)/M/49/29/6. 
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....the whole consent issue, and I know you’re gonna be 
talking about accountability, but  I do think that the two 
are inextricably linked….if we are serious 
about….consent….then we need to give people a voice 
over influencing what happens….it goes into a 
relationship of consent….DCC (3) M/47/21/1. 
 
….the obvious answer is the individuals. We can’t force 
people to give statements....we have to operate on that 
basis….give us information, give us intelligence….give 
us a statement….it is all….on the attitude of the 
individual….victim or otherwise. CI (4) M/53/23/8. 
The….law abiding majority of society….who are 
supportive of the….boundaries….put in place by 
government…. overall we maintain the confidence of the 
majority of the public….CS (5) F/42/15/1. 
 
 
Even under there, I think it still comes back to the 
people. I (6) M/42/23/5. 
 
I wouldn’t want to be part of a police organisation where 
there wasn’t public support, public consent, that  
tradition of public support and understanding. CS (7) 
M/44/25/1. 
The public’s consent…. that is the bedrock of the service 
that we provide…. To lose that consent…. which comes 
back to…. [your question on] “no-go” areas….that had 
some real issues. CS (8)  M/50/28/3.   
 
….It’s the consent of….the members of our….  
communities….consent is seen in their willingness to 
cooperate with the police....that to me is where key 
accountability lies and that’s what’s so important….DCC 
(9) M/57/29/4. 
 
I do believe it’s the wider public, the communities….we, 
we could not….do what we have to do if the public didn’t 
want us to do it. CS (10) M/40/20/1. 
 
Once again the views of the previous cohort are echoed here with 
recognition that the consent of the public, albeit unpublicised and normally 
unarticulated, is recognised as being inextricably linked to the performance of 
their duty in the name of that same public. In 2008 Tyler stated that the 
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‘….procedural justice model ….can build general legitimacy among the public 
by treating people justly during personal encounters’. (Tyler, 2008: p. 241). He 
then went on to say that by using fair procedures ‘….the police can increase 
their legitimacy, even if their policing activities involve restricting or 
sanctioning the people….’ (Tyler, 2008: p. 241). Could this be interpreted as 
the nascent beginnings of the legitimation of consent no less, and could it help 
to facilitate the formation of a jurisprudence of consent? 
From a cultural perspective, the attitudes and expression are very 
much in line with those of the previous cohort. In that sense it can appear to 
some that this is just the usual ‘management speak’, which, if repeated often 
enough will become an ‘established fact’. However, again in line with the 
Chief Constable cohort there is that recognition that there are occasions that 
consent will not be obtained and that the more confrontational and coercive 
methods of policing will need to be employed. 
Cohort 3 – Peer Group 
….my consent….not because I work for the organisation 
still, but I would be one of those….who will stand up and 
be counted if I didn’t approve of something….I (1) 
M/52/30/6R. 
 
I accept what you’re saying about consent of the police 
and the consent of the public because….we’ve got to 
then define consent, there’s a whole prison population 
out there would say we didn’t consent to the law.   I still 
think the consent of….the general public….is the basis 
to what we do….it’s….old fashioned, but I still think we 
police with their consent. C (2) M/58/30/30R. 
 
Well maybe they need to think “What does the 
community want from us?”  And they don’t want the 
police to make money out of them. CS (3) M/67/30/4 R. 
….something probably more nebulous than that, it’s the 
public consent balanced by public duty.  The perceptions 
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of the public….for you to carry out your role to the best 
of your ability. CI (4) M/64/30/8R. 
 
                 The public, nobody else’s. I (5) M/57/30/10R. 
Well, as I say, if the public….just totally disagree with 
anything you're doing and come out on the streets and 
start rioting, you're in the shit….so you've obviously got 
to have the public's consent. CS (6) M/68/30/5R. 
….as you said before, if I become a victim, I have to give 
my consent for details to be  passed of course….the 
only other consent issues I would think about is….what 
affects me, I found the guy who burgled my house, but 
he’d only admitted that on….a prison visit…. Sgt (7) 
M/57/30/10R. 
 
A great deal has been said and written about police officers 
empathising with the victims of crime in order to develop a more caring 
attitude towards those victims; however, I would contend that it is not until you 
actually experience being a victim yourself that the true meaning of ‘empathy’ 
is revealed. I support this with my own particular experience, which was 
almost identical to the situation described above, whilst still a serving officer. It 
was a defining moment for me and certainly helped to create empathy in my 
subsequent dealings with numerous victims of all kinds of crime in over 30 
years of police service. 
….there’ll come a time when consent will not be 
required. I certainly do.  I think we’re moving that way 
now….you need to determine…. whether you want them 
to police you. S (8) M/63/30/6R. 
Certainly not the consent of the criminals….you're really 
starting to talk about having….a constitution where there 
is implied consent…..we only know is withdrawn when 
things go pear shaped. CS (9) M/56/30/3R. 
….the consent of the majority of people that live by 
accepted standards….I don’t mean people that continue 
to break the law….you must have consent in the Human 
Rights issue….to Police with their permission. 
Sgt (10) M/67/30/12 R. 
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There were some interesting answers to this particular question which 
gave an indication that, having retired, there was in some respects less 
constraint on what was said but, a recognition that at the same time 
retirement does not, in all cases, provides a means of breaking free of this 
particular discourse; that there is still a sense of duty, of a morality code which 
is inculcated in the make up of most serving and retired officers. This ‘morality 
code’ was also identified by Jackson, Bradford, Hough and Murray in 2012 
when they stated ‘…. that in demonstrating a moral authority they are not 
required to be moralists or to demonstrate moral superiority.’ (Jackson, 
Bradford, Hough and Murray, 2012; p. 34). 
In a cultural sense the views of this cohort once again reflect the era in 
which they policed. As CS (6) so rightly commented on page 217/218 ‘….if the 
public….just totally disagree with anything you're doing and come out on the 
streets and start rioting, you're in the shit….so you've obviously got to have 
the public's consent.’ The question on loss of consent (see page 231 
onwards) will support this officers remarks, as well as facilitating the whole 
argument on rhetoric versus reality. There is an acknowledgement that in 
these situations the support of the public is required; whether or not consent is 
secured, its loss will lead to a much more restrictive and repressive type of 
policing, which, despite the almost glib assurances that the public’s consent is 
required, is certainly highly undesirable. 
Cohort 4 – Student Officers   
….if you asked the community whether they wanted 
police….half of them would probably say yes and half…. 
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would say no….the ones that say no would be the 
people that commit crime….so I’m not gonna stop 
working in [Town omitted] because the criminals want to 
have a free reign. I think as long as the Queen or her 
country needs a police force then that’s what the 
country’s gonna get. PC (1) F/23/2/2 
 
….you've obviously got to have the consent of the 
public….you're out there….if these people who….don't 
give us consent, were aware of what we actually do to 
fulfil our duties. PC (2) M/31/2/2 
I don't think they have a choice….a lot of them don’t like 
it….and are put off by it. PC (3) F/2/2 
 
A very telling comment here which displays a greater awareness of the 
power that is wielded by the police, whilst at the same time acknowledging, 
that it is, in all probability, that those who do not ‘like it’ are those who have 
fallen foul of the law. 
….there’s a lot….don’t want to be policed, especially the 
criminal fraternity…they don’t want to be policed so 
you’re not really policing by consent….it’s just a phrase 
isn’t it. PC (4) M/34/2/2. 
 
Again, like the previous reply this answer is concerned with ‘those who 
do not want to be policed’ which removes it (consent) from the restrictive 
boundaries of ‘conventional professional rhetoric’. The telling end-note ‘it’s 
just a phrase’ however immediately creates a dichotomy and, at the same 
time a recognition that perhaps it may well be the ‘shibboleth’ of all modern 
policing which has been alluded to under many guises across the continuum 
of the interview cohorts. It also contains elements of the cynicism noted by 
Reiner.  
….fundamentally that comes from….the public….that’s 
who’s elected the  government and who have then 
essentially said that they agree with the measures that 
we’ve introduced….voting….puts influence on the 
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government to reflect the views of the public and how 
they give their consent. PC (5) F/27/2/2. 
 
….If they want….to see police officers on the streets, 
they want to see….people who have done bad things 
have to answer for them….and be punished for doing 
that….so yeah people, you know, people in the 
community. PC (6) F/2/2. 
 
                 The public. PC (7) F/23/2/2. 
I think, we have to get away from the fact that people 
don’t give us consent….there’s very few people in 
society who don’t really want the Police service to be 
there. The concept has to come from the people,  
without any question. PC (8) M/28/2/2. 
 
‘we don’t need the public’s consent to do our jobs….it is 
a funny one, policing by consent….we are there to keep 
the peace, we are there to uphold the law….so, I don’t 
really understand where you are coming from with 
policing by consent….we are a public service, we do 
what is right for the victim, the member of the public. PC 
(9) M/29/2/2. 
 
This answer is very much at odds with the majority of answers in this 
particular group and at first impression it appeared that the question had been 
misunderstood; however, on closer examination, after saying that we don’t 
need the public’s consent to do our jobs, he goes on to say that we are a 
public service and we do what is right for the victim, the member of the public. 
Surely consent by any other name?  
….the publics’ as a whole. PC(10) M/27/2/2. 
 
In seven (or eight if you count PC (9) ) out of the ten replies there is a 
recognition that the consent, or at least the acquiescence, of the public is 
required in order that the police service can function in the way it does and 
assists in the acquisition of legitimacy for its actions on their behalf. 
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A number of the previous questions have demonstrated at least an 
acquiescent nod towards the whole question of consent and in some cases a 
more substantial reliance upon the cultural factors revealed in Chan’s 
findings, in order to carry out their day-to-day function. However, it is obvious 
from the replies to this question that that there is overwhelming support that 
the consent of the public to carry out their duties must be obtained. 
Rhetorically speaking, is there another facet to be added to the various 
models under discussion, that of an inherent belief that the police have both 
the confidence and the consent of the public?  
The next question was concerned with the legislative requirement 
imposed by government in Section 101 of the PACE Act of 1984 whereby all 
forces were required, and indeed still are required, to set up consultative local 
meetings in order to ensure that people had both a forum for voicing their 
concerns about their local policing and that, perhaps more importantly, they 
were given a voice at those same forums. It would, at this, stage be 
interesting to know whether the legislature was making a genuine attempt to 
enshrine the concept of consent, perhaps as Rowan and Mayne had originally 
envisaged it, within the legislation, or whether it was perhaps a somewhat 
cynical or populist attempt to convince the electorate that they would be 
consulted about policing. Whilst this is a subject for further investigation 
without the confines of this study it must be pointed out, in purely unscientific 
or indeed measurable terms, that the PACE forums that I attended as a 
serving officer and in a secretariat capacity, almost always fell into the second 
category where there was a constant blurring of the boundaries between 
rhetoric and reality. 
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Cohort 1 – Chief Constables   
….our surveys…. tend to suggest about seventy five…. 
per cent….are relatively happy....with the policing overall 
service and if they weren’t, they would tell us…. CC (1) 
M/51/24/2. 
 
….the feedback for….the robust early intervention stuff 
is….that….as a strategy, standing back and….being 
tolerant is not good enough for most good cops….I’ve 
had no negative feedback around that....CC (2) 
M/56/31/3. 
 
In my opinion I think those, those statutory meetings 
would never be enough….I do a lot of public 
meetings….I think you’ve got to get out there and….find 
out what they really think. CC (3) M/53/29/4. 
 
Absolutely. I think….that consultation under PACE….is 
just the....mandatory stuff….CC (4) M/51/32/3. 
 
….it’s been necessary but not sufficient. I think that if all 
we ever did was our PACE consultation, that would not 
be enough….there’s a whole range of things that need 
to be in place. CC (5) M/52/30/3. 
No to the second part of the question….you know you 
have the consent. It's like asking how do you know 
you've got your parents love. CC (6) M/52/30/8. 
I think....the British police service has always had strong 
support….it was inherent you had the consent of the 
British public....there are different ways of…. doing 
things in order to keep that consent and that confidence, 
it’s the confidence that’s so crucial….CC(7) M/54/31/3. 
 
The requirement to consult the public under PACE is an 
irrelevance….do I believe I have that consent?  Yes 
because I think I would be confronted by a withdrawal of 
consent and it is perhaps the withdrawal of consent 
that’s more easily identified than the giving. CC (8) 
M/52/29/4. 
 
The surveys....about the confidence that people have in 
the police service….is very high…..the public….want 
more police….we have to be able to spell out….our 
values….and….live up to those values. CC (9) 
M/56/36/5. 
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I think that was when it started….we’ve moved beyond 
that….one of the things we’ve got at the moment 
is….key individual networks at a neighbourhood level 
where in each of our neighbourhoods there’s key people 
identified who we take soundings from at various 
times ….it’s actually servicing that that’s becoming quite 
a major challenge. CC (10) M/48/27/1. 
 
There is quite a divergence of opinion on this particular question with 
five chiefs agreeing that this requirement is at least sufficient to begin with but 
needs backing up with further initiatives, some of which have been outlined. 
Four of the chiefs stated that it was a bare minimum. One chief, whom the 
reader will have already noted as being particularly frank, stated that it was an 
‘irrelevance’ by highlighting the fact that he would certainly know when he did 
not have consent. A very telling remark indeed! 
Further to this there is also an acknowledgement about the way things 
are done in the organisation, and an almost traditional reliance on the 
fundamental assumption that the police perform an essential role in protecting 
the social order and, as Reiner pointed out, ‘….with a sense of mission’ 
(Reiner, 1992: p112). These are also some of the salient features found in 
Chan’s description of axiomatic knowledge.   
Cohort 2 – Senior/Middle Management 
….no in my experience that’s lip service….I’ve been 
involved in a few myself and you get a handful of the 
same people turning up at the meetings and you’re not 
really I think getting a realistic view…. I think it’s a bit of 
a paper exercise….Not through the police’s fault….if 
they’re not really interested that’s….a good sign I (1) 
F/48/27/10. 
I can only say it….from a citizen’s point of view rather 
than a police officer’s....people say “The police did a 
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good job with that….those people want the police into 
their community, they want them as a proactive part of it. 
Sgt (2) M/49/29/6. 
No I don’t think that requirement’s sufficient at all….we 
need to go far beyond that into a relationship with the 
public whereby we are able to meet them very locally, 
establish….their priorities. DCC (3) M/47/21/1. 
 
….it is difficult to judge…..you will never know exactly to 
the extent of which you do have it. I suppose it provides 
some sort of measure….as a general index of whether 
we are getting a degree of cooperation. CI (4) 
M/53/23/8. 
….we survey and consult the public to death….but in 
terms of how satisfied people are with the service 
then….results are encouraging. We’ve gone beyond that 
to consult more widely because it’s….good 
business….whether your customers out there are 
satisfied….we do it much more extensively than….the 
minimum requirements within….the statutes. CS (5) 
F/42/15/1. 
 
 
Absolutely. I think we have the consent of the majority, 
unfortunately we end up dealing with and assisting the 
minority. I think….most law abiding citizens….do 
support….help….and assist us. I6 M/42/23/5. 
 
….it does aid the process and I think it’s something that  
in this area the police authority do, which forms the basis 
of our priority setting each year. CS (7) M/44/25/1. 
….their consultation process of questionnaires gives it 
another degree of significance findings. But I think 
conversely is that the lack of serious public disorder 
demonstrates contentment with policing arrangements. 
CS (8) M/50/31/3. 
 
I think….public satisfaction surveys that we conduct…. 
show there is still a high degree of trust in policing than 
politicians….evidence I’ve given you from my own 
consultation around the mergers29....DCC (9) M/57/30/4. 
I don’t think that PACE….I mean that’s where you see 
neighbourhood policing developing in that area….that  
our goal is to get to the level where….you consult 
                                            
29  See pages 19, 60 and 61  ( The proposed ‘Strategic Forces’ merger) 
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frequently on a neighbourhood basis. CS (10) 
M/40/20/1. 
 
It would appear, that at this level of policing, the PACE requirement for 
consultation is seen at best as a beginning. Despite having the requirement 
forced upon them by statute, the majority of these officers are responsible for 
both carrying out the consultation process and ensuring that action is taken 
upon the complaints they receive. They recognise the necessity of the forums 
and also the need to make them more meaningful than simply a statutory 
requirement. This can readily be identified as yet another discourse from 
which there is little or no hope of escape; even Giddens does not provide an 
escape route because of the statutory nature of the discourse. It (the 
situation) is almost in tune with Weber’s legitimate domination, validated on 
rational grounds whereby there is ‘a belief in the legality of enacted rules and 
the right of those elevated to authority….to issue commands’ (Weber,  1978: 
Vol. 1 Part III,  p 215). 
In 1978, according to Manning, the ‘….police have staked out a 
mandate that claims to include efficient, apolitical and professional 
enforcement of the law’. He then went on to term this an impossible mandate 
‘….which is driven by public expectation rather than the reality of police work.’ 
(Manning, 1978a in Chan 1997;  p.76). It is this impossible mandate which 
forms one of the base lines of Chan’s axiomatic knowledge and which is 
inherent in some of the responses.  
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Cohort 3 – Peer Group     
Yes I do actually, I think I always felt I had the 
consent….I have been in many of the public consultation 
meetings….many of them for years….I have always felt 
that the public just wanted to talk to the police. I (1) M 
52/30/30/6 R. 
 
I don’t think massive amounts changed….through 
consultation with police authorities and things like that 
and through people on the streets, I think….for me it’s 
an implied consent. PC (2) M/58/30/30(R). 
 
For me to get a consultative meeting you’d need 
agreement….they used to have a go at us all the time. 
CS (3) M/67/30/4 R. 
 
It is always good to consult, although I am not entirely 
convinced that being….forced to consult is a good or a 
bad move. It might look a bit like ‘well I suppose we have 
to go through the motions’ but if some good comes of it 
then….it might work. CI (4) M/64/30/8(R). 
 
I think it probably was counterproductive….I think a 
consultative process is all very well providing you take 
cognisance of what people say and do something about 
it. I (5) M57/30/10 R. 
                 No. CS (6)M/68/30/5 R. 
This, and the previous answer, indicates that all is not well; that being, 
in a sense, forced to hold meetings can, in some instances (see replies 8 and 
9 of this cohort that follow) be counter-productive and unable to achieve the 
ends that the legislature had wished for.  
No….I think the police service should been seen to be 
working for the people....not for any political ends at all. 
It comes down to who runs the police. Sgt (7) 
M/57/30/10(R). 
 
I was very often ambushed by ethnic minorities who 
would bring along members of the public who allegedly 
couldn’t speak English and then you’d get these self 
appointed people who’d stand up and interpret and take 
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it as an opportunity to lambaste the police. S (8) 
M/63/30/6 R. 
No.  That was a complete and utter waste of time, the 
PACE requirement….following….the Scarman Inquiry. 
CS (9) M/56/30/3 R. 
I never really thought about it I’m if honest. I knew that if 
I had gone outside what some persons considered to be 
their consent then I got a complaint against me which is 
acceptable. Sgt (10) M/67/30/12 R. 
 
Once again there are some notable exceptions to the veracity and 
usefulness of the PACE requirement which, in some instances, can be readily 
attributable to some officers being ‘ambushed’ by local, self appointed 
spokespersons (See comments by S (8)). From the recording it is clear that 
these people have viewed the statutory meetings as forum to push their own 
political and personal agenda as well as a means of ‘police bashing’. In this 
instance the person concerned had indeed become a self-styled ‘community 
leader who was seeking publicity in order to push his personal agenda. 
Within the context of these particular responses there is less clear 
delineation along cultural lines with very mixed reaction to the format, purpose 
and success of police/community forums. Indeed some officers felt that, given 
the way policing is carried out they should be left, albeit in a cultural sense, to 
get on with the job. As Reiner identified in 2000 there are undercurrents in this 
situation, one of which appears to be a collective sense of cynicism, whereby 
this requirement has been foisted onto a somewhat unwilling organisation and 
that there is no real option but to carry it out despite whatever cultural 
misgivings they have about its introduction.   
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Cohort 4 – Student Officers 
Question unanswered by PC (1)  
I think it has helped….I am aware of the meetings that 
go on where the public get involved and we then get 
down briefed with the priorities that have come out of 
those meetings. PC (2) M/31/2/2. 
They’ve got the domestic violence [positive policing]…. 
you get involved in….strategy meetings to see if they 
can get people to move from certain areas and things 
like that. PC (3) F/2/2. 
….people who chair these meetings….are they aware of 
what police deal with….what it is like going….to these 
places trying to stem anti-social behaviour. I think if the 
police were ruled by other authorities….that would 
probably be the wrong decision. PC (4) M/34/2/2. 
 
 
It is of particular note that, in reply to the next question on when they 
thought consent was being lost, this officer was involved in a situation where 
drunken youths were rampaging on a village green and when the police 
(heavily outnumbered) responded they were castigated by local residents who 
stated that the youths were doing no harm and should be left to their own 
devices. Whether this was an attempt by some residents to forestall any 
retaliation by the youths when the police presence was withdrawn is open to 
conjecture; could it be seen as part of the deeper malaise in society where 
there is an overall resentment of the police which, in the comments made 
here, the PACE requirement is, in itself, a piece of rhetoric, which carries very 
little weight with some sections of the public. It could also be argued that it is 
part of the change of the position of the police in society in the last fifty years 
which, according to Bradford and Jackson, ‘….has undoubtedly changed for 
the worse’ (Bradford and Jackson, 2009: p.9).  
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….very few people notice….a good service, it’s only 
when they feel they’ve had a bad service that they’ll 
vocalise it…. the police waste their time with….doing 
you for being on your mobile phone while you’re 
driving….whereas they should be focussing on the real 
criminals….I think overall we’ve got the consent of the 
public. PC (5) F/27/2/2. 
 
….it is important ….to be seen to be doing things…. 
public forums I think they’re probably a very good idea, 
people can be….honest and give you their opinions of, 
how they feel they’re being policed. PC (6) F/22/2/2. 
 
….the way you gauge when you have the public’s 
consent is through regular contact with the public and 
seeing….what problem their particular communities face 
and then trying solve those problems. PC (7) F/23/2/2. 
….we were given consent by the fact that we’ve been 
there since 1829….people expect us to be there…. I 
don’t understand what we need to do under PACE but 
regardless of that….the only way that you’re ever going 
to ensure that we do get consent is through voting….a 
fundamental issue is we have the consent because of 
where we’ve come from and for what we do….how do 
we really engage the community in terms of what we 
do?….we have to give the power of decision to the 
people we serve in terms of the direction that we take. 
PC (8) M/28/2/2. 
 
I think so, people….are a funny bunch….you have 
locked people up, given them a caution, or a ticket for 
£80, and, they say “Yes, sorry, thanks very much…. So I 
don’t know what difference these forums make. PC (9) 
M/29/2/2. 
 
I think we do have the consent.... as a whole, like I said. 
PC (10) M/27/2/2. 
Once again there are some common discursive themes emerging but 
one of the more interesting answers included the phrase ‘The requirement to 
consult the public under PACE is an irrelevance.’ (see page 214 – CC 8); 
however the same Chief, who has already pointed out the viability of ‘policing 
by consent’ as either a doctrine or something which, if enshrined in law, would 
certainly atrophy, states categorically whilst you may not know when you have 
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‘consent’ you certainly know when you do not have it. There is, beyond a 
shadow of doubt, no rhetoric involved in this answer; it was straightforward, 
and unequivocal; it falls outside of  Foucault’s ‘discursive’ boundaries, indeed 
it displays a very objective use of power within that particular context. There 
were others within the group who also disagreed with the relevance of the 
PACE requirement and a distillation of their replies, together with an analysis 
appears later in this chapter. 
In common with the other cohorts the overall impression gained is that 
this particular part of the legislation has a number of political undertones in 
effort to drive policing along certain lines. Their comments are very much in 
line with the previous cohorts who tend to indicate that the more junior (both in 
rank and service) officers are reproducing this cultural more from the older 
and more senior officers. 
The next question on consent was the question specifically designed to 
identify the ‘rhetoric/reality distinction’ and to draw on their personal and 
professional experiences which may reveal a divergence from any ‘rhetoric’ 
that they previously used. They were simply asked when they felt they were 
either losing or had already lost consent. This, in turn, was designed to 
stimulate an answer which would reveal their true feelings rather than have 
them revert to a rhetorical response or to fall back on the Millsian style 
response. 
Cohort 1 – Chief Officers 
The strategic forces debate….confused some of our 
communities. The miners’ strike, I think there were some 
major concerns….we were the political arm of the state 
and I think a lot of well informed intelligent people were 
probably aghast at the sight of police officers marching 
to crush a ….trade dispute.... we’ve got a lot of people 
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within the county.... who don’t like the police and never 
will because of the treatment they had during the miners’ 
dispute....CC (1) M/51/24/2. 
 
 
I don’t think so. There are always single events that 
have the potential….to have  a negative impact…. 
people who have had a bad experience telling ten 
people they know, who all tell ten people they know and 
all of a sudden a thousand people are aware of this one 
bad event. CC (2) M/56/31/3. 
 
Yes….with a model that was about reducing crime.... 
what stays fairly constant is the fear of crime….I do think 
that during the miners’ dispute….I couldn’t find a 
member of the public who was in favour of what the 
police were doing…. CC (3) M/53/29/4. 
 
I think here in (County omitted) the most recent 
example ….was probably the riots in (Town omitted) in 
2001, but ….that was a very small section of the 
community, ….whilst people thought that was about 
race….the reality is it was about criminality…. the vast 
majority of people did understand that this was about 
them being exploited and they just wanted us to get 
back to normality. CC (4) M/51/32/3. 
 
….two things that I’ve struggled with the most here, one 
was the agenda to improve (force named) and the 
second was gun crime. When it looked like we might 
lose either of those two battles then I think that consent 
and support were in serious danger….having …. 
damning HMI reports written about you….may well have 
been seen as a motivator….but it just fundamentally 
corrupted the public’s belief that they were being looked 
after by the police service. CC (5) M/52/31/3. 
Miners’ dispute….in certain areas we were seen as an 
occupying army, riot situations that I've lived through in 
certain communities….you do lose that trust and 
confidence….we're better now at understanding the 
signs that things aren't good….the police authority are 
much more focused…. they usually focused on 
efficiency, now they are focused on community 
relationships….that’s a bonus. CC (6) M/52/30/8. 
A good example on call incident handling....what I 
witnessed....was the sheer volume of criticism in the 
press in letters from the Police Authority....we made a 
huge error....we were consistently letting them down. CC 
(7) M/54/31/3. 
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I well recall (location omitted) ….I was constable in the 
first set of disorder and an Inspector when the second 
set based around (location omitted) kicked off….you can 
label anything in order to sell papers. The danger is that 
the public will believe it and public confidence in the 
institutional law and order will fall and 
reinforce….antisocial behaviour. CC (8) M/52/29/4. 
 
It was an interesting time when people felt that we were 
using fixed penalty notices as a means of a….quick fix 
on crime.  I think some people thought, “hang on a 
second, has this gone too far?” I don’t think we have 
ever reached the stage where we’re losing the….public 
confidence….there are some occasions when you can 
see collectively the public are raising the eyebrows as if 
to say, “not so sure about this”. CC (9) M/56/36/5. 
 
I think the example from my previous working 
environment….the policing of an airbase during a recent 
armed conflict…..that particular conflict, whatever the 
rights and wrongs from my own points of view, are totally 
irrelevant. But that conflict, as it went on, appeared to 
attract less and less public support. CC (10) M/48/27/1. 
 
This particular response would appear to answer, at least in part, the 
frustration demonstrated earlier by CC1 when he expressed a regret that 
young people, in general, were policed at. It was also echoed in the response 
by one of the student officers.  Perhaps, as this interviewee expressed they 
may already be beyond reach, forming part of an ever growing and in many 
respects a somewhat disenfranchised group who have little or no regard for 
law and order. As I had expected however a number of this cohort expressed 
strong views about the miners’ strike of the 1980s, which, as I have already 
stated, really did bring about a change in the public perception of the police, 
even to the extent of ‘politicising’ them. 
Cohort 2 – Senior/Middle Management   
….going back a long way….long periods of disorder like 
the miners’ strike….a lot of harm done there…. the 
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shooting of John (Charles De Menezes) have a big 
impact on the public….I wouldn’t like to say that it’s 
damaged us to the extent that we’re losing public 
confidence but all those things are damaging. I (1) 
F/48/27/10. 
….if you went to some ethnic areas….where there’s 
historically problems and frustration you definitely 
wouldn’t have policing by consent. At G8 when you’ve 
got people that are demonstrating against Heads of 
State and their different policies to do with the 
environment….we definitely lost their consent because 
they’re trying to do something which we’re trying to stop 
them from doing and they want to achieve a completely 
different purpose. Sgt (2) M/49/29/6. 
I think that is….difficult, because….there is a 
swathe….of young people who have an approach to 
authority….which is expressed to their parents, to 
education, to the police….which is very difficult.  My 
concern is that I think that these young people are doing 
it either with the acquiescence or with the support of 
parents and I think we’re storing up a significant problem 
for ourselves. DCC3 M/47/21/1. 
 
This answer is very much in line with comments made by one of the 
student officers and indicates that there may well be a negative ‘approach to 
authority’, or indeed a challenge to the overall legitimacy of the police.  
 
The miners’ strike might be a good example, whereby 
there was hostility. But even then in places like 
(Location) things got back relatively quickly to normality 
although there are still festering sores. There will always 
be individuals that will never forgive and forget. CI (4) 
M/53/23/8. 
….we’ve made changes….around….communications.... 
people felt….it was pointless in ringing us because…. 
they couldn’t get through….I don’t think it ever reached 
the stage of people rebelling….which, if we hadn’t 
addressed…could have resulted in a loss of 
consent....CS (5) F/42/15/1. 
 
....part of the role is to communicate and engage with 
people and if we were just seen as very authoritarian, 
policing to the letter of the law with no lee-way, we would 
lose that trust and that support and it would just make 
our job harder. I (6) M/42/23/5. 
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Brixton and Broadwater Farm….the consent of the 
public was withdrawn there….as a commander I’m 
required to have police and community forums whereby I 
go with the police authority and face the people….and 
sometimes the people disagree with my decisions. CS 
(7) M/44/25/1. 
….the miners’ strike….where communities then families 
were torn apart….because father and brother were on 
opposite sides of the fence….For no other reason than 
we had to police the rights of those individuals who 
wanted to go to work. CS (8) M/50/31/3. 
….it’s difficult to say, I’ve been in a situation where I 
think we’ve been losing….the consent of elements of the 
public….how we were dealing with….visible ethnic 
minority groups, road traffic enforcement, I think 
sometimes those have lost….a large element of support. 
DCC (9)  M/57/30/4. 
 
I think it’s almost like Fort Apache the Bronx….where all 
the police were told to do away with their discretion, and 
do everybody for everything.  I think it makes a total 
enemy of the public, that’s why we’re here, for the 
public.  We can’t have the public as the enemy. CS (10) 
M/40/20/1. 
 
This particular answer, although based on a feature film, is 
nevertheless a very perceptive comment on a situation where this officer sees 
it as a dystopian future which he finds difficult to accept. Indeed it creates a 
situation or a form of discourse where the public views the police as ‘the 
enemy’. This almost mordant sense of humour disguises what appears to be 
a real fear of this officer that, as he so rightly identified, ‘We can’t have the 
public as the enemy.’ 
Once again, because of the age and service band of this cohort, the 
miners’ strike of the 1980s has become a part of their police psyche, 
entrenched and immoveable as many Foucauldian discourses are. There are 
also a number of legitimate concerns expressed about the loss of public 
support during major changes to communications methodology which, rather 
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than making initial contact with the police easier, has only served to make it 
even more complicated and difficult for the public to grasp. In earlier research 
I examined the introduction of a centralised call acceptance/resource 
dispatching system in (Force name omitted) in the 1980s and can give first 
hand testimony to the utter confusion that the public were literally plunged 
into. One of the major criticisms, which still echoes today, is the inability 
created by these systems for a caller to speak to their local police station. 
Cohort 3 – Peer Group 
….when I worked on the drug squad….some of the 
policies would constantly harass them, turn them over, 
and search them. That was pre-PACE….It was not the 
best way to engage that community, many of whom 
actually wanted to give up drugs. I (1) M/52/30/6 R. 
 
There is, without doubt, honesty in this reply where the officer states he 
harassed a certain class of offender which he candidly admits was not the 
best way of dealing with them. This is the kind of reply that provides decisive 
counter-evidence to the Millsian theory of ‘vocabularies of motive’ or indeed 
any rhetoric; it appears to spring from a genuine regret that the best course of 
action was not followed and presents what will probably be the nearest 
approximation to the ‘truth’. This is particularly descriptive of the directory 
knowledge which Chan highlighted whereby officers tend to target those who 
are both different to the cultural norm and also appear less reputable than the 
remainder of society, or at least those parts of society that are within the 
police purview. This particular facet of police culture also relies upon the fact 
that patrolling officers never know what situation they are going to be 
confronted with and therefore tend to rely upon commonsense, experience 
and, to some extent, discretion. 
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….the miners’ strike hit me….there was a real fear that 
we’re gonna completely lose the consent….look at some 
of the situations….was it justified….there were times it 
wasn’t….I think sometimes that we were in real 
danger….the Brixton riots, Toxteth and places like that 
you were gonna lose minority community 
groups….there’s certain areas….where we’re 
vulnerable. PC (2) M/58/30/30(R). 
 
I didn’t know if I had it in [location omitted] sometimes.… 
I don’t think I did….I always tried to seek their consent. 
I’m sure there were incidents when they didn’t agree 
with us. CS (3) M/67/30/3. 
….the heavy handed approach to the….riots at [Location 
omitted]….where places became no-go areas simply 
because the police withdrew from them in order to 
consolidate….for a short period….there was a no-go 
area….half a day later that situation was addressed. CI 
(4) M/64/30/8(R). 
 
I think it probably was counterproductive (The 
requirement under PACE)….I think a consultative 
process is all very well providing you take cognisance of 
what people say and do something about it. I (5) 
M/57/32/10 R. 
There's a lack of respect of the police by younger 
people.  They don't respect anybody….as a result you 
have got more problems with disorder….with 
alcohol.  …you see groups of girls and lads on Friday 
nights drunk, lying in the gutter….that would never have 
been allowed in the old days. CS (6) M/68/30/5 R. 
No, unless we go back….to the miners’ strike….I think it 
was a testing time for us all…. Sgt (7) M/57/30/10(R). 
 
….there was always problems with Muslims having to 
walk through poor white areas to get to the mosque in 
(Town omitted)  and white people….the underclass, 
resented this and attacked them as they went to the 
mosque. I think that the loss of respect for the police 
was already there and I think that resulted in the riots. S 
(8) M/63/30/6R. 
 Definitely….because I just couldn't do what they [the 
public] wanted me to do. CS (9) M/56/30/3R. 
….at one time one of my Community Team PCs  used to 
go to these meetings…. it  became obvious that they 
would get a lot of brow beating….from the local 
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residents and councillors…. they were quite rightly upset 
with the increase in crime, there were senior officers with 
their own agendas….where they were going to put 
resources. I stopped my officers going unless I was 
present. I felt that we weren’t policing with the consent of 
the public that lived in that community….they were 
getting very uptight about what they perceived to be a 
lack of policing, and it was because our resources were 
being moved from one place to another at the drop of a 
hat. Sgt (10) M/67/30/12 R. 
Culturally, this supervisor’s action, in relation to the officers under his 
command attending these PACE forums would appear to be, as Reiner 
identified, at odds with the official purpose of the police. In saying that 
however what he is arguing against is that those self-same senior officers are 
the people responsible for directing, or in this case re-directing, police 
resources away from the locality where the complaints are being generated.   
Again a very wide ranging selection of incidents selected to illustrate 
that ‘loss of consent’ but, once again the miners’ strike of the 1980s features; 
it was, without doubt, a defining moment in police/public relations which left 
scars on participants from both sides of the dispute. That it saw further 
‘politicisation’ of the police is beyond dispute and once again, highlights the 
need for a jurisprudence of consent. Whilst this approach will never rectify the 
effects of that dispute, it may facilitate greater accountability and a bastion 
against some of the excesses of force employed by the police which had not 
been seen in these islands since the General Strike in 1926. 
Cohort 4 – Student Officers  
I think if, if you go in too heavy handed, or....with an 
attitude, then you get it back twice as bad from members 
of the public and I think if you go in....highlighting one 
group of people or assuming things,  then the reactions 
  240 24
 
 
gonna be horrendous....I think you need to be open 
minded in this job. PC (1) F/23/2/2. 
 
….the officer that has to listen to a number of complaints 
over a nightshift weekend about lack of action or lack 
manpower….Or that nothing is being done about 
antisocial behaviour.  If that's not controlled correctly by 
that officer, confidence is not really gained….I'm sure it 
could escalate into a bigger problem. PC (2) M/31/2/2. 
A lot of people don’t have respect for the police….But 
the majority….you’d be surprised who do. But you just 
get used to it. PC (3) F/28/2/2. 
I was called to a job down at (Town omitted) it was just 
youths drinking on The Green….there was about twenty 
or thirty youths….litter strewn everywhere, people 
staggering about….there was only four, four officers on 
at the time, but we got down there and did the best we 
could….asked them to go home and they wouldn’t, all 
you can do is take the alcohol and move them on then 
we had two or three residents come out of their houses  
giving us a hard time, I was completely shocked and I 
said to one of them, “What do you want us to do and 
they said “leave them they’re not doing any harm”.  And I  
said to her “are you happy to live like this?” and she was 
like “well yeah, yeah I am yeah, I don’t think they’re 
doing any harm”….I couldn’t believe it because for me it 
would be a nightmare. PC (4) M/34/2/2 (see also on 
page 26). 
 
This response is particularly noteworthy because the officer concerned 
was responding to a genuine call, albeit from an anonymous resident, about 
the disorder he found at the scene. The striking thing about the comments of 
the resident who spoke to the officer, and who is quoted above, appears 
indicative of some people’s reluctance to be policed even although, in the 
officer’s opinion, the disorder was fairly serious. It is, in many respects, the 
other side of police culture, indicating a negative view of law and order, and, 
in many respects, highlights the societal changes which Holdaway, Chan and 
Reiner all recommend as being a pre-requisite in order to bring about 
changes in police culture.  
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The student riots….in (Town omitted), where I just kept 
thinking….they’re all students, they will have a grain of 
common sense….we didn’t even try to rationalise with 
them at all, it was just straight in with the dog unit and 
operational support unit….so many of them were trying 
to argue back, that’s when they got dog bitten because 
they were seen to be resisting….it was not a very 
pleasant thing to be around….I just felt that we could 
have at least tried a little bit further to….use the arm of 
communication before you flood in the resources. PC (5) 
F/27/2/2. 
 
It is particularly noteworthy that this officer, who is an HPDS (see 
glossary) candidate is not that far distanced from her own university studies. 
Here she has expressed feelings that may well be more sympathetic towards 
young people who, once again, are being policed at30 and in a very robust 
and vigorous manner. She recognises this as a failing on the part of the police 
and something that is obviously at variance with the concept of ‘consent’. 
Indeed she expressed the wish there should have been at least an attempt to 
communicate or negotiate. Of more particular note however is the fact that 
this comment is similar in many respects to the view expressed by CC on 
page ? when he also recognised that young people were ‘policed at’. This 
situation demonstrates that, despite the age/gender/rank/experience which in 
this instance is probably at its widest, there is a commonality of both regret 
and frustration at this apparent inability to reach young people.         
 
 
Not really, just when people haven’t wanted to pursue a 
prosecution, but I suppose that’s not really them not 
wanting any police or anything….that’s just them not 
wanting to pursue a prosecution, so no, not really. PC 
(6) F/22/2/2. 
 
                                            
30  Once again ‘policed at’ is identified. Is this perhaps one of the discourses of power which Foucault claimed 
whose influence we cannot escape?  
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Probably the derby day (the officer is referring to the 
aftermath of a local football derby when a riot situation 
developed in the town centre because the local transport 
infrastructure failed to cope with the large numbers of 
drunken fans) on Sunday when people couldn’t get their 
trains. PC (7) F/23/2/2. 
….I’ve never really….been in a situation where….if I’ve 
needed the public’s help….it’s not been there.  But 
equally….have I really asked for an awful lot beyond 
what people would normally give and the answer’s 
probably no as well.   I’ve generally always found that 
people have been very cooperative. PC (8) M//28/2/2. 
 
….the only other thing I can think of ….would be  
domestic violence situations. If that person [the 
complainant] doesn’t want to give their help to us, that is 
taken out of their hands. PC (9) M/29/2/2. 
 
….it could be blatantly obvious that someone’s possibly 
responsible for something, however, without the  
evidence to support that we can’t act.  I think that’s 
frustrating for people, when they know who is, or they 
think they know who it is but….we can’t act. PC (10) 
M/27/2/2. 
Once again this response indicates the old cultural shiboleth of 
conviction at any cost rather than a search for the truth. Whilst the officer 
states that it is ‘….frustrating for people’ it is felt that, on this occasion the 
officer is also making a personal statement of regret about the situation.   
 
In this series of replies there is a clear demonstration of a number of 
different policing experiences, which in their view led to an implied loss of 
‘consent’,  that are directly attributable to the age gap between the student 
officers and the other three cohorts. The miners’ strike in the 1980s, as 
indicated in the comments by the respondents, looms large in the 
consciousness of the chief constables, the senior and middle management 
officers and my peer group. I have already explored my own personal 
experiences of that particular dispute in my Masters dissertation; suffice to 
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say here that my relationship with my father, an ex-miner, suffered a severe 
hiatus for a number of years. If any one particular event could be said to have 
done the public persona of the police the greatest disservice, particularly in 
the late twentieth century, it was that dispute. There is a general recognition 
that the police were both ‘politicised’ and polarised by their part in what turned 
out to be, in many respects, a bitter and rancorous occurrence which still has 
repercussions to this day with families still divided and a general mistrust of 
the police which is both geographically and demographically located in what 
were once the major coal mining areas of the North East of England, West 
Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire. This particular discourse tends, in my view to 
support Foucault’s theory of discourses. 
Whilst there has been an overall consensus between the cohorts, 
especially on the first three consent questions, there was a significant and 
quite voluble minority who expressed a different viewpoint. I have termed 
them the ‘outliers’ and I will now attempt to contextually rationalise them 
across the age/gender/rank boundaries that I have previously employed.  
 
Outliers - Question 1 
 
I would like to think….I was answerable to the law.…I 
think that’s more the case....it’s all about discretion31 ....if 
you come across someone committing a motor 
offence….a decent person….you let them off with words 
of advice….Someone with a criminal record….they’re 
not gonna get away with it.  We’re not machines you 
know. So the laws are there.... but it’s not used any 
more consistently is it. PC (4) M/34/2/2. 
 
That’s an interesting one….the frustration I have is 
around the work effort that we put into a prosecution.... 
in terms of gathering the evidence….the trivial 
sentence…. was it really worth it?....You can get some 
                                            
31  The use and loss of discretion was explored in Chapter 5 
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guy for shoplifting and they get an £80….fixed penalty 
and yet….three points and £80 for speeding.  I’m not 
sure with that one....PC (8) M//28/2/2. 
 
A genuine frustration has been expressed here and, although in human 
terms, quite understandable, is at variance with the views expressed by 
another student officer who saw the necessity to keep the ‘desirability to 
convict’ totally divorced from the implementation of the law. There are 
obviously strong and opposing influences at work, highlighted by the remark 
about fixed penalty notices (FPN) where he highlights the fines for theft and 
speeding; it has obviously made a negative impression on his sense of 
‘making the punishment fit the crime’.  Further to this, in drawing the 
distinction between the extensive work required to present a case at court as 
opposed to writing a Fixed Penalty Notice (FPN) which has immediate effect.  
 
 
. ….when I worked on the drug squad….some of the 
policies would constantly harass them, turn them over, 
and search them. That was pre-PACE….It was not the 
best way to engage that community, many of whom 
actually wanted to give up drugs. I (1) M/52/30/6 R. 
 
There is, without doubt, honesty in this reply where the officer states he 
harassed a certain class of offender which he candidly admits was not the 
best way of dealing with them. This is the kind of reply that totally negates the 
viability of the Millsian theory of ‘vocabularies of motive’ or indeed any 
rhetoric; it appears to spring from a genuine regret that the best course of 
action was not followed and presents what will probably be the nearest 
approximation to the ‘truth’. Once again the responses from PC (8), on the 
previous page and I (1) at the top of this page allude to the culture of convict 
at any cost but with one important difference. PC (8) indicates that he is 
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‘….not really sure about that one’, that is the work and effort involved in 
preparing a case knowing that his efforts may be frustrated. Whereas I (1) 
acknowledges that what he did to certain communities i.e. drug users, by 
harassing them, was very much in line with Chan’s findings, particularly in 
respect of what she termed directory knowledge. ‘Having developed indicators 
of normality and abnormality, police officers tend to target the unusual and the 
disreputable.’ (Chan, 1997: p.78). This response highlights that targeting but 
at least the officer does acknowledge that it was not the best way to engage 
that particular community, some of whom, in his view, wanted to give up drug 
taking.   
‘....I struggle with the word consent, I know what it 
means it’s not a word the public support and 
understanding is crucial….the general feeling about 
support is very important to the British police…I think…. 
the vast majority of law abiding public are proud and 
want to be well policed….depending what the issue is, if 
you’re talking about enforcing the law on speeding it’s 
subtly different consent than….talking about enforcing 
the law on openly smoking cannabis in public places. 
CC (7) M/54/31/3. 
 
Outliers - Question 2 
 
Whilst the PACE requirement to consult revealed broadly similar views 
there was a voluble minority who expressed dissenting opinion. In revealing 
what amounts to an opposition to the requirement, particularly in the way it 
was expressed, indicates support for my theory of the use of content specific 
rhetoric and similarly a revelation of something akin to a vocabulary of motive 
found in the replies of the majority.  
Those statutory meetings would never be enough….I 
think you’ve got to get out there and….find out what they 
really think….that’s where I’ve got my view of the two 
levels of consent, or conditional consent as I would call 
it ….but I don’t know whether they’re consenting or 
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not….I think to some degree, they just want the whole 
thing to go away and the police will deal with it….CC (3) 
M/53/29/4. 
 
The requirement to consult the public under PACE is an 
irrelevance. Do I believe I have that consent?  Yes 
because I think I would be confronted by a withdrawal of 
consent and it is perhaps the withdrawal of consent 
that’s more easily identified than the giving….you don’t 
know when you’ve got it, but you do know when you 
haven’t (my emphasis) CC (8) M/29/29/4. 
 
The reader will have already identified this particular interviewee as the 
same one who offered his own particular and very individual viewpoint on 
consent. In this particular context his use of the phrase ‘an irrelevance’ 
indicates a particularly strong and forceful personality who is, despite his 
position, unafraid to express an opinion that is far removed from conventional 
professional rhetoric. There is some evidence here to indicate that he does 
not see himself bound by this particular discourse.     
 
….I don’t think that requirement’s sufficient….we need to 
go far beyond that into a relationship with the public …. 
establish what their priorities are  and….go back and tell 
them what we’ve done about those priorities….I think …. 
the PACE requirement has nearly become cosmetic…. 
make sure the local….community beat officer sits with 
the….local community and says ‘right, what shall we 
work on this month’. DCC (3) M/47/21/1. 
 
In his reply on the second consent question this interviewee stated ‘that 
if we are serious about….consent….then we need to give people a voice over 
influencing what happens’. He obviously feels very strongly that the PACE 
requirement has, in many respects ‘….nearly become cosmetic’ and that 
something much more meaningful is required. This surely adds weight to the 
opposing views on the PACE requirement. 
 
I think it would be dangerous to do any more than 
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that.  ….I think if you have people making 
decisions….where they know a little bit….could be 
dangerous or wrong…. if the police were ruled by  other 
authorities….that would probably be the wrong decision. 
PC (4) M/34/2/2. 
 
No, because even in the most controversial policing 
circumstances that I have deployed….I’ll use G832 as a 
chief….I came under a certain degree of flack from 
interested politicians about how protests were to be 
managed around the (Location omitted) venue for the 
G8….even at the height of that when….people were 
saying that I wasn’t acting correctly….I was quite 
confident from my post bag, from my email and from 
comments by politicians. ....indeed I went to the council 
and said okay, you know, let’s stop the sniping ….you 
tell me straight and of course suddenly all the other 
people who had not written to me….I had their unwritten 
support, I certainly have that articulated.  So that’s about 
judgement….what’s acceptable….the feedback you get 
and what you have to do is get as many sources as 
possible, so you understand where your policing needs 
lie. CC (8) M/52/29/4. 
 
Once again a well-articulated statement from a chief officer who, in this 
context, expresses a very frank view about ‘interested politicians’; this can be 
easily interpreted as ‘interfering politicians’ for whom he appears to hold little 
regard particularly when they appear to be critical of, and interfering with, the 
impartial discharge of his duties. It is also noteworthy however that these self-
same robust tactics came under fire in the HMIC report highlighted on the first 
page of this chapter. It was, however, a course of action that he was 
appeared determined to pursue and which, in his considered opinion had the 
approval of diverse groups who had written to him in support of his actions at 
this particular venue. There is obviously a divergence present and it indicates 
once more strength of character and a willingness to break, or at least 
                                            
32  It would require no great effort to make a personal identification of this particular officer and his forthright 
views are well known. I would reassure the reader that he was cognisant that in highlighting a particular occurrence 
that he could be identified but, nevertheless, was insistent and concerned that I reported accurately.  
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surmount, the influences of this particular discourse by utilising the resources 
available to him.  
I was called to a job down at (Town omitted) it was just 
youths drinking on The Green….there was about twenty 
or thirty youths….litter strewn everywhere, people 
staggering about….there was only four, four officers on 
at the time, but we got down there and did the best we 
could….asked them to go home and they wouldn’t, all 
you can do is take the alcohol and move them on then 
we had two or three residents come out of their houses  
giving us a hard time, I was completely shocked and I 
said to one of them, “What do you want us to do and 
they said “leave them they’re not doing any harm”.  And I  
said to her “are you happy to live like this?” and she was 
like “well yeah, yeah I am yeah, I don’t think they’re 
doing any harm”….I couldn’t believe it because for me it 
would be a nightmare. PC (4) M/34/2/2 (see also on 
page 26 and page 33). 
 
This demonstrates ‘the other side of the coin’ where this particular 
officer, who is young in service and who felt that his efforts on behalf of the 
residents had been effectively negated by their attitude towards the 
miscreants, was totally taken aback. He was quite visibly upset by the rebuff 
his efforts on their behalf had received. It is also apparent that we are once 
again witnessing the ‘disenfranchised’ minority already alluded to by both a 
Chief Constable and a Student Officer. Additionally the attitude of the 
residents indicated in the response ‘I don’t think they’re doing any harm’ 
would suggest a possible root cause for the situation that they are in and 
perhaps gives a strong indication why they are policed ‘at’.       
That concludes the analysis on the questions dealing with consent 
which has, because of its’ importance, been subjected to a detailed analysis 
which will help to establish (or not) the existence of a doctrine of consent.  
This in turn may provide the basis for the proposed ‘jurisprudence of consent.’ 
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 In the following chapter, Chapter 8, the findings will be discussed and 
any common themes or discourses, as well as the many aspects of the 
various police culture models, and the effects that they have upon policing 
that have emerged from the data will be identified. Any themes that are at 
variance with the majority view will be highlighted and also rationalise the 
differences in answering which in many respects are contextually significant to 
the era in which the officers policed. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
 
The main themes of this work, which the reader can readily identify, 
were concerned with obtaining the views of a broad based continuum of 
police officers through rank, gender, length of service and policing experience 
to obtain their personal views on the autonomy or discretion they have within 
the daily milieu of policing; the accountability that they have both on a 
personal level and in conjunction with their rank and  an exploration, based on 
their responses, of the many facets of police culture, as particularly identified 
by Holdaway (1984), Chan (1997) and Reiner (2000) that have a bearing on 
their day-to-day policing. Finally and most importantly their views were sought 
on that most contentious of issues that of policing by consent. As a reminder 
to the reader it must be borne in mind that consent in action is under constant 
negotiation, there is not a passive acceptance nor is it a ‘one-off’ yes. It is, 
and always will remain, conditional to the context in which it is given with the 
ever-present potential that it can be withdrawn at any time.  
The Literature Review established that whilst there is a large volume of 
research on the subject of policing by consent there has been none which has 
sought the views of the practitioners themselves. It is, as already stated, a 
well hackneyed, sometimes overused phrase which some researchers find a 
total anathema whilst others are great champions of the principle. The 
literature review supports the diversity of those opposing views but it is the 
words and thoughts of the police officers themselves, from those who 
command to those who carry out the day to day policing tasks, which have 
added a new dimension to the research on this particular aspect of policing 
which has a long and chequered history. Indeed, given the exploration of the 
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impact of police culture on the day-to-day functions of the police, a further 
important dimension has been added to the large volume of research on 
policing.    
It is interesting to note that in early January 2014 the current 
Commissioner of the MPS, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, appeared on television 
following the inquest jury’s verdict of Lawful Killing on the shooting of Mark 
Duggan in 2012 by armed police officers.  During the television statement he 
also used the phrase ‘policing by consent’ several times and stated that we, 
the police, must retain this consent by regaining the public’s trust for what we 
do.   
In Chapter three, the Literature Review, a large array of views on 
policing by consent was uncovered. It is immediately apparent however that 
although this somewhat amorphous and ideological concept has been the 
subject of a considerable amount of academic research, none of the 
researchers had, as far as can be established, ever sought the views of the 
practitioners themselves. A number of authors including Adlam and Richards 
have espoused the idea of a doctrine of consent, rather than the proposed 
jurisprudence of consent; however there is no substantial evidence, apart 
from that revealed in Chapter 3, that such a doctrine exists. Further research 
on this has also proved negative.  Despite this apparent set-back, the original 
stand point whereby rather than consent per se, there is acquiescence, 
usually based on the little knowledge that public have, about the duties and 
workings of the police still holds up. As the reader will have seen in Chapter 7 
most of the police officers interviewed take a very pragmatic view of the 
subject.      
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Consequently the overriding impression gained is that there is only a 
basic understanding of what policing by consent means to the public. Further 
to this identifying the existence of a doctrine of consent appears to be quite an 
elusive challenge. Given that this is the case is it therefore possible to 
construct a ‘jurisprudence of consent’?  This jurisprudence may resemble a 
set of legally recognised ‘rules of engagement’ which would inform both the 
police and the public of the nature of that consent, coupled with the fact that it 
is necessary, as already premised, to be negotiated before, during and after 
each encounter. The fear is that if it is possible, would the dead hand of the 
audit culture, which has already permeated public organisations such as the 
police to a vast degree, kill it off before it had an opportunity to become a solid 
working practice?  Additionally there is the danger that there will be yet 
another set of bureaucratic forms to be completed as part of the almost ritual 
processes of the New Management Culture. This will be explored more fully in 
the conclusions. 
Within the discussion on power in Chapter 4, the methodology chapter, 
Foucault’s theory on discourses of power was employed as a means of 
identifying similar ways of thinking or discourses. This was also explored in 
greater depth during the analysis of the interview data. It is important to note 
however that there was no rigid adherence to Foucault’s main theory. In this 
instance it was employed more as a method of classification of the similar 
ideas and ways of thinking expressed by the various interview subjects. This 
approach enabled a sound anchorage of the theory proposed. 
In addition a number of models of police culture, namely those 
identified by Holdaway 1984 and 1997, Chan 1997 and Reiner in 2000 were 
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examined for the effect that they have both on the organisation and individual 
officers through the continuum of rank, length of service and seniority. 
The key concept of the work was to explore the practical reasoning of a 
number of both serving and retired police officers on how they felt with regard 
to both the concept of policing by consent and also what influences it might 
have on the performance of their day to day dealings with the public. It also 
involved an additional exploration of their recollections and the narratives of 
their collective and individual experiences. 
In constructing the methodology a number of key theories regarding 
the analysis of interview data were examined. They included; Life History; 
Oral History (Memory and Retrospection); Discourse Analysis; Critical 
Discourse Analysis; Conversational Analysis: Grounded Theory and C Wright-
Mills’s Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive. For a number of different 
reasons, which were demonstrated in the methodology chapter, none of the 
aforementioned methodologies provided what could be considered an ideal 
structure for the data analysis; however, important elements were drawn from 
a number of them and, in particular, Wright-Mills’s theory, in many respects, 
provided the basis of a sound platform on which to base the analysis. 
  The basis of the methodological plan was drawn up with the aim of 
conducting a series of semi-structured interviews from the four cohorts of both 
serving and retired police officers across the continuum of rank, gender, 
ethnicity, age and policing experience. These interviews, in turn, would then 
support the key research question enabling exploration of the practical 
reasoning of serving and retired officers with regard to policing by consent, 
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with an additional exploration of their recollections and narratives of their 
experiences. 
The main aims of the study were as follows:- 
The most important part of the research was to obtain the personal 
views of the individual officers within each of the four cohorts on the concept 
of policing by consent and what impact, if any, it had on the performance of 
their duties and professional conduct.  
The gathering and recording of the perceptions of the four cohorts on 
how they felt that they are, or conversely are not allowed, to exercise 
autonomy and/or discretion in the daily performance of their duty. 
To analyse the data and to employ that analysis as a barometer in 
order to gauge their views on both collective and individual accountability as 
well as exploring their perceptions on the differences between accountability 
and answerability. 
To identify the underlying influences of police culture with particular 
reference to Holdaway, Chan and Reiner and how the various facets of their 
models or concepts of that culture impinge, either knowingly, unknowingly or 
even to some extent, intuitively, upon the day-to-day practices of all officers, 
particularly those who police at street level. These particular authors, as well 
as others previously mentioned (see page 89) all tend to view police culture in 
a negative light and indeed Chan viewed it as being ‘somewhat corrosive’. In 
common with Chan, both Reiner and Holdaway also asked how we can get to 
the roots of this culture and how its negative effects can be overcome.    
A further analysis of the data in order to find any evidence of the 
employment of ‘conventional professional rhetoric’, which , in turn, would help 
Comment [PR1]: Better find a page 
number for Chan here 
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to establish whether or not Mills’s hypothesis of ‘Situated Actions’ and 
‘Vocabularies of Motive’ would stand up to examination as a valid social 
theory, particularly in the context of this work. 
 Having obtained their views, carry out further analysis of the data in 
order to establish if there is any support for the proposed jurisprudence of 
consent. 
The data has proved, in many respects, to be revelatory, personal, and 
apparently unencumbered by any need, especially in the case of Chief 
Officers, to use the interview situation as a means of airing their views in a 
public forum. In other words this supports the chosen methodology which was 
designed to invoke direct responses rather than allowing them to conduct a 
public relations exercise.   
 
Autonomy and accountability rank highly in this work but it is 
undoubtedly the area in and around consent that is its raison d’étre. It is 
therefore necessary to briefly reprise the three main question areas and then, 
to assist the reader who will have just read the chapter on consent, discuss it 
in more depth whilst they retain its salient points.   
The first question area was concerned with the autonomy which 
officers have over the day to day performance of their duties, including the 
ability and indeed the means, to practice a certain level of discretion as to how 
they deal with individuals and how satisfied those individuals will be with the 
outcome of the encounter. Indeed this is the basis of police legitimation.  
The next question examined accountability and it is obvious that, apart 
from the high levels of personal accountability that are demanded from 
officers of every rank there is a new and recent phenomenon to be taken into 
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consideration. The ‘New Management Culture’, as identified by Hough in 
2007, has seen ‘…. conventional bureaucracies lose sight of outcomes in their 
obsession with processes’ (Hough, 2007: p. 79).  It would appear that the 
main concern of this ‘audit culture’ is the actual recording of the process, 
rather than concentrating on the policing aspects with the joint aims of 
achieving both local and nationally set targets. Indeed there has been ‘a 
rumbling of dissent amongst police professionals….about performance 
measures based on outcomes’. (Hough, 2007: p.79). These types of 
processes undoubtedly have an effect upon the legitimation strategies of the 
police insofar as the processes and not the outcomes become the driving 
force. As Hough (2007) stated ‘….there is a risk that the pursuit of public 
compliance through legitimation strategies could itself be transformed into a 
form of narrow instrumentality’. (Hough, 2007: p. 80). This, according to 
Hough, will lead to a high cost in terms of the loss of ‘….institutional 
legitimacy’ (Hough 2007: p.80). 
   Unfortunately this particular culture does have stifling effects on both 
police actions and, more worryingly, police legitimation. It has further negative 
connotations insofar as in many situations, it has a tendency to nullify the 
individual actions that an officer may employ to ensure that there is an 
element of fairness, and indeed a’ smile on the face of justice’. This should, 
and in many respects often does, characterise the many millions of face-to-
face encounters that take place on a daily basis in and around the minutia that 
comprises day-to-day policing.    
The third and probably the most important question area dealt with the 
title of the piece, and, as stated, was its raison d’étre, that of the impressions 
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of a number of serving and retired officers, across the spectrum of age, 
gender, rank and service of their views on ‘policing by consent’. 
 
Autonomy/Discretion 
In Chapter 5 the views of all four cohorts were sought on the levels of 
autonomy that police officers across the continuum of ranks, from the most 
junior officers to chief officers have. Closely linked to the question of 
autonomy is discretion and, as a number of authors, including Elmsley,   
Weinberger and Reiner, have already identified, the greatest amount of 
discretion is practised by the most junior of the ranks, those constables who 
patrol the streets on a daily basis. It cannot be denied that the question of 
control is also closely linked to the practice of discretion and there are 
undoubtedly many situations where the officer does not, because of controls 
that are in place, practice discretion.  
Official reaction to the practice of discretion, has, within my knowledge, 
resulted in some police forces setting targets for traffic patrol officers who 
have been told achieve a certain number of processes (summonses for traffic 
regulation offences such as exceeding the speed limit); should they fail to 
reach those targets on a regular basis they would then be ‘transferred’ out of 
the Traffic Department. Again within my knowledge this did happen to a 
number of my colleagues and is a particularly unedifying aspect of control 
over junior officers. Other police forces also had unofficial ‘league tables’ for 
various types of offence that were prosecuted successfully, again mostly 
traffic based infringements and that officers were encouraged to assist the 
force in achieving a high league position.  
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This of course totally negates the exercise of discretion and is also 
closely linked to a lack of consent for this kind of action. However it is still 
maintained that it is the proper exercise of discretion which makes the job 
manageable and acceptable to the public. It is not difficult to envisage the 
effects if every officer on patrol identified every minor infringement of the law 
and either arrested the person committing the offence or reported them for 
summons. Within a day the street work of every officer would grind to a halt 
under the weight of the bureaucracy needed to complete the process. It is 
therefore important to recognise that, properly and fairly exercised, discretion 
is surely the most potent of tools in an officer’s tool box. 
Additionally the practice of discretion would appear to have its roots in 
the many aspects of police culture. As Holdaway found, officers often employ 
stories and jokes, which to both lighten the more trying aspects of the job and 
to place themselves, following a particularly chastening experience, and in a 
better light with both their colleagues and their supervisors, as well as backing 
up colleagues, even when their actions may be wrong; Chan’s multi-layered 
description of police knowledge which officers appear to rely upon to get the 
job done and, finally, the ‘sense of mission’ which Reiner identified as an 
important constituent of that same ‘police culture. 
 
Discretion 
Chief Constable Cohort 
Within the Chief Constables cohort there was a recognition,  that whilst 
they encouraged their junior officers to practice discretion, they also  
recognised that this led to a concomitant loss of their control; however 
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because of the trust they placed in their officers they seemed quite happy to 
relinquish that particular aspect of control. The use of discretion was neatly 
summed up by one Chief Constable who stated that ‘I like their exercising of 
discretion….just because you have got a power doesn’t mean you have to 
use it.’ (CC (3) M/53/29/4). Five of the chief officers agreed that discretion 
should be practised, especially by their patrol officers and one Chief even 
stated that ‘we don’t have enough discretion’ (CC (4) M51/32/3). It is 
interesting to note at this point that in 2008 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, following a year-long review of policing, 
actually recommended that police officers should be allowed even more 
discretion than they currently practise. 
With regard to the ‘control’ element or the other side of discretion two 
of the chief officers recognised that whilst they have a large amount of control 
and operational independence over the day to day running of the police the 
imposition of government targets and performance frameworks is 
‘….constantly eating away at that control.’ (CC (5) M/52/31/3). 
The main cultural theme disclosed in the responses to this question 
clearly emerges as that identified by Chan in 1997 and which she described 
as axiomatic knowledge; in other words the Chief Officers acknowledge and 
identify what they see as the main functions of the police, or as Chan 
described it, ‘….why things are done the way they are in an organisation.’ 
(Chan, 1997: p.76). They also clearly identified that the practice of discretion 
is, to a much greater degree, practised by the more junior ranks particularly 
those who have day-today dealings and contact with the public. The practice 
of that discretion also bears hallmarks of Reiner’s sense of mission. 
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Senior Management Cohort 
In the Senior Management Cohort there was a definite contrast in 
attitude with the views expressed by the by the Chief Constables in that they 
felt the power to exercise discretion was being eroded all the time. One officer 
stated;  
‘I am of the opinion that driven through statistics, 
target management and government policies, the 
individual officer, and I take this directly from experience 
within our own county , has no discretion whatever 
anymore.’ (Sgt (2) M/49/29/6).  
 
Another four officers in this cohort also alluded to what they felt was an 
erosion of discretion but six of them agreed that they were able to exercise 
control over what they do. This was neatly summed up by CS (5) F/42/15/1  
who stated that ‘….we have controls in place across all of the range of 
policing activities….we haven’t got somebody sitting on the shoulder of every 
police action we….have a number of checks and balances in place to ensure 
that they carry out their duties lawfully proportionately and professionally….’. 
A somewhat contrasting view of the patrol officer’s exercise of 
discretion was expressed by an Inspector who stated ‘I have an awful lot of 
control over what I do but if you are talking about an operational person who 
is interfacing with the public they can have….control that’s without 
discretion…. the easiest thing in the world is just to deal with things by the 
book isn’t it?....I’m not suggesting that’s the right way….I think you have to be 
prepared to justify the action you have taken but that erodes discretion which I 
think is completely essential.’ (I (1)F/48/27/10). It is obvious that whilst this 
officer exercises a great deal of control over her own daily tasks she 
recognises that patrol officers could exercise control to the extent that they do 
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everything by the book. However, a bureaucratic system designed along 
these lines  would, within a very short space of time, render any officer 
incapable of performing further patrol duties until the necessary 
documentation was completed. The Inspector also acknowledged this fact 
and, very tellingly, admitted that this would erode discretion which she 
obviously regards as an essential part of policing. 
Within this same cohort another two officers expressed much the same 
view about the erosion of discretion with one stating ‘….they don’t have a lot 
of discretion….they are looking to us to be clearer about the parameters 
within which they can operate.’ (DCC (3) M/47/21/1). The other officer stated 
that ‘….I feel that constables now are losing their powers of discretion, they do 
not see it as an option….if they can get five detected crimes out of an offence 
that’s the way they are pushed.’ (I (6) M/42/23/5). 
It is very telling that the second officer above, who mentioned an officer 
recording five ‘detected’ crimes out of one set of circumstances, is clearly 
referring to the relatively new National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) a 
set of procedures which are driven by the audit culture demonstrating that 
‘accountability’ is always in an upward rather than a downward direction. To 
illustrate this point the key feature  in this set of circumstances, where a 
number of offences have been ‘cleared up’, is the effect that it has on the 
published figures for detected crime; that appears to be the important 
element. It naturally follows from this, that  because of this culture, officers are 
being driven more and more down the path of meeting crime detection targets 
in order to improve the forces detection rate; however, in my opinion, it is not, 
in any way, a fair and just way of policing. 
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This set of responses developed a similar cultural theme to that of the 
Chief Constables insofar as the tacit acknowledgement and indeed a 
recognition that the practice of discretion appears to be necessary to keep the 
wheels turning. This indicates that, as Reiner proposed, the sub-culture often 
appears to be very much in contrast to the official police function. Once again, 
in view of the seniority of this cohort, the traditional views, identified by Chan 
as axiomatic knowledge, see them acknowledging that they are, according to 
Chan, ‘….waging a war against crime, maintaining order and protecting 
peoples lives and property.’ (Chan, 1997: p. 76) 
Peer Group 
Within the peer group cohort only two of them linked control and 
discretion with one stating that ‘….the degree of control came with 
responsibility….to use discretion effectively and not to discriminate against 
any particular group. (PC(2)M/58/30/30R). Once again this officer is 
demonstrating that he has a genuine concern being expressed about the fair 
and just qualities of policing upon which so much rests. The other officer 
alluded to the ‘league tables’ that I have already identified when he stated that 
‘….there was a lot of pressure….they have five shifts competing….but I never 
did that….and whilst I was part of that culture I can say that I had exercised 
discretion.’ (I (5)M57/30/10/R). This officer, whilst acknowledging that league 
tables and target driven performances were always present he at least had 
exercised some discretion both in his dealings with the public and in a refusal 
to take part in the ‘competition’ between the shifts. 
Whilst six of the cohort expressed the opinion that they were able to 
exercise a certain amount of control over what they did the remaining four 
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expressed a different view. One very pointedly referred directly to the lack of 
resources which did not enable him to be in control when he stated ‘No I didn’t 
have the resources and as a result I lost the control. That was my Achilles 
heel.’ (CS (3) M/67/30/4/R). Here we see a direct link between budget 
restrictions and the very real consequences that they had in this particular 
situation. Another officer was quite adamant that in a certain situation control 
had been removed from him by the Command Block (ACPO Officers office 
block within the forces headquarters.). He was involved at BCU level in a 
situation involving an ethnic minority population stating that ‘….the directions 
from command meant that I had to do certain things….take some flack and 
put my resources where they directed….I think that was totally wrong.’ (S (8) 
M/63/30/6R). This theme, which linked the lack of resources to the lack of 
control was continued by CS (9) who stated that ‘….the difficulty….goes back 
to resources. I felt that I didn’t have control….it was all to do with targets, 
Police authority targets and Home Office targets…. (CS (9)M/56/30/3R). 
Whilst a lack of resources was in some cases due to inadequate funding it 
was also the case that on a number of occasions officers would be taken for 
other duties when required. ‘When there were no other priorities ….I was 
allowed to get on….build my bridges with the community and it worked….but 
that control was soon taken away if the resources [in this context the officer 
means the officers under his command] were needed elsewhere.’ (Sgt (10) 
M/67/30/12R). Once again targets appear; this is testament to the ‘dead hand’ 
of the audit culture that reaches into every aspect of policing today and which, 
in many respects is gradually changing the nature of the service. 
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In this set of responses the contradiction between the official purposes 
of the police in response to both local and national policing initiatives and the 
level of Chan’s axiomatic knowledge, applied to the ‘whys and wherefores’ of 
the job was quite obvious. This in turn appears to find them, as Reiner 
highlighted, as being at odds, in a cultural sense, with the official purposes of 
the police. It is important however to view this particular set of responses in 
light of the era that they policed in i.e. mainly during the late 1960s to the early 
1990s when police practise was subject of much less scrutiny than it is today.      
Student Officer Cohort 
In the Student officer cohort the seven of the ten officers acknowledged 
that they did have at least a measure of control over their day to day functions 
and six of them linked that control to the practice of discretion which they were 
able to practice particularly at a lower level. It is heartening to note that in 
most cases that discretion appeared to be applied fairly and justly with a 
recognition of the consequences should they get it wrong. ‘It’s my 
decisions….if I mess up it’s my fault and I am in control of every decision I 
make….and unless I am directed by a supervisor…. I will do what I think is 
right. (PC (1)F/23/2/2). Another officer explained that he was still able to give 
warnings for the more minor offences when he stated that ‘….lower level stuff 
you have more control on that, you can still give warnings….but you’ve got 
PACE (see glossary) that you have to adhere to….but lower end you do have 
a little bit of discretion.’ (PC (2)M/31/2/2). Another officer reported that in 
many situations that he was involved in he was able to establish, at the outset 
of the encounter, the level of discretion that he felt both qualified and able to 
apply ‘Someone parked on a double yellow line dropping somebody off who is 
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elderly and infirm….there is no benefit for the police to say ‘oh, £30 ticket for 
obstruction’ ….this is not going to improve the consent of the public.’ (PC 
(8)M/28/2/2). This situation is exactly what the practice of discretion is about 
and also demonstrates the officer’s awareness about the consequences of not 
practising discretion when the circumstances virtually demand it. Again that 
link between control and discretion was highlighted by another officer who 
said that ‘I can decide whether or not someone is arrested or not so to that 
extent I have control’  
There were however occasions when the opportunity to practice 
discretion was effectively removed from the officer’s armoury and this 
situation was highlighted by an officer who stated  ‘….to be honest when a log 
has been created your discretion has gone.’ (PC (4) M/34/2/2). This simply 
means that the complainant has actually telephoned the police to record a 
complaint and that an official record has been created on the force’s computer 
aided despatching system. This places an absolute necessity upon the officer 
to deal with the incident and, where necessary, take the appropriate action. 
There is however one dissenting voice within this particular cohort who 
stated that whilst ‘….you have control over just small things….I think you are 
always answerable to someone else.’ (PC (5) F/27/2/2). This, in essence is 
the crux of the matter and that whilst she has a measure of control and 
therefore discretion there is always an ultimate requirement to report 
back….to your supervision who, in turn are reporting back to NCRS (see 
glossary) or conforming to a force policy on domestic violence. 
This particular structure of answerability or accountability reveals the 
dichotomy between the control that an officer exercises over the performance 
  266 26
 
 
(or non-performance) of their duty and the need to report back reveals the 
discourses of power that Foucault explored when recognised that we are 
subjected to and subjugated by those discourses  which we are unable to 
escape. 
However it is apparent from the answers given by this cohort that the 
practice of discretion appears to be very much ‘alive and well’, and, perhaps 
more importantly, it is being applied fairly and justly.  In 1984 Pepinsky 
proposed that the practice of discretion starts ‘….from the premise that 
discretion is a desirable part of policing. It proposes a system of accountability 
designed to generate discretion in a way that reduces the injustice of selective 
law enforcement’ (Pepinsky, 1984: p.249). 
There are clear and distinct cultural differences in this set of responses 
which appear to be directly linked to the officers’ junior (in rank) status within 
the organisation. In 1995 Holdaway stated that ‘….police work requires 
officers to summarise complex and ambiguous situations in a short period of 
time and to take some action’ (Holdaway, 1995 in Chan 1997; p.77). This is 
what Chan described as dictionary knowledge whereby officers ‘….develop 
routine ways of categorising their environment and the people they encounter 
in the community.’ (Chan, 1997: p.77). It also reveals elements of Chan’s 
directory knowledge which ‘….informs officers how operational work is 
routinely carried out.’ (Chan,1997: p. 78). Elements that Reiner identified as a 
need to get the job done, but which often appear to be at odds with the official 
purpose of the police are also present. These cultural themes appear to be 
very much a prerogative of those same junior (in rank) officers. 
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In order to balance the measure of control that the various cohorts can 
and do establish in the performance of their duties it was therefore  necessary 
to ask the question that would examine the situations or conditions which 
would render their ability to control a given situation impossible. 
 
Lack of Autonomy/Discretion 
Chief Constable Cohort 
As expected the Chief Constable cohort, by the responses given, did 
not appear to be in favour of the New Management Culture with seven of the 
ten claiming that targets and performance indicators had a tendency to stifle 
what they were trying to achieve. ‘We get measured on a massive portfolio of 
performance indicators, it does remove my discretion because frankly some of 
them are meaningless and all they do is confuse the cops. I have even been 
hauled up once in front of the Attorney General because our Persistent Young 
Offender [PYO] performance was poor for one quarter.’ (CC1 M/51/24/2). 
 Another chief officer identified being in the same position when he said 
that his control was ‘….being eroded by the inappropriateness of the basket of 
targets we are given….I think most of them are diagnostics they’re not 
outcomes…..there are some frustrations around….the way forces are being 
directed….’ (CC (2) M/54/31/3). In a similar vein another Chief Constable 
expressed the view that ‘….it [the audit culture] aggregates into bureaucracy, 
into perverse decisions that are being taken, the wrong judgements that are 
being applied to some sensitive areas, we’re moving into enforcement when 
we should be into some sort of treatment or rehabilitation….’ (CC (4) 
M/51/32/3). This last quotation would appear to sum up the majority view of 
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the Chief Constables interviewed that, once again, the audit culture extends 
its influence over a vast area of policing and carries a set of negative 
connotations for policing with it.  
Once again one of the main cultural themes is that of Chan’s axiomatic 
knowledge; this, as already premised, is about the way things should be done 
within an organisation; it also indicates the effects of the audit culture 
described in the previous paragraph, which is perhaps better described as the 
‘official position’ and its impact upon policing. It reveals that there is appears 
to be a collective counter-culture demonstrating that there is often significant 
deviation from the official position. The Chief Officers have demonstrated the 
pragmatics of doing the job and their collective solidarity appears to have 
produced a distinctive version or interpretation of that same ‘official culture.’ 
They have also demonstrated a fairly healthy scepticism regarding the official 
position which runs very much in opposition to that same official position.     
However, as in previous replies and in order to achieve a balanced 
view, some Chief Officers took an opposing view. Chief Constable number 8, 
whom the reader should recall from his forthright and frank answers given 
throughout his interview, has never appeared to hide under the cover of 
conventional professional rhetoric. In this particular question about whether he 
was always in control he replied ’Yes, absolutely I do. If you ask my 
subordinates further down the food chain they might feel the answer’s 
different. But I think that if you feel you don’t have control over what you do, 
that’s a failure in yourself, not a system error.’ (CC (8) M/52/29/4). Another 
expressed a similar view when he stated that ‘I’ve got control over policing 
most of the time. I don’t feel as though there is any pressure on me that I 
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should or shouldn’t conduct an operation. I think the operational 
independence of Chief Constables is extremely important.’ (CC (9) 
M/56/36/5). Once again it appears to be a very careful balancing act that most 
Chief Constables perform; that of trying to satisfy the needs of the New 
Management culture and, at the same time preserve their operational 
independence.   
Senior Management Cohort 
Overall this particular cohort expressed a much more pessimistic view 
in realising that their autonomy over their day-to-day duties was ever-
decreasing.  A number of them  identified that pressures placed on their 
limited resources by some of the more unedifying features of the audit culture 
that have already been identified by the Chief Constables’ cohort in the 
previous section were causal links in this process of loss. It is also interesting 
to note that eight of the ten claimed a recognisable diminution in the practice 
of discretion for both themselves and for the junior officers under their 
command. ‘….you’re tied as a constable to a very strict system of rules, 
regulations and guidelines….the discretion of the constable….has virtually 
completely gone.’ (Sgt (2) M/49/29/6). Another expressed a similar viewpoint 
when she stated that ‘….the lack of freedom about what we deal with comes 
more from central policy making than it does from….local controls over 
policing..’ (CS(5) F/42/15/1). The negative aspects of the New Management  
culture were highlighted by DCC (9) who was ‘….very concerned with some of 
the targets set by government which do remove an element of discretion from 
the front line officer because we have to achieve results….’ (DCC (9) 
M/57/30/4). 
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However on a more positive note, but very much in the minority within 
this cohort one officer stated ‘….I think there has to be discretion and if we 
ever lost that discretion it would be a very sad day….we might as well become 
a dictatorship.’ (I (6) M/42/23/5). 
In this set of responses there are a number of fundamental 
assumptions, similar to those of the Chief Constables insofar as Chan’s 
axiomatic knowledge is concerned. However, again in common with the Chief 
Constables, they display a collective cynicism about the official rhetoric 
insofar as they view the imposition of policing targets and initiatives as an 
erosion of the traditional role of the police. However, it also demonstrates that 
they are thinking professionally and displaying a measure of self-reflection.  
Peer Group. 
It will be obvious to the reader that I policed in a very different era and 
was an operational officer and supervisor, in various departments, from 1964 
until 1987. Following the completion of my two year probation period when the 
practice of discretion was somewhat overshadowed by the necessity to prove 
oneself a good and efficient constable I was then able, in a fair and honest 
manner [but perhaps this is for others, including my one-time supervisors, to 
judge], to apply an element of discretion to a level that was common in the 
delivery of street-level policing at this particular time.  
This view is echoed in the majority of the comments of the peer group 
cohort who served as constables around the same time as I did. ‘I thought 
police officers on the street showed a great deal of discretion in the manner in 
which they dealt with the public…. If we couldn’t make a decision we went up 
the chain of command….now I think they pass it up the chain of command 
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straight away….the level of discretion been taken away from the officer on the 
beat.’ (Sgt (7) M/57/30/10R). Another echoed similar sentiments when he 
stated ‘I think officers had some discretion when I was on the job. I don’t think 
they have that much now….it’s all to do with targets.’ (S (8) M/63/30/6R).  
Once again the spectre of the audit culture appears and this view was 
supported by CS (9) who stated ‘Discretion….has been eroded….it’s 
accountability to the nth degree where you really started to strangle 
initiative….’ (CS (9) M/56/30/3R). 
The ‘ways and means’ according to Chan, of getting the job done using 
the components of her dictionary and directory knowledge are very much to 
the fore in these responses. This is very much in line with the same groups 
previous responses insofar as it is an indicator of the way policing was carried 
out in those less restrictive times. It also indicates a collective solidarity of 
professional people who could and often did produce their own distinctive 
version of the ‘official position’.   
Student Officers 
Within the context of this work it is interesting to note, that despite the 
somewhat gloomier views expressed on the lack of discretion by the three 
previous cohorts, seven of the student officer cohort felt able to confirm, that 
in their view, the practice of discretion is alive and well. Indeed it is, as  
already demonstrated, invested in the most junior of ranks; those officers who 
face the public on a day to day basis. One officer stated ‘I’m comfortable 
where I can give discretion….minor crimes….but if they over-step the mark 
you’ve got to act. (PC (2) M31/2/2). Similarly PC (3) stated ‘I think we do have 
a lot of discretion because we are at the forefront.’ (PC (3) F/28/2/2).  
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Another officer explained that he used discretion on a daily basis but 
that the new NCRS (see glossary) had, to some extent, limited his ability to 
practice discretion because ‘…. a log has been made….you have to fill in your 
pink which records all your statistics for the Home Office….which gives you 
ethical crime recording….but in those circumstances you’ve got no discretion. 
(PC (4) M/34/2/2). The comments that this particular officer made were similar 
to an earlier reply by another student officer. They were directed at ethical 
crime recording (under the auspices of the NCRS) which, in some respects, 
had resulted in the criminalisation of a young person who, for want of a better 
expression, has been scrapping in the school playground. As a result of this 
incident being officially ‘logged’ (by the creation of a computerised incident 
log) by the call-taker it then necessitated the protagonist being arrested and 
processed in order to obtain a ‘Sanctioned Detection’ (see glossary).  
It is certainly worth repeating at this stage that in Chapter 5 one of the 
student officer cohort described a situation where a misguided remark 
between two work colleagues resulted in the reporting of a ‘Hate Crime’ 
incident. This incident was then referred, on no less than two occasions to a 
hate panel that had to decide whether the police had done enough. This 
resulted in the complete disillusionment of the person who had originally 
spoken to the officer concerned and who had, throughout the whole lengthy 
process expressed the view that he was aware that the remark was simply an 
unintentional off-the-cuff remark. He stated that he would have been 
completely satisfied if the officer had spoken to the person making the remark 
to ensure that he realised that his words could have easily given offence. As it 
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was the incident dragged on for over two months, the complainant, as stated, 
was thoroughly disillusioned with the police and it had, in his opinion, strained 
community relations. Rhetorically speaking, does this highlight the need for 
the practice of discretion? 
There are quite striking differences in the responses of this cohort (the 
Student Officers) to those of the other three cohorts, namely the Chief 
Constables, Senior Management and the Peer Group. This is noticeable with 
particular reference to their junior position within the rank structure and, 
although they are in many respects bound by the same local and national 
initiatives as their senior officers, they are able to practise discretion on a 
much greater scale. This they do by employing knowledge previously gained 
by dealing with similar incidents (Chan’s directory knowledge) as well as 
employing knowledge gained from more senior (in service) officers of the 
same rank. This, in turn, provides them with a number of practical solutions in 
order to deal with the incidents, which may not always be in line with official 
thinking.    
Accountability 
Chief Constables 
Chapter six dealt with some aspects of police accountability 
encompassing the accountability that all ranks have to their colleagues, their 
supervisors in the hierarchical structure, and ultimately to the legislature and 
the government of the day. It is important to note that whilst police officers are 
also citizens, and are able to express personal political views and exercise 
their individual franchise, they are not, under the strictures of the Police 
Discipline Regulations, allowed to take an active part in politics. 
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It is however important to state that the ‘new police’ were undoubtedly 
politicised when the Thatcher government literally used the police to ‘control’ 
the miners’ strike in the early 1980s and the phrase ‘Maggie’s Boot Boys’ still 
resonates with when recalling the many days and hours spent policing miners’ 
picket lines in a large number of locations throughout the North East and 
Yorkshire. 
Since this work began, the current coalition government have fulfilled at 
least one element of their election manifesto which was to enable the election 
of Independent Police and Crime Commissioners for 41 of the 43 police 
forces in England and Wales the MPS and the City of London being the 
exceptions. This action has removed the powers that the various police 
authorities had over the setting, (within Home Office ‘guidelines’), and control 
of the policing budget and the appointment of the Chief Constable and has 
placed it in the hands of the newly appointed Independent, i.e. elected, Police 
and Crime Commissioners. It remains to be seen how successful these 
appointments may be but as already noted, Lord Stevens, the chair of the 
Independent Police Commission, set up by the Labour opposition during the 
coalition government, has recommended removing the commissioners from 
their posts and re-directing the control and power back to the police 
authorities. 
In order to establish the varying degrees of accountability which exist 
across the spectrum of rank in all four cohorts they were simply asked to 
outline both their perceived personal accountability and the official 
accountability attached to their rank and position in the organisation. Once 
their replies had been explored and analysed then the interview data from the 
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other questions was re-examined because it became obvious that evidence of 
accountability, which had emerged in their replies to some of the other 
questions, was also present, particularly in some of the replies on consent.  
Without exception all of the Chief Constables acknowledged their 
ultimate accountability to the government of the day [of whatever political 
persuasion] through the medium of the Home Office. As one chief stated 
‘….to the police authority (now the Police and Crime Commissioner)…. and 
the Home Office….’ (CC (2) M/56/31/3).  This was echoed by another who 
stated that ultimately he was responsible ‘….to the Home Office and the 
Government.’ CC (6) acknowledged the significant influence that the Home 
Secretary of the day has over chief constables when he highlighted the case 
of the Chief Constable of Humberside who was removed from his post   in the 
aftermath of the Soham Murders and the subsequent Bichard Enquiry into the 
police handling of intelligence which was fully explained in Chapter 3 CC (6) 
M/52/30/8. CC (2). 
It is also worth reporting that there was also an acknowledgement of 
the accountability that the police service has to the public and five of the 
chiefs alluded to this particular accountability in their replies. As CC (5) 
remarked ‘….I cannot go anywhere in this county without being stopped and 
told by people what they think….and asked difficult questions as well.’ (CC (5) 
M/51/32/3). This aspect of interaction with the public rang particularly true 
because, during interview, he also revealed that many of these instances had 
occurred whilst he was shopping in the city centre and had literally been 
accosted by a number of residents. It is entirely to his credit that he did not in 
any sense curtail his shopping because these unrehearsed meetings allowed 
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him to gauge some of the grass roots opinions and perceptions that the 
people had of their police force.  The overall accountability to the public was 
neatly and concisely summed up by CC (8) who, after acknowledging his 
accountability under the law to the Home Secretary, stated that ‘….ultimately 
I’m accountable to the public through my local police authority and that’s 
more important than anything else (added emphasis). (CC (8) M/52/29/4).  
As stated earlier, accountability to their workforce was also 
acknowledged and CC (1) went even further than a mere acknowledgement  
when he said ‘….I don’t mind being held to account by my workforce ‘….I am 
happy that they can come and knock on my door at any time and speak to me 
about something that they are not happy with.’ (CC (1) M/51/24/2). It was  
later established, through the auspices of the Police Federation that the chief 
did, obviously within reason, to his credit have an ‘open door’ policy. Another 
chief simply stated ‘….I am accountable to my officers and staff….and they 
certainly hold me to account.’ (CC (3) M/53/29/4). Also worthy of comment is 
the answer given by CC (4) who, after acknowledging the police authority and 
the Home Office remarked that ‘….constitutionally we’re in an interesting 
position because we do not have a boss’.(CC (4) M/51/32/3). This surely 
highlights the unique independence and day to day control that Chief 
Constables hold but it is also true to say that are at the mercy of the ultimate 
sanction. 
The reader needs to bear in mind that these interviews were conducted 
whilst Police Authorities were still functional before they were replaced by 
Police and Crime Commissioners. However their responses still rest upon 
‘….the fundamental assumptions about why things are done the way they are 
  277 27
 
 
in an organisation.’ (Chan, 1997: p. 76). These whys and wherefores once 
again were a dominant theme of their responses given their rank and seniority 
within the organisation indicating that it almost appears to be the most 
dominant feature of their working practices.    
Senior and Middle Management  
 Within this cohort and without exception each of the officers 
acknowledged the varying degrees of accountability up through the rank 
structure and six of them also recognised their accountability to the public but 
one officer did say ‘….I’m accountable to my head of department but in my 
current role I’m not accountable to anyone outside of the organisation.’ (I (1) 
F/48/27/10). This may strike the reader as somewhat unusual but it is 
important to recognise that the officer was speaking strictly within the context 
of her current role. It emerged during interview that she is extremely cognisant 
of her overall accountability to her staff, her senior officers and, more 
importantly, her accountability to the public. This attitude was reflected in the 
remarks of DCC (3) when he stated that ‘….I’m really clear that chief officers 
and the staff of the constabulary are accountable to the public of [County 
Omitted].’ (DCC (3) M/47/21/1). CS (8) stated ‘….I am accountable on a daily 
basis….to the public of [Location omitted] in relation to the provision of that 
[policing] service. (CS (8) M/5031/3). This view was echoed by I (6) who 
recognised that, despite the bureaucracy, and the generation of almost 
endless statistics to satisfy the demands of the audit culture, that this is an 
organisation ‘….of people for the people.’ (I (6) M/42/23/5). 
Once again, the police mandate, which Chan identified as axiomatic 
knowledge, is a dominant cultural theme in this set of responses; however the 
  278 27
 
 
final remark by I (6) indicates that ‘….despite the endless bureaucracy….this 
is an organisation of people for the people.’ (I (6) M/42/23/5). This appears 
almost to be at variance with the official line but nevertheless carries more 
than a hint of practical common sense and an effort to place the police firmly 
in context within society. 
Peer Group 
Once again an analysis of what the peer group cohort said about their 
accountability reflects the very different nature of policing in that particular era. 
Whilst the police service at this time was not, in any way, a secret 
organisation it was, in many respects, a closed organisation with its own rules 
and mores. Additionally, as an organisation it did not appear, at that time, to 
be open to a great deal of public scrutiny. This position appears to have 
reversed since the advent of the New Management Culture that is prevalent 
today.  It is mainly because of these factors that officers of the time 
acquiesced to the senior ranks to whom they saw themselves mainly 
accountable and it featured in eight of the answers. Accountability to the 
police authority featured in three of the answers and the Home Office only 
twice. Only one officer mentioned his accountability to the public but he then 
qualified it further. He stated that  ‘….I’d like to think that I was accountable to 
the public but that would be a bit naive of me….my accountability was to the 
person who had the strongest voice within that district at the time….’ (Sgt (10) 
M/67/30/12/R). The reference to the ‘strongest voice’ can be found in Chapter 
6. 
In common with their previous responses this cohort is very much a 
product of the era that they policed in and their sense of duty, as well as a 
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strong moral obligation, are both strong influences. Strangely enough it is 
Chan’s axiomatic knowledge which is a relatively strong theme in these 
particular responses whereas, in their responses to previous questions, 
Chan’s directory and dictionary knowledge were more dominant.   
Student Officers 
There is, within this group, a strange, almost mirror image of the replies 
given to the question by the peer group insofar as they all referred in some 
detail to their accountability up through the rank structure. However there  
may be different reasons behind this insofar as these are very junior officers 
at the start of their policing career who have not yet developed a wider 
awareness of their responsibilities whilst they concentrate on learning their 
trade. Nine of them referred to their accountability throughout the hierarchical 
structure and PC (8), whilst obviously possessing a keen awareness of his 
junior position, was able to inject a sense of humour into his reply when he 
stated ‘My Sergeant and everybody above (and the jocular reference) PCSOs 
and Special Constables….not really I’m not accountable to them at the 
moment….I’m moving up the ladder, but pretty much everybody.’ (PC (8) 
M/28/2/2).  
PC (1) was keenly aware of her responsibility and accountability 
particularly to the other members of her relief when she said ‘….I’m 
accountable to myself and to my colleagues obviously, I’m part of a busy 
working shift….and if I sit about all day I’m not going to be flavour of the 
month….it doesn’t work….It’s the management that I’m accountable to in 
relation to figures, what I am doing with my time….KPIs and all that 
rubbish….’ (PC (1) F/23//2/2). This is a very succinct and pithy comment 
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about how the officer feels about the audit culture in general and certainly 
reflects the attitude held by most of the junior ranking officers whom I 
interviewed as part of my work as Training Evaluation Officer with Durham 
Constabulary.  
Another officer stated that on some occasions she may not be held 
personally accountable. This was a direct reference to the one-time vicarious 
liability that the Chief Constable held for all officers under his/her command. 
However with the enactment of the Human Rights Act individual officers can 
now be held accountable for their own malfeasance. She did however go on 
to say that ‘….I am accountable to the public but whether the force would take 
some kind of responsibility for it [her actions] or whether it would be a case of 
‘No she’s just a loose cannon….on her own. (PC (5) F/27/2/2). It is obvious 
that this particular officer, who is an HPDS (see glossary) candidate, has 
given considerable thought to this reply and indeed to all of her replies. PC 
(9), whilst acknowledging that ‘….we are accountable to the public’ offered a 
similar view to his cohort when he stated that ….inside of it [the job] we are 
accountable to our chief.’ (PC (9) M/29/2/2). 
Within this set of responses there appeared to be a great deal of both 
scepticism and cynicism regarding the official policing purpose, as identified 
by both Chan and Reiner. One particular officer acknowledged his 
accountability, in somewhat jocular fashion, was to everyone, including the 
PCSOs. This cultural feature was identified by Holdaway in 1984 whereby a 
joking narrative by the officer concerned helps ‘….to preserve the traditions of 
the occupational culture sustaining it against the odds of experience.’ 
(Holdaway, 1984: p.138).    
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As previously stated there were a number of occasions when 
accountability was mentioned in context with the replies to some of the other 
questions, indeed it was raised on no less than twenty two occasions with 
more than half of the responses (twelve in total) coming from the Chief 
Constable Cohort. The remaining ten were divided thus; Senior/Middle 
Management Cohort five; Peer Group, three and finally the Student Officer 
Cohort, two.  
Whilst the cohorts are relatively small, thereby rendering it difficult to 
extrapolate the results across a wider population, it is quite notable, and what 
I might have expected to find, that, once again the Chief Constables were so 
much more aware of the often political influences on their post.  CC (2) put it 
very succinctly following his appearance at a public inquiry into the 
shortcomings of various bodies, including the police, to apologise for his 
forces’ shortcomings. He said ‘I gave evidence at the (Name Omitted) 
enquiry. I was the one who said sorry on behalf of the (force name omitted) 
and that gets quite interesting in terms of your digestive system, being dealt 
with by public inquiries….its real, I’ve been there and its not an amusing way 
to spend a few weeks….it is a very powerful sort of accountability!’ (CC (2) 
M/56/31/3). Whilst there was almost an element of humour in his reply it 
appeared to spring more from his relief that it was over and that he was 
lightening the experience by a somewhat jocular response. There is no doubt,  
from the tone of his reply, that he did in fact find it a very harrowing 
experience. Here again we see evidence of the joking narrative by the officer 
concerned, as identified by Holdaway in 1984, whereby the humour helps 
‘….to preserve the traditions of the occupational culture sustaining it against 
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the odds of experience.’  CC (7) also highlighted the ultimate accountability 
when he stated that ‘….I’m always accountable….I know from personal 
knowledge and my predecessor knew better that I [did] given his experience 
with the Home Secretary. (CC (7) M/54/31/3).    
Consent   
Having analysed the interview data across all four cohorts it is obvious 
that there is a consensus amongst all interviewees, with one or two notable 
exceptions, that policing in this country (England and Wales) does indeed 
demand some form of consent, or, at the very least, an acquiescence based 
on the limited knowledge that the British public have about the policing that is 
delivered to them.  As other authors (Brogden, 1982 and Dixon Coleman and 
Bottomley, 1990) argued, consent was no mere ideology but a view of the 
relationships between police and public which was constantly under review 
and shifting according to the practicalities of day-to-day policing.  
However in the Sage Dictionary of Policing in 2009 an entirely different 
view of policing by consent was expressed when it was defined, despite its 
public status, as ‘….an inherently conflict ridden, potentially coercive mode of 
governance, concerned with the maintenance of dominant conceptions of 
order and the regulation of deviance, ultimately using legitimate force if 
deemed necessary’ (Wakefield and Fleming, 2009: p.52). It is also 
recognised by many commentators that because of the pluralisation and part 
privatisation of some policing services sworn officers are being restricted to 
performing the confrontational and coercive role of policing. Doubtless this 
has given rise to the view expressed in the definition above. It is equally 
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obvious that, by its very nature, it may eventually impinge upon and perhaps 
even change the nature of consent.   
However this somewhat narrow and almost dystopian view of policing 
serves neither to legitimate the actions of the police nor to make any useful 
contribution towards a betterment of relationships between the police and the 
public. Indeed in 2012 the rational for this particular viewpoint was, in many 
respects, modified by Jackson, Bradford, Hough and Murray (2012: p. 14) 
who demonstrated that in order to achieve legitimacy and therefore by default, 
consent, the public impressions of fairness of the system were an extremely 
important contribution to that legitimacy. The way that people are treated by 
the police would appear to be more important than the actual contact and its 
final result. Indeed the consent of the public depends on the legitimacy of 
policing, defined in parts as fair and just, which, in turn, demonstrates that it is 
also impartial law enforcement.  Jackson, Bradford, Hough and Murray were 
also of the opinion that the police themselves should negotiate with the public 
in order to ensure that consent is obtained.  
Chief Constables 
This need for negotiation view was clearly supported by CC (8) who 
had already recognised that a substantial minority are more than concerned 
about the specificity of ‘consent’ per se and prefer to express it in terms of 
public support; as he so rightly pointed no one ‘consents’ to being fined for a 
traffic infringement but still can (and indeed do – added) broadly support the 
principle of policing. This support for that principle of fairness also serves to 
assist the legitimation of the police. 
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On the other side of the coin however one Chief Constable  (CC (1) 
stated that ‘….one area where we don’t police with consent….is the young 
people….they are pretty much policed at, very little policed with, (added 
emphasis)….seen as a problem and not a solution, they are seen as....devils 
by the elderly. (CC (1) M/51/24/2)   
This answer is obviously at odds with the concept of negotiation but it 
has been reiterated to highlight personal perceptions, drawn from the audio 
recording, that this Chief Constable was expressing regret at his apparent 
inability to police young people in a more human and humane fashion. It also 
disputes the Millsian theory of an ‘actor’ producing talk based on the situation 
they currently find themselves in because there is no apparent use of any 
‘vocabulary of motive’. There is a clear distinction here which highlights a total 
lack of the conventional professional rhetoric which was already identified in 
the Methodology Chapter.  It is, in all probability, as near to the truth that we 
are likely to get. 
In answer to the first ‘scene setting’ question on consent six of the ten 
Chief Constables employed ‘accountability’ as their benchmark whilst the 
remaining four, more specifically and honestly, used the term answerability. 
CC10 neatly and concisely defined what he felt was the answer to this 
conundrum when he stated ’….Is my requirement to explain, articulate and 
provide an answer? Or is it to account…. If its’ to account, is the ultimate 
sanction around accountability to get rid of me? (CC (10) M/48/27/1). 
However, whilst it is appreciated that this question has produced some 
semantic dialogue, overall there appeared to be no doubt as to either their 
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accountability or their answerability, in which ever way they chose to express 
it. As CC (3) said ‘….Yes thankfully I do still feel we are answerable to the law 
and its quite right that we should be.’ (CC (3) M/53/29/4), whilst CC (7) 
explained ‘….Yes I do feel accountable to the law and that’s entirely right. 
(CC(7) M/54/31/3). 
Once again, as in their previous responses, the dominant cultural 
theme is that of Chan’s axiomatic knowledge. However, it is important to note 
that as with many of their responses Chief Constables do appear to be very 
aware of, as it were, the dark or negative aspects of police culture; however 
their professionalism and self-reflexivity indicates that whilst they are bound 
by the official position there does appear to be a collective instinct to produce 
their own version of the official line which is not at odds with doing the right 
thing as far as their professional lives are concerned. This point will be further 
discussed in the following and final chapter.     
Senior/Middle Management 
Within this cohort there was, once again, a division between 
accountability and answerability with seven of the ten using accountability and 
the remaining three answerability. That all in the cohort expressed strong 
feelings is beyond doubt and in whatever way it was expressed there was 
recognition that, as police officers, they were duty bound to operate within the 
law. Of course it must be said that there are occasions when officers do 
overstep the mark or operate outside the confines of the law but as we have 
seen in Chapter seven, one Chief Constables as recently as May 2012 has 
been dismissed from his post for misconduct in a public office. Another Chief 
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Constable resigned in October of the same year having been found guilty of a 
similar type of misconduct. However, unlike his colleague, the Police Authority 
chose neither to dismiss him nor require him to resign. Nevertheless he did 
choose to resign in a very short time, in all likelihood, because his position 
was, in effect, untenable. 
One officer in this particular cohort very perceptibly stated ‘….the whole 
consent issue and accountability are inextricably linked….if we are serious 
about consent then we need to give people a voice over influencing what 
happens’. (DCC (3) M/47/21/1). This statement confirms the long-held view 
that consent, according to Brogden in 1979 ‘….is subject to continuing 
interpretation, re-interpretation, adaptation and negotiation – an endless 
testing and resolving of the contradictions and ambiguities and contemporary 
experiences…..’(Brogden, 1979: p. 7).  In other words, the majority of 
police/public encounters that involve more than the day to day routines of 
policing require that same negotiation in order to ensure that consent can, 
whenever and wherever possible, be obtained. 
The close link to the law was summed up by I (1) who stated ‘….you let 
the law take its course and I think that is ultimately it….any other way is when 
you start cutting corners and being dishonest to….make the outcome the way 
you want it to be….’ (I (1) F/48/27/10).  Another officer linked the impartiality 
of the police in their upholding of the law when he opined that ‘….the police 
service is still answerable to the law and it’s entirely appropriate that we are 
set apart from the judicial process. What happens in a court of law is and 
should remain ….nothing to do with the police.’ (CS (7) M/4425/1).  This 
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demonstrates that whilst the police are often regarded as the gatekeepers of, 
or the entry point into the CJS (see glossary), officers of all ranks should be 
seen as seekers of the truth who will present a properly evidenced case 
before the court and then have no further influence or interest in the decision 
of the court. 
Once again, present in this particular set of responses, there is what 
appears to be a thematic construct of police culture, which is concomitant with 
the rank and seniority of this group of officers within the organisation. 
Additionally, the solidarity of their views provides a different and distinctive 
version of the official policing policy. 
Peer Group 
Without exception, all of the officers in this cohort recognised their 
answerability to the law; however, the differences in the police culture during 
the era they served were acknowledged and neatly summed up by I (1) who 
stated that ‘….as an individual I was answerable to the law but in my early 
days I felt driven….because of the culture in the CID, to succeed in 
prosecutions, rather than a search for the truth [see previous paragraph]. On 
reflection, I think I actually believe in the search for the truth. (I (1) M/52/30/6 
R).  Sgt. (10) expressed similar views about this cultural more when he 
explained that he had ‘….lost cases at court. I used to get a bit uptight about it 
but I moved on. I knew I could probably end up going to pieces over it….I 
thought, I’m accountable to the law, if I stick with what I can do and what 
offences I can investigate, we get to court and, irrespective of sentence [or 
any other finding] I’ve done my job. (Sgt (10) M/67/30/12 R).  Yet another 
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stated ‘….we should be answerable to the law, not to a political bias….You 
had to seek the truth in all incidents….that’s the way its’ got to be done. (Sgt 
(7) M/57/30/10/R). 
The ‘inner workings’ of police culture are quite clearly on display in 
these responses. They are once again indicative of the era they policed in 
whereby the culture of conviction at any cost, rather than a search for the truth 
dominated the certain areas of their work which, in turn, led to a number of 
well publicised miscarriages of justice, some of which are still coming to light.      
Student Officers 
 With one notable exception, all of the officers in this cohort clearly 
acknowledged their answerability to the law coupled with the fact that there 
should be a search for or a seeking of the truth as an absolute necessity. One 
officer highlighted what she viewed as police impartiality when she stated ‘….I 
think that the positive aspect of the police being a separate entity to the courts 
[is important]….our main issue being the implementation of the law rather 
than procedural aspects in terms of convictions’. (PC (5) F/272/2).  
This accords with some of the views of the previous two cohorts and 
removes an officer from being ‘result driven’ with a desire to convict. The only 
exception to the views expressed by the majority was the answer given by PC 
(8) who appeared completely genuine, open and honest when he stated that 
‘….the frustration I have is the work effort that we put into a 
prosecution….finding that person guilty and then the trivial sentence….was it 
really worth it? It’s difficult to divorce yourself from the end result.’ However it 
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is important to note that the same officer went on to say that ‘…I’m not sure 
that I’ve got enough experience in the service to be able to give that a proper 
reflective answer.’ (PC (8) M/28.2/2). It is evident from the tone of the 
recording, that this officer appears to have a genuine personal and human 
conflict which he may well solve as he gains more experience of the service. It 
is quite probable that he may well gained this view from one of his more 
senior (in service) colleagues, that of conviction at all costs rather than a 
search for the truth. It is however heartening to note that this particularly dark 
aspect of police culture seems, at last, to be declining. 
Whose Consent?  
  This was a straightforward question on whose consent, in their view, 
was necessary to carry out effective policing and did they, in turn, believe that 
they had this consent. 
Chief Constables 
Eight of the ten Chief Constables generally recognised that it was 
either the public or the communities, which are, in this context, one and the 
same. As CC (1) so succinctly phrased it ‘….I think we police with the consent 
of the majority….we’re largely unarmed and we have to police with their 
consent….they outnumber us a hell of a lot….’ (CC (1) M/52/24/2). This was, 
in many respects, an open and honest phrase and if anything could be utilised 
in support of the necessity for consent surely this particular phrase forms the 
basis of an extremely convincing argument. It would also tend to indicate that 
he genuinely felt that he did have both the support and the consent of the 
  290 29
 
 
public. CC (8) neatly summed up the conundrum of consent when he said 
‘The consent of the population as a whole is probably too tenuous to pin 
down….they consent to me enforcing speed limits when it is not them that is 
paying the fifty [now £60] quid….Overall it’s the consent of the broadest 
possible population….to the policing tactics and doctrine applied with 
outcomes that are acceptable to the public….’ (CC(8) M/52/29/4). It is 
interesting that he uses the word doctrine, but having replayed the recording 
several times it appears that he was using it as a general term for a policing 
methodology or paradigm rather referring specifically to a doctrine of consent. 
However he does get right to the core of the question and indicates that he 
feels there is indeed general, if not specific support, in this instance, for the 
principle of policing by consent.   
At this stage it is also worth reiterating the words of CC (1) who 
said ,….the one area we don’t police by consent is young people….they are 
pretty much policed at, very little policed with….they are seen as a 
problem….they are seen as devils by the elderly….’  (CC (1) M/52/24/2). As  
already noted this answer was given with a very tangible element of regret, he 
has obviously reflected on this and it is perhaps an area where he would like, 
if it is possible, to try and change this particular facet of the policing of his 
area. Whilst  hesitating to put words in his mouth it was felt that his remarks 
were meant, not only for the force he commands, but for the police in general. 
One Chief Constable (CC 7) did not, during interview, appear greatly 
enamoured with the concept of ‘consent’ per se when he stated that ‘….I 
struggle with the word consent, I know what it means, it’s not a word the 
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public supports….but I still think the vast majority of the law-abiding public 
want to be well policed….and want us to succeed….’ (CC (7) M/54/31/3). It is 
obvious from the recording, and the amount of time he took to formulate his 
reply, that a great deal of reflection took place before he answered. This 
reflection really appears to place his words beyond conventional professional 
rhetoric and sums up the fact that he wants to serve the public to the best of 
his ability. 
There is a collective and professional theme to these responses which 
may even, within itself form another aspect of police culture. It also 
demonstrates that this solidarity of a group of professional officers has in 
effect produced its own version of the official line. That they feel they have 
obtained conditional consent to what they do is perhaps a truer version of the 
principle of policing by consent.   
Senior/Middle Management 
Eight of the ten members of this cohort firmly believe quite emphatically 
that it is the consent of the public and CS (7) summed up the philosophy quite 
neatly when he stated ‘….I wouldn’t want to be part of a police organisation 
where there wasn’t public support, public consent, that tradition of public 
support and understanding.’ (CS (7) M/44/25/1). This tradition of public 
support can be linked directly to Rowan and Mayne’s nine principles of 
policing  which they laid down during the formation of the ‘new police’. Despite 
the fact that the support and indeed trust has, on many notable occasions, 
taken a ‘bit of a battering’ it is indeed heartening to find that this officers’ belief 
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is still quite strong and which, in turn, obviously influences the performance of 
his duty.  
In support of this view another member of the cohort DCC (3) stated  
‘….I know you are going to be talking about accountability but I do think that 
the two are inextricably linked….if we are serious about consent then we need 
to give people a voice over influencing what happens….it goes into a 
relationship of consent. (DCC (3) M/47/21/1).  There is demonstrated here a 
clearly established link between accountability and consent coupled with 
recognition that if the police both need and want the consent of the public then 
they [the public] must be given a say in what happens. They also need to be 
ensured that there are strict accountability measures in place when that 
consent has not been obtained and that the police themselves are policed. 
Could this indicate support for a jurisprudence of consent? 
Culturally speaking the views of this cohort fall broadly into line with the 
previous cohort and that a conditional consent is likely to be the best in the 
given circumstances notwithstanding that, on some occasions, the more 
coercive and confrontational methods of policing will need to be used.   
Peer Group 
Whilst a number of this cohort generally supported the view that it was 
the public’s consent that was required, a number of them did acknowledge 
that there are situations and occasions when people do not consent. For 
example, as C (2) stated ‘….there’s a whole prison population out there would 
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say we didn’t consent to the law….’ (C (2) M/58/30/30 R) whilst CS (9) said 
‘Certainly not the consent of the criminals….’ (CS (9) M/56/30/3 R).  
There is here a recognition of the very tenuous nature of consent and 
as CS (9) also stated ‘…. you’re really starting to talk about having a 
constitution where there is implied consent….’ and even more tellingly ‘….we 
only know it is withdrawn when things start to go pear shaped….’  (CS (9) 
M/56/30/3 R). Further to this the expression he used about having a 
‘constitution’ is very much in line with the view that a number people from all 
walks of life have frequently  expressed; that we (The United Kingdom) should 
have our rights enshrined in a constitution somewhat similar to that of the 
United States of America. Again this indicates that there may be some 
support for a jurisprudence of consent. 
Whilst not wishing to excuse this cohort on the grounds of the 
influences of the era they policed in, their views nevertheless do reflect this. 
They acknowledge that the support of the public, whether or not consent is 
secured, is paramount to the purpose of policing, and if not secured, will see a 
much more repressive policing regime come into being.  
Student Officers 
Six of the members of this cohort unreservedly stated that it was the 
consent of the public which was required. Out of the four remaining, two of 
them again echoed views previously expressed by the other cohorts that the 
people who commit crime obviously do not subscribe to the concept of 
policing by consent.  PC 1 simply said that ‘….the ones that say no would be 
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the people who commit crime….’ (PC (1) F/23/2/20), whilst her colleague PC 
(4) echoed her sentiments when he stated that ,….there’s a lot don’t want to 
be policed, especially the criminal fraternity….’; however he  then went on to 
say that ‘….they don’t want to be policed so you are not really policing by 
consent….’ (PC (4) M/34/2/2). This very succinctly captures the concept of 
consent and its limited application in the eyes of some of the practitioners. 
  The two remaining members of this cohort expressed an opposing 
view and were equally adamant. PC (3) quite bluntly stated ‘…. I don’t think 
they have a choice….’  (PC (3) F/2/2), a view echoed by PC (9) who appeared 
at first to ride roughshod over the whole concept when he stated  ‘….we don’t 
need the public’s consent to do our jobs, its’ a funny one policing by consent 
so I don’t really understand where you are coming from….we are there to 
keep the peace….to uphold the law….we are a public service….’ (PC (9) 
M/29/2/2). Having already commented on this particular statement and having 
reviewed the recording it is felt that the officer does indeed recognise his duty 
and whilst he would not ‘label’ it as policing by consent he did acknowledge 
‘the victim’ and ‘the public’. 
This cohort appears to have an almost inherent belief that the police do 
have both the confidence and consent of the public to carry out their role 
despite the fact that their reliance on Chan’s dictionary and directory 
knowledge appears to run in cultural opposition to the official policing 
purpose.  
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The PACE (See glossary) Act 1984 – Section 101 - Requirement to 
Consult 
This was a legislative requirement, set out in the PACE Act of 1984, 
which required Chief Officers to set up consultation forums, to be held on a 
regular basis and to involve senior police officers, representatives of the local 
police authority and members of the public.  In simple terms it was designed 
to give the public a say, if somewhat limited, on the way their communities 
were being policed.  
This requirement has already been reviewed and it appears to  have 
been a genuine attempt by the government of the day to involve the public in 
the policing of their communities. However having reviewed the reasons for 
the introduction of the PACE (see glossary) Act, 1984, an Act designed to 
ensure that police/public encounters, particularly in the areas of Stop and 
Search, Arrest, Detention and Interview, the overwhelming impression is one 
of the need for greater accountability. Not, I hasten to add, that it was not 
needed. My personal experiences of policing, particularly in the time 
preceding PACE, demanded the need for such legislation.  
In connection with other research, interviews were carried out on the 
introduction of PACE.  It is interesting to note that pre-Pace all officers saw it 
[PACE] as completely unnecessary and they were all of the opinion that it 
would make their job almost impossible. To their credit, once the Act had 
been operational for some time, they recognised that as well as protecting the 
person who was under arrest or being stopped and searched, it also gave 
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them [the police] a clear set of guidelines or Codes of Practice which would 
make these encounters rather more professional than hitherto. 
Chief Constables 
 Half of the cohort, whilst recognising the need for such a requirement, 
and the additional accountability that it provided, simply saw it as a bare 
minimum that required much greater efforts, in form of additional initiatives, in 
order to ensure that it did not become yet another public relations exercise. 
‘Its been necessary but not sufficient. I think that if all we ever did was our 
PACE consultation that would not be enough….there’s a whole range of 
things that need to be in place.’ (CC (5) M/52/30/3). The views of the 
remaining four in favour accord with this view recognising that it provided a 
basic driver for further initiatives. 
CC (8) simply viewed this requirement  as ‘….an irrelevance’ and he 
went on to highlight his belief that he had consent when he stated ‘I believe I 
have that consent….I think I would be confronted by a withdrawal of consent 
that’s more easily identified than the giving. (CC(8) M/52/29/4). It is also worth 
repeating that this Chief Constable summed up his views on consent by 
stating that it was a concept best left ‘woolly’ and that any attempt to define or 
codify it  would render it at best unworkable. Perhaps an argument against 
any proposed jurisprudence of consent. 
There is overall acknowledgement that, traditionally, the police have a 
fundamental assumption that they perform an essential role in protecting the 
social order with Reiner’s ‘….sense of mission.’ (Reiner, 1992; p. 112)   
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Senior/Middle Management 
Almost in line with the views of the Chief Constables cohort  more than 
half of this particular cohort saw it (the PACE requirement to consult) as, at 
the very best a basis on which to build. As I (1) stated ‘….no, in my 
experience that’s lip service. I’ve been involved in a few and you get a handful 
of the same people turning up at the meetings and you’re not really, I  think, 
getting a realistic view….’ (I (1) F/48/27/10). This was supported by DCC (3) 
who said that ‘….I don’t think that requirement’s sufficient at all we need to go 
far beyond that into a relationship with the public….meet them locally and 
establish their priorities….’ (DCC (3) M/47/21/1). A further three gave qualified 
support to the process with CI (4) stating ‘I suppose it provides some sort of 
measure….as a general index of whether we are getting a degree of 
cooperation. (CI (4) M53/23/8). ‘Their consultation process of questionnaires 
gives another degree of significant findings. But I think conversely is that the 
lack of serious public disorder (in that officers particular police area) 
demonstrates contentment with policing arrangements. (CS (8) M/50/31/3). Is 
it therefore possible to build on what is revealed during the consultation 
process and arrive at a much better way of conducting these particular forums 
and perhaps identify at least the beginnings of a jurisprudence of consent. 
In 1978 according to Manning the ‘….police have staked out a mandate 
that claims to include efficient, apolitical and professional enforcement of the 
law.’ (Manning, 1978: p.8), which he regarded as an impossible mandate 
‘….driven by public expectation rather than the reality of police work. 
Culturally this falls within the ambit of Chan’s axiomatic knowledge.   
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Peer Group 
 Once again the era in which this cohort policed impinged upon their 
views with eight of them seeing little or no value in this particular process. The 
answers ranged from a simple, straightforward unequivocal  ‘No’ (CS(7) 
M/68/30/5). to the comments by another who stated that ‘I think it was 
probably counter-productive….I think a consultative process is all very well 
providing you take cognisance of what people say and do something about 
it (added emphasis). This clearly illustrates what this particular officer thought 
about both the process and the follow-up (or lack of it) and his tone of voice 
indicated the latter. Of the two who supported the process one was 
reasonably enthusiastic when he stated ‘….I’ve been in many of the public 
consultation meetings….I have always felt that the public just wanted to talk to 
the police.’ (I (1) M/52/30). It is interesting to note at this juncture that from 
information obtained from the Northumbria Police Professional Standards 
Team, the majority of complaints made against officers in Northumbria in 
2012 were for officer incivility. This tends to indicate, that despite the public’s 
wishes as expressed by both CS (7) and  I (1), are either not being met or not 
being met correctly. 
Culturally, there appears to be an undercurrent of collective cynicism 
that the legislature has willed a somewhat esoteric requirement upon an 
unwilling organisation, who, despite the cultural misgivings they express, 
nevertheless have little or no option but to carry it out.  
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Student Officers   
Having only policed in an era where the requirement was already in 
place it was reasonable to expect that a majority of this cohort would agree 
and indeed it was found that seven of them did. PC (6) stated ‘….public 
forums, I think they are probably a very good idea….people can be honest 
and give you their opinions of how they feel they are being policed.’ (PC (6) 
F/22/2/2). PC (7) supported this view by stating the way you gauge you have 
the publics’ consent is through regular contact with the public and seeing what 
problems their communities face.’ (PC (7) F/23/2/2). In an historical context  
PC (8) was quite dismissive of the requirement when he stated ‘We were 
given consent by the fact that we have been here since 1829….people expect 
us to be there, I don’t understand what we need to do under PACE but 
regardless of that the only way you are going to ensure that we get consent is 
through voting….we have to give the power of decision to the people we 
serve in terms of the direction we take.’ (PC (8) M/ 28/2/2). Here, once again, 
there is  an indication of support for a greater involvement of the public in the 
direction that the police should take in order to police their communities more 
effectively. This particular comment could also be taken as a pointer towards  
a jurisprudence of consent. 
Within these responses there are indications that whilst these more 
junior (in rank and service) officers are expressing the view that policing is 
being driven along a particular path it also appears that they may simply be 
reproducing a particular facet of police culture that they have gained from their 
more senior colleagues.   
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Consent – When it was lost 
The final question on consent simply asked all four cohorts when they 
felt they were either loosing, or had already lost, the consent of the public for 
the action they had either physically taken or had been responsible for 
implementing. This question was specifically included in order to enable me to 
‘see through’ any conventional professional rhetoric. Additionally it would 
enable them to be put in a position where they would find it difficult to revert to 
a Millsian type of response, which is explained in detail in Chapter 4, the 
methodology Chapter. In essence, according to Mills, the answers given are 
the product of both the situation and the relationship. In effect, none of the 
reasons or explanations of past conduct given are truer than any others and it 
is therefore not possible to divine the truth of given explanations with any 
certainty. 
Chief Constables 
There were, within the context of the size of the cohort, quite a varied 
set of replies to this particular question and during the planning stages it was  
thought that, particularly within this cohort, the miners’ strike of the 1980s and 
its consequences would be a dominating discourse. The reality however 
proved somewhat different with only three of the Chief Constables referring to 
it. 
‘The miners’ strike, I think there were some major concerns….we were  
[seen] as the political arm of the state and I think a lot of well-informed, 
intelligent people were probably aghast at the sight of police officers marching 
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to crush a trade dispute. We’ve got a lot of people within the county who don’t 
like the police and never will because of the treatment they had during the 
miners’ dispute.’ (CC (1) M/56/31/3). CC3 echoed this when he stated ‘I do 
think that during the miners’ dispute I couldn’t find a member of the public who 
was in favour of what the police were doing….’ (CC (3) M/53/29/4).  
This particular dispute, as already suggested, was one of the worst 
policing episodes of my career and I recall, during many stages of the dispute, 
being thoroughly disgusted by the behaviour of some of my erstwhile 
colleagues, from police forces in other parts of the country as well as those 
from my own force, who were acting more like mercenaries in an armed 
conflict, rather than police officers within an organisation that I was once 
proud to be part of. Indeed the actions of some officers at the Orgreave Coke 
Works in South Yorkshire in May 1984 still continue to be the subject of a 
divisive debate with ever increasing demands for a full public enquiry.  
One Chief Constable made particular reference to the strategic forces 
debate engendered by the HMIC report, published in 2005, entitled ‘Closing 
the Gap’. The report dealt with the proposed future structure of the police and 
one of the main recommendations, that of reducing the number of police 
forces from the current 43 down to approximately 12 regional forces was 
enthusiastically welcomed and wholeheartedly endorsed  by the then Labour 
Home Secretary, Charles Clarke33. However history tells us that there was 
intense public dislike of the proposal and it eventually foundered for a number 
of reasons including a failure to make the proper arrangements for funding.  
                                            
33  See also Chapter 2 p. 19 
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Another Chief Constable referred to a situation in his force where he, 
having replaced its previous Chief, was struggling with two major problems. 
Firstly the complex and detailed agenda of improvements that were being 
carried out and secondly, the worrying rise of gun crime in the same force 
area. In direct reference to these major problems he stated ‘When it looked 
like we might lose either of these two battles then I think that [both] consent 
and support were in serious danger….having had damning reports written 
about you….may well be seen as a motivator….but it just fundamentally 
corrupted the public’s belief that they were being looked after by the police 
service. (CC (5) M/52/31/3). 
This was a truly genuine response, at once highlighting the difficult 
professional and personal situation that he found himself in. He did not 
however, to his credit, demonstrate any animosity towards his predecessor; 
neither did he shrink from his responsibilities or his overall determination to 
put matters to right. This particular response was one of the highlights of his 
interview, and one which gave lie to the Millsian theory of one explanation 
given for past conduct being truer than any other; neither was there any 
attempt to hide behind conventional professional rhetoric.  
CC (7) made reference to the introduction of centralised call-handling 
and resource dispatch within his force, a process which I had also 
experienced personally within Northumbria Police. He stated ‘A good example 
on call-handling (to highlight the loss of consent – added) ….what I witnessed 
was the sheer volume of criticism in the press and  in letters to the police 
authority….we made a huge error….we were consistently letting them down.’ 
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(CC(7) MM54/31/3). The adoption of this type of centralised call-handling, 
which was introduced by the majority of forces in England and Wales in effort 
to modernise and streamline the initial contact with the public, was without 
doubt, one of the biggest single causes of public dissatisfaction with the police 
in many years. There are still echoes of that dissatisfaction today and the 
public are still annoyed that they are unable to speak to their own ‘local’ police 
station.  
Two chief officers made reference to major public disorder scenarios, 
one in his own force and another in two separate forces in which he served as 
a more junior (in rank) officer. CC (4) explained that ‘….the most recent 
example was probably the riots in (Town omitted)….but that was a very small 
section of the community….whilst people (and the media) thought that it was 
about race the reality is it was about criminality….the vast majority of people 
did understand….and they just wanted us to get back to normality.’ (CC (4) 
M/51/32/3). ‘ I well recall (location omitted)…. I was a constable in the first 
disorder and an Inspector in the second lot in (location omitted)….you can 
label anything in order to sell papers. The danger is that the public will believe 
it and confidence in law and order will fall and reinforce anti-social behaviour. 
(CC (8) M/52/29/4).  
CC (2) was the one dissenting voice in answer to this particular 
question and whilst he recognised the potential of particular events to have a 
negative impact [upon consent] his reply indicated that he did not feel there 
was a particular occasion that pointed towards a loss of consent. He stated 
‘….I don’t think so. There are always single events that have the potential to 
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have a negative impact….people who have had a bad experience telling ten 
people they know, who all tell ten people they know and all of a sudden a 
thousand people are aware of this one bad event.’ (CC (2) M/56/31/3). 
However it is telling that his use of the phrase ‘have a negative impact’ could 
direct both the researcher and the reader into the area of a potential loss of 
consent. In order to substantiate this theory it is worth recalling his reply on 
accountability (see page 184) when he found himself in front of a public 
inquiry having to explain his force’s failings in connection with an incident that 
generated both a media and a public outcry and a mass of soul searching. It 
is not a leap of faith to link this reply on accountability to a lack of consent in 
what his force had signally failed to do. 
In examining these particular responses it is noteworthy that, almost 
without exception, there did not appear to be any collective culture to ‘shift the 
blame’ as it were for their own particular failings and the frank admissions 
made are, I feel testament to their honesty and professional integrity. 
Senior/Middle Management 
   Within this cohort there was, as in the Chief Constables’ cohort, a 
wide variety of incidents which, in their view, had lost them the consent to 
police with three of them mentioning the miners’ strike. As I (1) observed 
when referring to the miners’ strike, she stated that ‘….going back a long 
way….periods of disorder like the miners’ strike….a lot of harm was done 
there….I wouldn’t like to say that its’ damaged us to the extent that we are 
losing public confidence but all these things are damaging….’ (I (1) 
F/48/27/10). 
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Apart from that strike it is extremely interesting to note that this 
particular officer was the only one, across all four cohorts, who mentioned the 
shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes in July 2005, an event which had 
massive repercussions, especially on the MPS. It severely damaged the 
reputation of the then Commissioner Sir Ian Blair who, whilst he did not resign 
at this stage, later became embroiled in a scandal over contracts for services 
provided which were awarded by him to a friend. Following a vote of ‘no 
confidence’ from the Lord Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, Blair eventually 
resigned in October 2008. 
The miners’ strike might be a good example, whereby there was 
hostility. But even then in places like (location omitted) things got back 
relatively quickly to normality although there are still festering stores. There 
will always be individuals that will never forgive and forget….’ (CI (4) 
M/53/23/8). Whilst this officer acknowledges the harm that was done to mining 
communities in the policing of this dispute he still felt able to say that in his 
area relationships did return to what they were fairly quickly but, at the same, 
time he acknowledged that some individuals would never forgive and forget. 
The treatment of ethnic minorities featured in three of the replies with 
one officer commenting ‘….if you went to some ethnic areas where there’s 
historic problems and frustration you definitely wouldn’t have policing by 
consent….’ (Sgt (2) M/49/29/6). There is, however, as we have found to our 
cost, no easy solution to these particular problems and evidence of racial 
discrimination within the training of police recruits was uncovered when a BBC 
reporter joined Greater Manchester Police as a recruit and covertly filmed 
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such incidents. The programme, entitled ‘The Secret Policeman’ (Daly, M. 
2003) was screened in October 2003 as a part of the ‘Panorama’ investigative 
series of programmes  
 Evidence of overt racism emerged from the film and The Campaign for 
Racial Equality launched a formal inquiry which identified that racism was still 
at the core of the police service. The subsequent report made 125 
recommendations for change.  
Additionally, ten of the police officers involved resigned, twelve more 
were disciplined and three police trainers were removed following a Police 
Complaints Authority (PCA) investigation, in agreement with the IPCC. The 
IPCC also made a number of recommendations for changes to police training 
nationally, some that were similar to those used in Northern Ireland to bridge 
sectarian divides. (Marshall, A. 2014). 
It is disturbing to note that, despite this and a number of other high 
profile cases, that rioting and looting took place in London following the 
shooting of Mark Duggan in August 2011. This highlights the fact that, despite 
the many enquiries, reports, recommendations and initiatives that have been 
made over the years since 2003, there are still a number of serious issues 
that exist between the police and the ethnic minority communities. 
In a direct reference to the problems of policing, especially with young 
people, one officer commented ‘….I think that it is difficult because there is 
swathe of young people who have an approach to authority….which is 
expressed to their parents, to education, to the police which is very difficult. 
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My concern is that I think these young people are doing it either with the 
acquiescence or with the support of the parents and I think we are storing up 
a significant problem for ourselves….’ (DCC (3) M/47/21/). This comment is 
very closely linked to an answer given by a Student Officer, PC (4) who talked 
about an incident involving a large group of intoxicated youths drinking on a 
public green. He was obviously shocked when some of the residents in the 
area volubly objected to the police presence and demanded in no uncertain 
terms that they (the youths) should be left in peace because they were 
causing no harm.   
 
The officer obviously felt his efforts on behalf of the residents had been 
effectively negated by their attitude towards the miscreants. Having done his 
best to ensure fairness in the encounter, thereby legitimating his actions, he 
was quite visibly upset by the rebuff his efforts on their behalf had received. In 
addition to this, the attitude displayed by the residents would appear to 
indicate an obvious lack of consent towards the policing of the occurrence. Is 
it possible that their reaction, which indicated that they felt no harm was being 
caused, is root cause as to why some young people feel they are being 
policed ‘at’.  This was also highlighted by CC1 and by one of the peer group 
who stated ‘….There’s a lack of respect of the police by younger people. They 
don’t respect anybody and,  as a result you have got more problems with 
disorder (and) with alcohol. You see groups of girls and lads on Friday nights, 
drunk, lying in the gutter….that would never have been allowed in the old 
days….’ (CS (6) M/68/30/5 R).  
It is clear from this answer, which reflects the other three answers 
involving loss of consent and young people that there is a minority of young 
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people who, either by choice or by default, are becoming more and more 
distanced from the norms of society. It is also interesting to note the use of the 
phrase ‘….in the old days’ which indicates a different style of policing in that 
particular era. 
Culturally this particular cohort fall largely into line with the Chief 
Constables cohort insofar as genuine regret, with little or no attempt to attach 
blame to any one else, is expressed at the loss of consent that they 
experienced.  
 
Peer Group 
As already stated, having policed at the front line during the miners’ 
dispute, I thought that it would feature heavily within this group but only two of 
the cohort made direct reference to it. As CI (4) commented in the particular 
area he policed, the situation returned fairly quickly to some semblance of 
normality after the strike ended. Perhaps it was also ‘lost’ in the collective 
consciousness of this particular cohort? 
Of those who did comment Sgt (7) said that ‘….unless we go back to 
the miners’ strike….I think it was a testing time for us all….’ (Sgt (7) 
M/57/30/10 R). PC (2) was more forthright when he commented that ‘….the 
miners’ strike hit me, there was a real fear that we were going to completely 
lose consent….look at some of the situations (this part of his answer was in 
direct reference to the particularly unedifying spectacle of police brutality that 
occurred at Orgreave in South Yorkshire, where he had been posted, on a 
mutual aid basis, under the auspices of the National Reporting Centre)….was 
it justified?....there were times that it wasn’t….’ (PC (2) M/58/30/30 R).  
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Four of the cohort highlighted various riot situations that they had been 
involved in. CI (4) drew attention to the ‘….heavy-handed approach to the 
riots at (location omitted)….where places became no-go areas simply 
because the police withdrew from them in order to consolidate for a short 
period….half a day later that situation was addressed….’( CI (4) M/64/30/8/R).  
One officer Sgt (10), who had latterly been a Community Beat 
Supervisor, made particular reference to the PACE public forums which, at his 
direction, one of his team PCs would attend. ‘They got a lot of brow beating 
from both the local residents and the councillors. There were senior officers 
with their own agendas who were moving resources at the drop of a hat and I 
felt we were not policing with the consent of the public in that community 
because the residents were quite rightly upset at the increases in crime. (Sgt 
(10) M/67/30/12 R).  This situation arose in this particular area because, whilst 
the BCU Commander, partially embraced the philosophy of community beat 
policing, those particular resources were often drafted into other areas on 
response, because of personnel shortages. Whilst there may not have been a 
causal link to the increases in crime there were a number of indicators from 
the statistics that this may be part of the cause of the increases. 
One member of the cohort again made reference to the differences in 
the conduct of the police prior to the introduction of the PACE Act 1984 when 
he recounted his personal experiences that occurred during his time in his 
force’s drug squad. He quite candidly stated that ‘….when I worked on the 
drug squad some of us would constantly harass them (drug addicts), turn 
them over, search them. That was pre PACE….it was not the best way to 
engage that community many of whom actually wanted to give up drugs’.  
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This was, without doubt a clear and unequivocal answer, devoid of any 
conventional professional rhetoric, and an acknowledgement that there never 
was nor could their ever be, consent for this kind of conduct. 
The one outstanding cultural aspect highlighted in this set of responses 
is in Sgt (10s) reply on the previous page. He indicated that he had stopped 
his officers attending the PACE community forums, because, in essence, they 
were being taken to task for the failings of their senior officers. This would 
appear, as Reiner identified, to be at odds with the policing purpose. However 
placing those same officers in a no-win situation is not a particularly edifying 
aspect of senior management and on this occasion might easily be excused.    
Student Officers 
It is no surprise that the miners’ strike did not feature at all in the 
answers provided by the Student Officer cohort given that it was outside their 
purview. Indeed as I have already surmised it has probably been lost from the 
collective consciousness of older police officers and, as one officer 
commented, from the consciousness of the community he policed at the time 
and in the aftermath. However it is important note that in some of the ex-
mining communities of County Durham there are still family divisions which 
were caused by some family members working during the strike. 
There was a broad range of responses from this cohort and one female 
officer was concerned with what she viewed as a lack of respect for the police 
when she said ‘….A lot of people don’t have respect for the police…but you 
just get used to it….’ (PC (3) F/28/2/2).           
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Another student officer despaired at the actions of her colleagues 
whilst policing a student demonstration. She was particularly and visibly upset 
by the fact that there had been no attempt at negotiation or conciliation, even 
although, as she rightly points out, they do possess more than a grain of 
common sense and would have, in all likelihood, responded to negotiation: 
instead as she graphically put it ‘they got dog bitten’34 (PC (5) F/27/2/2. This 
answer once again prompts the feeling that some young people, as we have 
already premised, are being policed ‘at’ which is totally unsatisfactory and in 
no way serves to legitimate the actions of the police.  There is, without doubt, 
even in this small survey, a genuine worry from three officers that this is not a 
satisfactory state of affairs.  
There were however two officers in this group who expressed an 
opposing view which of course must be measured against their limited length 
of service and their experience. PC (6) stated ‘Not really, just when people 
have not wanted to pursue a prosecution, but that’s not them not wanting 
police or anything….’ (PC (6) F/22/2/2). PC (8) was very positive when he 
commented ‘….I’ve never really been in a situation where, if I have needed 
the public’s help it’s not been there. But equally ….have I really asked for an 
awful lot beyond what people would normally give and the answer’s probably 
no as well. I’ve generally always found that people have been very 
cooperative’. (PC (8) M28/2/2). Even whilst stating he had not experienced 
any personal loss of consent he does temper it somewhat by adding that he 
has not asked more of the people he has dealt with than would be expected 
                                            
34  There was, in this situation, no attempt to negotiate and those in charge simply sent the police dogs and 
the Operational Support Unit, armed with all of the body armour and shields as seen in Fig. 1, page 71, into the 
demonstrators in order to gain the upper hand. Surely an attempt should have been made to negotiate in order to try 
and secure legitimacy for their actions?  
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so he does acknowledge that perhaps a situation might arise in the future 
when he will experience a withdrawal of consent. 
Overall in chapter 7 the question on loss of consent once more raised 
the spectre of ‘conviction at any cost’ rather than a search for the truth. This 
particular cultural aspect is in line with Chan’s findings on directory knowledge 
whereby police ‘Having developed indicators of normality and abnormality, 
police officers tend to target the unusual and the disreputable.’ (Chan 1997: p. 
78). 
In the next and final chapter I will draw my conclusions and I will also 
extend the discussion around that proposed jurisprudence of consent with 
some recommendations of how it may look and how it might be operated.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
First and foremost there are limitations in a study of this size and the 
reader will have gathered that what have been presented are the personal 
views of the officers through each of the four cohorts. It is a ‘snapshot in time’ 
rather than a series of biographical histories. Furthermore the small size of the 
study population, forty officers overall, with ten in each of the cohorts, can and 
does only represent their particular views and perceptions. There is not 
sufficient data to enable the extrapolation of their views across a wider 
population with any confidence or accuracy, indeed that has not even been 
attempted. However, there is a measure of confidence that the views obtained 
have been genuine and relatively free of ‘conventional professional rhetoric’.  
At this point it is noteworthy to highlight that during interview Chief 
Constable No. 8 was called to an emergency Police Authority meeting and 
was unable to complete the interview. He subsequently provided a written 
response to the remaining questions. Whilst these questions were outside the 
basic remit of accountability, autonomy/discretion, control and consent the 
written answers provided evidence of both conventional professional rhetoric 
and a formulaic response. This clearly indicates that, when providing written 
responses, there is more time to phrase the answers and control the language 
which, in turn, provides ample scope for rhetoric.  Methodologically, the face-
to-face interviews have produced more genuine responses which, in turn, help 
to support the methodological stance taken.   
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In Chapter four, the Methodology Chapter, the position of the ‘insider 
researcher’ was examined and it was revealed that the majority of work on 
‘insider’ research has been carried out by teaching professionals who, in the 
main, have carried out their research on their own work whilst still teaching. It 
can therefore be appreciated that because I no longer work for the 
organisation I am not researching the work I do. This, in turn, enabled the 
identification as a ‘distanced insider researcher’. In essence, this simply 
means that whilst no longer a working police officer, the insider knowledge of 
the organisation and its inner workings, together with prior professional 
relationships with some of the respondents, placed me in an extremely 
valuable locus to carry out the research. Indeed it was because of them I was 
able to collect the interview data which, in turn, enabled me to inculcate both 
authority and authenticity within the interview proceedings.   
Throughout this work extensive effort has been made to preserve 
objectivity, particularly with regard to the researcher’s position as a ‘distanced 
insider’. This was neatly summed up by Grumet in 1990 when she stated that 
‘….a failure to engage in some analysis of the….texts beyond celebration and 
recapitulation leads to patronizing sentimentality…. resonant but marginal 
because it is not part of the discourse that justifies real action’. (Grumet, 1990: 
p. 3). It is felt that in essence, the dangers of ‘patronizing sentimentality’ have 
been avoided and that the data have been analysed with a critical and 
objective eye.  
Additionally, this critically objective view has been applied throughout 
the data analysis, particularly with regard to the implications and the impact 
that the numerous and diverse facets of police culture have, either knowingly, 
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intuitively or even perhaps, in some cases, subliminally, upon the day-to-day 
routines of the police, across the gender, rank and seniority continuum. I am 
confident that the objective viewpoint has remained to a very large extent; 
however, the final judgement on objectivity lies with the reader.  
Again in the methodology chapter the work of Wright-Mills, particularly 
his early work on Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive was employed, 
in order to establish whether what was being said was the truth, or as near the 
truth as it was likely to be, given all of the caveats that have already been 
explored; however, it is important to recognise that ‘absolute truth’ cannot be 
guaranteed. Having gained the stories of the respondents' professional 
experiences and the narratives they deploy to make sense of them, the 
deployment  of a built-in reality check, which put them ‘on the spot’ by asking 
them about situations where they felt that they had lost the consent of the 
public for the legitimacy of their actions was employed to force them away 
from  conventional professional rhetoric by recalling their worst experiences. It 
is felt that, on the majority of occasions, there was some truth in what was 
said. This was particularly noticeable where genuine regret over the loss of 
consent was expressed; however, once again, it is for the reader to judge the 
veracity of what has been said. 
In recent times the government has been seen to be more or less 
forcing people to be independent in so many areas that the welfare state used 
to provide for. This, in turn, gives rise to the impression that the public are 
increasingly on their own.  Our experience of the great 1990s ‘crime wave’ 
indicated that, while the police responded to our calls, there was little they 
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could do to stop us suffering crimes. In essence the state seems unable to 
win the public over to some of the major changes they have made in policing. 
Having already found that, according to Holdaway, Chan and Reiner 
amongst others, there needs to be societal change, which, in turn, will have a 
positive impact upon lessening the influence of police culture. However, given 
the observations in both the previous and the following paragraphs, it is felt 
that these desired societal changes seem destined to remain a pipe dream. 
Later in this chapter I will examine the conclusions drawn by these particular 
authors and their models of culture to determine whether in fact they are 
adequate in light of my findings.    
 The extremely low electorate turn-out in 2011 during the process to 
elect Police and Crime Commissioners bears testimony to this fact. 
Nevertheless the answers from all four cohorts indicate that individual officers 
can and do try to allay the fears of the public. 
It is well established that what the police in England and Wales do and 
what they stand for is never going to be acceptable to everyone but the 
serving officers interviewed do appear to worry about this as their replies on 
the question of consent clearly indicate. There was some expectation that 
there would be a lot of commonality in the replies but there has been a 
considerable variance both between the cohorts. This was again expected to 
a certain degree, even within each cohort, which would tend to indicate that 
police officers do reflect on their practice and that reflexivity, both personal 
and professional, is becoming an increasing part of the police culture. Indeed 
as Giddens stated in 1994 ‘There is a fundamental sense in which reflexivity 
is a defining characteristic of all human action. All human beings routinely 
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‘keep in touch’ with the grounds of what they do as an integral element of 
doing it’ (Giddens, 1994: p.1). It is also important to note that that same 
reflexivity is fundamental to professionalism and the professionalisation of the 
modern police officer’s role.  
Unfortunately, whilst their self-awareness is extremely laudable there is 
very little, if any, structured inside research to help them turn that self-
awareness and reflexivity into positive action. It also raises the conundrum of 
how you research yourself with any great objectivity? 
It is equally obvious that the police are not robots in a military 
campaign nor are they a monolithic organisation blindly following the dictates 
of the centre. At present, whilst there are a number of ACPO committees 
designed to ensure that there is some commonality and cooperation between 
the 43 forces in England and Wales, the independence of individual forces 
and the views of their chief officers, especially with regard to operational 
independence, are still paramount. This independence was highlighted in 
2014 during the recent debate on the provision of water cannon which police 
could deploy in order to quell the calumny which is often a feature of large 
public demonstrations, particularly in the capital. The debate is further 
explored in the following paragraphs. 
Water Cannon for the Police  
This operational independence was highlighted recently in an article in 
the Guardian newspaper on the 28th of January 2014 whereby the 
Metropolitan police and the London Mayor, Boris Johnson, were pressing the 
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case for water cannon to be deployed in the capital as soon as summer 
(2014), amid warnings that continuing financial austerity could fuel disorder. 
The article also went on to highlight the fact that not all Chief 
Constables or their Independent Police Commissioners were in favour of 
either the outright purchase or the ready availability of water cannon for 
deployment when required.  
Five of the six largest forces in England and Wales said they were 
against deploying water cannon on their streets. The West Midlands PCC Bob 
Jones dismissed them as being "as much use as a chocolate teapot" for 
quelling disorder. Tony Lloyd, the PCC for Greater Manchester, said he 
remained sceptical when he stated; 
‘No convincing argument has been made about 
how water cannons could improve policing or community 
safety," he said. "Before we moved anywhere close to 
using them on our streets, there would need to be a full 
and proper public debate about when they would be 
used, how they would be used and why they would be 
used. For example, they would have been completely 
ineffective on the streets of Manchester and Salford 
during the 2011 riots.’  
Greater Manchester's chief constable, Sir Peter Fahy, was in 
agreement with Lloyd and stated;  
‘Water cannon would have been of no use 
whatsoever as the groups of people involved in the 
disturbances dissolved to avoid confrontation with any 
significant police presence and reformed elsewhere to 
loot etcetera. If anything a water cannon could have 
been more of a liability, as an asset that scarce police 
resources would have been needed to protect.’ 
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Jane Kennedy, PCC for Merseyside was also dismissive when she 
stated that:- 
‘The chief constable, Jon Murphy, and I have 
considered the use of water cannon and believe them to 
be of limited value for Merseyside. I would not want to 
see precious resources diverted to purchase such 
vehicles when their value is yet to be proven.’ 
 
David Shaw, the Chief Constable of West Mercia, who is ACPO lead 
on the water cannon project said that police may have reason to deploy water 
cannon because the ‘….on-going and potential future austerity measures are 
likely to lead to continued protest’. He did however go on to highlight that it 
was 
 ‘….virtually unforeseeable that he would need 
water cannon in West Mercia….I'm not a water cannon 
zealot, I'm absolutely clear it's virtually unforeseeable I 
would ever need to use water cannon….they are a 
useful additional tactic, to be used in exceptional and 
rare circumstances. It feels very un-British, but it feels 
un-British when the streets of London and Salford are on 
fire.’  
It is interesting to note that whilst he (Shaw) did not visualise the 
deployment of water cannon in his police area he did however express a 
caveat that they are ‘a useful additional tactic to be used in exceptional and 
rare circumstances’  
Additionally the report also stated that ‘….the views of the other forces 
leave the Met in isolation, weeks before it is expected to ask the Home 
Secretary for formal approval.’ The police and crime commissioners 
(PCCs) for the forces in Greater Manchester, West Midlands, West 
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Yorkshire, Merseyside and Thames Valley have all rejected the idea and 
suggested they would be unwilling to share the cost. One senior critic said the 
MPS had made basic errors in the run-up to the riots, which were 
compounded by more blunders once the disorder erupted: "The Met made a 
mess of it and now they are looking for a gimmicky solution.’ 
The final word on this particular situation is left to Baroness Jenny 
Jones, the London Assembly Green Party Member, who stated in a report in 
the Independent newspaper, ‘The water cannon has no place on London’s 
streets. To bring them in would be deeply damaging to the principles of 
policing by consent’35  
Reflexivity 
Having looked at the situation of operational independence which has, 
in the aforementioned Guardian report, quite forcefully underlined and 
supported, it is as well to recognise that those patrol officers who carry out 
both the routine and less routine tasks of policing do not always have the 
luxury of ‘thinking time’. This lack of time for considered action has recently 
been exacerbated by the commodification, privatisation and pluralisation of 
the police service which has left those same front-line officers to deal with the 
coercive and confrontational situations that form a growing part of day to day 
police patrol work. 
That said however surely there is time, after the event, for a measure 
of reflexivity which is, as already stated, in essence, an essential tool in 
assisting professionals to be self-directing rather than being reactive to 
                                            
35 On June 10th 2014, the Guardian reported that Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London had approved the 
purchase of three second hand Water Cannon for use by the Metropolitan Police. 
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situations. This of course rests on the premise that they, the police, can use 
the same level of understanding on others that they have used on 
themselves. However, if professional reflexivity is to become an integral part 
of their professional practice will depend, to a large degree, on the 
organisations’ willingness to accept self-questioning and exchanges of self-
doubt and stress. This would of course be difficult in a hierarchical 
organisation, based on obedience to orders and procedures. At this stage it 
should be noted that reflective practice has become an essential part of 
almost all professions, particularly social, work, teaching and other similar 
professions; why not within the police service? 
 It is well established that individual officers rely on training and 
development initiatives to provide them with the relevant knowledge of the law 
and procedures required for them to remain competitive in their role and 
responsibilities and to enable them to promote and exploit both local and 
national initiatives. It has also been established that, in some cases, training 
and development programmes did not always fulfil the explicit organisational 
requirements for addressing the range of knowledge required to police 
effectively, at whatever level that there were inconsistencies across levels, 
roles and functions. 
Training and development initiatives would have to be augmented by 
organisational practices and policies focused on reorienting and reframing 
roles and responsibilities to address new and emerging demands. This would 
need to include a renewed focus on identifying and recruiting the right talent;  
identifying and addressing obsolete roles and responsibilities; re-skilling, up-
skilling and reorienting the current workforce; and creating provisions for 
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managing out individuals who are not able to adapt. This process would, of 
necessity, include input on reflexivity as well as providing both the means and 
the opportunity to practise it. 
Interesting parallels can be found in the role of psychologists within the 
armed forces who are inside the organisation in terms of uniform and authority 
but outside the organisation in terms of combat. It has been recognised that in 
World War II the US Army deliberately posted psychologists into the fighting 
zones with the other medical services which had the effect of preventing shell 
shock. Within this context it is also interesting to speculate whether in fact the 
modern army now has more experience of conflict resolution than the police 
and that the police presence may not be acceptable to all people in all 
situations, and indeed in some situations they are very badly trained when 
they come to face hostility, particularly in events involving large scale public 
disorder. The interview data has graphically demonstrated that all officers 
across the four cohorts either reported situations where they felt that consent 
had been lost, or that they found themselves unable to handle the hostility 
generated when that same consent was lost.   
Overall it is essential that the police do reflect on their practices and 
learn from their experiences. Whilst the requirement to consult the public 
under PACE legislation this is only a base line to build on, in itself it will never 
be enough. Once again, the interview data, particularly from the Chief 
Constable cohort, indicates strong feelings to this effect. They indicate that it 
will never be enough and that all officers, not just the senior officers who head 
these PACE enforced forums, need to engage more with the public in order to 
legitimate the unspoken but ever-present notion of consent. It is also obvious 
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from the interview data that consent is something which still has to be 
negotiated. 
What of police culture? Having used models, particularly those 
proposed and developed by Holdaway (1984) Chan (1997) and Reiner (2000) 
it is necessary to examine their proposed solutions to either eliminating or 
negating the effects of police culture. Holdaway proposed that; 
The tightly bound culture of the lower ranks has to be 
broken into; the virtual sanctity of police policy has to be 
demystified, not just to denounce but also to check 
power and gain a wider appreciation of the possibilities 
and limitations of policing. Whatever reforms might be 
effected, more attention has to be paid to the lower 
ranks as they work from day to day. The occupational 
culture remains the final testing ground of sociological 
analysis and policy  intervention. (Holdaway, 1984: p. 
175). 
 
Here Holdaway advocates focusing attention on the lower ranks and 
their day-to-day workings but only in connection with greater analysis and, 
perhaps more tellingly, on policy intervention. It remains to be seen whether 
policy intervention or the introduction of more restrictive bounds being placed 
upon police actions will have the desired, but possibly unachievable effect of 
changing police culture. 
Chan, in the main, tends to direct her summation in a similar direction 
to that of Holdaway. However, as she states  
‘….change is traumatic, it has to be directed and 
continuous, people must be willing to change, and, 
finally, planned change is difficult to achieve, especially 
when it is imposed by one group upon another’. (Chan, 
1997: p. 237). 
 
Chan further argued that ‘….changing police culture requires changes 
both in the field, the external and internal structural conditions of policing, and 
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in the habitus, the content of cultural knowledge. Her model, shown on page 
91 (Fig. 3) illustrated the existing condition and that on page 92, Fig. 4, 
demonstrated the changes she felt were needed to both the habitus and 
cultural knowledge necessary to bring about cultural change. Finally she 
suggests that….’police reformers should reconsider the utility of changing the 
field, that is, changing the structural conditions of policing.’ 
(Chan,1997:p.237). She further proposed that this course of action;  
‘….could find support  among advocates of 
independent civilian review of police conduct….those 
who favour tighter control over police misconduct using 
various administrative, civil and criminal law 
sanctions….those who push for democratic control of 
policing….and those who prefer audit-based monitoring 
of police conduct’ (Chan, 1997: p. 237). 
 
In essence, it is felt that Chan appears to have grouped together a 
number of the standard methodologies employed that are designed to make 
professionals externally accountable. However, as she finally states, on a 
somewhat pessimistic note; 
‘….changing the field does not guarantee any 
change in cultural practice. Many regulatory efforts not 
only fail to gain compliance, but sometimes lead to 
escalation of the problem, unintended or even perverse 
consequences. Nevertheless changing police culture 
and improving the relations between police and 
minorities requires changes in both the cultural 
knowledge and the structural conditions of policing.’ 
Chan, 1997: p.p. 237-238). 
 
 Whilst it will be seen that Chan was referring to changes in the 
relationship between the police and minorities, which was in essence, the 
main drive of her study, it is nevertheless, easy to extrapolate both her 
research, her findings and her recommendations across the whole continuum 
of police/public relations.        
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 Lastly, Reiner suggested that ‘Police culture is neither monolithic nor 
unchanging. But the predicament of the police in maintaining order and 
enforcing the law in liberal democracies generates a typical culture pattern.’ 
(Reiner, 2000; p. 106). This would tend to suggest that Reiner at least 
envisages a debate that might perhaps embrace some of the more edifying 
aspects of police culture. However, this requires fundamental changes ‘….not 
just aimed at individual officers (for example in selection and training), nor 
grand policy declarations, but a reshaping of the basic character of the police 
role as a result of wider social transformation.’ (Reiner, 2000: p.106).  
How then do we go about getting ‘rid’ of the police culture, if indeed 
that is what is needed? As is common with almost every other occupation, 
both the selection of potential officers, and their subsequent training following 
selection, is delivered, in the main, by officers who are already part of the 
organisation and who, as we have seen from the data analysis, appear to be 
imbued with the very culture that it is proposed to eradicate or at least temper 
and change. Whilst Reiner has proposed that the basic character of the police 
role needs to be reshaped by a wider social transformation, it is interesting to 
speculate the shape and format this wider social transformation would have. 
Having examined the views of Holdaway, Chan and Reiner, and 
analysed the interview data utilising their sometimes differing, but often similar 
views, particularly in their proposals for changing police culture, my evidence 
suggests that police culture is far from being monolithic. However there is a 
need for serious continuing debate on this question. Similarly, once again 
given the size of the study population, it is not possible to either document or 
establish the effects of police culture upon the actions of every police officer. 
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However, it is felt that there is ample evidence, given the amount of research 
carried out, that it still appears to form part of the psychological make-up of 
most officers regardless of their rank, length of service or gender. The initial 
aim of the work was to obtain officer perceptions on the concept of policing by 
consent, and to identify whether the effects of police culture has any bearing 
on both this concept and whether it interferes with the impartial discharge of 
their duties. The work, despite its limitations, has made a valuable contribution 
both to the debate on the effects of police culture and to the possible changes 
in that culture which could be made. 
It is probable , given the present social climate, that both the social and 
societal changes required to bring about changes in police culture are far 
beyond the grasp of any government, of whatever political hue. Overall it 
would appear that there is almost an inherent belief across the four cohorts 
that the police have the confidence and the consent of the public. Rhetorically 
speaking, is this, in itself, a cultural belief which has, over the years become a 
theoretical construct? 
In summation, both Holdaway and Chan appear to favour changes to 
the internal structure of the police, whilst Reiner’s view is more open and 
appears to recognise that there are some features of police culture that may 
be positive. Both Holdaway and Reiner also argue that changes to society are 
also required in order to bring about internal changes to the nature and culture 
of the police service as a whole.   
Whilst the argument for social and societal change, which by its very 
nature would bring about changes to policing, is a persuasive one, it remains, 
in many respects, an extremely ambitious and perhaps unachievable aim. 
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Perhaps then my proposal for a ‘jurisprudence of consent’ could inform the 
debate to sufficient depth which, in turn may bring about some of the desired 
changes. On balance, there appears to be a place for some of the ‘better’ 
aspects of police culture which, if so adopted, could, at the very least, greatly 
enhance the debate in order to bring about those changes.             
Jurisprudence of Consent 
  In 2005 Smith and Grey wrote:-  
‘….police conduct is the product of complex 
formal and informal processes;….while legal rules are 
important in regulating action, they are only effective 
insofar as they become ‘governing principles’ of police 
behaviour….This is contingent upon three factors; the 
type of rule; the structure and quality of police 
management; and how rules interact with the norms and 
objectives of police officers. For that reason they 
maintain that there are ‘considerable dangers’ in 
assuming that police conduct can be changed merely by 
the imposition of ‘more rules’ (Smith and Grey 2005 in 
Henry and Smith, 2007: p42-43). 
It is immediately obvious that this view impinges upon the notion of a 
jurisprudence of consent whereby even more rules are required. It also 
highlights, once again, the negative effects of police culture and that changes 
can be brought about by the imposition of yet more rules and conditions.  Will 
these rules then become another stick to beat the police or will they become 
part of the New Management Culture whereby the process itself, rather than 
the outcome achieved, becomes more important; another box to be ticked or 
an activity to be measured? 
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Police Code of Ethics 
In July 2014, in a report published in the Independent newspaper  it 
was announced by Michael Hirst, the Chief Constable of Leicestershire, who 
heads the ACPO ethics working party, was in the process of drawing up a 
new national code for policing ethics. He stated that the code was being 
formulated to  prevent fresh miscarriages of justice and to protect officers from 
increasing pressures to secure convictions. 
Other members of the working party include representatives from the 
Police Superintendents' Association, the Home Office and Bramshill Police 
Training College. On of the main aims is to improve the image of the police 
following a number of recent, highly publicised miscarriages of justice. Mr 
Hirst went on to say 'I have been saying for more than three years that we are 
getting it wrong. The gap between the public's expectation of its police force 
and the services the police delivers has been growing wider’. 
The working party has examined the codes of conduct of other forces, 
the Council of Europe's Declaration on the Police and the United Nations' 
code for its law enforcement officers. It is planned to publish the code in 
December, but there is some disagreement over its format whereby some 
members of the working party are looking for a simple 10-point code whereas  
others appear to want a detailed handbook for issue to all police employees 
throughout the extended police family. 
 There are, as yet, no details of the proposed code available but when 
Police Scotland was established in April 2013 a code of ethics was also 
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published. The code has been examined and there is no mention of policing 
by consent. There were however a number of allusions to it contained within 
the code.  Will the new national code for England and Wales be the same? In 
which case there is a place, within the code, for a jurisprudence of consent. 
The data also include detailed accounts of their meanings and 
practices as well as mistakes that were made when the consent, which was 
hitherto always present, had been assumed but was not, in fact, given. As 
already premised, they have the experience, they obviously think very 
seriously about their role in modern society but are they getting the right 
training? 
Despite a contention by some that today’s police officers are not strictly 
‘professionals’ their role is becoming more and more professionalised. Indeed 
they have a unique role in society; doctors do not arrest their patients; 
teachers have little or no control over their students but the police, in today’s 
parlance, have ‘customers’ who they may also arrest. It is a unique 
contradiction that, in the police, we have a ‘service’ that also in effect 
punishes, with powers to do so granted by the state and enacted in 
legislation. The only other profession that has somewhat similar powers are 
social workers and their role within society also results in creating the same 
kind of ambivalence towards them as is directed towards the police. 
 
Postscript  
It was reported on BBC Television News on Tuesday 26th August 2014 
that ‘…. all 43 police forces in England and Wales have agreed to adopt 
a new government code of conduct on the use of their powers to stop and 
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search members of the public’. (Marshall, A. 2014.) The Home Secretary, 
Theresa May, had said the technique was being misused so often that it was 
damaging relations between the public and police. From now on the police will 
record every outcome arising out of each application of Stop and Search 
Powers. Could this be the first step towards a jurisprudence of consent? This 
will, in all probability form the basis of some further post-doctoral research. I 
am of the opinion that this step, coupled with the Code of Ethics currently 
being written, may well be the nascent beginnings of a jurisprudence of  
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The following set of principles, which lay out in the clearest and most succinct 
terms what could well be regarded as a ‘doctrine’ as opposed to a philosophy 
of policing by consent, appeared as an appendix to ‘A New Study of Police 
History’ by Charles Reith (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1956). Reith was a 
lifelong historian of the police force in Britain, and his book covers the early 
years of Metropolitan Police following the passage of Sir Robert Peel's 'Bill for 
Improving the Police in and near the Metropolis' on 19 June 1829. Reith notes 
that there are particular problems involved in writing police history, owing to 
the loss or destruction of much early archive material, and, probably for this 
reason, the principles appear without details of author or date. 
However, it seems more than likely that they were composed by Charles 
Rowan and Richard Mayne, as the first and joint Commissioners of the 
Metropolitan Police. Rowan was a military man and Mayne, fourteen years his 
junior, a barrister. Rowan retired in 1850 leaving Mayne as sole 
Commissioner until his death in 1868. The sentiments expressed in the 'Nine 
Principles' reflect those contained in the 'General Instructions', first published 
in 1829, which were issued to every member of the Metropolitan Police, 
especially the emphasis on prevention of crime as the most important duty of 
the police. 
Reith notes that Rowan and Mayne's conception of a police force was ‘unique 
in history and throughout the world because it derived not from fear but almost 
exclusively from public co-operation with the police, induced by them 
designedly by behaviour which secures and maintains for them the approval, 
respect and affection of the public’ (Reith, 1956: p.140). 
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The Nine Principles of Policing 
1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by 
military force and severity of legal punishment. 
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and 
duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and 
behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect. 
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval 
of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public 
in the task of securing observance of laws. 
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public 
can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical 
force and compulsion for achieving police objectives. 
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but 
by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete 
independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the 
substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and 
friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social 
standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by 
ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life. 
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and 
warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent 
 iv 
necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the 
minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular 
occasion for achieving a police objective. 
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the 
historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the 
police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full 
time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests 
of community welfare and existence. 
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive 
functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the 
judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging 
guilt and punishing the guilty. 
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of 
crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing 
with them. 
 v  
Appendix ‘B’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi  
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) made 16 
recommendations for change to the police service as a result of the Stockwell 
investigation. These recommendations were addressed to Her Majesty's Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC), the Home Office, the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).  
In drawing up these recommendations the IPCC has worked closely with 
HMIC.  
The area of concern will be demonstrated followed by each individual  
recommendation.  
POLICE USE OF FIREARMS  
Command and control 
1. Concern 
Despite Commander Dick making it clear she was in command of all 
aspects of the firearms operation, there remains the potential for 
confusion between the respective roles of gold, silver and designated 
senior officer.  
Recommendation 
To review existing policy and guidance in relation to the command and 
control of firearms operations to ensure there is absolute clarity of role and 
responsibility within the chain of command, particularly when a designated 
senior officer is deployed. This should include deployments conducted 
under the auspices of Operation Kratos and Operation C.  
 vii  
2. Despite being appointed as the designated senior officer, the strategic 
briefing chaired by Commander McDowall commenced before 
Commander Dick's arrival due to inaccurate information being provided 
to her regarding the location of where the briefing was to be held.  
Recommendation  
To review existing guidance and practice to ensure gold, silver and bronze 
commanders have a clear and common understanding of the 
circumstances surrounding future firearms operations, the overall strategy 
and the key tactical options under consideration.  
3. No formal recording was made of any of the briefings prior to the 
deployment of firearms and surveillance officers. Thereafter, there was 
no audio recording of what was communicated within the operations 
room. Such recordings would have provided an audit trail regarding the 
information that was received by the room and the decisions that were 
then transmitted. Some staff working in the operations room expressed 
concerns regarding the noise generated within it and how that may 
have affected its effectiveness.  
Recommendation 
To review existing practice to ensure that, at a corporate level, robust 
and appropriate facilities and mechanisms exist to maintain the 
effective command and control of future operations of a similar nature. 
Particular attention should be paid to ensuring that key briefings, 
strategic and tactical decisions are fully recorded or documented and in 
any event capable of audit.  
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4. The strategy set by the gold commander was not implemented. The 
strategy made it clear that all persons leaving Scotia Road would be 
stopped either as suspects or as potential intelligence sources. Six 
persons left the flats before Mr De Menezes. Due to insufficient 
resources being in place, none were stopped.  
Recommendation  
To review the existing mechanisms and policy for ensuring that sufficient 
and robust channels of communication exist that provide commanders with 
'real-time' updates on intelligence, operational and resourcing issues that 
could adversely impact the successful implementation of the overall 
strategic parameters and the identified tactical options and that robust 
procedures are in place to ensure that the necessary fast-time action is 
taken in the early stages of an incident to achieve this.  
5. There was no threat assessment and the risk assessments undertaken 
for this operation did not consider the risk of misidentification or 
uncertainty regarding the identification of a suspect. The assessment 
did not consider a suspect leaving the premises before firearms 
resources were in place.  
Recommendation  
To review existing procedures and training for carrying out assessments 
for operations of this nature incorporating lessons learned from this 
incident  
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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
6. There was a substantial delay between the time the firearms team 
were requested and when they were deployed. By the time Mr De 
Menezes left Scotia Road at 9.33am, CO19 officers were still not in 
place despite being initially requested at 5.05am.  
Recommendation 
To review existing policy and practice to ensure that, when in pursuance of 
an armed operation, it is necessary to stop or otherwise detain potential 
subjects of a surveillance operation, and that appropriate firearms support 
is in place to expedite a prompt and safe resolution of the encounter.  
7. There was a lack of clarity about the command to 'stop' the suspect 
given the likely mindset of the firearms officers. They were deployed on 
an anti-terrorist operation the day after unsuccessful attempts were 
made to cause explosions within the underground system. They had 
been issued with special ammunition. They knew a designated senior 
officer was in command.  
Recommendation 
To review existing policy and guidance to ensure absolute clarity exists in 
the use of operationally specific terminology. Particular attention is to be 
paid to ensuring the terminology used for deployments under the auspices 
of Operations Kratos and Operation C are entirely consistent with the 
common language of command for regular firearms deployments in 
response to serious crime operations.  
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SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS 
8. The S012 surveillance team, the CO19 specialist firearms officers and 
those in command were not used to working together and were not 
sufficiently familiar with each other's working practices.  
Recommendation  
To review existing policy and operational capability in relation to the 
deployment of surveillance teams on firearms operations to ensure that 
deployment fully complements and supports rapid armed intervention 
should such subsequently become necessary.  
9. It was only the views of the surveillance team leader that were 
communicated in relation to the identification of the suspect. The fact 
that two surveillance officers believed that the person being followed 
was not the suspect should have been communicated to the 
designated senior officer, as it may have assisted her decision making.  
Recommendation  
To review existing policy and practice to ensure joint firearms and 
surveillance operations are fully integrated and that channels exist to 
ensure salient developments, such as doubts over a target's identity, can 
be swiftly communicated to relevant strategic and operational 
commanders.  
10. The completion of the supplementary surveillance log has been proved 
to involve alterations which changed the meaning of the entry.  
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Recommendation  
To review existing policy and practice to ensure that at a corporate level 
robust facilities and processes exist to demonstrate the integrity of 
evidence gathered during the course of surveillance operations. Particular 
attention should be paid to the continued utility of surveillance logs.  
POST-INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
11. The incident was not referred until 3.21pm on Monday, July 25 and 
until that time the IPCC was prevented from starting an investigation on 
the instruction of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The 
rationale given by the Commissioner for this decision relating to the 
IPCC's powers and duties was not correct.  
At the present time the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 
2004 require the police to refer complaints and allegations of misconduct 
that are subject to mandatory referral (such as death and serious injuries) 
to the IPCC no later than the end of the working day following the day on 
which the complaint was made or the conduct came to the attention of the 
appropriate authority.  
Recommendation  
That all mandatory referrals to the IPCC should occur, particularly in the 
case of death or serious injury, as soon as possible but in any event not 
later than the end of the day following the following the incident, complaint 
or misconduct and that the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) 
Regulations 2004 should be amended accordingly.  
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12. The difference in the treatment of police and civilian witnesses to this 
incident are not acceptable or justifiable. Members of the public were 
expected to be interviewed and make statements soon after witnessing 
a most traumatic incident without being able confer with other 
witnesses and provide a joint account. The police officers involved 
were allowed to return to their own base, refresh themselves and 
confer. This was and is accepted practice. However, the IPCC has 
raised its concerns regarding the post incident procedures put in place 
after other incidents where police firearms are discharged.  
Recommendation  
To review existing guidance and practice to ensure that appropriate and 
robust mechanisms exist to secure an accurate and auditable record of 
'hot' and team/group debriefs.  
13. Officers involved in the incident wrote up their notes together. This is 
current practice but makes those accounts less credible. Such 
practices were agreed in the protocol between the police service and 
the IPCC in July 2004.  
Recommendation  
To review efficacy of existing post incident management policy, guidance 
and practice to ensure an appropriate balance exists between being rightly 
held to account for one's actions whilst discharging the office of constable 
and the rights of the principal officers. Particular attention should be paid 
to the need to ensure that individual accounts are obtained in a proximate 
and transparent manner that is consistent with the rules of evidence, the 
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duty of care to staff and the need to secure public confidence. Post-
incident procedures should be revised to ensure that officers do not write 
up their notes together.  
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 
14. Command and control of this incident was inevitably lost when CO19 
officers entered the underground. Had there been any update 
regarding the uncertainty surrounding the identification at this point it 
would have been impossible to communicate.  
Recommendation  
That, in collaboration with partners in Transport for London and British 
Transport Police, the Metropolitan Police Service undertake to ensure that 
communications are harmonised and facilitate the command and control of 
operations conducted within the London Underground network.  
TRAINING AND EXERCISES 
15. Events during July 2005 confronted the Metropolitan Police Service 
with a series of challenges that had not been experienced before. 
Whilst terrorist attacks on the transport system had been predicted, the 
MPS relied on the ACPO firearms manual and the Kratos policy to 
combat such an attack. It is apparent that more was required. The 
IPCC wants to ensure that the police service and individual police 
officers have learnt as much as possible from the events of July 22 and 
have the best possible preparation for dealing with similar situations in 
future.  
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Recommendation 
The MPS, HMIC, ACPO, the National Policing Improvement Agency 
(NPIA), the Home Office and other relevant agencies should revise 
planning, exercises and training provided for those involved in anti-terrorist 
policing to ensure such processes fully incorporate all the learning from 
the events of July 22.  
As soon as legal procedures permit, the experience of those officers 
directly involved, including staff from the IPCC, should be fed into those 
reviews.  
 
COMMUNITY REASSURANCE 
16. The IPCC has noted the positive response given by members of the 
Community Reference Group and other community representatives to 
the steps taken by the then Lambeth borough commander and other 
statutory bodies to provide community reassurance in the aftermath of 
all the events in July 2005. The IPCC witnessed some of this at first 
hand. We commend Chief Superintendent Martin Bridger and his 
officers for an excellent job facing the communities directly, listening to 
their concerns and seeking to restore their confidence. It was reported 
to us that this had been achieved as a result of the community police 
liaison arrangements.  
Recommendation  
The good practice in place in Lambeth, which ensured effective community 
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reassurance, should be noted by the MPS and HMIC. Steps should be 
taken to ensure that, where appropriate, this good practice is replicated in 
other BCUs (Basic Command Units).  
 
 
 
 
